Our conversation began with my admiring the singular good fortune of philosophy, which, as it requires entire liberty above all other privileges, and chiefly flourishes from the free opposition3 of sentiments and argumentation, received its first birth in an age and country of freedom and toleration, and was never cramped4, even in its most extravagant5 principles, by any creeds6, concessions7, or penal8 statutes9. For, except the banishment10 of Protagoras, and the death of Socrates, which last event proceeded partly from other motives11, there are scarcely any instances to be met with, in ancient history, of this bigoted12 jealousy13, with which the present age is so much infested14. Epicurus lived at Athens to an advanced age, in peace and tranquillity15: Epicureans27 were even admitted to receive the sacerdotal character, and to officiate at the altar, in the most sacred rites16 of the established religion: and the public encouragement28 of pensions and salaries was afforded equally, by the wisest of all the Roman emperors29, to the professors of every sect17 of philosophy. How requisite18 such kind of treatment was to philosophy, in her early youth, will easily be conceived, if we reflect, that, even at present, when she may be supposed more hardy19 and robust20, she bears with much difficulty the inclemency21 of the seasons, and those harsh winds of calumny22 and persecution23, which blow upon her.
You admire, says my friend, as the singular good fortune of philosophy, what seems to result from the natural course of things, and to be unavoidable in every age and nation. This pertinacious24 bigotry25, of which you complain, as so fatal to philosophy, is really her offspring, who, after allying with superstition26, separates himself entirely27 from the interest of his parent, and becomes her most inveterate28 enemy and persecutor29. Speculative30 dogmas of religion, the present occasions of such furious dispute, could not possibly be conceived or admitted in the early ages of the world; when mankind, being wholly illiterate31, formed an idea of religion more suitable to their weak apprehension32, and composed their sacred tenets of such tales chiefly as were the objects of traditional belief, more than of argument or disputation. After the first alarm, therefore, was over, which arose from the new paradoxes and principles of the philosophers; these teachers seem ever after, during the ages of antiquity33, to have lived in great harmony with the established superstition, and to have made a fair partition of mankind between them; the former claiming all the learned and wise, the latter possessing all the vulgar and illiterate.
It seems then, say I, that you leave politics entirely out of the question, and never suppose, that a wise magistrate34 can justly be jealous of certain tenets of philosophy, such as those of Epicurus, which, denying a divine existence, and consequently a providence35 and a future state, seem to loosen, in a great measure the ties of morality, and may be supposed, for that reason, pernicious to the peace of civil society.
I know, replied he, that in fact these persecutions never, in any age, proceeded from calm reason, or from experience of the pernicious consequences of philosophy; but arose entirely from passion and prejudice. But what if I should advance farther, and assert, that if Epicurus had been accused before the people, by any of the sycophants36 or informers of those days, he could easily have defended his cause, and proved his principles of philosophy to be as salutary as those of his adversaries37, who endeavoured, with such zeal38, to expose him to the public hatred39 and jealousy?
I wish, said I, you would try your eloquence40 upon so extraordinary a topic, and make a speech for Epicurus, which might satisfy, not the mob of Athens, if you will allow that ancient and polite city to have contained any mob, but the more philosophical41 part of his audience, such as might be supposed capable of comprehending his arguments.
The matter would not be difficult, upon such conditions, replied he: and if you please, I shall suppose myself Epicurus for a moment, and make you stand for the Athenian people, and shall deliver you such an harangue42 as will fill all the urn43 with white beans, and leave not a black one to gratify the malice44 of my adversaries.
Very well: pray proceed upon these suppositions.
I come hither, O ye Athenians, to justify45 in your assembly what I maintain in my school, and I find myself impeached46 by furious antagonists47, instead of reasoning with calm and dispassionate enquirers. Your deliberations, which of right should be directed to questions of public good, and the interest of the commonwealth49, are diverted to the disquisitions of speculative philosophy; and these magnificent, but perhaps fruitless enquiries, take place of your more familiar but more useful occupations. But so far as in me lies, I will prevent this abuse. We shall not here dispute concerning the origin and government of worlds. We shall only enquire48 how far such questions concern the public interest. And if I can persuade you, that they are entirely indifferent to the peace of society and security of government, I hope that you will presently send us back to our schools, there to examine, at leisure, the question the most sublime50, but, at the same time, the most speculative of all philosophy.
