340. The arithmetical machine produces effects which approach nearer to thought than all the actions of animals. But it does nothing which would enable us to attribute will to it, as to the animals.
341. The account of the pike and frog of Liancourt. They do it always, and never otherwise, nor any other thing showing mind.
342. If an animal did by mind what it does by instinct, and if it spoke2 by mind what it speaks by instinct, in hunting and in warning its mates that the prey3 is found or lost, it would indeed also speak in regard to those things which affect it closer, as example, “Gnaw me this cord which is wounding me, and which I cannot reach.”
343. The beak5 of the parrot, which it wipes, although it is clean.
344. Instinct and reason, marks of two natures.
345. Reason commands us far more imperiously than a master; for in disobeying the one we are unfortunate, and in disobeying the other we are fools.
346. Thought constitutes the greatness of man.
347. Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature; but he is a thinking reed. The entire universe need not arm itself to crush him. A vapour, a drop of water suffices to kill him. But, if the universe were to crush him, man would still be more noble than that which killed him, because he knows that he dies and the advantage which the universe has over him; the universe knows nothing of this.
All our dignity consists, then, in thought. By it we must elevate ourselves, and not by space and time which we cannot fill. Let us endeavour, then, to think well; this is the principle of morality.
348. A thinking reed. — It is not from space that I must seek my dignity, but from the government of my thought. I shall have no more if I possess worlds. By space the universe encompasses6 and swallows me up like an atom; by thought I comprehend the world.
349. Immateriality of the soul — Philosophers who have mastered their passions. What matter could do that?
350. The Stoics7. — They conclude that what has been done once can be done always, and that, since the desire of glory imparts some power to those whom it possesses, others can do likewise. There are feverish8 movements which health cannot imitate.
Epictetus concludes that, since there are consistent Christians9, every man can easily be so.
351. Those great spiritual efforts, which the soul sometimes assays10, are things on which it does not lay hold. It only leaps to them, not as upon a throne, for ever, but merely for an instant.
352. The strength of a man’s virtue11 must not be measured by his efforts, but by his ordinary life.
353. I do not admire the excess of a virtue as of valour, except I see at the same time the excess of the opposite virtue, as in Epaminondas, who had the greatest valour and the greatest kindness. For otherwise it is not to rise, it is to fall. We do not display greatness by going to one extreme, but in touching12 both at once, and filling all the intervening space. But perhaps this is only a sudden movement of the soul from one to the other extreme, and in fact it is ever at one point only, as in the case of a firebrand. Be it so, but at least this indicates agility13 if not expanse of soul.
354. Man’s nature is not always to advance; it has its advances and retreats.
Fever has its cold and hot fits; and the cold proves as well as the hot the greatness of the fire of fever.
The discoveries of men from age to age turn out the same. The kindness and the malice14 of the world in general are the same. Plerumque gratae principibus vices15.1
355. Continuous eloquence17 wearies.
Princes and kings sometimes play. They are not always on their thrones. They weary there. Grandeur18 must be abandoned to be appreciated. Continuity in everything is unpleasant. Cold is agreeable, that we may get warm.
Nature acts by progress, itus et reditus. It goes and returns, then advances further, then twice as much backwards19, then more forward than ever, etc.
The tide of the sea behaves in the same manner; and so, apparently20, does the sun in its course.
356. The nourishment21 of the body is little by little. Fullness of nourishment and smallness of substance.
357. When we would pursue virtues22 to their extremes on either side, vices present themselves, which insinuate23 themselves insensibly there, in their insensible journey towards the infinitely24 little; and vices present themselves in a crowd towards the infinitely great, so that we lose ourselves in them and no longer see virtues. We find fault with perfection itself.
358. Man is neither angel nor brute, and the unfortunate thing is that he who would act the angel acts the brute.
359. We do not sustain ourselves in virtue by our own strength, but by the balancing of two opposed vices, just as we remain upright amidst two contrary gales25. Remove one of the vices, and we fall into the other.
