In maintaining this principle, the greatest difficulty to be encountered does not lie in the appreciation16 of means towards an acknowledged end, but in the indifference17 of persons in general to the end itself. If it were felt that the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being18; that it is not only a coordinate19 element with all that is designated by the terms civilization, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things; there would be no danger that liberty should be undervalued, and the adjustment of the boundaries between it and social control would present no extraordinary difficulty. But the evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognized by the common modes of thinking as having any intrinsic worth, or deserving any regard on its own account. The majority, being satisfied with the ways of mankind as they now are (for it is they who make them what they are), cannot comprehend why those ways should not be good enough for everybody; and what is more, spontaneity forms no part of the ideal of the majority of moral and social reformers, but is rather looked on with jealousy20, as a troublesome and perhaps rebellious21 obstruction22 to the general acceptance of what these reformers, in their own judgment, think would be best for mankind. Few persons, out of Germany, even comprehend the meaning of the doctrine23 which Wilhelm von Humboldt, so eminent24 both as a savant and as a politician, made the text of a treatise25 — that “the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable26 dictates27 of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious28 development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole;” that, therefore, the object “towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on which especially those who design to influence their fellow-men must ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of power and development;” that for this there are two requisites29, “freedom, and a variety of situations;” and that from the union of these arise “individual vigor30 and manifold diversity,” which combine themselves in “ originality31.”1
Little, however, as people are accustomed to a doctrine like that of Von Humboldt, and surprising as it may be to them to find so high a value attached to individuality, the question, one must nevertheless think, can only be one of degree. No one’s idea of excellence32 in conduct is that people should do absolutely nothing but copy one another. No one would assert that people ought not to put into their mode of life, and into the conduct of their concerns, any impress whatever of their own judgment, or of their own individual character. On the other hand, it would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they came into it; as if experience had as yet done nothing towards showing that one mode of existence, or of conduct, is preferable to another. Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth, as to know and benefit by the ascertained33 results of human experience. But it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity34 of his faculties35, to use and interpret experience in his own way. It is for him to find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to his own circumstances and character. The traditions and customs of other people are, to a certain extent, evidence of what their experience has taught them; presumptive evidence, and as such, have a claim to this deference36: but, in the first place, their experience may be too narrow; or they may not have interpreted it rightly. Secondly37, their interpretation38 of experience may be correct but unsuitable to him. Customs are made for customary circumstances, and customary characters: and his circumstances or his character may be uncustomary. Thirdly, though the customs be both good as customs, and suitable to him, yet to conform to custom, merely as custom, does not educate or develop in him any of the qualities which are the distinctive39 endowment of a human being. The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative40 feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice. He who does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by being used. The faculties are called into no exercise by doing a thing merely because others do it, no more than by believing a thing only because others believe it. If the grounds of an opinion are not conclusive41 to the person’s own reason, his reason cannot be strengthened, but is likely to be weakened by his adopting it: and if the inducements to an act are not such as are consentaneous to his own feelings and character (where affection, or the rights of others are not concerned), it is so much done towards rendering42 his feelings and character inert43 and torpid44, instead of active and energetic.
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty45 than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided46, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. And these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct which he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a large one. It is possible that he might be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm’s way, without any of these things. But what will be his comparative worth as a human being? It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it. Among the works of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself. Supposing it were possible to get houses built, corn grown, battles fought, causes tried, and even churches erected47 and prayers said, by machinery48 — by automatons49 in human form — it would be a considerable loss to exchange for these automatons even the men and women who at present inhabit the more civilized50 parts of the world, and who assuredly are but starved specimens51 of what nature can and will produce. Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing.
It will probably be conceded that it is desirable people should exercise their understandings, and that an intelligent following of custom, or even occasionally an intelligent deviation53 from custom, is better than a blind and simply mechanical adhesion to it. To a certain extent it is admitted, that our understanding should be our own: but there is not the same willingness to admit that our desires and impulses should be our own likewise; or that to possess impulses of our own, and of any strength, is anything but a peril and a snare54. Yet desires and impulses are as much a part of a perfect human being, as beliefs and restraints: and strong impulses are only perilous55 when not properly balanced; when one set of aims and inclinations56 is developed into strength, while others, which ought to coexist with them, remain weak and inactive. It is not because men’s desires are strong that they act ill; it is because their consciences are weak. There is no natural connection between strong impulses and a weak conscience. The natural connection is the other way. To say that one person’s desires and feelings are stronger and more various than those of another, is merely to say that he has more of the raw material of human nature, and is therefore capable, perhaps of more evil, but certainly of more good. Strong impulses are but another name for energy. Energy may be turned to bad uses; but more good may always be made of an energetic nature, than of an indolent and impassive one. Those who have most natural feeling, are always those whose cultivated feelings may be made the strongest. The same strong susceptibilities which make the personal impulses vivid and powerful, are also the source from whence are generated the most passionate57 love of virtue58, and the sternest self-control. It is through the cultivation59 of these, that society both does its duty and protects its interests: not by rejecting the stuff of which heroes are made, because it knows not how to make them. A person whose desires and impulses are his own — are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture — is said to have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character. If, in addition to being his own, his impulses are strong, and are under the government of a strong will, he has an energetic character. Whoever thinks that individuality of desires and impulses should not be encouraged to unfold itself, must maintain that society has no need of strong natures — is not the better for containing many persons who have much character — and that a high general average of energy is not desirable.