The religious philosophers, not satisfied with the tradition of your forefathers51, and doctrine52 of your priests (in which I willingly acquiesce), indulge a rash curiosity, in trying how far they can establish religion upon the principles of reason; and they thereby53 excite, instead of satisfying, the doubts, which naturally arise from a diligent54 and scrutinous enquiry. They paint, in the most magnificent colours, the order, beauty, and wise arrangement of the universe; and then ask, if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms, or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently55 admire. I shall not examine the justness of this argument. I shall allow it to be as solid as my antagonists and accusers can desire. It is sufficient, if I can prove, from this very reasoning, that the question is entirely speculative, and that, when, in my philosophical disquisitions, I deny a providence and a future state, I undermine not the foundations of society, but advance principles, which they themselves, upon their own topics, if they argue consistently, must allow to be solid and satisfactory.
You then, who are my accusers, have acknowledged, that the chief or sole argument for a divine existence (which I never questioned) is derived56 from the order of nature; where there appear such marks of intelligence and design, that you think it extravagant to assign for its cause, either chance, or the blind and unguided force of matter. You allow, that this is an argument drawn58 from effects to causes. From the order of the work, you infer, that there must have been project and forethought in the workman. If you cannot make out this point, you allow, that your conclusion fails; and you pretend not to establish the conclusion in a greater latitude59 than the phenomena60 of nature will justify. These are your concessions. I desire you to mark the consequences.
When we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect. A body of ten ounces raised in any scale may serve as a proof, that the counterbalancing weight exceeds ten ounces; but can never afford a reason that it exceeds a hundred. If the cause, assigned for any effect, be not sufficient to produce it, we must either reject that cause, or add to it such qualities as will give it a just proportion to the effect. But if we ascribe to it farther qualities, or affirm it capable of producing other effects, we can only indulge the licence of conjecture61, and arbitrarily suppose the existence of qualities and energies, without reason or authority.
The same rule holds, whether the cause assigned be brute62 unconscious matter, or a rational intelligent being. If the cause be known only by the effect, we never ought to ascribe to it any qualities, beyond what are precisely63 requisite to produce the effect: nor can we, by any rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause, and infer other effects from it, beyond those by which alone it is known to us. No one, merely from the sight of one of Zeuxis's pictures, could know, that he was also a statuary or architect, and was an artist no less skilful65 in stone and marble than in colours. The talents and taste, displayed in the particular work before us; these we may safely conclude the workman to be possessed66 of. The cause must be proportioned to the effect; and if we exactly and precisely proportion it, we shall never find in it any qualities, that point farther, or afford an inference concerning any other design or performance. Such qualities must be somewhat beyond what is merely requisite for producing the effect, which we examine.
Allowing, therefore, the gods to be the authors of the existence or order of the universe; it follows, that they possess that precise degree of power, intelligence, and benevolence67, which appears in their workmanship; but nothing farther can ever be proved, except we call in the assistance of exaggeration and flattery to supply the defects of argument and reasoning. So far as the traces of any attributes, at present, appear, so far may we conclude these attributes to exist. The supposition of farther attributes is mere64 hypothesis; much more the supposition, that, in distant regions of space or periods of time, there has been, or will be, a more magnificent display of these attributes, and a scheme of administration more suitable to such imaginary virtues69. We can never be allowed to mount up from the universe, the effect, to Jupiter, the cause; and then descend70 downwards71, to infer any new effect from that cause; as if the present effects alone were not entirely worthy72 of the glorious attributes, which we ascribe to that deity73. The knowledge of the cause being derived solely74 from the effect, they must be exactly adjusted to each other; and the one can never refer to anything farther, or be the foundation of any new inference and conclusion.
You find certain phenomena in nature. You seek a cause or author. You imagine that you have found him. You afterwards become so enamoured of this offspring of your brain, that you imagine it impossible, but he must produce something greater and more perfect than the present scene of things, which is so full of ill and disorder75. You forget, that this superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary, or, at least, without any foundation in reason; and that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities, but what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his productions. Let your gods, therefore, O philosophers, be suited to the present appearances of nature: and presume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions, in order to suit them to the attributes, which you so fondly ascribe to your deities76.