360. What the Stoics propose is so difficult and foolish!
The Stoics lay down that all those who are not at the high degree of wisdom are equally foolish and vicious, as those who are two inches under water.
361. The sovereign good. Dispute about the sovereign good. — Ut sis contentus temetipso et ex te nascentibus bonis.2 There is a contradiction, for in the end they advise suicide. Oh! What a happy life, from which we are to free ourselves as from the plague!
362. Ex senatus-consultis et plebiscitis . . .
To ask like passages.
363. Ex senatus-consultis et plebiscitis scelera exercentur. Seneca. 588.3
Nihil tam absurde dici potest quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum.4
Quibusdam destinatis sententiis consecrati quae non probant coguntur defendere.5
Ut omnium rerum sic litterarum quoque intemperantia laboramus.6
Id maxime quemque decet, quod est cujusque suum maxime.7
Hos natura modos primum dedit.8
Paucis opus est litteris ad bonam mentem.9
Si quando turpe non sit, tamen non est non turpe quum id a multitudine laudetur.10
Mihi sic usus est, tibi ut opus est facto, fac.11
364. Rarum est enim ut satis se quisque vereatur.12
Tot circa unum caput tumultuantes deos.13
Nihil turpius quam cognitioni assertionem praecurrere.14
Nec me pudet, ut istos, fateri nescire quid nesciam.15
Melius non incipient27.16
365. Thought. — All the dignity of man consists in thought. Thought is, therefore, by its nature a wonderful and incomparable thing. It must have strange defects to be contemptible28. But it has such, so that nothing is more ridiculous. How great it is in its nature! How vile29 it is in its defects!
But what is this thought? How foolish it is!
366. The mind of this sovereign judge of the world is not so independent that it is not liable to be disturbed by the first din4 about it. The noise of a cannon30 is not necessary to hinder its thoughts; it needs only the creaking of a weathercock or pulley. Do not wonder if at present it does not reason well; a fly is buzzing in its ears; that is enough to render it incapable31 of good judgement. If you wish it to be able to reach the truth, chase away that animal which holds its reason in check and disturbs that powerful intellect which rules towns and kingdoms. Here is a comical god! O ridicolosissimo eroe!
367. The power of flies; they win battles, hinder our soul from acting32, eat our body.
368. When it is said that heat is only the motions of certain molecules33, and light the conatus recedendi which we feel, it astonishes us. What! Is pleasure only the ballet of our spirits? We have conceived so different an idea of it! And these sensations seem so removed from those others which we say are the same as those with which we compare them! The sensation from the fire, that warmth which affects us in a manner wholly different from touch, the reception of sound and light, all this appears to us mysterious, and yet it is material like the blow of a stone. It is true that the smallness of the spirits which enter into the pores touches other nerves, but there are always some nerves touched.
369. Memory is necessary for all the operations of reason.
370. Chance gives rise to thoughts, and chance removes them; no art can keep or acquire them.
A thought has escaped me. I wanted to write it down. I write instead that it has escaped me.
371. When I was small, I hugged my book; and because it sometimes happened to me to . . . in believing I hugged it, I doubted. . . .
372. In writing down my thought, it sometimes escapes me; but this makes me remember my weakness, that I constantly forget. This is as instructive to me as my forgotten thought; for I strive only to know my nothingness.
373. Scepticism. — I shall here write my thoughts without order, and not perhaps in unintentional confusion; that is true order, which will always indicate my object by its very disorder34. I should do too much honour to my subject, if I treated it with order, since I want to show that it is incapable of it.
374. What astonishes me most is to see that all the world is not astonished at its own weakness. Men act seriously, and each follows his own mode of life, not because it is in fact good to follow since it is the custom, but as if each man knew certainly where reason and justice are. They find themselves continually deceived, and, by a comical humility35, think it is their own fault and not that of the art which they claim always to possess. But it is well there are so many such people in the world, who are not sceptics for the glory of scepticism, in order to show that man is quite capable of the most extravagant36 opinions, since he is capable of believing that he is not in a state of natural and inevitable37 weakness, but, on the contrary, of natural wisdom.