In some early states of society, these forces might be, and were, too much ahead of the power which society then possessed60 of disciplining and controlling them. There has been a time when the element of spontaneity and individuality was in excess, and the social principle had a hard struggle with it. The difficulty then was, to induce men of strong bodies or minds to pay obedience61 to any rules which required them to control their impulses. To overcome this difficulty, law and discipline, like the Popes struggling against the Emperors, asserted a power over the whole man, claiming to control all his life in order to control his character — which society had not found any other sufficient means of binding62. But society has now fairly got the better of individuality; and the danger which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of personal impulses and preferences. Things are vastly changed, since the passions of those who were strong by station or by personal endowment were in a state of habitual63 rebellion against laws and ordinances64, and required to be rigorously chained up to enable the persons within their reach to enjoy any particle of security. In our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest every one lives as under the eye of a hostile and dreaded65 censorship. Not only in what concerns others, but in what concerns only themselves, the individual, or the family, do not ask themselves — what do I prefer? or, what would suit my character and disposition66? or, what would allow the best and highest in me to have fair play, and enable it to grow and thrive? They ask themselves, what is suitable to my position? what is usually done by persons of my station and pecuniary67 circumstances? or (worse still) what is usually done by persons of a station and circumstances superior to mine? I do not mean that they choose what is customary, in preference to what suits their own inclination. It does not occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is customary. Thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke68: even in what people do for pleasure, conformity69 is the first thing thought of; they like in crowds; they exercise choice only among things commonly done: peculiarity70 of taste, eccentricity71 of conduct, are shunned72 equally with crimes: until by dint73 of not following their own nature, they have no nature to follow: their human capacities are withered74 and starved: they become incapable75 of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and are generally without either opinions or feelings of home growth, or properly their own. Now is this, or is it not, the desirable condition of human nature?
It is so, on the Calvinistic theory. According to that, the one great offence of man is Self-will. All the good of which humanity is capable, is comprised in Obedience. You have no choice; thus you must do, and no otherwise; “whatever is not a duty is a sin.” Human nature being radically76 corrupt77, there is no redemption for any one until human nature is killed within him. To one holding this theory of life, crushing out any of the human faculties, capacities, and susceptibilities, is no evil: man needs no capacity, but that of surrendering himself to the will of God: and if he uses any of his faculties for any other purpose but to do that supposed will more effectually, he is better without them. That is the theory of Calvinism; and it is held, in a mitigated78 form, by many who do not consider themselves Calvinists; the mitigation consisting in giving a less ascetic79 interpretation to the alleged80 will of God; asserting it to be his will that mankind should gratify some of their inclinations; of course not in the manner they themselves prefer, but in the way of obedience, that is, in a way prescribed to them by authority; and, therefore, by the necessary conditions of the case, the same for all.
In some such insidious81 form there is at present a strong tendency to this narrow theory of life, and to the pinched and hidebound type of human character which it patronizes. Many persons, no doubt, sincerely think that human beings thus cramped82 and dwarfed83, are as their Maker84 designed them to be; just as many have thought that trees are a much finer thing when clipped into pollards, or cut out into figures of animals, than as nature made them. But if it be any part of religion to believe that man was made by a good Being, it is more consistent with that faith to believe, that this Being gave all human faculties that they might be cultivated and unfolded, not rooted out and consumed, and that he takes delight in every nearer approach made by his creatures to the ideal conception embodied85 in them, every increase in any of their capabilities86 of comprehension, of action, or of enjoyment87. There is a different type of human excellence from the Calvinistic; a conception of humanity as having its nature bestowed88 on it for other purposes than merely to be abnegated. “Pagan self-assertion” is one of the elements of human worth, as well as “Christian89 self-denial.”2 There is a Greek ideal of self-development, which the Platonic90 and Christian ideal of self-government blends with, but does not supersede91. It may be better to be a John Knox than an Alcibiades, but it is better to be a Pericles than either; nor would a Pericles, if we had one in these days, be without anything good which belonged to John Knox.
