2. But, on the other hand, we cannot doubt (Chap. VI. Sec. 3), that, if without destroying the form of dominion, the sword of the dictator might be permanent, and only terrible to the wicked, evils will never grow to such a pitch, that they cannot be eradicated24 or amended25. In order, therefore, to secure all these conditions, we have said, that there is to be a council of syndics subordinate to the supreme council, to the end that the sword of the dictator should be permanent in the hands not of any natural person, but of a civil person, whose members are too numerous to divide the dominion amongst themselves (Chap. IX. Secs. 1, 2), or to combine in any wickedness. To which is to be added, that they are forbidden to fill any other office in the dominion, that they are not the paymasters of the soldiery, and, lastly, that they are of an age to prefer actual security to things new and perilous26. Wherefore the dominion is in no danger from them, and consequently they cannot, and in fact will not be a terror to the good, but only to the wicked. For as they are less powerful to accomplish criminal designs, so are they more so to restrain wickedness. For, not to mention that they can resist it in its beginnings (since the council lasts for ever), they are also sufficiently27 numerous to dare to accuse and condemn28 this or that influential29 man without fear of his enmity; especially as they vote by ballot30, and the sentence is pronounced in the name of the entire council.
3. But the tribunes of the commons at Rome were likewise regularly appointed; but they were too weak to restrain the power of a Scipio, and had besides to submit to the senate their plans for the public welfare, 3 which also frequently eluded31 them, by contriving33 that the one whom the senators were least afraid of should be most popular with the commons. Besides which, the tribunes' authority was supported against the patricians34 by the favour of the commons. and whenever they convoked36 the commons, it looked as if they were raising a sedition37 rather than assembling a council. Which inconveniences have certainly no place in the dominion which we have described in the last two chapters.
4. However, this authority of the syndics will only be able to secure the preservation of the form of the dominion, and thus to prevent the laws from being broken, or anyone from gaining by transgressing38; but will by no means suffice to prevent the growth of vices39, which cannot be forbidden by law, such as those into which men fall from excess of leisure, and from which the ruin of a dominion not uncommonly40 follows. For men in time of peace lay aside fear, and gradually from being fierce savages41 become civilized42 or humane43, and from being humane become soft and sluggish44, and seek to excel one another not in virtue, but in ostentation45 and luxury. And hence they begin to put off their native manners and to put on foreign ones, that is, to become slaves.
5. To avoid these evils many have tried to establish sumptuary laws; but in vain. For all laws which can be broken without any injury to another, are counted but a laughing-stock, and are so far from bridling46 the desires and lusts47 of men, that on the contrary they stimulate48 them. For "we are ever eager for forbidden fruit, and desire what is denied." 4 Nor do idle men ever lack ability to elude32 the laws which are instituted about things, which cannot absolutely be forbidden, as banquets, plays, ornaments49, and the like, of which only the excess is bad; and that is to be judged according to the individual's fortune, so that it cannot be determined50 by any general law.
6. I conclude, therefore, that the common vices of peace, of which we are here speaking, are never to be directly, but indirectly51 forbidden; that is, by laying such foundations of dominion, that the result may be, that the majority, I do not say are anxious to live wisely (for that is impossible), but are guided by those passions whence the republic has most advantage. And therefore the chief point to be studied is, that the rich may be, if not thrifty52, yet avaricious53. For there is no doubt, that, if this passion of avarice54, which is general and lasting55, be encouraged by the desire of glory, most people would set their chief affection upon increasing their property without disgrace, in order to acquire honours, while avoiding extreme infamy56. If then we examine the foundations of both kinds of aristocracy which I have explained in the last two chapters, we shall see, that this very result follows from them. For the number of rulers in both is so large, that most of the rich have access to government and to the offices of the dominion open to them.
7. But if it be further ordained57 (as we said, Chap. VIII. Sec. 47), that patricians who are insolvent58 be deposed59 from patrician35 rank, and that those who have lost their property by misfortune be restored to their former position, there is no doubt that all will try their best to keep their property. Moreover, they will never desire foreign costumes, nor disdain60 their native ones, if it is by law appointed, that patricians and candidates for office should be distinguished61 by a special robe, concerning which see Chap. VIII. Secs. 25, 47. And besides these, other means may be devised in every dominion agreeable to the nature of its situation and the national genius, and herein it is above all to be studied, that the subjects may do their duty rather spontaneously than under pressure of the law.