Nothing fortifies38 scepticism more than that there are some who are not sceptics; if all were so, they would be wrong.
375. I have passed a great part of my life believing that there was justice, and in this I was not mistaken; for there is justice according as God has willed to reveal it to us. But I did not take it so, and this is where I made a mistake; for I believed that our justice was essentially39 just, and that I had that whereby to know and judge of it. But I have so often found my right judgement at fault, that at last I have come to distrust myself and then others. I have seen changes in all nations and men, and thus, after many changes of judgement regarding true justice, I have recognised that our nature was but in continual change, and I have not changed since; and if I changed, I would confirm my opinion.
The sceptic Arcesilaus, who became a dogmatist.
376. This sect40 derives42 more strength from its enemies than from its friends; for the weakness of man is far more evident in those who know it not than in those who know it.
377. Discourses43 on humility are a source of pride in the vain and of humility in the humble44. So those on scepticism cause believers to affirm. Few men speak humbly45 of humility, chastely46 of chastity, few doubtingly of scepticism. We are only falsehood, duplicity, contradiction; we both conceal47 and disguise ourselves from ourselves.
378. Scepticism. — Excess, like defect of intellect, is accused of madness. Nothing is good but mediocrity. The majority has settled that and finds fault with him who escapes it at whichever end. I will not oppose it. I quite consent to put there, and refuse to be at the lower end, not because it is low, but because it is an end; for I would likewise refuse to be placed at the top. To leave the mean is to abandon humanity. The greatness of the human soul consists in knowing how to preserve the mean. So far from greatness consisting in leaving it, it consists in not leaving it.
379. It is not good to have too much liberty. It is not good to have all one wants.
380. All good maxims48 are in the world. We only need to apply them. For instance, we do not doubt that we ought to risk our lives in defence of the public good; but for religion, no.
It is true there must be inequality among men; but if this be conceded, the door is opened not only to the highest power, but to the highest tyranny.
We must relax our minds a little; but this opens the door to the greatest debauchery. Let us mark the limits. There are no limits in things. laws would put them there, and the mind cannot suffer it.
381. When we are too young, we do not judge well; so, also, when we are too old. If we do not think enough, or if we think too much on any matter, we get obstinate49 and infatuated with it. If one considers one’s work immediately after having done it, one is entirely50 prepossessed in its favour; by delaying too long, one can no longer enter into the spirit of it. So with pictures seen from too far or too near; there is but one exact point which is the true place wherefrom to look at them: the rest are too near, too far, too high or too low. Perspective determines that point in the art of painting. But who shall determine it in truth and morality?
382. When all is equally agitated51, nothing appears to be agitated, as in a ship. When all tend to debauchery, none appears to do so. He who stops draws attention to the excess of others, like a fixed52 point.
383. The licentious53 tell men of orderly lives that they stray from nature’s path, while they themselves follow it; as people in a ship think those move who are on the shore. On all sides the language is similar. We must have a fixed point in order to judge. The harbour decides for those who are in a ship; but where shall we find a harbour in morality?
384. Contradiction is a bad sign of truth; several things which are certain are contradicted; several things which are false pass without contradiction. Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor the want of contradiction a sign of truth.
385. Scepticism. — Each thing here is partly true and partly false. Essential truth is not so; it is altogether pure and altogether true. This mixture dishonours54 and annihilates55 it. Nothing is purely56 true, and thus nothing is true, meaning by that pure truth. You will say it is true that homicide is wrong. Yes; for we know well the wrong and the false. But what will you say is good? Chastity? I say no; for the world would come to an end. Marriage? No; continence is better. Not to kill? No; for lawlessness would be horrible, and the wicked would kill all the good. To kill? No; for that destroys nature. We possess truth and goodness only in part, and mingled57 with falsehood and evil.