When priests and poets, supported by your authority, O Athenians, talk of a golden or silver age, which preceded the present state of vice77 and misery78, I hear them with attention and with reverence79. But when philosophers, who pretend to neglect authority, and to cultivate reason, hold the same discourse80, I pay them not, I own, the same obsequious81 submission82 and pious83 deference84. I ask; who carried them into the celestial85 regions, who admitted them into the councils of the gods, who opened to them the book of fate, that they thus rashly affirm, that their deities have executed, or will execute, any purpose beyond what has actually appeared? If they tell me, that they have mounted on the steps or by the gradual ascent86 of reason, and by drawing inferences from effects to causes, I still insist, that they have aided the ascent of reason by the wings of imagination; otherwise they could not thus change their manner of inference, and argue from causes to effects; presuming, that a more perfect production than the present world would be more suitable to such perfect beings as the gods, and forgetting that they have no reason to ascribe to these celestial beings any perfection or any attribute, but what can be found in the present world.
Hence all the fruitless industry to account for the ill appearances of nature, and save the honour of the gods; while we must acknowledge the reality of that evil and disorder, with which the world so much abounds87. The obstinate88 and intractable qualities of matter, we are told, or the observance of general laws, or some such reason, is the sole cause, which controlled the power and benevolence of Jupiter, and obliged him to create mankind and every sensible creature so imperfect and so unhappy. These attributes then, are, it seems, beforehand, taken for granted, in their greatest latitude. And upon that supposition, I own that such conjectures89 may, perhaps, be admitted as plausible90 solutions of the ill phenomena. But still I ask; Why take these attributes for granted, or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect? Why torture your brain to justify the course of nature upon suppositions, which, for aught you know, may be entirely imaginary, and of which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature?
The religious hypothesis, therefore, must be considered only as a particular method of accounting91 for the visible phenomena of the universe: but no just reasoner will ever presume to infer from it any single fact, and alter or add to the phenomena, in any single particular. If you think, that the appearances of things prove such causes, it is allowable for you to draw an inference concerning the existence of these causes. In such complicated and sublime subjects, every one should be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument. But here you ought to rest. If you come backward, and arguing from your inferred causes, conclude, that any other fact has existed, or will exist, in the course of nature, which may serve as a fuller display of particular attributes; I must admonish92 you, that you have departed from the method of reasoning, attached to the present subject, and have certainly added something to the attributes of the cause, beyond what appears in the effect; otherwise you could never, with tolerable sense or propriety93, add anything to the effect, in order to render it more worthy of the cause.
Where, then, is the odiousness94 of that doctrine, which I teach in my school, or rather, which I examine in my gardens? Or what do you find in this whole question, wherein the security of good morals, or the peace and order of society, is in the least concerned?
I deny a providence, you say, and supreme95 governor of the world, who guides the course of events, and punishes the vicious with infamy96 and disappointment, and rewards the virtuous97 with honour and success, in all their undertakings98. But surely, I deny not the course itself of events, which lies open to every one's inquiry99 and examination. I acknowledge, that, in the present order of things, virtue68 is attended with more peace of mind than vice, and meets with a more favourable100 reception from the world. I am sensible, that, according to the past experience of mankind, friendship is the chief joy of human life, and moderation the only source of tranquillity and happiness. I never balance between the virtuous and the vicious course of life; but am sensible, that, to a well-disposed mind, every advantage is on the side of the former. And what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and reasonings? You tell me, indeed, that this disposition101 of things proceeds from intelligence and design. But whatever it proceeds from, the disposition itself, on which depends our happiness or misery, and consequently our conduct and deportment in life is still the same. It is still open for me, as well as you, to regulate my behaviour, by my experience of past events. And if you affirm, that, while a divine providence is allowed and a supreme distributive justice in the universe, I ought to expect some more particular reward of the good, and punishment of the bad, beyond the ordinary course of events; I here find the same fallacy, which I have before endeavoured to detect. You persist in imagining, that, if we grant that divine existence, for which you so earnestly contend, you may safely infer consequences from it, and add something to the experienced order of nature, by arguing from the attributes which you ascribe to your gods. You seem not to remember, that all your reasonings on this subJect can only be drawn from effects to causes; and that every argument, deducted102 from causes to effects, must of necessity be a gross sophism103; since it is impossible for you to know anything of the cause, but what you have antecedently, not inferred, but discovered to the full, in the effect.
