Belief.
EVERYONE knows the difference between imagining a thing and believing in its existence, between supposing a proposition and acquiescing1 in its truth. In the case of acquiescence2 or belief, the object is not only apprehended4 by the mind, but is held to have reality. Belief is thus the mental state or function of cognizing reality. As used in the following pages,'Belief' will mean every degree of assurance, including the highest possible certainty and conviction.
There are, as we know, two ways of studying every psychic5 state. First, the way of analysis: What does it consist in? What is its inner nature? Of what sort of mind-stuff is it composed? Second, the way of history: What are its conditions of production, and its connection with other facts?
Into the first way we cannot go very far. In its inner nature, belief or the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling more allied6 to the emotions than anything else. Mr. Bagehot distinctly calls it the 'emotion' of conviction. I just now spoke7 of it as acquiescence. It resembles more than anything what in the psychology8 of volition9 we know as consent. Consent is recognized by all to be a manifestation10 of our active nature. It would naturally be described by such terms as 'willingness' or the 'turning of our disposition11.' What characterizes both consent and belief is the cessation of theoretic agitation12, though the advent13 of an idea which is inwardly stable, and fills the mind solidly to the exclusion14 of contradictory15 ideas. When this is the case, motor effects are apt to follow. Hence the states of consent and belief, characterized by repose16 on the purely17 intellectual side, are both intimately connected with subsequent practical activity. This inward stability of the mind's content is as characteristic of disbelief as of belief. But we shall presently see that we never disbelieve anything except for the reason that we believe something else which contradicts the rest thing. 2 Disbelief is thus an incidental complication to belief, and need not be considered by itself.
The true opposite of belief, psychologically considered, are doubt and inquiry18, not disbelief. In both these states the content of our mind is in unrest, and the emotion engendered19 thereby20 is, like the emotion of belief itself, perfectly21 distinct, but perfectly indescribable in words. Both sorts of emotion may be pathologically exalted22. One of the charms of drunkenness unquestionably lies in the deepening of the sense of reality and truth which is gained therein. In whatever light things may then appear to us, they seem more utterly23 what they are, more 'utterly utter' than when we are sober. This goes to a fully24 unutterable extreme in the nitrous oxide25 intoxication26, in which a man s very soul will sweat with conviction, and he be all the while unable to tell what he is convinced of at all. 3 The pathological state opposed to this solidity and deepening has been called the questioning mania27 (Grübelsucht by the Germans). It is sometimes found as a substantive28 affection, paroxysmal or chronic30, and consists in the inability to rest in any conception, and the need of having it confirmed and explained 'Why do I stand here where I stand?' 'Why is a glass a glass, a chair a chair' 'How is it that men are only of the size they are? Why not as big as houses,' etc., etc. 4
There is, it is true, another pathological state which is as far removed from doubt as from belief, and which some may prefer to consider the proper contrary of the latter state of mind. I refer to the feeling that everything is hollow, unreal, dead. I shall speak of this state again upon a later page. The point I wish to notice here is simply that belief and disbelief are but two aspects of one psychic state.
John Mill, reviewing various opinions about belief, comes to the conclusion that no account of it can be given:
What," he says "is the difference to our minds between thinking of a reality and representing to ourselves an imaginary picture? I confess I can see no escape from the opinion that the distinction is ultimate and primordial31. There is no more difficulty in holding it to be so than in holding the difference between a sensation and an idea to be primordial. It seems almost another aspect of the same difference. . . . I cannot help thinking, therefore, that there is in the remembrance of a real fact, as distinguished32 from that of a thought, an element which does not consist . . . in a difference between the mere33 ideas which are present to the mind in the two cases. This element, howsoever we define it, constitutes belief, and is the difference between Memory and Imagination. From whatever direction we approach, this difference seems to close our path. When me arrive at it, we seem to have reached, as it were, the central point of our intellectual nature, presupposed and built upon in every attempt we make to explain the more recondite34 phenomena35 of our mental being." 5
If the words of Mill be taken to apply to the mere subjective36 analysis of belief -- to the question, What does it feel like when we have it? -- they must be held, on the whole, to be correct. Belief, the sense of reality, feels like itself -- that is about as much as we can say.
Prof. Brentano, in an admirable chapter of his Psychologie, expresses this by saying that conception and belief (which he names judgment37) are two different fundamental psychic phenomena. What I myself have called (Vol. I, p.276) the 'object' of thought may be comparatively simple, like "Ha! what a pain," or "It-thunders"; or it may becomplex, like "Columbus-discovered-America-in-1492," or "There-exists-an-all-wise-Creator-of-the-world" In either case, however, the mere thought of the object may exist as something quite distinct from the belief in its reality. The belief, as Brentano says, presupposes the mere thought:
"Every object comes into consciousness in a twofold way, as simply thought of [vorgestellt] and as admitted [anerkaant] or denied. The relation is analogous38 to that which is assumed by most philosophers(by Kant no less than by Aristotle) to obtain between mere thought and desire. Nothing is ever desired without being thought of; but the desiring is nevertheless a second quite new and peculiar39 form of relation to the object, a second quite new way of receiving it into consciousness. No more is anything judged [i.e., believed or disbelieved] which is not thought of too. But we must insist that, so soon as the object of a thought becomes the object of an assenting41 or rejecting judgment, our consciousness steps into an entirely42 new relation towards it. It is then twice present in consciousness, as thought of, and as held for real or denied; just as when desire awakens43 for it, it is both thought and simultaneously44 desired." (P. 266.)
The commonplace doctrine45 of 'judgment' is that it consists in the combination of 'ideas' by a 'copula' into a 'proposition,' which may be of various sorts, as a formative, negative, hypothetical, etc. But who does not see that in a disbelieved or doubted or interrogative or conditional46 proposition, the ideas are combined in the same identical way in which they are in a proposition which is solidly believed? The way in which the ideas are combined with inner constitution the thoughts object or content. That object is sometimes an articulated whole with relations between its parts, amongst which relations, that of predicate to subject may be one. But when we have got our object with its inner constitution thus defined in a proposition, then the question comes up regarding the object as a whole: 'Is it a real object? is this proposition a true proposition or not?' And in the answer Yes to this question lies that new psychic act which Brentano calls 'judgment,' but which I prefer to call 'belief.'
In every proposition, then, so far as it is believed, questioned, or disbelieved, four elements are to be distinguished, the subject, the predicate, and their relation(of whatever sort it be) -- these form the object of belief -- and finally the psychic attitude in which our mind stands towards the proposition taken as a whole-and this is the belief itself. 9
Admitting, then, that this attitude is a state of consciousness sui generis, about which nothing more can be said in the way of internal analysis, let us proceed to the second way of studying the subject of belief: Under what circumstances do we think things real? We shall soon see how much matter this gives us to discuss.
The Various Orders of Reality.
Suppose a new-born mind, entirely blank and waiting for experience to begin. Suppose that it begins in the forms of visual impression (whether faint or vivid is immaterial) of a lighted candle against a dark background, and nothing else, so that whilst this image lasts it constitutes the entire universe known to the mind in question. Suppose, moreover (to simplify the hypothesis), that the candle is only imaginary, and that no 'original' of it is recognized by us psychologists outside. Will this hallucinatory candle be believed in, will it have a real existence for the mind?