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth92, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified93, and animating94, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds95 every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely96 better worth belonging to. In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fulness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them. As much compression as is necessary to prevent the stronger specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed97 with; but for this there is ample compensation even in the point of view of human development. The means of development which the individual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the expense of the development of other people. And even to himself there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature, rendered possible by the restraint put upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid98 rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their object. But to be restrained in things not affecting their good, by their mere12 displeasure, develops nothing valuable, except such force of character as may unfold itself in resisting the restraint. If acquiesced99 in, it dulls and blunts the whole nature. To give any fair play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed to lead different lives. In proportion as this latitude100 has been exercised in any age, has that age been noteworthy to posterity102. Even despotism does not produce its worst effects, so long as Individuality exists under it; and whatever crushes individuality is despotism, by whatever name it may be called, and whether it professes103 to be enforcing the will of God or the injunctions of men.
Having said that Individuality is the same thing with development, and that it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings, I might here close the argument: for what more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs, than that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be? or what worse can be said of any obstruction to good, than that it prevents this? Doubtless, however, these considerations will not suffice to convince those who most need convincing; and it is necessary further to show, that these developed human beings are of some use to the undeveloped — to point out to those who do not desire liberty, and would not avail themselves of it, that they may be in some intelligible104 manner rewarded for allowing other people to make use of it without hindrance.
In the first place, then, I would suggest that they might possibly learn something from them. It will not be denied by anybody, that originality is a valuable element in human affairs. There is always need of persons not only to discover new truths, and point out when what were once truths are true no longer, but also to commence new practices, and set the example of more enlightened conduct, and better taste and sense in human life. This cannot well be gainsaid105 by anybody who does not believe that the world has already attained106 perfection in all its ways and practices. It is true that this benefit is not capable of being rendered by everybody alike: there are but few persons, in comparison with the whole of mankind, whose experiments, if adopted by others, would be likely to be any improvement on established practice. But these few are the salt of the earth; without them, human life would become a stagnant107 pool. Not only is it they who introduce good things which did not before exist; it is they who keep the life in those which already existed. If there were nothing new to be done, would human intellect cease to be necessary? Would it be a reason why those who do the old things should forget why they are done, and do them like cattle, not like human beings? There is only too great a tendency in the best beliefs and practices to degenerate108 into the mechanical; and unless there were a succession of persons whose ever-recurring originality prevents the grounds of those beliefs and practices from becoming merely traditional, such dead matter would not resist the smallest shock from anything really alive, and there would be no reason why civilization should not die out, as in the Byzantine Empire. Persons of genius, it is true, are, and are always likely to be, a small minority; but in order to have them, it is necessary to preserve the soil in which they grow. Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom. Persons of genius are, ex vi termini, more individual than any other people — less capable, consequently, of fitting themselves, without hurtful compression, into any of the small number of moulds which society provides in order to save its members the trouble of forming their own character. If from timidity they consent to be forced into one of these moulds, and to let all that part of themselves which cannot expand under the pressure remain unexpanded, society will be little the better for their genius. If they are of a strong character, and break their fetters109 they become a mark for the society which has not succeeded in reducing them to common-place, to point at with solemn warning as “wild,” “erratic,” and the like; much as if one should complain of the Niagara river for not flowing smoothly110 between its banks like a Dutch canal.
I insist thus emphatically on the importance of genius, and the necessity of allowing it to unfold itself freely both in thought and in practice, being well aware that no one will deny the position in theory, but knowing also that almost every one, in reality, is totally indifferent to it. People think genius a fine thing if it enables a man to write an exciting poem, or paint a picture. But in its true sense, that of originality in thought and action, though no one says that it is not a thing to be admired, nearly all, at heart, think they can do very well without it. Unhappily this is too natural to be wondered at. Originality is the one thing which unoriginal minds cannot feel the use of. They cannot see what it is to do for them: how should they? If they could see what it would do for them, it would not be originality. The first service which originality has to render them, is that of opening their eyes: which being once fully111 done, they would have a chance of being themselves original. Meanwhile, recollecting112 that nothing was ever yet done which some one was not the first to do, and that all good things which exist are the fruits of originality, let them be modest enough to believe that there is something still left for it to accomplish, and assure themselves that they are more in need of originality, the less they are conscious of the want.
