Such are the three ways in which soul has traditionally been defined; one group of thinkers declared it to be that which is most originative of movement because it moves itself, another group to be the subtlest and most nearly incorporeal10 of all kinds of body. We have now sufficiently12 set forth13 the difficulties and inconsistencies to which these theories are exposed. It remains14 now to examine the doctrine15 that soul is composed of the elements.
The reason assigned for this doctrine is that thus the soul may perceive or come to know everything that is, but the theory necessarily involves itself in many impossibilities. Its upholders assume that like is known only by like, and imagine that by declaring the soul to be composed of the elements they succeed in identifying the soul with all the things it is capable of apprehending17. But the elements are not the only things it knows; there are many others, or, more exactly, an infinite number of others, formed out of the elements. Let us admit that the soul knows or perceives the elements out of which each of these composites is made up; but by what means will it know or perceive the composite whole, e.g. what God, man, flesh, bone (or any other compound) is? For each is, not merely the elements of which it is composed, but those elements combined in a determinate mode or ratio, as Empedocles himself says of bone,
The kindly18 Earth in its broad-bosomed moulds
Won of clear Water two parts out of eight,
And four of Fire; and so white bones were formed.
Nothing, therefore, will be gained by the presence of the elements in the soul, unless there be also present there the various formulae of proportion and the various compositions in accordance with them. Each element will indeed know its fellow outside, but there will be no knowledge of bone or man, unless they too are present in the constitution of the soul. The impossibility of this needs no pointing out; for who would suggest that stone or man could enter into the constitution of the soul? The same applies to ‘the good’ and ‘the not-good’, and so on.
Further, the word ‘is’ has many meanings: it may be used of a ‘this’ or substance, or of a quantum, or of a quale, or of any other of the kinds of predicates we have distinguished19. Does the soul consist of all of these or not? It does not appear that all have common elements. Is the soul formed out of those elements alone which enter into substances? so how will it be able to know each of the other kinds of thing? Will it be said that each kind of thing has elements or principles of its own, and that the soul is formed out of the whole of these? In that case, the soul must be a quantum and a quale and a substance. But all that can be made out of the elements of a quantum is a quantum, not a substance. These (and others like them) are the consequences of the view that the soul is composed of all the elements.
It is absurd, also, to say both (a) that like is not capable of being affected20 by like, and (b) that like is perceived or known by like, for perceiving, and also both thinking and knowing, are, on their own assumption, ways of being affected or moved.
There are many puzzles and difficulties raised by saying, as Empedocles does, that each set of things is known by means of its corporeal11 elements and by reference to something in soul which is like them, and additional testimony21 is furnished by this new consideration; for all the parts of the animal body which consist wholly of earth such as bones, sinews, and hair seem to be wholly insensitive and consequently not perceptive22 even of objects earthy like themselves, as they ought to have been.
Further, each of the principles will have far more ignorance than knowledge, for though each of them will know one thing, there will be many of which it will be ignorant. Empedocles at any rate must conclude that his God is the least intelligent of all beings, for of him alone is it true that there is one thing, Strife23, which he does not know, while there is nothing which mortal beings do not know, for ere is nothing which does not enter into their composition.
In general, we may ask, Why has not everything a soul, since everything either is an element, or is formed out of one or several or all of the elements? Each must certainly know one or several or all.
The problem might also be raised, What is that which unifies24 the elements into a soul? The elements correspond, it would appear, to the matter; what unites them, whatever it is, is the supremely25 important factor. But it is impossible that there should be something superior to, and dominant26 over, the soul (and a fortiori over the mind); it is reasonable to hold that mind is by nature most primordial27 and dominant, while their statement that it is the elements which are first of all that is.
All, both those who assert that the soul, because of its knowledge or perception of what is compounded out of the elements, and is those who assert that it is of all things the most originative of movement, fail to take into consideration all kinds of soul. In fact (1) not all beings that perceive can originate movement; there appear to be certain animals which stationary28, and yet local movement is the only one, so it seems, which the soul originates in animals. And (2) the same object-on holds against all those who construct mind and the perceptive faculty29 out of the elements; for it appears that plants live, and yet are not endowed with locomotion30 or perception, while a large number of animals are without discourse31 of reason. Even if these points were waived32 and mind admitted to be a part of the soul (and so too the perceptive faculty), still, even so, there would be kinds and parts of soul of which they had failed to give any account.
The same objection lies against the view expressed in the ‘Orphic’ poems: there it is said that the soul comes in from the whole when breathing takes place, being borne in upon the winds. Now this cannot take place in the case of plants, nor indeed in the case of certain classes of animal, for not all classes of animal breathe. This fact has escaped the notice of the holders16 of this view.