What possible sense (for that mind) would a suspicion have that the candle was not real? What would doubt or disbelief of it imply? When we, the onlooking47 psychologists, say the candle is unreal, we mean something quite definite, viz., that there is a world known to us which is real, and to which we perceive that the candle does not belong; it belongs exclusively to that individual mind, has no status anywhere else, etc. It exists, to be sure, in a fashion, for it forms the content of that mind's hallucination; but the hallucination itself, though unquestionably it is a sort of existing fact, has no knowledge of other facts; and since those other facts are the realities par29 excellence48 for us, and the only things we believe in, the candle is simply outside of our reality and belief altogether.
By the hypothesis, however, the mind which sees the candle can spin no such considerations as these about it, for of other facts, actual or possible, it has no inkling whatever. That candle is its all, its absolute. Its entire faculty49 of attention is absorbed by it. It is, it is that; it is there; no other possible candle, or quality of this candle, no other possible place, or possible object in the place, no alternative, in short, suggests itself as even conceivable; so how can the mind help believing the candle real? The supposition that it might possibly not do so is, under the supposed conditions, unintelligible50. 10
This is what Spinonza long ago announced:
"Let us conceive a boy," he said, "imagining to himself a horse, and taking note of nothing else. As this imagination involves the existence of the horse, and the boy has no perception which annuls51 its resistance, he will necessarily contemplate52 the horse as present, nor will he be able to doubt of its existence, however little certain of it he maybe. I deny that a man in so far as he imagines [percipit] affirms nothing. For what is it to imagine a winged horse but to affirm that, the horse [that horse, namely] has wings? For if the mind had nothing before it but the winged horse it would contemplate the same as present, would have no cause to doubt of its existence, nor any power of dissenting53 from its existence, unless the imagination of the winged horse were joined to an idea which contradicted [tollit] its existence."(Ethics, 11, 49, Scholium.)
The sense that anything we think of is unreal can only come, then, when that thing is contradicted by some other thing of which we think. Any object which remains54 uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited55 as absolute reality.
Now, how comes it that one thing thought of can be contradicted by another? It cannot unless it begins the quarrel by saying something inadmissible about that other. Take the mind with the candle, or the boy with the horse. If either of them say, 'That candle or that horse, even when I don't see it, exists in the outer world,' he pushes into 'the outer world,' an object which may be incompatible56 with everything which he otherwise knows of that world. If so, he must take his choice of which to hold by, the present perceptions or the other knowledge of the world. If he holds to the other knowledge, the present perceptions are contradicted, so far as their relation to that world goes. Candle and horse, whatever they may be, are not existents in outward space. They are existents, of course; they are mental objects; mental objects have existence as mental objects. But they are situated57 in their own spaces, the space in which they severally appear, and neither of those spaces is the space in which the realities called 'the outer world' exist.
Take again the horse with wings. If I merely dream of a horse with wings, my horse interferes58 with nothing else and has not to be contradicted. That horse, its wings, and its place, are all equally real. That horse exists no other-wise than as winged, and is moreover really there, for that place exists no otherwise than as the place of that horse, and claims as yet no connection with the other places of the world. But if with this horse I make an inroad into the world otherwise known, and say, for example, 'That is my old mare59 Maggie, having grown a pair of wings where she stands in her stall,' the whole case is altered; for now the horse and place are identified with a horse and place otherwise known, and what is known of the latter objects is incompatible with what is perceived with the former. 'Maggie in her stall with wings! Never!' The wings are unreal, then, visionary. I have dreamed a lie about Maggie in her stall.
The reader will recognize in these two cases the two sorts of judgment called in the logic-books existential and attributive respectively. 'The candle exists as an outer reality' is an existential, 'My Maggie has got a pair of wings' is an attributive, proposition; 14 and it follows from what was first said that all propositions, whether attributive or existential, are believed through the very fact of being conceived, unless they clash with other propositions believed at the same time, by alarming that their terms are the same with the terms of these other propositions. A dream-candle has existence, true enough; but not the same existence (existence for itself, namely, or extra mentem meam) which the candles of waking perception have. A dream-horse has wings; but then neither horse nor wings are the same with any horses or wings known to memory. That we call at any moment think of the same thing which at any former moment we thought of is the ultimate law of our intellectual constitution. But when we now think of it incompatibly60 with our other ways of thinking it, then we must choose which way to stand by, for we cannot continue to think in two contradictory ways at once. The whole distinction of real and unreal, the whole psychology of belief, disbelief, and doubt, is thus grounded on two mental facts -- first, that we are liable to think differently of the same; and second, that when we have done so, we can choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard.
The subjects adhered to become real subjects, the attributes adhered to real attributes, the existence adhered to real existence; whilst the subjects disregarded become imaginary subjects, the attributes disregarded erroneous it attributes, and the existence disregarded an existence into men's land, in the limbo61 'where footless fancies dwell.' The real things are, in Mr. Taine's terminology62, the reductives of the things judged unreal.
The Many Worlds.
Habitually63 and practically we do not count these disregarded things as existents at all. For them Vœ victis is the law in the popular philosophy; they are not even treated as appearances; they are treated as if they were mere waste, equivalent to nothing at all. To the genuinely philosophic65 mind, however, they still have existence, though not the same existence, as the real things. As objects of fancy, as errors, as occupants of dreamland, etc., they are in their way as indefeasible parts of life, as undeniable features of the Universe, as the realities are in their way. The total world of which the philosophers must take account is thus composed of the realities plus the fancies and illusions.
Two sub-universes, at least, connected by relations which philosophy tries to ascertain66! Really there are more than two sub-universes of which we take account, some of us of this one, and others of that. For there are various categories both of illusion and of reality, and alongside of the world of absolute error (i.e., error confined to single individuals) but still within the world of absolute reality (i.e., reality believed by the complete philosopher) there is the world of collective error, there are the worlds of abstract reality, of relative or practical reality, of ideal relations, and there is the supernatural world. The popular mind conceives of all these sub-worlds more or less discontentedly; and when dealing68 with one of them, forgets for the time being its relations to the rest. The complete philosopher is he who seeks not only to assign to every given object of his thought its right place in one or other of these sub-worlds, but he also seeks to determine the relation of each sub-world to the others in the total world which is.
The most important sub-universes commonly discriminated69 from each other and recognized by most of us as existing, each with its own special and separate style of existence, are the following:
(1) The world of sense, or of physical 'things' as we instinctively70 apprehend3 them, with such qualities as heat, color, and sound, and such 'forces' as life, chemical affinity72, gravity, electricity, all existing as such within or on the surface of the things.
(2) The world of science, or of physical things as the learned conceive them, with secondary qualities and 'forces' (in the popular sense) excluded, and nothing real but solids and fluids and their 'laws' (i.e., customs) of motion. 15
(3) The world of ideal relations, or abstract truths believed or believable by all, and expressed in logical, mathematical, metaphysical, ethical73, or aesthetic74 propositions.