In sober truth, whatever homage113 may be professed114, or even paid, to real or supposed mental superiority, the general tendency of things throughout the world is to render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind. In ancient history, in the Middle Ages, and in a diminishing degree through the long transition from feudality to the present time, the individual was a power in himself; and If he had either great talents or a high social position, he was a considerable power. At present individuals are lost in the crowd. In politics it is almost a triviality to say that public opinion now rules the world. The only power deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they make themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses. This is as true in the moral and social relations of private life as in public transactions. Those whose opinions go by the name of public opinion, are not always the same sort of public: in America, they are the whole white population; in England, chiefly the middle class. But they are always a mass, that is to say, collective mediocrity. And what is still greater novelty, the mass do not now take their opinions from dignitaries in Church or State, from ostensible115 leaders, or from books. Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through the newspapers. I am not complaining of all this. I do not assert that anything better is compatible, as a general rule, with the present low state of the human mind. But that does not hinder the government of mediocrity from being mediocre116 government. No government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political acts or in the opinions, qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or could rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the sovereign Many have let themselves be guided (which in their best times they always have done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and instructed One or Few. The initiation117 of all wise or noble things, comes and must come from individuals; generally at first from some one individual. The honor and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following that initiative; that he can respond internally to wise and noble things, and be led to them with his eyes open. I am not countenancing118 the sort of “hero-worship” which applauds the strong man of genius for forcibly seizing on the government of the world and making it do his bidding in spite of itself. All he can claim is, freedom to point out the way. The power of compelling others into it, is not only inconsistent with the freedom and development of all the rest, but corrupting119 to the strong man himself. It does seem, however, that when the opinions of masses of merely average men are everywhere become or becoming the dominant120 power, the counterpoise and corrective to that tendency would be, the more and more pronounced individuality of those who stand on the higher eminences121 of thought. It Is in these circumstances most especially, that exceptional individuals, instead of being deterred122, should be encouraged in acting123 differently from the mass. In other times there was no advantage in their doing so, unless they acted not only differently, but better. In this age the mere example of non-conformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service. Precisely124 because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a reproach, it is desirable, in order to break through that tyranny, that people should be eccentric. Eccentricity has always abounded125 when and where strength of character has abounded; and the amount of eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional to the amount of genius, mental vigor, and moral courage which it contained. That so few now dare to be eccentric, marks the chief danger of the time.
I have said that it is important to give the freest scope possible to uncustomary things, in order that it may in time appear which of these are fit to be converted into customs. But independence of action, and disregard of custom are not solely126 deserving of encouragement for the chance they afford that better modes of action, and customs more worthy101 of general adoption127, may be struck out; nor is it only persons of decided mental superiority who have a just claim to carry on their lives in their own way. There is no reason that all human existences should be constructed on some one, or some small number of patterns. If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode. Human beings are not like sheep; and even sheep are not undistinguishably alike. A man cannot get a coat or a pair of boots to fit him, unless they are either made to his measure, or he has a whole warehouseful to choose from: and is it easier to fit him with a life than with a coat, or are human beings more like one another in their whole physical and spiritual conformation than in the shape of their feet? If it were only that people have diversities of taste that is reason enough for not attempting to shape them all after one model. But different persons also require different conditions for their spiritual development; and can no more exist healthily in the same moral, than all the variety of plants can in the same physical atmosphere and climate. The same things which are helps to one person towards the cultivation of his higher nature, are hindrances128 to another. The same mode of life is a healthy excitement to one, keeping all his faculties of action and enjoyment in their best order, while to another it is a distracting burden, which suspends or crushes all internal life. Such are the differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on them of different physical and moral agencies, that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic129 stature130 of which their nature is capable. Why then should tolerance131, as far as the public sentiment is concerned, extend only to tastes and modes of life which extort132 acquiescence133 by the multitude of their adherents134? Nowhere (except in some monastic institutions) is diversity of taste entirely135 unrecognized; a person may without blame, either like or dislike rowing, or smoking, or music, or athletic136 exercises, or chess, or cards, or study, because both those who like each of these things, and those who dislike them, are too numerous to be put down. But the man, and still more the woman, who can be accused either of doing “what nobody does,” or of not doing “what everybody does,” is the subject of as much depreciatory137 remark as if he or she had committed some grave moral delinquency. Persons require to possess a title, or some other badge of rank, or the consideration of people of rank, to be able to indulge somewhat in the luxury of doing as they like without detriment138 to their estimation. To indulge somewhat, I repeat: for whoever allow themselves much of that in dulgence, incur the risk of something worse than disparaging139 speeches — they are in peril of a commission de lunatico, and of having their property taken from them and given to their relations.3
There is one characteristic of the present direction of public opinion, peculiarly calculated to make it intolerant of any marked demonstration140 of individuality. The general average of mankind are not only moderate in intellect, but also moderate in inclinations: they have no tastes or wishes strong enough to incline them to do anything unusual, and they consequently do not understand those who have, and class all such with the wild and intemperate141 whom they are accustomed to look down upon. Now, in addition to this fact which is general, we have only to suppose that a strong movement has set in towards the improvement of morals, and it is evident what we have to expect. In these days such a movement has set in; much has actually been effected in the way of increased regularity142 of conduct, and discouragement of excesses; and there is a philanthropic spirit abroad, for the exercise of which there is no more inviting143 field than the moral and prudential improvement of our fellow-creatures. These tendencies of the times cause the public to be more disposed than at most former periods to prescribe general rules of conduct, and endeavor to make every one conform to the approved standard. And that standard, express or tacit, is to desire nothing strongly. Its ideal of character is to be without any marked character; to maim144 by compression, like a Chinese lady’s foot, every part of human nature which stands out prominently, and tends to make the person markedly dissimilar in outline to commonplace humanity.