But what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners, who instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object of their contemplation, so far reverse the whole course of nature, as to render this life merely a passage to something farther; a porch, which leads to a greater, and vastly different building; a prologue104, which serves only to introduce the piece, and give it more grace and propriety? Whence, do you think, can such philosophers derive57 their idea of the gods? From their own conceit105 and imagination surely. For if they derived it from the present phenomena, it would never point to anything farther, but must be exactly adjusted to them. That the divinity may possibly be endowed with attributes, which we have never seen exerted; may be governed by principles of action, which we cannot discover to be satisfied: all this will freely be allowed. But still this is mere possibility and hypothesis. We never can have reason to infer any attributes, or any principles of action in him, but so far as we know them to have been exerted and satisfied.
Are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world? If you answer in the affirmative, I conclude, that, since justice here exerts itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I conclude, that you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation106, by saying, that the justice of the gods, at present, exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent; I answer, that you have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so far as you see it, at present, exert itself.
Thus I bring the dispute, O Athenians, to a short issue with my antagonists. The course of nature lies open to my contemplation as well as to theirs. The experienced train of events is the great standard, by which we all regulate our conduct. Nothing else can be appealed to in the field, or in the senate. Nothing else ought ever to be heard of in the school, or in the closet. In vain would our limited understanding break through those boundaries, which are too narrow for our fond imagination. While we argue from the course of nature, and infer a particular intelligent cause, which first bestowed108, and still preserves order in the universe, we embrace a principle, which is both uncertain and useless. It is uncertain; because the subject lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience. It is useless; because our knowledge of this cause being derived entirely from the course of nature, we can never, according to the rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause with any new inference, or making additions to the common and experienced course of nature, establish any new principles of conduct and behaviour.
I observe (said I, finding he had finished his harangue) that you neglect not the artifice109 of the demagogues of old; and as you were pleased to make me stand for the people, you insinuate110 yourself into my favour by embracing those principles, to which, you know, I have always expressed a particular attachment111. But allowing you to make experience (as indeed I think you ought) the only standard of our judgement concerning this, and all other questions of fact; I doubt not but, from the very same experience, to which you appeal, it may be possible to refute this reasoning, which you have put into the mouth of Epicurus. If you saw, for instance, a half-finished building, surrounded with heaps of brick and stone and mortar112, and all the instruments of masonry113; could you not infer from the effect, that it was a work of design and contrivance? And could you not return again, from this inferred cause, to infer new additions to the effect, and conclude, that the building would soon be finished, and receive all the further improvements, which art could bestow107 upon it? If you saw upon the sea-shore the print of one human foot, you would conclude, that a man had passed that way, and that he had also left the traces of the other foot, though effaced114 by the rolling of the sands or inundation115 of the waters. Why then do you refuse to admit the same method of reasoning with regard to the order of nature? Consider the world and the present life only as an imperfect building, from which you can infer a superior intelligence; and arguing from that superior intelligence, which can leave nothing imperfect; why may you not infer a more finished scheme or plan, which will receive its completion in some distant point of space or time? Are not these methods of reasoning exactly similar? And under what pretence116 can you embrace the one, while you reject the other?