(4) The world of 'idols76 of the tribe,' illusions or prejudices common to the race. All educated people recognize these as forming one sub-universe. The motion of the sky round the earth, for example, belongs to this world. That motion is not a recognized item of any of the other worlds; but as an 'idol75 of the tribe' it really exists. For certain philosophers 'matter' exists only as an idol of the tribe. For science, the 'secondary qualities' of matter are but 'idols of the tribe.'
(5) The various supernatural worlds, the Christian77 heaven and hell, the world of the Hindoo mythology78, the world of Swedenborg's visa et nudita, etc. Each of these is a consistent system, with definite relations among its own parts. Neptune's trident, e.g., has no status of reality whatever in the Christian heaven; but within the classic Olympus certain definite things are true of it, whether one believe in the reality of the classic mythology as a whole or not. The various worlds of deliberate fable79 may be ranked with these worlds of faith -- the world of the Iliad, that of King Lear, of the Pickwick Pacers, etc. 16
(6) The various worlds of individual opinion, as numerous as men are.
(7) The worlds of sheer madness and vagary80, also indefinitely numerous.
Every object we think of gets at last referred to one world or another of this or of some similar list. It settles into our belief as a common-sense object, a scientific object, an abstract object, a mythological81 object, an object of some one's mistaken conception, or a madman's object; and it reaches this state sometimes immediately, but often only after being hustled83 and bandied about amongst other objects until it finds some which will tolerate its presence and stand in relations to it which nothing contradicts. The molecules84 and ether-waves of the scientific world, for example, simply kick the object's warmth and color out, they refuse to have any relations with them. But the world of 'idols of the tribe' stands ready to take them in. Just so the world of classic myth takes up the winged horse; the world of individual hallucination, the vision of the candle; the world of abstract truth, the proposition that justice is kingly, though no actual king be just. The various worlds themselves, however, appear (as aforesaid) to most men's minds in no very definitely conceived relation to each other, and our attention, when it turns to one, is apt to drop the others for the time being out of its account. Propositions concerning the different worlds are made from 'different points of view'; and in this more or less chaotic85 state the consciousness of most thinkers remains to the end. Each world whilst it is attended to is real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses86 with the attention.
The World of 'practical Realities.'
Each thinker, however, has dominant87 habits of attention; and these practically elect from among the various worlds some one to be for him the world of ultimate realities. From this world's objects he does not appeal. Whatever positively88 contradicts them must get into another world or die. The horse, e.g., may have wings to its heart's content, so long as it does not pretend to be the real world's horse -- that horse is absolutely wingless. For most men, as we shall immediately see, the 'things of sense' hold this prerogative89 position, and are the absolutely real world's nucleus90. Other things, to be sure, may be real for this man or for that things of science, abstract moral relations, things of the Christian theology, or what not. But even for the special man, these things are usually real with a less real reality than that of the things of sense. They are taken less seriously; and the very utmost that can be said for anyone's belief in them is that it is as strong as his 'belief in his own senses. 17
In all this the everlasting91 partiality of our nature shows itself, our inveterate92 propensity93 to choice. For, in the strict and ultimate sense of the word existence, everything which can be thought of at all exists as some sort of object, whether mythical94 object, individual thinker's object, or object in outer space and for intelligence at large. Errors, fictions, tribal95 beliefs, are parts of the whole great Universe which God has made, and He must have meant all these things to be in it, each in its respective- place. But for us finite creatures, "'tis to consider too curiously96 to consider so." The mere fact of appearing as an object at all is not enough to constitute reality. That may be metaphysical reality, reality for God; but what we need is practical reality, reality for ourselves; and, to have that, an object must not only appear, but it must appear both interesting and important. The worlds whose objects are neither interesting nor important we treat simply negatively, we brand them as unreal.
In the relative sense, then, the sense in which we contrast reality with simple unreality, and in which one thing is said to have more reality than another, and to be more believed, reality means simply relation to our emotional and active life. This is the only sense which the word ever has in the mouths of practical men. In this sense, whatever excites and stimulates97 our interest is real; whenever an object so appeals to us that we turn to it, accept it, fill our mind with it, or practically take account of it, so far it is real for us, and we believe it. Whenever, on the contrary, we ignore it, fail to consider it or act upon it, despise it, reject it, forget it, so far it is unreal for us and disbelieved Hume's account of the matter was then essentially98 correct, when he said that belief in anything was simply the having the idea of it in a lively and active manner:
"I say, then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object than the imagination alone is ever able to attain99. . . . It consists not in the peculiar nature or order of the ideas, but in the manner of their conception and in their feeling to the mind. I confess that it is impossible perfectly to explain this feeling or manner of conception. . . . Its true and proper name . . . is belief, which is a term that everyone sufficiently100 understands in common life. And in philosophy we can go no farther than assert that belief is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the idea of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. 18 It gives them more weight and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; enforces them in the mind; gives them a superior influence on the passions, and renders them the governing principle in our actions." 19
Or as Prof. Bain puts it: "In its essential character, belief is a phase of our active nature -- otherwise called the Will." 20
"The object of belief, then, reality or real existence, in something quite different from all the other predicates which a subject may possess. Those are properties intellectually or sensibly intuited. When we add any one of them to the subject, we increase the intrinsic content of the latter, we enrich its picture in our mind. But adding reality does not enrich the picture in any such inward way; it leaves it inwardly as it finds it, and only fixes it and stamps it in to us.
"The real," as Kant says, "contains no more than the possible. A hundred real dollars do not contain a penny more than a hundred possible dollars. . . . By whatever, and by however many, predicates I may think a thing, nothing is added to it if I add that the thing exists. . . . Whatever, therefore, our concept of an object may contain, we must always step outside of it in order to attribute to it existence." 21
The 'stepping outside' of it is the establishment either of immediate82 practical relations between it and ourselves, or of relations between it and other objects with which we have immediate practical relations. Relations of this sort, which are as yet not transcended101 or superseded102 by others, are ipso facto real relations, and confer reality upon their objective term. The fons et origo of all reality, whether from the absolute or the practical point of view, is thus subjective, is ourselves. As bare logical thinkers, without emotional reaction, we give reality to whatever objects we think of, for they are really phenomena, or objects of our pausing thought, if nothing more. But, as thinkers with emotional reaction, to give what seems to be a still higher degree of reality to whatever things we select and emphasize and turn to WITH A WILL. These are our living realities; and not only these, but all the other things which are intimately connected with these. Reality, starting from our Ego67, thus sheds itself from point to point-first, upon all objects which have an immediate sting of interest for our Ego in them, and next, upon the objects most continuously related with these. It only fails when the connecting thread is lost. A whole system may be real, if it only hang to our Ego by one immediately stinging term. But what contradicts any such stinging term, even though it be another stinging term itself, is either not believed, or only believe drifter settlement of the dispute.
We reach thus the important conclusion that our own reality, that sense of our own, life which we at every moment possess, is the ultimate of ultimates for our belief. 'As sure as I exist!' -- this is our uttermost warrant for the being of all other things. As Descartes made the indubitable reality of the cogito go bail103 for the reality of all that the cogito involved, so we all of us, feeling our own present reality with absolutely coercive force, ascribe an all but equal degree of reality, first to whatever things we lay hold on with a sense of personal need, and second, to whatever farther things continuously belong with these. "Mein Jetzt und Hier," as Prof. Lipps says, "ist der letzte Angelpunkt für alle Wirklichkeit, also alle Erkenntniss."