386. If we dreamt the same thing every night, it would affect us as much as the objects we see every day. And if an artisan were sure to dream every night for twelve hours’ duration that he was a king, I believe he would be almost as happy as a king, who should dream every night for twelve hours on end that he was an artisan.
If we were to dream every night that we were pursued by enemies and harassed58 by these painful phantoms59, or that we passed every day in different occupations, as in making a voyage, we should suffer almost as much as if it were real, and should fear to sleep, as we fear to wake when we dread60 in fact to enter on such mishaps61. And, indeed, it would cause pretty nearly the same discomforts62 as the reality.
But since dreams are all different, and each single one is diversified63, what is seen in them affects us much less than what we see when awake, because of its continuity, which is not, however, so continuous and level as not to change too; but it changes less abruptly64, except rarely, as when we travel, and then we say, “It seems to me I am dreaming.” For life is a dream a little less inconstant.
387. It may be that there are true demonstrations65; but this is not certain. Thus, this proves nothing else but that it is not certain that all is uncertain, to the glory of scepticism.
388. Good sense. — They are compelled to say, “You are not acting in good faith; we are not asleep,” etc. How I love to see this proud reason humiliated66 and suppliant67! For this is not the language of a man whose right is disputed, and who defends it with the power of armed hands. He is not foolish enough to declare that men are not acting in good faith, but he punishes this bad faith with force.
389. Ecclesiastes shows that man without God is in total ignorance and inevitable misery68. For it is wretched to have the wish, but not the power. Now he would be happy and assured of some truth, and yet he can neither know, nor desire not to know. He cannot even doubt.
390. My God! How foolish this talk is! “Would God have made the world to damn it? Would He ask so much from persons so weak”? etc. Scepticism is the cure for this evil, and will take down this vanity.
391. Conversation. — Great words: Religion, I deny it.
Conversation. — Scepticism helps religion.
392. Against Scepticism. — . . . It is, then, a strange fact that we cannot define these things without obscuring them, while we speak of them with all assurance. We assume that all conceive of them in the same way; but we assume it quite gratuitously69, for we have no proof of it. I see, in truth, that the same words are applied70 on the same occasions, and that every time two men see a body change its place, they both express their view of this same fact by the same word, both saying that it has moved; and from this conformity71 of application we derive41 a strong conviction of a conformity of ideas. But this is not absolutely or finally convincing though there is enough to support a bet on the affirmative, since we know that we often draw the same conclusions from different premises72.
This is enough, at least, to obscure the matter; not that it completely extinguishes the natural light which assures us of these things. The academicians would have won. But this dulls it and troubles the dogmatists to the glory of the sceptical crowd, which consists in this doubtful ambiguity73 and in a certain doubtful dimness from which our doubts cannot take away all the clearness, nor our own natural lights chase away all the darkness.
393. It is a singular thing to consider that there are people in the world who, having renounced74 all the laws of God and nature, have made laws for themselves which they strictly76 obey, as, for instance, the soldiers of Mahomet, robbers, heretics, etc. It is the same with logicians. It seems that their license77 must be without any limits or barriers, since they have broken through so many that are so just and sacred.
394. All the principles of sceptics, stoics, atheists, etc., are true. But their conclusions are false, because the opposite principles are also true.
395. Instinct, reason. — We have an incapacity of proof, insurmountable by all dogmatism. We have an idea of truth, invincible78 to all scepticism.
396. Two things instruct man about his whole nature; instinct and experience.
397. The greatness of man is great in that he knows himself to be miserable79. A tree does not know itself to be miserable. It is then being miserable to know oneself to be miserable; but it is also being great to know that one is miserable.
398. All these same miseries80 prove man’s greatness. They are the miseries of a great lord, of a deposed81 king.
399. We are not miserable without feeling it. A ruined house is not miserable. Man only is miserable. Ego82 vir videns.17
400. The greatness of man. — We have so great an idea of the soul of man that we cannot endure being despised, or not being esteemed84 by any soul; and all the happiness of men consists in this esteem83.