If we must construct the soul out of the elements, there is no necessity to suppose that all the elements enter into its construction; one element in each pair of contraries will suffice to enable it to know both that element itself and its contrary. By means of the straight line we know both itself and the curved-the carpenter’s rule enables us to test both-but what is curved does not enable us to distinguish either itself or the straight. Certain thinkers say that soul is intermingled in the whole universe, and it is perhaps for that reason that Thales came to the opinion that all things are full of gods. This presents some difficulties: Why does the soul when it resides in air or fire not form an animal, while it does so when it resides in mixtures of the elements, and that although it is held to be of higher quality when contained in the former? (One might add the question, why the soul in air is maintained to be higher and more immortal33 than that in animals.) Both possible ways of replying to the former question lead to absurdity or paradox34; for it is beyond paradox to say that fire or air is an animal, and it is absurd to refuse the name of animal to what has soul in it. The opinion that the elements have soul in them seems to have arisen from the doctrine that a whole must be homogeneous with its parts. If it is true that animals become animate35 by drawing into themselves a portion of what surrounds them, the partisans36 of this view are bound to say that the soul of the Whole too is homogeneous with all its parts. If the air sucked in is homogeneous, but soul heterogeneous37, clearly while some part of soul will exist in the inbreathed air, some other part will not. The soul must either be homogeneous, or such that there are some parts of the Whole in which it is not to be found.
From what has been said it is now clear that knowing as an attribute of soul cannot be explained by soul’s being composed of the elements, and that it is neither sound nor true to speak of soul as moved. But since (a) knowing, perceiving, opining, and further (b) desiring, wishing, and generally all other modes of appetition, belong to soul, and (c) the local movements of animals, and (d) growth, maturity38, and decay are produced by the soul, we must ask whether each of these is an attribute of the soul as a whole, i.e. whether it is with the whole soul we think, perceive, move ourselves, act or are acted upon, or whether each of them requires a different part of the soul? So too with regard to life. Does it depend on one of the parts of soul? Or is it dependent on more than one? Or on all? Or has it some quite other cause?
Some hold that the soul is divisible, and that one part thinks, another desires. If, then, its nature admits of its being divided, what can it be that holds the parts together? Surely not the body; on the contrary it seems rather to be the soul that holds the body together; at any rate when the soul departs the body disintegrates39 and decays. If, then, there is something else which makes the soul one, this unifying40 agency would have the best right to the name of soul, and we shall have to repeat for it the question: Is it one or multipartite? If it is one, why not at once admit that ‘the soul’ is one? If it has parts, once more the question must be put: What holds its parts together, and so ad infinitum?
The question might also be raised about the parts of the soul: What is the separate role of each in relation to the body? For, if the whole soul holds together the whole body, we should expect each part of the soul to hold together a part of the body. But this seems an impossibility; it is difficult even to imagine what sort of bodily part mind will hold together, or how it will do this.
It is a fact of observation that plants and certain insects go on living when divided into segments; this means that each of the segments has a soul in it identical in species, though not numerically identical in the different segments, for both of the segments for a time possess the power of sensation and local movement. That this does not last is not surprising, for they no longer possess the organs necessary for self-maintenance. But, all the same, in each of the bodily parts there are present all the parts of soul, and the souls so present are homogeneous with one another and with the whole; this means that the several parts of the soul are indisseverable from one another, although the whole soul is divisible. It seems also that the principle found in plants is also a kind of soul; for this is the only principle which is common to both animals and plants; and this exists in isolation41 from the principle of sensation, though there nothing which has the latter without the former.
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1
entangled
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| adj.卷入的；陷入的；被缠住的；缠在一起的v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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2
absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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3
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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4
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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5
spherical
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| adj.球形的；球面的 | |
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6
psychic
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| n.对超自然力敏感的人；adj.有超自然力的 | |
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7
absurdities
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| n.极端无理性( absurdity的名词复数 )；荒谬；谬论；荒谬的行为 | |
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conjecture
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| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
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9
derivative
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| n.派(衍)生物；adj.非独创性的，模仿他人的 | |
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10
incorporeal
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| adj.非物质的，精神的 | |
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11
corporeal
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| adj.肉体的，身体的；物质的 | |
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12
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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13
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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14
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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15
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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16
holders
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| 支持物( holder的名词复数 )； 持有者； （支票等）持有人； 支托（或握持）…之物 | |
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17
apprehending
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的现在分词 )； 理解 | |
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18
kindly
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| adj.和蔼的，温和的，爽快的；adv.温和地，亲切地 | |
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19
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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20
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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21
testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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22
perceptive
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| adj.知觉的，有洞察力的，感知的 | |
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23
strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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24
unifies
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| 使联合( unify的第三人称单数 )； 使相同； 使一致； 统一 | |
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25
supremely
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| adv.无上地，崇高地 | |
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26
dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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27
primordial
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| adj.原始的；最初的 | |
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28
stationary
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| adj.固定的，静止不动的 | |
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29
faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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30
locomotion
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| n.运动，移动 | |
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31
discourse
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| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
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32
waived
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| v.宣布放弃( waive的过去式和过去分词 )；搁置；推迟；放弃（权利、要求等） | |
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33
immortal
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| adj.不朽的；永生的，不死的；神的 | |
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34
paradox
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| n.似乎矛盾却正确的说法；自相矛盾的人(物) | |
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35
animate
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| v.赋于生命，鼓励；adj.有生命的，有生气的 | |
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36
partisans
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| 游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙 | |
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37
heterogeneous
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| adj.庞杂的；异类的 | |
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38
maturity
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| n.成熟；完成；(支票、债券等)到期 | |
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39
disintegrates
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| n.（使）破裂[分裂，粉碎]，（使）崩溃( disintegrate的名词复数 )v.（使）破裂[分裂，粉碎]，（使）崩溃( disintegrate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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40
unifying
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| 使联合( unify的现在分词 )； 使相同； 使一致； 统一 | |
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41
isolation
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| n.隔离，孤立，分解，分离 | |
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