The world of living realities as contrasted with unrealities is thus anchored in the Ego, considered as an active and emotional term. 22 That is the hook from which the rest dangles104, the absolute support. And as from a painted hook it has been said that one can only hang a painted chain, so conversely, from a real hook only a real chain can properly be hung. Whatever things have intimate and continuous connection with my life are things of whose reality I cannot doubt. Whatever things fail to establish this connection are things which are practically no better for me than if they existed not at all.
In certain forms of melancholic105 perversion106 of the sensibilities and reactive powers, nothing touches us intimately, rouses us, or wakens natural feeling. The consequence is the complaint so often heard from melancholic patients, that nothing is believed in by them as it used to be, and that all sense of reality is fled from life. They are sheathed107 in india-rubber; nothing penetrates108 to the quick or draws blood, as it were. According to Griesinger, "I see, I hear!" such patients say, 'but the objects do not reach me, it is as if there were a wall between me and the outer world!"
"In such patients there often is an alteration109 of the cutaneous sensibility, such that things feel indistinct or sometimes rough and woolly. But even were this change always present, it would not completely explain the psychic phenomenon . . . which reminds us more of the alteration in our psychic relations to the outer world which advancing age on the one hand, and on the other emotions and passions, may bring about in childhood we feel ourselves to be closer to the world of sensible phenomena, we lire immediately with them and in them; an intimately vital tie binds110 us and them together. But with the ripening111 of reflection this tie is loosened, the warmth of our interest cools, things look differently to us, and we act more as foreigners to the outer world, even though we know it a great deal better. Joy and expansive emotions in general draw it nearer to us again. Everything makes a more lively impression, and with the quick immediate return of this warm receptivity for sense-impressions, joy makes us feel young again. In depressing emotions it is the other way. Outer things, whether living or inorganic113, suddenly grow cold and foreign to us, and even our favorite objects of interest feel as if they belonged to us no more. Under these circumstances, receiving no longer from anything a lively impression, we cease to turn towards outer things, and the sense of inward loneliness grows upon us. . . . Where there is no strong intelligence to control this blasé condition, this psychic coldness and lack of interest, the issue of these states in which all seems so cold and hollow, the heart dried up, the world grown dead and empty, is often suicide or the deeper forms of insanity114. 23
The Paramount115 Reality of Sensations.
But now we are met by questions of detail. What does this stirring, this exciting power, this interest, consist in, which some objects have? which are those 'intimate relations' with our life which give reality? And what things stand in these relations immediately, and what others are so closely connected with the former that (in Hume's language) we 'carry our disposition' also on to them?
In a simple and direct way these questions cannot be answered at all. The whole history of human thought is but an unfinished attempt to answer them. For what have men been trying to find out, since men were men, but just those things: "Where do our true interests lie -- which relations shall we call the intimate and real ones -- which things shall we call living realities and which not?" A few psychological points can, however, be made clear.
Any relation to our mind at all, in the absence of a stronger relation, suffices to make an object real. The barest appeal to our attention is enough for that. Revert116 to the beginning of the chapter, and take the candle entering the vacant mind. The mind was waiting for just some such object to make its spring upon. It makes its spring and the candle is believed. But when the candle appears at the same time with other objects, it must run the gauntlet of their rivalry117, and then it becomes a question which of the various candidates for attention shall compel belief. As a rule we believe as much as we can. We would believe everything if we only could. When objects are represented by us quite unsystematically they conflict but little with each other, and the number of them which in this chaotic manner we can believe is limitless. The primitive118 savage119's mind is a jungle in which hallucinations, dreams, superstitions121, conceptions, and sensible objects all flourish alongside of each other, unregulated except by the attention turning in this way or in that. The child's mind is the same. It is only as objects become permanent and their relations fixed122 that discrepancies123 and contradictions are felt and must be settled in some stable way. As a, rule, the success with which a contradicted object maintains itself in our belief is proportional to several qualities which it must possess. Of these the one which would be put first by most people, because it characterizes objects of sensation, is its --
(1) Coerciveness over attention, or the mere power to possess consciousness: then follow --
(2) Liveliness, or sensible pungency124, especially in the way of exciting pleasure or pain;
(3) Stimulating125 effect upon the will, i.e., capacity to arouse active impulses, the more instinctive71 the better;
(4) Emotional interest, as object of love, dread126, admiration127, desire, etc.;
(5) Congruity128 with certain favorite forms of contemplation -- unity129, simplicity130, permanence, and the like;
(6) Independence of other causes, and its own causal importance.
These characters run into each other. Coerciveness is the result of liveliness or emotional interest. What is lively and interesting stimulates eo ipso the will; congruity holds of active impulses as well as of contemplative forms; causal independence and importance suit a certain contemplative demand, etc. I will therefore abandon all attempt at a formal treatment, and simply proceed to make remarks in the most convenient order of exposition.
As a, whole, sensations are more lively and are judged more real than conceptions; things met with every hour more real than things seen once; attributes perceived when awake, more real than attributes perceived in a dream. But, owing to the diverse relations contracted by the various objects with each other, the simple rule that the lively and permanent is the real is often enough disguised. A conceived thing may be deemed more real than a certain sensible thing, if it only be intimately related to other sensible things more vivid, permanent, or interesting than the first one. Conceived molecular132 vibrations133, e.g., are by the physicist134 judged more real than felt warmth, because so intimately related to all those other facts of motion in the world which he has made his special study. Similarly, a rare thing may be deemed more real than a permanent thing if it be more widely related to other permanent things. All the occasional crucial observations of science are examples of this. A rare experience, too, is likely to be judged more real than a permanent one, if it be more interesting and exciting. Such is the sight of Saturn135 through a telescope; such are the occasional insights and illuminations which upset our habitual64 ways of thought.
But no mere floating conception, no mere disconnected rarity, ever displaces vivid things or permanent things from our belief. A conception, to prevail, must terminate in the world of orderly sensible experience. A rare phenomenon, to displace frequent ones, must belong with others more frequent still. The history of science is strewn with wrecks136 and ruins of theory -- essences and principles, fluids and forces -- once fondly clung to, But found to hang together with no facts of sense. And exceptional phenomena solicit137 our belief in vain until such time as we chance to conceive them as of kinds already admitted to exist. What science means by 'verification' is no more than this, that no object of conception shall be believed which sooner or later has not some permanent and vivid object of sensation for its term. Compare what was said on pages 3-7, above.
Sensible objects are thus either our realities or the tests of our realities. Conceived objects must show sensible effects or else be disbelieved. And the effects, even though reduced to relative unreality when their causes come to view (as heat, which molecular vibrations make unreal), are yet the things on which our knowledge of the causes rests. Strange mutual138 dependence131 this, in which the appearance needs the reality in order to exist, but the reality needs the appearance in order to be known!