8. For a dominion, that looks no farther than to lead men by fear, will be rather free from vices, than possessed62 of virtue. But men are so to be led, that they may think that they are not led, but living after their own mind, and according to their free decision; and so that they are restrained only by love of liberty, desire to increase their property, and hope of gaining the honours of the dominion. But effigies63, triumphs, and other incitements to virtue, are signs rather of slavery than liberty. For rewards of virtue are granted to slaves, not freemen. I admit, indeed, that men are very much stimulated64 by these incitements; but, as in the first instance, they are awarded to great men, so afterwards, with the growth of envy, they are granted to cowards and men swollen65 with the extent of their wealth, to the great indignation of all good men. Secondly66, those, who boast of their ancestors' effigies and triumphs, think they are wronged, if they are not preferred to others. Lastly, not to mention other objections, it is certain that equality, which once cast off the general liberty is lost, can by no means be maintained, from the time that peculiar67 honours are by public law decreed to any man renowned68 for his virtue.
9. After which premisses, let us now see whether dominions of this kind can be destroyed by any cause to which blame attaches. But if any dominion can be everlasting69, that will necessarily be so, whose constitution being once rightly instituted remains unbroken. For the constitution is the soul of a dominion. Therefore, if it is preserved, so is the dominion. But a constitution cannot remain unconquered, unless it is defended alike by reason and common human passion: otherwise, if it relies only on the help of reason, it is certainly weak and easily overcome. Now since the fundamental constitution of both kinds of aristocracy has been shown to agree with reason and common human passion, we can therefore assert that these, if any kinds of dominion, will be eternal, in other words, that they cannot be destroyed by any cause to which blame attaches, but only by some inevitable fate.
10. But it may still be objected to us, that, although the constitution of dominion above set forth70 is defended by reason and common human passion, yet for all that it may at some time be overpowered. For there is no passion, that is not sometimes overpowered, by a stronger contrary one; for we frequently see the fear of death overpowered by the greed for another's property. Men, who are running away in panic fear from the enemy, can be stopped by the fear of nothing else, but throw themselves into rivers, or rush into fire, to escape the enemy's steel. In whatever degree, therefore, a commonwealth71 is rightly ordered, and its laws well made; yet in the extreme difficulties of a dominion, when all, as sometimes happens, are seized by a sort of panic terror, all, without regard to the future or the laws, approve only that which their actual fear suggests, all turn towards the man who is renowned for his victories, and set him free from the laws, and (establishing thereby the worst of precedents), continue him in command, and entrust72 to his fidelity73 all affairs of state: and this was, in fact, the cause of the destruction of the Roman dominion. But to answer this objection, I say, first, that in a rightly constituted republic such terror does not arise but from a due cause. And so such terror and consequent confusion can be attributed to no cause avoidable by human foresight74. In the next place, it is to be observed, that in a republic such as we have above described, it is impossible (Chap. VIII. Secs. 9, 25) for this or that man so to distinguish himself by the report of his virtue, as to turn towards himself the attention of all, but he must have many rivals favoured by others. And so, although from terror there arise some confusion in the republic, yet no one will be able to elude the law and declare the election of anyone to an illegal military command, without its being immediately disputed by other candidates; and to settle the dispute, it will, in the end, be necessary to have recourse to the constitution ordained once for all, and approved by all, and to order the affairs of the dominion according to the existing laws. I may therefore absolutely assert, that as the aristocracy, which is in the hands of one city only, so especially that which is in the hands of several, is everlasting, or, in other words, can be dissolved or changed into another form by no internal cause.