401. Glory. — The brutes85 do not admire each other. A horse does not admire his companion. Not that there is no rivalry86 between them in a race, but that is of no consequence; for, when in the stable, the heaviest and most ill-formed does not give up his oats to another, as men would have others do to them. Their virtue is satisfied with itself.
402. The greatness of man even in his lust87, to have known how to extract from it a wonderful code, and to have drawn88 from it a picture of benevolence89.
403. Greatness. — The reasons of effects indicate the greatness of man, in having extracted so fair an order from lust.
404. The greatest baseness of man is the pursuit of glory. But is the greatest mark of his excellence90; for whatever possessions he may have on earth, whatever health and essential comfort, he is not satisfied if he has not the esteem of men. He values human reason so highly that, whatever advantages he may have on earth, he is not content if he is not also ranked highly in the judgement of man. This is the finest position in the world. Nothing can turn him from that desire, which is the most indelible quality of man’s heart.
And those who must despise men, and put them on a level with the brutes, yet wish to be admired and believed by men, and contradict themselves by their own feelings; their nature, which is stronger than all, convincing them of the greatness of man more forcibly than reason convinces them of their baseness.
405. Contradiction. — Pride counterbalancing all miseries. Man either hides his miseries, or, if he disclose them, glories in knowing them.
406. Pride counterbalances and takes away all miseries. Here is a strange monster and a very plain aberration91. He is fallen from his place and is anxiously seeking it. This is what all men do. Let us see who will have found it.
407. When malice has reason on its side, it becomes proud and parades reason in all its splendour. When austerity or stern choice has not arrived at the true good and must needs return to follow nature, it becomes proud by reason of this return.
408. Evil is easy, and has infinite forms; good is almost unique. But a certain kind of evil is as difficult to find as what we call good; and often on this account such particular evil gets passed off as good. An extraordinary greatness of soul is needed in order to attain92 to it as well as to good.
409. The greatness of man. — The greatness of man is so evident that it is even proved by his wretchedness. For what in animals is nature, we call in man wretchedness, by which we recognise that, his nature being now like that of animals, he has fallen from a better nature which once was his.
For who is unhappy at not being a king, except a deposed king? Was Paulus Aemilius unhappy at being no longer consul26? On the contrary, everybody thought him happy in having been consul, because the office could only be held for a time. But men thought Perseus so unhappy in being no longer king, because the condition of kingship implied his being always king, that they thought it strange that he endured life. Who is unhappy at only having one mouth? And who is not unhappy at having only one eye? Probably no man ever ventured to mourn at not having three eyes. But any one is inconsolable at having none.
410. Perseus, King of Macedon. — Paulus Aemilius reproached Perseus for not killing93 himself.
411. Notwithstanding the sight of all our miseries, which press upon us and take us by the throat, we have an instinct which we cannot repress and which lifts us up.
412. There is internal war in man between reason and the passions.
If he had only reason without passions . . .
If he had only passions without reason . . .
But having both, he cannot be without strife94, being unable to be at peace with the one without being at war with the other. Thus he is always divided against and opposed to himself.
413. This internal war of reason against the passions has made a division of those who would have peace into two sects95. The first would renounce75 their passions and become gods; the others would renounce reason and become brute beasts. (Des Barreaux.) But neither can do so, and reason still remains96, to condemn97 the vileness98 and injustice99 of the passions and to trouble the repose100 of those who abandon themselves to them; and the passions keep always alive in those who would renounce them.
414. Men are so necessarily mad that not to be mad would amount to another form of madness.
415. The nature of man may be viewed in two ways: the one according to its end, and then he is great and incomparable; the other according to the multitude, just as we judge of the nature of the horse and the dog, popularly, by seeing its fleetness, et animum arcendi; and then man is abject101 and vile. These are the two ways which make us judge of him differently and which occasion such disputes among philosophers. For one denies the assumption of the other. One says, “He is not born for this end, for all his actions are repugnant to it.” The other says, “He forsakes102 his end, when he does these base actions.”