The infinite difference of the subjects, replied he, is a sufficient foundation for this difference in my conclusions. In works of human art and contrivance, it is allowable to advance from the effect to the cause, and returning back from the cause, to form new inferences concerning the effect, and examine the alterations118, which it has probably undergone, or may still undergo. But what is the foundation of this method of reasoning? Plainly this; that man is a being, whom we know by experience, whose motives and designs we are acquainted with, and whose projects and inclinations119 have a certain connexion and coherence120, according to the laws which nature has established for the government of such a creature. When, therefore, we find, that any work has proceeded from the skill and industry of man; as we are otherwise acquainted with the nature of the animal, we can draw a hundred inferences concerning what may be expected from him; and these inferences will all be founded in experience and observation. But did we know man only from the single work or production which we examine, it were impossible for us to argue in this manner; because our knowledge of all the qualities, which we ascribe to him, being in that case derived from the production, it is impossible they could point to anything farther, or be the foundation of any new inference. The print of a foot in the sand can only prove, when considered alone, that there was some figure adapted to it, by which it was produced: but the print of a human foot proves likewise, from our other experience, that there was probably another foot, which also left its impression, though effaced by time or other accidents. Here we mount from the effect to the cause; and descending121 again from the cause, infer alterations in the effect; but this is not a continuation of the same simple chain of reasoning. We comprehend in this case a hundred other experiences and observations, concerning the usual figure and members of that species of animal, without which this method of argument must be considered as fallacious and sophistical.
The case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a single being in the universe, not comprehended under any species or genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities, we can, by analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him. As the universe shews wisdom and goodness, we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shews a particular degree of these perfections, we infer a particular degree of them, precisely adapted to the effect which we examine. But farther attributes or farther degrees of the same attributes, we can never be authorised to infer or suppose, by any rules of just reasoning. Now, without some such licence of supposition, it is impossible for us to argue from the cause, or infer any alteration117 in the effect, beyond what has immediately fallen under our observation. Greater good produced by this Being must still prove a greater degree of goodness: a more impartial122 distribution of rewards and punishments must proceed from a greater regard to justice and equity123. Every supposed addition to the works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the Author of nature; and consequently, being entirely unsupported by any reason or argument, can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and hypothesis.30
The great source of our mistake in this subject, and of the unbounded licence of conjecture, which we indulge, is, that we tacitly consider ourselves, as in the place of the Supreme Being, and conclude, that he will, on every occasion, observe the same conduct, which we ourselves, in his situation, would have embraced as reasonable and eligible124. But, besides that the ordinary course of nature may convince us, that almost everything is regulated by principles and maxims125 very different from ours; besides this, I say, it must evidently appear contrary to all rules of analogy to reason, from the intentions and projects of men, to those of a Being so different, and so much superior. In human nature, there is a certain experienced coherence of designs and inclinations; so that when, from any fact, we have discovered one intention of any man, it may often be reasonable, from experience, to infer another, and draw a long chain of conclusions concerning his past or future conduct. But this method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a Being, so remote and incomprehensible, who bears much less analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper126, and who discovers himself only by some faint traces or outlines, beyond which we have no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection. What we imagine to be a superior perfection, may really be a defect. Or were it ever so much a perfection, the ascribing of it to the Supreme Being, where it appears not to have been really exerted, to the full, in his works, savours more of flattery and panegyric127, than of just reasoning and sound philosophy. All the philosophy, therefore, in the world, and all the religion, which is nothing but a species of philosophy, will never be able to carry us beyond the usual course of experience, or give us measures of conduct and behaviour different from those which are furnished by reflections on common life. No new fact can ever be inferred from the religious hypothesis; no event foreseen or foretold128; no reward or punishment expected or dreaded129, beyond what is already known by practice and observation. So that my apology for Epicurus will still appear solid and satisfactory; nor have the political interests of society any connexion with the philosophical disputes concerning metaphysics and religion.
There is still one circumstance, replied I, which you seem to have overlooked. Though I should allow your premises130, I must deny your conclusion. You conclude, that religious doctrines131 and reasonings can have no influence on life, because they ought to have no influence; never considering, that men reason not in the same manner you do, but draw many consequences from the belief of a divine Existence, and suppose that the Deity will inflict132 punishments on vice, and bestow rewards on virtue, beyond what appear in the ordinary course of nature. Whether this reasoning of theirs be just or not, is no matter. Its influence on their life and conduct must still be the same. And those, who attempt to disabuse133 them of such prejudices, may, for aught I know, be good reasoners, but I cannot allow them to be good citizens and politicians; since they free men from one restraint upon their passions, and make the infringement134 of the laws of society, in one respect, more easy and secure.