As is usually the case with ideals which exclude one half of what is desirable, the present standard of approbation145 produces only an inferior imitation of the other half. Instead of great energies guided by vigorous reason, and strong feelings strongly controlled by a conscientious146 will, its result is weak feelings and weak energies, which therefore can be kept in outward conformity to rule without any strength either of will or of reason. Already energetic characters on any large scale are becoming merely traditional. There is now scarcely any outlet147 for energy in this country except business. The energy expended148 in that may still be regarded as considerable. What little is left from that employment, is expended on some hobby; which may be a useful, even a philanthropic hobby, but is always some one thing, and generally a thing of small dimensions. The greatness of England is now all collective: individually small, we only appear capable of anything great by our habit of combining; and with this our moral and religious philanthropists are perfectly149 contented150. But it was men of another stamp than this that made England what it has been; and men of another stamp will be needed to prevent its decline.
The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing52 hindrance to human advancement151, being in unceasing antagonism152 to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or improvement. The spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim at forcing improvements on an unwilling153 people; and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it resists such attempts, may ally itself locally and temporarily with the opponents of improvement; but the only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals. The progressive principle, however, in either shape, whether as the love of liberty or of improvement, is antagonistic154 to the sway of Custom, involving at least emancipation155 from that yoke; and the contest between the two constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind. The greater part of the world has, properly speaking, no history, because the despotism of Custom is complete. This is the case over the whole East. Custom is there, in all things, the final appeal; Justice and right mean conformity to custom; the argument of custom no one, unless some tyrant156 intoxicated157 with power, thinks of resisting. And we see the result. Those nations must once have had originality; they did not start out of the ground populous158, lettered, and versed159 in many of the arts of life; they made themselves all this, and were then the greatest and most powerful nations in the world. What are they now? The subjects or dependents of tribes whose forefathers160 wandered in the forests when theirs had magnificent palaces and gorgeous temples, but over whom custom exercised only a divided rule with liberty and progress. A people, it appears, may be progressive for a certain length of time, and then stop: when does it stop? When it ceases to possess individuality. If a similar change should befall the nations of Europe, it will not be in exactly the same shape: the despotism of custom with which these nations are threatened is not precisely stationariness. It proscribes161 singularity, but it does not preclude162 change, provided all change together. We have discarded the fixed163 costumes of our forefathers; every one must still dress like other people, but the fashion may change once or twice a year. We thus take care that when there is change, it shall be for change’s sake, and not from any idea of beauty or convenience; for the same idea of beauty or convenience would not strike all the world at the same moment, and be simultaneously164 thrown aside by all at another moment. But we are progressive as well as changeable: we continually make new inventions in mechanical things, and keep them until they are again superseded165 by better; we are eager for improvement in politics, in education, even in morals, though in this last our idea of improvement chiefly consists in persuading or forcing other people to be as good as ourselves. It is not progress that we object to; on the contrary, we flatter ourselves that we are the most progressive people who ever lived. It is individuality that we war against: we should think we had done wonders if we had made ourselves all alike; forgetting that the unlikeness of one person to another is generally the first thing which draws the attention of either to the imperfection of his own type, and the superiority of another, or the possibility, by combining the advantages of both, of producing something better than either. We have a warning example in China — a nation of much talent, and, in some respects, even wisdom, owing to the rare good fortune of having been provided at an early period with a particularly good set of customs, the work, in some measure, of men to whom even the most enlightened European must accord, under certain limitations, the title of sages166 and philosophers. They are remarkable167, too, in the excellence of their apparatus168 for impressing, as far as possible, the best wisdom they possess upon every mind in the community, and securing that those who have appropriated most of it shall occupy the posts of honor and power. Surely the people who did this have discovered the secret of human progressiveness, and must have kept themselves steadily169 at the head of the movement of the world. On the contrary, they have become stationary170 — have remained so for thousands of years; and if they are ever to be farther improved, it must be by foreigners. They have succeeded beyond all hope in what English philanthropists are so industriously171 working at — in making a people all alike, all governing their thoughts and conduct by the same maxims172 and rules; and these are the fruits. The modern regime of public opinion is, in an unorganized form, what the Chinese educational and political systems are in an organized; and unless individuality shall be able successfully to assert itself against this yoke, Europe, notwithstanding its noble antecedents and its professed Christianity, will tend to become another China.