416. For Port-Royal. Greatness and wretchedness. — Wretchedness being deduced from greatness, and greatness from wretchedness, some have inferred man’s wretchedness all the more because they have taken his greatness as a proof of it, and others have inferred his greatness with all the more force, because they have inferred it from his very wretchedness. All that the one party has been able to say in proof of his greatness has only served as an argument of his wretchedness to the others, because the greater our fall, the more wretched we are, and vice16 versa. The one party is brought back to the other in an endless circle, it being certain that, in proportion as men possess light, they discover both the greatness and the wretchedness of man. In a word, man knows that he is wretched. He is therefore wretched, because be is so; but he is really great because he knows it.
417. This twofold nature of man is so evident that some have thought that we had two souls. A single subject seemed to them incapable of such sudden variations from unmeasured presumption103 to a dreadful dejection of heart.
418. It is dangerous to make man see too clearly his equality with the brutes without showing him his greatness. It is also dangerous to make his see his greatness too clearly, apart from his vileness. It is still more dangerous to leave him in ignorance of both. But it is very advantageous104 to show him both. Man must not think that he is on a level either with the brutes or with the angels, nor must he be ignorant of both sides of his nature; but he must know both.
419. I will not allow man to depend upon himself, or upon another, to the end that, being without a resting-place and without repose.
420. If he exalt105 himself, I humble him; if he humble himself, I exalt him; and I always contradict him, till he understands that he is an incomprehensible monster.
421. I blame equally those who choose to praise man, those who choose to blame him, and those who choose to amuse themselves; and I can only approve of those who seek with lamentation106.
422. It is good to be tired and wearied by the vain search after the true good, that we may stretch out our arms to the Redeemer.
423. Contraries. After having shown the vileness and the greatness of man. — Let man now know his value. Let him love himself, for there is in him a nature capable of good; but let him not for this reason love the vileness which is in him. Let him despise himself, for this capacity is barren; but let him not therefore despise this natural capacity. Let him hate himself, let him love himself; he has within him the capacity of knowing the truth and of being happy, but he possesses no truth, either constant or satisfactory.
I would then lead man to the desire of finding truth; to be free from passions, and ready to follow it where he may find it, knowing how much his knowledge is obscured by the passions. I would, indeed, that he should hate in himself the lust which determined107 his will by itself so that it may not blind him in making his choice, and may not hinder him when he has chosen.
424. All these contradictions, which seem most to keep me from the knowledge of religion, have led me most quickly to the true one.
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brute
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| n.野兽，兽性 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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din
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| n.喧闹声，嘈杂声 | |
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beak
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| n.鸟嘴，茶壶嘴，钩形鼻 | |
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encompasses
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| v.围绕( encompass的第三人称单数 )；包围；包含；包括 | |
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stoics
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| 禁欲主义者，恬淡寡欲的人，不以苦乐为意的人( stoic的名词复数 ) | |
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feverish
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| adj.发烧的，狂热的，兴奋的 | |
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Christians
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| n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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assays
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| n.化验( assay的名词复数 )；试验；尝试；试金 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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touching
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agility
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malice
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| n.恶意，怨恨，蓄意；[律]预谋 | |
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vices
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| 缺陷( vice的名词复数 )； 恶习； 不道德行为； 台钳 | |
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vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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eloquence
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grandeur
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backwards
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apparently
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nourishment
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| n.食物，营养品；营养情况 | |
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virtues
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| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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23
insinuate
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| vt.含沙射影地说，暗示 | |
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24
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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25
gales
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| 龙猫 | |
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26
consul
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| n.领事；执政官 | |
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27
incipient
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| adj.起初的，发端的，初期的 | |
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28
contemptible
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| adj.可鄙的，可轻视的，卑劣的 | |
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29
vile
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| adj.卑鄙的，可耻的，邪恶的；坏透的 | |
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30
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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31
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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32
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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33
molecules
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| 分子( molecule的名词复数 ) | |
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34
disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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35
humility
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| n.谦逊，谦恭 | |
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36
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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37
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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38
fortifies
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| 筑防御工事于( fortify的第三人称单数 )； 筑堡于； 增强； 强化（食品） | |
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39
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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40
sect
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| n.派别，宗教，学派，派系 | |
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41
derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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derives
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| v.得到( derive的第三人称单数 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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43
discourses