After all, I may, perhaps, agree to your general conclusion in favour of liberty, though upon different premises from those, on which you endeavour to found it. I think, that the state ought to tolerate every principle of philosophy; nor is there an instance, that any government has suffered in its political interests by such indulgence. There is no enthusiasm among philosophers; their doctrines are not very alluring135 to the people; and no restraint can be put upon their reasonings, but what must be of dangerous consequence to the sciences, and even to the state, by paving the way for persecution and oppression in points, where the generality of mankind are more deeply interested and concerned.
But there occurs to me (continued I) with regard to your main topic, a difficulty, which I shall just propose to you without insisting on it; lest it lead into reasonings of too nice and delicate a nature. In a word, I much doubt whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its effect (as you have all along supposed) or to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object, that has ever fallen under our observation. It is only when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other; and were an effect presented, which was entirely singular, and could not be comprehended under any known species, I do not see, that we could form any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause. If experience and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature; both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes, which we know, and which we have found, in many instances, to be conjoined with each other. I leave it to your own reflection to pursue the consequences of this principle. I shall just observe, that, as the antagonists of Epicurus always suppose the universe, an effect quite singular and unparalleled, to be the proof of a Deity, a cause no less singular and unparalleled; your reasonings, upon that supposition, seem, at least, to merit our attention. There is, I own, some difficulty, how we can ever return from the cause to the effect, and, reasoning from our ideas of the former, infer any alteration on the latter, or any, addition to it.
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paradoxes
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| n.似非而是的隽语，看似矛盾而实际却可能正确的说法( paradox的名词复数 )；用于语言文学中的上述隽语；有矛盾特点的人[事物，情况] | |
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accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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cramped
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| a.狭窄的 | |
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extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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creeds
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| （尤指宗教）信条，教条( creed的名词复数 ) | |
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concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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penal
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| adj.刑罚的；刑法上的 | |
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statutes
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| 成文法( statute的名词复数 )； 法令； 法规； 章程 | |
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banishment
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| n.放逐，驱逐 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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bigoted
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| adj.固执己见的，心胸狭窄的 | |
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jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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infested
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| adj.为患的，大批滋生的（常与with搭配）v.害虫、野兽大批出没于( infest的过去式和过去分词 )；遍布于 | |
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tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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rites
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| 仪式，典礼( rite的名词复数 ) | |
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sect
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| n.派别，宗教，学派，派系 | |
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requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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hardy
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| adj.勇敢的，果断的，吃苦的；耐寒的 | |
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robust
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| adj.强壮的，强健的，粗野的，需要体力的，浓的 | |
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inclemency
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| n.险恶，严酷 | |
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calumny
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| n.诽谤，污蔑，中伤 | |
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persecution
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| n. 迫害,烦扰 | |
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pertinacious
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| adj.顽固的 | |
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bigotry
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| n.偏见，偏执，持偏见的行为[态度]等 | |
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superstition
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| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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inveterate
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| adj.积习已深的，根深蒂固的 | |
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persecutor
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| n. 迫害者 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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illiterate
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| adj.文盲的；无知的；n.文盲 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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antiquity
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| n.古老；高龄；古物，古迹 | |
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magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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providence
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| n.深谋远虑，天道，天意；远见；节约；上帝 | |
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sycophants
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| n.谄媚者，拍马屁者( sycophant的名词复数 ) | |
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adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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38
zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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39
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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40
eloquence
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| n.雄辩；口才，修辞 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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harangue
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| n.慷慨冗长的训话，言辞激烈的讲话 | |
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urn
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| n.（有座脚的）瓮；坟墓；骨灰瓮 | |
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44
malice
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| n.恶意，怨恨，蓄意；[律]预谋 | |
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45
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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46
impeached
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| v.控告（某人）犯罪( impeach的过去式和过去分词 )；弹劾；对（某事物）怀疑；提出异议 | |
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antagonists
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| 对立[对抗] 者，对手，敌手( antagonist的名词复数 )； 对抗肌； 对抗药 | |
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enquire
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| v.打听，询问；调查，查问 | |
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commonwealth
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| n.共和国，联邦，共同体 | |
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sublime
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| adj.崇高的，伟大的；极度的，不顾后果的 | |
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forefathers
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| n.祖先，先人；祖先，祖宗( forefather的名词复数 )；列祖列宗；前人 | |
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52
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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53
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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54
diligent
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| adj.勤勉的，勤奋的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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latitude
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| n.纬度，行动或言论的自由(范围)，(pl.)地区 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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61
conjecture
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| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
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62
brute
