From Empedocles at any rate we might demand an answer to the following question for he says that each of the parts of the body is what it is in virtue10 of a ratio between the elements: is the soul identical with this ratio, or is it not rather something over and above this which is formed in the parts? Is love the cause of any and every mixture, or only of those that are in the right ratio? Is love this ratio itself, or is love something over and above this? Such are the problems raised by this account. But, on the other hand, if the soul is different from the mixture, why does it disappear at one and the same moment with that relation between the elements which constitutes flesh or the other parts of the animal body? Further, if the soul is not identical with the ratio of mixture, and it is consequently not the case that each of the parts has a soul, what is that which perishes when the soul quits the body?
That the soul cannot either be a harmony, or be moved in a circle, is clear from what we have said. Yet that it can be moved incidentally is, as we said above, possible, and even that in a sense it can move itself, i.e. in the sense that the vehicle in which it is can be moved, and moved by it; in no other sense can the soul be moved in space.
More legitimate11 doubts might remain as to its movement in view of the following facts. We speak of the soul as being pained or pleased, being bold or fearful, being angry, perceiving, thinking. All these are regarded as modes of movement, and hence it might be inferred that the soul is moved. This, however, does not necessarily follow. We may admit to the full that being pained or pleased, or thinking, are movements (each of them a ‘being moved’), and that the movement is originated by the soul. For example we may regard anger or fear as such and such movements of the heart, and thinking as such and such another movement of that organ, or of some other; these modifications12 may arise either from changes of place in certain parts or from qualitative13 alterations14 (the special nature of the parts and the special modes of their changes being for our present purpose irrelevant). Yet to say that it is the soul which is angry is as inexact as it would be to say that it is the soul that weaves webs or builds houses. It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his soul. What we mean is not that the movement is in the soul, but that sometimes it terminates in the soul and sometimes starts from it, sensation e.g. coming from without inwards, and reminiscence starting from the soul and terminating with the movements, actual or residual15, in the sense organs.
The case of mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable16 of being destroyed. If it could be destroyed at all, it would be under the blunting influence of old age. What really happens in respect of mind in old age is, however, exactly parallel to what happens in the case of the sense organs; if the old man could recover the proper kind of eye, he would see just as well as the young man. The incapacity of old age is due to an affection not of the soul but of its vehicle, as occurs in drunkenness or disease. Thus it is that in old age the activity of mind or intellectual apprehension17 declines only through the decay of some other inward part; mind itself is impassible. Thinking, loving, and hating are affections not of mind, but of that which has mind, so far as it has it. That is why, when this vehicle decays, memory and love cease; they were activities not of mind, but of the composite which has perished; mind is, no doubt, something more divine and impassible. That the soul cannot be moved is therefore clear from what we have said, and if it cannot be moved at all, manifestly it cannot be moved by itself.
Of all the opinions we have enumerated18, by far the most unreasonable19 is that which declares the soul to be a self-moving number; it involves in the first place all the impossibilities which follow from regarding the soul as moved, and in the second special absurdities20 which follow from calling it a number. How we to imagine a unit being moved? By what agency? What sort of movement can be attributed to what is without parts or internal differences? If the unit is both originative of movement and itself capable of being moved, it must contain difference.
Further, since they say a moving line generates a surface and a moving point a line, the movements of the psychic21 units must be lines (for a point is a unit having position, and the number of the soul is, of course, somewhere and has position).
Again, if from a number a number or a unit is subtracted, the remainder is another number; but plants and many animals when divided continue to live, and each segment is thought to retain the same kind of soul.
It must be all the same whether we speak of units or corpuscles; for if the spherical22 atoms of Democritus became points, nothing being retained but their being a quantum, there must remain in each a moving and a moved part, just as there is in what is continuous; what happens has nothing to do with the size of the atoms, it depends solely23 upon their being a quantum. That is why there must be something to originate movement in the units. If in the animal what originates movement is the soul, so also must it be in the case of the number, so that not the mover and the moved together, but the mover only, will be the soul. But how is it possible for one of the units to fulfil this function of originating movement? There must be some difference between such a unit and all the other units, and what difference can there be between one placed unit and another except a difference of position? If then, on the other hand, these psychic units within the body are different from the points of the body, there will be two sets of units both occupying the same place; for each unit will occupy a point. And yet, if there can be two, why cannot there be an infinite number? For if things can occupy an indivisible lace, they must themselves be indivisible. If, on the other hand, the points of the body are identical with the units whose number is the soul, or if the number of the points in the body is the soul, why have not all bodies souls? For all bodies contain points or an infinity24 of points.
Further, how is it possible for these points to be isolated25 or separated from their bodies, seeing that lines cannot be resolved into points?
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1 constituents | |
n.选民( constituent的名词复数 );成分;构成部分;要素 | |
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2 concur | |
v.同意,意见一致,互助,同时发生 | |
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3 absurdity | |
n.荒谬,愚蠢;谬论 | |
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4 spatial | |
adj.空间的,占据空间的 | |
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5 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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6 cohesion | |
n.团结,凝结力 | |
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7 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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8 plausible | |
adj.似真实的,似乎有理的,似乎可信的 | |
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9 faculty | |
n.才能;学院,系;(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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10 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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11 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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12 modifications | |
n.缓和( modification的名词复数 );限制;更改;改变 | |
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13 qualitative | |
adj.性质上的,质的,定性的 | |
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14 alterations | |
n.改动( alteration的名词复数 );更改;变化;改变 | |
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15 residual | |
adj.复播复映追加时间;存留下来的,剩余的 | |
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16 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
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17 apprehension | |
n.理解,领悟;逮捕,拘捕;忧虑 | |
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18 enumerated | |
v.列举,枚举,数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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19 unreasonable | |
adj.不讲道理的,不合情理的,过度的 | |
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20 absurdities | |
n.极端无理性( absurdity的名词复数 );荒谬;谬论;荒谬的行为 | |
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21 psychic | |
n.对超自然力敏感的人;adj.有超自然力的 | |
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22 spherical | |
adj.球形的;球面的 | |
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23 solely | |
adv.仅仅,唯一地 | |
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24 infinity | |
n.无限,无穷,大量 | |
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25 isolated | |
adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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