Sensible vividness or pungency is then tire vital factor in reality when once the conflict between objects, and the connecting of them together in the mind, has begun. No object which neither possesses this vividness in its own right nor is able to borrow it from anything else has a chance of making headway against vivid rivals, or of rousing in us that reaction in which belief consists. On the vivid objects we pin, as the saying is, our faith in all the rest; and our belief returns instinctively even to those of them from which reflection has led it away. Witness the obduracy139 with which the popular world of colors, sounds, and smells holds its own against that of molecules and vibrations. Let the physicist himself but nod, like Homer, and the world of sense becomes his absolute reality again. 24
That things originally devoid140 of this stimulating power should be enabled, by association with other things which have it, to compel our belief as if they had it themselves, is a remarkable141 psychological fact, which since Hume's time it has been impossible to overlook.
"The vividness of the first conception," he writes," diffuses142 itself along the relations and is conveyed, as by so many pipes or channels, to every idea that has any communication with the primary one. . . . Superstitious143 people are fond of the relics144 of saints and holy men, for the same reason that they seek after types and images, in order to enliven their devotion and give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary lives. . . . Now, 'tis evident one of the best relics a devotee could procure145 would be the handiwork of a saint, and if his clothes and furniture are ever to be considered in this light, 'tis because they were once at his disposal, and were moved and affected146 by him; in which respect they are . . . connected with him by a shorter train of consequences than any of those from which we learn the reality of his existence. This phenomenon clearly proves that a present impression, with a relation of causation, may enliven any idea, and consequently produce belief or assent40, according to the precedent147 definition of it. . . . It has been remarked among the Mahometans as well as Christians148 that those pilgrims who have seen Mecca or the Holy Land are ever after more faithful and zealous149 believers than those who have not had that advantage. A man whose memory presents him with a lively image of the Red Sea and the Desert and Jerusalem and Galilee can never doubt of any miraculous150 events which are related either by Moses or the Evangelists. The lively idea of the places passes by an easy transition to the facts which are supposed to have been related to them by contiguity151, and increases the belief by increasing the vivacity152 of the conception. The remembrance of those fields and rivers has the same influence as a new argument. . . . The ceremonies of the Catholic religion may be considered as instances of the same nature. The devotees of that strange superstition120 usually plead in excuse for the mummeries with which they are upbraided153 that they feel the good effect of external motions and postures154 and actions in enlivening their devotion and quickening their fervor155, which otherwise would decay, if directed entirely to distant and immaterial objects. We shadow out the objects of our faith, say they, in sensible types and images, and render them more present to us by the immediate presence of these types than it is possible for us to do merely by an intellectual view and contemplation." 25
Hume's cases are rather trivial; and the things which associated sensible objects make us believe in are supposed by him to be unreal. But all the more manifest for that is the fact of their psychological influence. Who does not 'realize' more the fact of a dead or distant friend's existence, at the moment when a portrait, letter, garment or other material reminder156 of him is found? The whole notion of him then grows pungent157 and speaks to us and shakes us, in a manner unknown at other times. In children's minds, fancies and realities live side by side. But however lively their fancies may be, they still gain help from association with reality. The imaginative child identifies its dramatis personæ with some doll or other material object, and this evidently solidifies158 belief, little as it may resemble what it is held to stand for. A thing not too interesting by its own real qualities generally does the best service here. The most useful doll I ever saw was a large cucumber in the hands of a little Amazonian-Indian girl; she nursed it and washed it and rocked it to sleep in a, hammock, and talked to it all day long -- there was no part in life which the cucumber did not play. Says Mr. Tylor:
"An imaginative child will make a dog do duty for a horse, or a soldier for a shepherd, till at last the objective resemblance almost disappears, and a bit of wood may be dragged about, resembling a ship on the sea or a coach on the road. Here the likeness159 of the bit of wood to a ship or coach is very slight indeed; but it is a thing, and can be moved about, . . . and is an evident assistance to the child in enabling it to arrange and develop its ideas. . . . Of how much use . . . may be seen by taking it away, and leaving the child nothing to play with. . . . In later years and among highly educated people the mental process which goes on in a child's playing with wooden soldiers and horses, though it never disappears, must be sought for in more complex phenomena. Perhaps nothing in after-life more closely resembles the effect of a doll upon a child than the effect of the illustrations of a tale upon a grown reader. Here the objective resemblance is very indefinite . . . yet what reality is given to the scene by a good picture. . . . Mr. Back-house one day noticed in Van Diemen's Land a woman arranging several stones that were hat, oval, and about, two inches wide, and marked in various directions with black and red lines. These, he learned, represented absent friends, and one larger than the rest stood for a fat native woman on Flinder's Island, known by the name of Mother Brown. Similar practices are found among far higher races than the ill-fated Tasmanians. Among some North American tribes another who has lost a child keeps its memory ever present to her by filling its cradle with black feathers and quills160, and carrying it about with her for a year or more. When she stops anywhere, she sets up the cradle and talks to it as she goes about her work, just as she would have done if the dead body had been still alive within it. Here we have an image; but in Africa we find a rude doll representing the child, kept as a memorial. . . . Bastian saw Indian women in Peru who had lost an infant carrying about on their backs a wooden doll to represent it." 26
To many persons among us, photographs of lost ones seem to be fetishes. They, it is true, resemble; but the fact that the mere materiality of the reminder is almost as important as its resemblance is shown by the popularity a, hundred years ago of the black taffeta 'silhouettes161' which are still found among family relies, and of one of which Fichte could write to his affianced: 'Die Farbe fehlt, das Auge feldt, es fehlt der himmlische Ausdruck deiner lieblichen Züge' -- and yet go on worshiping it all the same. The opinion so stoutly162 professed163 by many, that language is essential to thought, seems to have this much of truth in it, that all our inward images tend invincibly164 to attach themselves to something sensible, so as to gain in corporeity and life. Words serve this purpose, gestures serve it, stones, straws, chalk-marks, anything will do. As soon as anyone of these things stands for the idea, the latter seems to be more real. Some persons, the present writer among the number, can hardly lecture without a black-board: the abstract conceptions must be symbolized165 by letters, squares or circles, and the relations between them by lines. All this symbolism, linguistic166, graphic167, and dramatic, has other uses too, for it abridges168 thought and fixes terms. But one of its uses is surely to rouse the believing reaction and give to the ideas a more living reality. As, when we are told a story, and shown the very knife that did the murder, the very ring whose hiding-place the clairvoyant169 revealed, the whole thing passes from fairy-land to mother-earth, so here we believe all the more, if only we see that 'the bricks are alive to tell the tale.'