What is it that has hitherto preserved Europe from this lot? What has made the European family of nations an improving, instead of a stationary portion of mankind? Not any superior excellence in them, which when it exists, exists as the effect, not as the cause; but their remarkable diversity of character and culture. Individuals, classes, nations, have been extremely unlike one another: they have struck out a great variety of paths, each leading to something valuable; and although at every period those who travelled in different paths have been intolerant of one another, and each would have thought it an excellent thing if all the rest could have been compelled to travel his road, their attempts to thwart173 each other’s development have rarely had any permanent success, and each has in time endured to receive the good which the others have offered. Europe is, in my judgment, wholly indebted to this plurality of paths for its progressive and many-sided development. But it already begins to possess this benefit in a considerably174 less degree. It is decidedly advancing towards the Chinese ideal of making all people alike. M. de Tocqueville, in his last important work, remarks how much more the Frenchmen of the present day resemble one another, than did those even of the last generation. The same remark might be made of Englishmen in a far greater degree. In a passage already quoted from Wilhelm von Humboldt, he points out two things as necessary conditions of human development, because necessary to render people unlike one another; namely, freedom, and variety of situations. The second of these two conditions is in this country every day diminishing. The circumstances which surround different classes and individuals, and shape their characters, are daily becoming more assimilated. Formerly175, different ranks, different neighborhoods, different trades and professions lived in what might be called different worlds; at present, to a great degree, in the same. Comparatively speaking, they now read the same things, listen to the same things, see the same things, go to the same places, have their hopes and fears directed to the same objects, have the same rights and liberties, and the same means of asserting them. Great as are the differences of position which remain, they are nothing to those which have ceased. And the assimilation is still proceeding176. All the political changes of the age promote it, since they all tend to raise the low and to lower the high. Every extension of education promotes it, because education brings people under common influences, and gives them access to the general stock of facts and sentiments. Improvements in the means of communication promote it, by bringing the inhabitants of distant places into personal contact, and keeping up a rapid flow of changes of residence between one place and another. The increase of commerce and manufactures promotes it, by diffusing177 more widely the advantages of easy circumstances, and opening all objects of ambition, even the highest, to general competition, whereby the desire of rising becomes no longer the character of a particular class, but of all classes. A more powerful agency than even all these, in bringing about a general similarity among mankind, is the complete establishment, in this and other free countries, of the ascendancy178 of public opinion in the State. As the various social eminences which enabled persons entrenched179 on them to disregard the opinion of the multitude, gradually became levelled; as the very idea of resisting the will of the public, when it is positively180 known that they have a will, disappears more and more from the minds of practical politicians; there ceases to be any social support for non-conformity — any substantive181 power in society, which, itself opposed to the ascendancy of numbers, is interested in taking under its protection opinions and tendencies at variance182 with those of the public.
The combination of all these causes forms so great a mass of influences hostile to Individuality, that it is not easy to see how it can stand its ground. It will do so with increasing difficulty, unless the intelligent part of the public can be made to feel its value — to see that it is good there should be differences, even though not for the better, even though, as it may appear to them, some should be for the worse. If the claims of Individuality are ever to be asserted, the time is now, while much is still wanting to complete the enforced assimilation. It is only in the earlier stages that any stand can be successfully made against the encroachment183. The demand that all other people shall resemble ourselves, grows by what it feeds on. If resistance waits till life is reduced nearly to one uniform type, all deviations184 from that type will come to be considered impious, immoral185, even monstrous186 and contrary to nature. Mankind speedily become unable to conceive diversity, when they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it.