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| n.野兽，兽性 | |
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63
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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benevolence
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| n.慈悲，捐助 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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virtues
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| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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70
descend
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| vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降 | |
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71
downwards
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| adj./adv.向下的（地），下行的（地） | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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73
deity
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| n.神，神性；被奉若神明的人(或物) | |
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74
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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deities
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| n.神，女神( deity的名词复数 )；神祗；神灵；神明 | |
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vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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reverence
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| n.敬畏，尊敬，尊严；Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称；v.尊敬，敬畏，崇敬 | |
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discourse
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| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
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81
obsequious
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| adj.谄媚的，奉承的，顺从的 | |
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82
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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83
pious
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| adj.虔诚的；道貌岸然的 | |
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84
deference
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| n.尊重，顺从；敬意 | |
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85
celestial
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| adj.天体的；天上的 | |
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86
ascent
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| n.(声望或地位)提高；上升，升高；登高 | |
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abounds
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| v.大量存在，充满，富于( abound的第三人称单数 ) | |
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obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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conjectures
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| 推测，猜想( conjecture的名词复数 ) | |
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90
plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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accounting
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| n.会计，会计学，借贷对照表 | |
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92
admonish
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| v.训戒；警告；劝告 | |
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93
propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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94
odiousness
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| n.可憎；讨厌；可恨 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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infamy
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| n.声名狼藉，出丑，恶行 | |
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virtuous
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| adj.有品德的，善良的，贞洁的，有效力的 | |
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98
undertakings
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| 企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务 | |
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99
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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100
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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102
deducted
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| v.扣除，减去( deduct的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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103
sophism
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| n.诡辩 | |
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104
prologue
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| n.开场白，序言；开端，序幕 | |
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105
conceit
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| n.自负，自高自大 | |
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106
negation
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| n.否定；否认 | |
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107
bestow
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| v.把…赠与，把…授予；花费 | |
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108
bestowed
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| 赠给，授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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109
artifice
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| n.妙计，高明的手段；狡诈，诡计 | |
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110
insinuate
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| vt.含沙射影地说，暗示 | |
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111
attachment
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| n.附属物，附件；依恋；依附 | |
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112
mortar
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| n.灰浆，灰泥；迫击炮；v.把…用灰浆涂接合 | |
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113
masonry
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| n.砖土建筑；砖石 | |
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114
effaced
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| v.擦掉( efface的过去式和过去分词 )；抹去；超越；使黯然失色 | |
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115
inundation
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| n.the act or fact of overflowing | |
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116
pretence
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| n.假装，作假；借口，口实；虚伪；虚饰 | |
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117
alteration
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| n.变更，改变；蚀变 | |
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118
alterations
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| n.改动( alteration的名词复数 )；更改；变化；改变 | |
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119
inclinations
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| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
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120
coherence
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| n.紧凑；连贯；一致性 | |
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121
descending
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| n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
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122
impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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123
equity
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| n.公正，公平，（无固定利息的）股票 | |
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124
eligible
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| adj.有条件被选中的；(尤指婚姻等)合适(意)的 | |
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125
maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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126
taper
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| n.小蜡烛，尖细，渐弱；adj.尖细的；v.逐渐变小 | |
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127
panegyric
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| n.颂词，颂扬 | |
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128
foretold
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| v.预言，预示( foretell的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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129
dreaded
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| adj.令人畏惧的；害怕的v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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130
premises
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| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
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131
doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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132
inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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133
disabuse
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| v.解惑；矫正 | |
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134
infringement
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| n.违反；侵权 | |
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135
alluring
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| adj.吸引人的，迷人的 | |
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