So much for the prerogative position of sensations in regard to our belief. But among the sensations themselves all are not deemed equally real. The more practically important ones, the more permanent ones, and the more aesthetically170 apprehensible ones are selected from the mass, to be believed in most of all; the others are degraded to the position of mere signs and suggestions of these. This fact has already been adverted171 to in former chapters. 27 The real color of a thing is that one color-sensation which it gives us when most favorably lighted for vision. Soon its real size, its real shape, etc. -- these are but optical sensations selected out of thousands of others, because they have aesthetic characteristics which appeal to our convenience or delight. But I will not repeat what I have already written about this matter, but pass on to our treatment of tactile172 and muscular sensations, as 'primary qualities,' more real than those 'secondary' qualities which eye and ear and nose reveal. Why do we thus so markedly select the tangible173 to be the real? Our motives174 are not far to seek. The tangible qualities are the least fluctuating. When we get them at all we get them the same. The other qualities fluctuate enormously as our relative position to the object changes. Then, more decisive still, the tactile properties are those most intimately connected with our weal or woe175. A dagger176 hurts us only when in contact with our skin, a poison only when we take it into our mouths, and we can only use an object for our advantage when we have it in our muscular control. It is as tangibles177, then, that things concern us most; and the other senses, so far as their practical use goes, do but warn us of what tangible things to expect. They are but organs of anticipatory178 touch, as Berkeley has with perfect clearness explained. 28
Among all sensations, the most belief-compelling are those productive of pleasure or of pain. Locke expressly makes the pleasure- or pain- giving quality to be the ultimate human criterion of anything's reality. Discussing (with supposed Berkeleyan before Berkeley) the notion that all our perceptions may be but a dream, he says:
" He may please to dream that I make him this answer. I believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire and being actually in it. But yet if he be resolved to appear so skeptical179 as to maintain that what I call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream, and that we cannot thereby certainly know that any such thing as fire actually exists without us, I answer that we, certainly finding that pleasure or pain [or emotion of any sort] follows upon the application of certain objects to us, whose existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive by our senses, this certainly is as great as our happiness or misery180, beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be. 30
The Influence of Emotion and Active Impulse on Belief.
The quality of arousing emotion, of shaking, moving us or inciting181 us to action, has as much to do with our belief in an object's reality as the quality of giving pleasure or pain. In Chapter XXIV I shall seek to show that our emotions probably owe their pungent quality to the bodily sensations which they involve. Our tendency to believe in emotionally exciting objects (objects of fear, desire, etc.) is thus explained without resorting to any fundamentally new principle of choice. Speaking generally, the more a conceived object excites us, the more reality it has. The same object excites us differently at different times. Moral and religious truths come 'home' to us far more on some occasions than on others. As Emerson says, "There is a difference between one and another hour of life in their authority and subsequent effect. Our faith comes in moments, . . . yet there is a depth in those brief moments which constrains182 us to ascribe more reality to them than to all other experiences." The 'depth' is partly, no doubt, the insight into wider systems of unified183 relation, but far more often than that it is the emotional thrill. Thus, to descend184 to more trivial examples, a man who has no belief in ghosts by daylight will temporarily believe in them when, alone at midnight, he feels his blood curdle185 at a, mysterious sound or vision, his heart thumping186, and his legs impelled187 to flee. The thought of falling when we walk along a curbs188 one awakens no emotion of dread; so no sense of reality attaches to it, and we are sure me shall not fall. On a precipice's edge, however, the sickening emotion which the notion of a possible fall engenders189 makes ns believe in the latter's imminent190 reality, and quite unfits us to proceed.
The greatest proof that a man is sui compos is his ability to suspend belief in presence of an emotionally exciting idea. To give this power is the highest result of education. In untutored minds the power does not exist. Ever exciting thought in the natural man carries credence191 with it. To conceive with passion is ipso facto affirm. As Bagehot says:
"The Caliph Omar burnt the Alexandrian Library, saying: 'All books which contain what is not in the Koran are dangerous. All which contain what is in it are useless! ' Probably no one ever had an intenser belief in anything than Omar had in this. Yet it is impossible to imagine it preceded by an argument. His belief in Mahomet, in the Koran, and in the sufficiency of the Koran, probably came to him in spontaneous rushes of emotion; there may have been little vestiges192 of argument donating here and there, but they did not justify193 the strength of the emotion, stillness did they create it, and they hardly even excused it. . . . Probably, when the subject is thoroughly194 examined, conviction will be found to be one of the intensest of human emotions, and one most closely connected with the bodily state, . . . accompanied or preceded by the sensation that Scott makes his seer describe as the prelude195 of a prophecy
At length the fatal answer came,
In characters of living flame--
Not spoke in words, nor blazed in scroll196,
But borne and branded on my soul.'
A hot hash seems to burn across the brain. Men in these intense states of mind have altered all history, changed for better or worse the creed197 of myriads198, and desolated199 or redeemed200 provinces or ages. Nor is this intensity201 a sign of truth, for it is precisely202 strongest in those points in which men differ most from each other. John Knox felt it in his anti-Catholicism; Ignatius Loyola in his anti-Protestantism; and both, I suppose, felt it as much as it is possible to feel it." 31
The reason of the belief is undoubtedly203 the bodily commotion204 which the exciting idea sets up. 'Nothing which I can feel like that can be false.' All our religious and supernatural beliefs are of this order. The surest warrant for immortality205 is the yearning206 of our bowels207 for our dear ones; for God, the sinking sense it gives us to imagine no such Providence208 or help. So of our political or pecuniary209 hopes and fears, and things and persons dreaded210 and desired "A grocer has a full creed as to foreign policy, young lady a complete theory of the sacraments, as to which neither has any doubt. . . . A girl in a country parsonage will be sure that Paris never can be taken, or that Bismarck is a wretch211" -- all because they have either conceived these things at some moment with passion, or associated them with other things which they have conceived with passion.
Renouvier calls this belief of a thing for no other reason than that we conceive it with passion, by the name of mental vertigo212. 32 Other objects whisper doubt or disbelief; but the object of passion makes us deaf to all but itself, and we affirm it unhesitatingly. Such objects are the delusions213 of insanity, which the insane person can tit odd moments steady himself against, but which again return to sweep him off his feet. Such are the revelations of mysticism. Such, particularly, are the sudden beliefs which animate214 mobs of men when frenzied215 impulse to action is involved. Whatever be the action in point -- whether the stoning of a prophet, the bailing216 of a conqueror217, the burning of a, witch, the baiting of a heretic or Jew, the starting of a forlorn hope, or the flying from a foe218 -- the fact that to believe a certain object will cause that action to explode is a sufficient reason for that belief to come. The motor impulse sweeps it unresisting in its train.
The whole history of witchcraft219 and early medicine is a commentary on the facility with which anything which chances to be conceived is believed the moment the belief chimes in with an emotional mood. 'The cause of sickness?' When a savage asks the cause of anything he means to ask exclusively 'What is to blame?' The theoretic curiosity starts from the practical life's demands. Let some one then accuse a necromancer220, suggest a charm or spell which has been cast, and no more 'evidence' is asked for. What evidence is required beyond this intimate sense of the culprit's responsibility, to which our very viscera and limbs reply? 33
Human credulity in the way of therapeutics has similar psychological roots. If there is anything intolerable (especially to the heart of a woman), it is to do nothing when a loved one is sick or in pain. To do anything is a relief. Accordingly, whatever remedy may be suggested is a spark on inflammable soil. The mind makes its spring towards action on that cue, sends for that remedy, and for a day at least believes the danger past. Blame, dread, and hope are thus the great belief inspiring passions, and cover among them the future, the present, and the past.
These remarks illustrate221 the earlier heads of the list on page 292. Whichever represented objects give us sensations, especially interesting ones, or incite222 our motor impulses, or arouse our hate, desire, or fear, are real enough for us. Our requirements in the way of reality terminate in our own acts and emotions, our own pleasures and pains. These are the ultimate fixities from which, as we formerly223 observed, the whole chain of our beliefs depends, object hanging to object, as the bees, in swarming224, hang to each other until, de proche en proche, the supporting branch, the Self, is reached and held.