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1
imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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baneful
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| adj.有害的 | |
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prohibition
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| n.禁止；禁令，禁律 | |
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hindrance
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| n.妨碍，障碍 | |
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peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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immunity
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| n.优惠；免除；豁免，豁免权 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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mischievous
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| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
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incur
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| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
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justifiable
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| adj.有理由的，无可非议的 | |
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molesting
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| v.骚扰( molest的现在分词 )；干扰；调戏；猥亵 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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14
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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molestation
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| n.骚扰，干扰，调戏；折磨 | |
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appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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18
well-being
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| n.安康，安乐，幸福 | |
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19
coordinate
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| adj.同等的，协调的；n.同等者；vt.协作，协调 | |
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jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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rebellious
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| adj.造反的，反抗的，难控制的 | |
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obstruction
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| n.阻塞，堵塞；障碍物 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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26
immutable
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| adj.不可改变的，永恒的 | |
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dictates
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| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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28
harmonious
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| adj.和睦的，调和的，和谐的，协调的 | |
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requisites
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| n.必要的事物( requisite的名词复数 ) | |
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vigor
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| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
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originality
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| n.创造力，独创性；新颖 | |
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excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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maturity
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| n.成熟；完成；(支票、债券等)到期 | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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36
deference
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| n.尊重，顺从；敬意 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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distinctive
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| adj.特别的，有特色的，与众不同的 | |
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40
discriminative
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| 有判别力 | |
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41
conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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43
inert
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| adj.无活动能力的，惰性的；迟钝的 | |
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torpid
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| adj.麻痹的，麻木的，迟钝的 | |
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faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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47
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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48
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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automatons
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| n.自动机，机器人( automaton的名词复数 ) | |
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civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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51
specimens
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| n.样品( specimen的名词复数 )；范例；（化验的）抽样；某种类型的人 | |
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52
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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53
deviation
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| n.背离，偏离；偏差，偏向；离题 | |
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54
snare
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| n.陷阱，诱惑，圈套；（去除息肉或者肿瘤的）勒除器；响弦，小军鼓；vt.以陷阱捕获，诱惑 | |
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55
perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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56
inclinations
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| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
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57
passionate
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，激昂的，易动情的，易怒的，性情暴躁的 | |
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58
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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cultivation
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| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
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60
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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62
binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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64
ordinances
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| n.条例，法令( ordinance的名词复数 ) | |
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65
dreaded
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| adj.令人畏惧的；害怕的v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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66
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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67
pecuniary
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| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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68
yoke
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| n.轭；支配；v.给...上轭，连接，使成配偶 | |
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conformity
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| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
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70
peculiarity
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| n.独特性，特色；特殊的东西；怪癖 | |
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71
eccentricity
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| n.古怪，反常，怪癖 | |
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72
shunned
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| v.避开，回避，避免( shun的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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73
dint
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| n.由于，靠；凹坑 | |
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74
withered
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| adj. 枯萎的，干瘪的，（人身体的部分器官）因病萎缩的或未发育良好的 动词wither的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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75
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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76
radically
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| ad.根本地，本质地 | |
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77
corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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mitigated
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| v.减轻，缓和( mitigate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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79
ascetic
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| adj.禁欲的；严肃的 | |
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80
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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81
insidious
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| adj.阴险的，隐匿的，暗中为害的，（疾病）不知不觉之间加剧 | |
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82
cramped
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| a.狭窄的 | |
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83
dwarfed
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| vt.（使）显得矮小（dwarf的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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84
maker
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| n.制造者，制造商 | |
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85
embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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86
capabilities
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| n.能力( capability的名词复数 )；可能；容量；[复数]潜在能力 | |
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enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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bestowed
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| 赠给，授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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platonic
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| adj.精神的；柏拉图（哲学）的 | |
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supersede
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| v.替代；充任 | |
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92
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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93
diversified
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| adj.多样化的，多种经营的v.使多样化，多样化( diversify的过去式和过去分词 )；进入新的商业领域 | |
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94
animating
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| v.使有生气( animate的现在分词 )；驱动；使栩栩如生地动作；赋予…以生命 | |
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95
binds
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| v.约束( bind的第三人称单数 )；装订；捆绑；（用长布条）缠绕 | |
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infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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97
dispensed
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| v.分配( dispense的过去式和过去分词 )；施与；配（药） | |
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98
rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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99
acquiesced
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| v.默认，默许( acquiesce的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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100