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1 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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2 dominion | |
n.统治,管辖,支配权;领土,版图 | |
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3 dominions | |
统治权( dominion的名词复数 ); 领土; 疆土; 版图 | |
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4 discourses | |
论文( discourse的名词复数 ); 演说; 讲道; 话语 | |
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5 blemishes | |
n.(身体的)瘢点( blemish的名词复数 );伤疤;瑕疵;污点 | |
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6 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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7 excellence | |
n.优秀,杰出,(pl.)优点,美德 | |
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8 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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9 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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10 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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11 ordinances | |
n.条例,法令( ordinance的名词复数 ) | |
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12 thereby | |
adv.因此,从而 | |
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13 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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14 impunity | |
n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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15 haughty | |
adj.傲慢的,高傲的 | |
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16 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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17 tumour | |
n.(tumor)(肿)瘤,肿块 | |
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18 displeasing | |
不愉快的,令人发火的 | |
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19 monarchy | |
n.君主,最高统治者;君主政体,君主国 | |
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20 peril | |
n.(严重的)危险;危险的事物 | |
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21 interval | |
n.间隔,间距;幕间休息,中场休息 | |
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22 dictatorial | |
adj. 独裁的,专断的 | |
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23 preservation | |
n.保护,维护,保存,保留,保持 | |
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24 eradicated | |
画着根的 | |
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25 Amended | |
adj. 修正的 动词amend的过去式和过去分词 | |
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26 perilous | |
adj.危险的,冒险的 | |
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27 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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28 condemn | |
vt.谴责,指责;宣判(罪犯),判刑 | |
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29 influential | |
adj.有影响的,有权势的 | |
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30 ballot | |
n.(不记名)投票,投票总数,投票权;vi.投票 | |
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31 eluded | |
v.(尤指机敏地)避开( elude的过去式和过去分词 );逃避;躲避;使达不到 | |
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32 elude | |
v.躲避,困惑 | |
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33 contriving | |
(不顾困难地)促成某事( contrive的现在分词 ); 巧妙地策划,精巧地制造(如机器); 设法做到 | |
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34 patricians | |
n.(古罗马的)统治阶层成员( patrician的名词复数 );贵族,显贵 | |
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35 patrician | |
adj.贵族的,显贵的;n.贵族;有教养的人;罗马帝国的地方官 | |
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36 convoked | |
v.召集,召开(会议)( convoke的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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37 sedition | |
n.煽动叛乱 | |
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38 transgressing | |
v.超越( transgress的现在分词 );越过;违反;违背 | |
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39 vices | |
缺陷( vice的名词复数 ); 恶习; 不道德行为; 台钳 | |
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40 uncommonly | |
adv. 稀罕(极,非常) | |
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41 savages | |
未开化的人,野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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42 civilized | |
a.有教养的,文雅的 | |
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43 humane | |
adj.人道的,富有同情心的 | |
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44 sluggish | |
adj.懒惰的,迟钝的,无精打采的 | |
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45 ostentation | |
n.夸耀,卖弄 | |
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46 bridling | |
给…套龙头( bridle的现在分词 ); 控制; 昂首表示轻蔑(或怨忿等); 动怒,生气 | |
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47 lusts | |
贪求(lust的第三人称单数形式) | |
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48 stimulate | |
vt.刺激,使兴奋;激励,使…振奋 | |
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49 ornaments | |
n.装饰( ornament的名词复数 );点缀;装饰品;首饰v.装饰,点缀,美化( ornament的第三人称单数 ) | |
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50 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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51 indirectly | |
adv.间接地,不直接了当地 | |
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52 thrifty | |
adj.节俭的;兴旺的;健壮的 | |
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53 avaricious | |
adj.贪婪的,贪心的 | |
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54 avarice | |
n.贪婪;贪心 | |
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55 lasting | |
adj.永久的,永恒的;vbl.持续,维持 | |
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56 infamy | |
n.声名狼藉,出丑,恶行 | |
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57 ordained | |
v.任命(某人)为牧师( ordain的过去式和过去分词 );授予(某人)圣职;(上帝、法律等)命令;判定 | |
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58 insolvent | |
adj.破产的,无偿还能力的 | |
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59 deposed | |
v.罢免( depose的过去式和过去分词 );(在法庭上)宣誓作证 | |
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60 disdain | |
n.鄙视,轻视;v.轻视,鄙视,不屑 | |
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61 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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62 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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63 effigies | |
n.(人的)雕像,模拟像,肖像( effigy的名词复数 ) | |
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64 stimulated | |
a.刺激的 | |
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65 swollen | |
adj.肿大的,水涨的;v.使变大,肿胀 | |
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66 secondly | |
adv.第二,其次 | |
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67 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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68 renowned | |
adj.著名的,有名望的,声誉鹊起的 | |
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69 everlasting | |
adj.永恒的,持久的,无止境的 | |
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70 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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71 commonwealth | |
n.共和国,联邦,共同体 | |
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72 entrust | |
v.信赖,信托,交托 | |
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73 fidelity | |
n.忠诚,忠实;精确 | |
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74 foresight | |
n.先见之明,深谋远虑 | |
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