Belief in Objects of Theory.
Now the merely conceived or imagined objects which our mind represents as hanging to the sensations (causing them, etc.), filling the gaps between them, and weaving their interrupted chaos225 into order are innumerable. Whole systems of them conflict with other systems, and our choice of which system shall carry our belief is governed by principles which are simple enough, however subtle and difficult may be their application to details. The conceived system, to pass for true, must at least include the reality of the sensible objects in it, by explaining them as effects on us, if nothing more. The system which includes the most of them, and definitely explains or pretends to explain the rest of them, will, ceteris paribus, prevail. It is needless to say how far mankind still is from having excogitated such a system. But the various materialisms, idealisms, and hylozoisms show with what industry the attempt is forever made. It is conceivable that several rival theories should equally well include the actual order of our sensations in their scheme, much as the one-fluid and two-fluid theories of electricity formulated227 all the common electrical phenomena equally well. The sciences are full of these alternatives. Which theory is then to be believed? That theory will be most generally believed which, besides bring us objects able to account satisfactorily for our sensible experience, also offers those which are most interesting, those which apiaeal most urgently to our æsthetic, emotional, and active needs. So here, in the higher intellectual life, the same selection among general conceptions goes on which went on among the sensations themselves. First, a word of their relation to our emotional and active needs -- and here I can do no better than quote from an article published some years ago: 34
"A philosophy may be unimpeachable228 in other respects, but either of two defects will be fatal to its universal acceptance. First, its ultimate principle must not be one that essentially baffles and disappoints our dearest desires and most cherished powers. A pessimistic principle like Schopenhauer's incurably229 vicious Will-substance, or Hartmann's wicked jack-at-all-trades, the Unconscious, will perpetually call forth230 essays at other philosophies. Incompatibility231 of the future with their desires and active tendencies is, in fact, to most men a source of more fixed disquietude than uncertainty232 itself. Witness the attempts to overcome the 'problem of evil,' the 'mystery of pain.' There is no problem of 'good.'
"But a second and worse defect in a philosophy than that of contradicting our active propensities233 is to give them no Object whatever to press against. A philosophy whose principle is so incommensurate with our most intimate powers as to deny them all relevancy in universal affairs, as to annihilate234 their motives at one blow, will be even more unpopular than pessimism235. Better face the enemy than the eternal Void! This is why materialism226 will always fail of universal adoption236, however well it may fuse things into an atomistic unity, however clearly it may prophesy237 the future eternity238. For materialism denies reality to the objects of almost all the impulses which we most cherish. The real meaning of the impulses, it says, is something which has no emotional interest for us whatever. But what is called extradition239 is quite as characteristic of our emotions as of our sense. Both point to an object as the cause of the present feeling. What an intensely objective reference lies in fear I In like manner an enraptured240 man, a dreary-feeling man, are not simply aware of their subjective states; if they were, the force of their feelings would evaporate. Both believe there is outward cause why they should feel as they do: either 'It is a glad world! 'how good is life!' or 'What a loathsome242 tedium243 is existence!' Any philosophy which annihilates244 the validity of the reference by explaining away its objects or translating them into terms of no emotional pertinency245 leaves the mind with little to care or act for. This is the opposite condition from that of nightmare, but when acutely brought home to consciousness it produces a kindred horror. In nightmare we have motives to act, hut no power: here we have powers, but no motives. A nameless Unheimlichkeit comes over us at the thought of there being nothing eternal in our final purposes, in the objects of those loves and aspirations246 which are our deepest energies. The monstrously247 lopsided equation of the universe and its knower, which we postulate248 as the ideal of cognition, is perfectly paralleled by the no less lopsided equation of the universe and the doer. We demand in it a character for which our emotions and active propensities shall be a match. Small as we are, minute as is the point by which the Cosmos249 impinges upon each one of us, each one desires to feel that his reaction at that point is congruous with the demands of the vast whole, that balances the latter, so to speak, and is able to do what it expects of him. But as his abilities to 'do' lie wholly in the line of his natural propensities; as he enjoys reaction with such emotions as fortitude250, hope, rapture241, admiration, earnestness, and the like; and as he very unwillingly251 reacts with fear, disgust, despair, or doubt, -- a philosophy which should legitimate252 only emotions of the latter sort would be sure to leave the mind a prey253 to discontent and craving254.
"It is far too little recognized how entirely the intellect is built up of practical interests. The theory of Evolution is beginning to do very good service by its reduction of all mentality255 to the type of reflex action. Cognition, in this view, is but a fleeting256 moment, a cross-section at a certain point of what in its totality Is a motor phenomenon. In the lower forms of life no one will pretend that cognition is anything more than a guide to appropriate action. The germinal question concerning things brought for the first time before consciousness is not the theoretic 'What is that?' but the practical 'Who goes there?' or rather, as Horwicz has admirably put it, 'What is to be done?' -- 'Was fang257' ich an?' In all our discussions about the intelligence of lower animals the only test we use is that of their activity as if for a purpose. Cognition, in short, is incomplete until discharged in act. And although it is true that the later mental development, which attains258 its maximum through the hypertrophied cerebrum of man, gives birth to a vast amount of theoretic activity over and above that which is immediately ministerial to practice, Set the earlier claim is only postponed259, not effaced260, and the active nature asserts its rights to the end.
"If there be any truth at all in this view, it follows that however vaguely261 a philosopher may define the ultimate universal datum262, he cannot be said to leave it unknown to us so long as he in the slightest degree pretends that our emotional or active attitude towards it should be of one sort rather than another. He who says, 'Life is real, life is earnest,' however much he may speak of the fundamental mysteriousness of things, gives a distinct definition to that mysteriousness by ascribing to it the right to claim from us the particular mood called seriousness, which means the unwillingness263 to live with energy, though energy bring pain. The same is true of him who says that all is vanity. Indefinable as the predicate vanity may be in se, it is clearly enough something which permits anæsthesia, mere escape from suffering, to be our rule of life. There is no more ludicrous incongruity264 than for agnostics to proclaim with one breath that the substance of things is unknowable, and with the next that the thought of it should inspire us with admiration of its glory, reverence265, and a willingness to add our cooperative push in the direction towards which its manifestations266 seem to be drifting. The unknowable may be unfathomed, but if it make such distinct demands upon our activity, we surely are not ignorant of its essential quality.