latitude
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| n.纬度，行动或言论的自由(范围)，(pl.)地区 | |
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101
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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102
posterity
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| n.后裔，子孙，后代 | |
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professes
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| 声称( profess的第三人称单数 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉 | |
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104
intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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105
gainsaid
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| v.否认，反驳( gainsay的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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106
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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107
stagnant
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| adj.不流动的，停滞的，不景气的 | |
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108
degenerate
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| v.退步，堕落；adj.退步的，堕落的；n.堕落者 | |
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109
fetters
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| n.脚镣( fetter的名词复数 )；束缚v.给…上脚镣，束缚( fetter的第三人称单数 ) | |
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smoothly
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| adv.平滑地，顺利地，流利地，流畅地 | |
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111
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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112
recollecting
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| v.记起，想起( recollect的现在分词 ) | |
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113
homage
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| n.尊敬，敬意，崇敬 | |
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114
professed
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| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
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115
ostensible
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| adj.(指理由)表面的，假装的 | |
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116
mediocre
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| adj.平常的，普通的 | |
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117
initiation
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| n.开始 | |
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118
countenancing
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| v.支持，赞同，批准( countenance的现在分词 ) | |
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119
corrupting
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的现在分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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120
dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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121
eminences
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| 卓越( eminence的名词复数 )； 著名； 高地； 山丘 | |
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122
deterred
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| v.阻止，制止( deter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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123
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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125
abounded
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| v.大量存在，充满，富于( abound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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126
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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127
adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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128
hindrances
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| 阻碍者( hindrance的名词复数 )； 障碍物； 受到妨碍的状态 | |
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129
aesthetic
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| adj.美学的，审美的，有美感 | |
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130
stature
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| n.（高度）水平，（高度）境界，身高，身材 | |
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131
tolerance
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| n.宽容；容忍，忍受；耐药力；公差 | |
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132
extort
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| v.勒索，敲诈，强要 | |
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133
acquiescence
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| n.默许；顺从 | |
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134
adherents
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| n.支持者，拥护者( adherent的名词复数 )；党羽；徒子徒孙 | |
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135
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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136
athletic
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| adj.擅长运动的，强健的；活跃的，体格健壮的 | |
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137
depreciatory
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| adj.贬值的，蔑视的 | |
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138
detriment
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| n.损害；损害物，造成损害的根源 | |
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disparaging
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| adj.轻蔑的，毁谤的v.轻视( disparage的现在分词 )；贬低；批评；非难 | |
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140
demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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141
intemperate
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| adj.无节制的，放纵的 | |
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142
regularity
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| n.规律性，规则性；匀称，整齐 | |
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143
inviting
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| adj.诱人的，引人注目的 | |
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144
maim
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| v.使残废，使不能工作，使伤残 | |
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145
approbation
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| n.称赞；认可 | |
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conscientious
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| adj.审慎正直的，认真的，本着良心的 | |
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outlet
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| n.出口/路；销路；批发商店；通风口；发泄 | |
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expended
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| v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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150
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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151
advancement
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| n.前进，促进，提升 | |
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152
antagonism
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| n.对抗，敌对，对立 | |
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153
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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154
antagonistic
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| adj.敌对的 | |
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155
emancipation
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| n.（从束缚、支配下）解放 | |
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156
tyrant
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| n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人 | |
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157
intoxicated
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| 喝醉的，极其兴奋的 | |
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158
populous
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| adj.人口稠密的，人口众多的 | |
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versed
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| adj. 精通，熟练 | |
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160
forefathers
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| n.祖先，先人；祖先，祖宗( forefather的名词复数 )；列祖列宗；前人 | |
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proscribes
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| v.正式宣布（某事物）有危险或被禁止( proscribe的第三人称单数 ) | |
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preclude
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| vt.阻止，排除，防止；妨碍 | |
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163
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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164
simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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165
superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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166
sages
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| n.圣人( sage的名词复数 )；智者；哲人；鼠尾草（可用作调料） | |
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167
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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168
apparatus
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| n.装置，器械；器具，设备 | |
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169
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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170
stationary
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| adj.固定的，静止不动的 | |
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171
industriously
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172
maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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173
thwart
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| v.阻挠，妨碍，反对；adj.横(断的) | |
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174
considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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175
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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176
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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177
diffusing
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| （使光）模糊，漫射，漫散( diffuse的现在分词 )； （使）扩散； （使）弥漫； （使）传播 | |
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178
ascendancy
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| n.统治权，支配力量 | |
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179
entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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180
positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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181
substantive
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| adj.表示实在的；本质的、实质性的；独立的；n.实词，实名词；独立存在的实体 | |
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182
variance
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| n.矛盾，不同 | |
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183
encroachment
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| n.侵入，蚕食 | |
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184
deviations
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| 背离，偏离( deviation的名词复数 )； 离经叛道的行为 | |
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185
immoral
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| adj.不道德的，淫荡的，荒淫的，有伤风化的 | |
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186
monstrous
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| adj.巨大的；恐怖的；可耻的，丢脸的 | |
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