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| 论文( discourse的名词复数 )； 演说； 讲道； 话语 | |
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44
humble
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| adj.谦卑的，恭顺的；地位低下的；v.降低，贬低 | |
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humbly
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| adv. 恭顺地，谦卑地 | |
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46
chastely
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| adv.贞洁地，清高地，纯正地 | |
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conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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51
agitated
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| adj.被鼓动的，不安的 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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licentious
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| adj.放纵的，淫乱的 | |
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54
dishonours
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| 不名誉( dishonour的名词复数 )； 耻辱； 丢脸； 丢脸的人或事 | |
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annihilates
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| n.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的名词复数 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的第三人称单数 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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mingled
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| 混合，混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 )； 混进，与…交往[联系] | |
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harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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phantoms
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| n.鬼怪，幽灵( phantom的名词复数 ) | |
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dread
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| vt.担忧，忧虑；惧怕，不敢；n.担忧，畏惧 | |
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mishaps
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| n.轻微的事故，小的意外( mishap的名词复数 ) | |
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discomforts
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| n.不舒适( discomfort的名词复数 )；不愉快，苦恼 | |
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diversified
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| adj.多样化的，多种经营的v.使多样化，多样化( diversify的过去式和过去分词 )；进入新的商业领域 | |
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abruptly
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| adv.突然地，出其不意地 | |
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demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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humiliated
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| 感到羞愧的 | |
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suppliant
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| adj.哀恳的；n.恳求者，哀求者 | |
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misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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gratuitously
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| 平白 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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conformity
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| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
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72
premises
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| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
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73
ambiguity
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| n.模棱两可；意义不明确 | |
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renounced
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| v.声明放弃( renounce的过去式和过去分词 )；宣布放弃；宣布与…决裂；宣布摒弃 | |
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75
renounce
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| v.放弃；拒绝承认，宣布与…断绝关系 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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license
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| n.执照，许可证，特许；v.许可，特许 | |
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78
invincible
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| adj.不可征服的，难以制服的 | |
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miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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miseries
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| n.痛苦( misery的名词复数 )；痛苦的事；穷困；常发牢骚的人 | |
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81
deposed
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| v.罢免( depose的过去式和过去分词 )；（在法庭上）宣誓作证 | |
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82
ego
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| n.自我，自己，自尊 | |
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83
esteem
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| n.尊敬，尊重；vt.尊重，敬重；把…看作 | |
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esteemed
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| adj.受人尊敬的v.尊敬( esteem的过去式和过去分词 )；敬重；认为；以为 | |
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85
brutes
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| 兽( brute的名词复数 )； 畜生； 残酷无情的人； 兽性 | |
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86
rivalry
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| n.竞争，竞赛，对抗 | |
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87
lust
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| n.性(淫)欲；渴(欲)望；vi.对…有强烈的欲望 | |
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88
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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benevolence
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| n.慈悲，捐助 | |
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90
excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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91
aberration
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| n.离开正路，脱离常规，色差 | |
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92
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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93
killing
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| n.巨额利润；突然赚大钱，发大财 | |
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strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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95
sects
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| n.宗派，教派( sect的名词复数 ) | |
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96
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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97
condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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98
vileness
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| n.讨厌，卑劣 | |
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99
injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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100
repose
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| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
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101
abject
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| adj.极可怜的，卑屈的 | |
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102
forsakes
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| 放弃( forsake的第三人称单数 )； 弃绝； 抛弃； 摒弃 | |
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103
presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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104
advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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105
exalt
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| v.赞扬，歌颂，晋升，提升 | |
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106
lamentation
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| n.悲叹，哀悼 | |
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107
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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