"If we survey the held of history and ask what feature all great periods of revival267, of expansion of the human mind, display in common, we shall find, I think, simply this: that each and all of them have said to the human being, 'The inmost nature of the reality is congenial to powers which you possess.' In what did the emancipating268 message of primitive Christianity consist, but in the announcement that God recognizes those weak and tender impulses which pagrtnism had so rudely overlooked. Take repentance269: the man who can do nothing rightly can at least repent270 of his failures. But for paganism this faculty of repentance was a pure supernumerary, a straggler too late for the fair. Christianity took it and made it the one power within us which appealed straight to the heart of God. And after the night of the Middle Ages had so long branded with obloquy271 even the generous impulses of the flesh, and defined the Reality to be such that only slavish natures could commune with it? in what did the Sursum corda! of the Renaissance272 lie but in the proclamation that the archetype of verity273 in things laid claim on the widest activity of our whole æsthetic being? What were Luther's mission and Wesley's but appeals to powers which even the meanest of men might carry with them, faith and self-despair, but which were personal, requiring no priestly intermediation, and which brought their owner face to face with God? What caused the wild-fire influence of Rousseau but the assurance he gave that man's nature was in harmony with the nature of things, if only the paralyzing corruptions274 of custom would stand from between? How did Kant and Fichte, Goethe and Schiller, inspire their time with cheer, except by saying, 'Use all your powers; that is the only obedience275 which the universe exacts'? And Carlyle with his gospel of Work, of Fact, of Veracity276, how does he move us except by saying that the universe imposes no tasks upon us but such as the most humble277 can perform? Emerson's creed that everything that ever was or will be is here in the enveloping278 now; that man has but to obey himself -- ' He who will rest in what he is, is a part of Destiny' -- is in like manner nothing but an exorcism of all scepticism as to the pertinency of one's natural faculties279."
In a word, 'Son of Man, stand upon thy feet and I will speak unto thee!' is the only revelation of truth to which the solving epochs have helped the disciple280. But that has been enough to satisfy the greater part of his rational need. In se and per se the universal essence has hardly been more defined by any of these formulae than by the agnostics; but the mere assurance that my powers, such as they are, are not irrelevant281 to it, but pertinent282, that it speaks to them and will in some way recognize their reply, that I can be a match for it if I will, and not a footless waif, suffices to make it rational to my feeling in the sense given above. Nothing could be more absurd than to hope for the definitive283 triumph of any philosophy which should refuse to legitimate, and to legitimate in an emphatic284 manner, the more powerful of our emotional and practical tendencies. Fatalism, whose solving word in all crises of behavior is 'All striving is vain,' will never reign112 supreme285, for the impulse to take life strivingly is indestructible in the race. Moral creeds286 which speak to that impulse will be widely successful In spite of Inconsistency, vagueness, and shadowy determination of expectancy287. Man needs a rule for his will, and will invent one if one be not given him."
After the emotional and active needs come the intellectual and æsthetic ones. The two great æsthetic principles, of richness and of ease, dominate our intellectual as well as our sensuous288 life. And, ceteris paribus, no system which should not be rich, simple, and harmonious289 would have a chance of being chosen for belief, if rich, simple, and harmonious systems were also there. Into the latter we should unhesitatingly settle, with that welcoming attitude of the will in which belief consists. To quote from a remarkable book:
"This law that our consciousness constantly tends to the minimum of complexity290 and to the maximum of definiteness, is of great importance for all our knowledge. . . . Our own activity of attention will thus determine what we are to know and what we are to believe. If things have more than a certain complexity, not only will our limited powers of attention forbid us to unravel291 this complexity, but we shall strongly desire to believe the things much simpler than they are. For our thoughts about them will have a constant tendency to become as simple and definite as possible. Put a man into a perfect chaos of phenomena-sounds, sights, feelings -- and if the man continued to exist, and to be rational at all, his attention would doubtless soon find for him a way to make up some kind of rhythmic292 regularity293, which he would impute294 to the things about him, so as to imagine that he had discovered some laws of sequence in this mad new world. And thus, in every case where we fancy ourselves sure of a simple law of Nature, we must remember that a great deal of the fancied simplicity may be due, in the given case, not to Nature, but to the ineradicable prejudice of our own minds in favor of regularity and simplicity. All our thoughts are determined295, in great measure, by this law of least effort, as it is found exemplified in our activity of attention . . . The aim of the whole process seems to be to reach as complete and united a conception of reality as possible, a conception wherein the greatest fulness of data shall be combined with the greatest simplicity of conception. The effort of consciousness seems to be to combine the greatest richness of content with the greatest definiteness of organization." 35
The richness is got by including all the facts of sense in the scheme; the simplicity, by deducing them out of the smallest possible number of permanent and independent primordial entities296: the definite organization, by assimilating these latter to ideal objects between which relations of an inwardly rational sort obtain. That these ideal objects and rational relations are will require a separate chapter to show. 36 Meanwhile, enough has surely been said to justify the assertion made above that no general off hand answer can be given as to which objects mankind shall choose as its realities. The fight is still under way. Our minds are yet chaotic; and at best we make a mixture and a compromise, as we yield to the claim of this interest or that, and follow first one and then another principle in turn. It is undeniably true that materialistic297, or so-called 'scientific,' conceptions of the universe have so far gratified the purely intellectual interests more than the mere sentimental298 conceptions have. But, on the other hand, as already remarked, they leave the emotional and active interests cold. The perfect object of belief would be a God or 'Soul of the World,' represented both optimistically and moralistically (if such a combination could be), and withal so definitely conceived as to show us why our phenomenal experiences should be sent to us by Him in just the very way in which they come. All Science and all History would thus be accounted for in the deepest and simplest fashion. The very room in which I sit, its sensible walls and floor, and the feeling the air and are within it give me, no less than the 'scientific' conceptions which I am urged to frame concerning the mode of existence of all these phenomena when my back is turned, would then all be corroborated299, not de-realized, by the ultimate principle of my belief. The World-soul sends me just those phenomena in order that I may react upon them; and among the reactions is the intellectual one of spinning these conceptions. What is beyond the crude experiences is not an alternative to them, but something that means them for me here and now. It is safe to say that, if ever such a system is satisfactorily excogitated, mankind will drop all other systems and cling to that one alone as reel. Meanwhile the other systems coexist with the attempts at that one, and, all being alike fragmentary, each has its little audience and day.
I have now, I trust, shown sufficiently what the psyche-logic sources of the sense of reality are. Certain postulatesare given in our nature; and whatever satisfies those postulates300 is treated as if real. 37 I might therefore finish the it not that a few additional words will chapter here, were it not that a reset301 the truth in a still clearer light.
Doubt.
There is hardly a common man who (if consulted) would not say that things come to us in the first instance as ideas; and that if we take them for realities, it is because we add something to them, namely, the predicate of having also 'real existence outside of our thought.' This notion that a higher faculty than the mere having of a conscious content is needed to make us know anything real by its means has pervaded302 psychology from the earliest times, and is the tradition of Scholasticism, Kantism, and Common-sense. Just as sensations must come as inward affections and then be 'extradited;' as objects of memory must appear at first as presently unrealities, and subsequently be 'projected' backwards303 as past realities; so conceptions must be entia rationis till a higher faculty uses them as windows to look beyond the ego, into the real extra-mental world; -- so runs the orthodox and popular account.
And there is no question that this is a true account of the way in which many of our later beliefs come to pass. The logical distinction between the bare thought of an object and belief in the object's reality is often a chronological304 distinction as well. The having and the crediting of and idea do not always coalesce305; for often we first suppose and then believe; first play with the notion, frame the hypothesis, and then affirm the existence, of an object of thought. And we are quite conscious of the succession of the two mental acts. But these cases are none of them primitive cases. They only occur in minds long schooled to doubt by the contradictions of experience. The primitive impulse is to affirm immediately the reality of all that is conceived. 38 When we do doubt, however, in what does the subsequent resolution of the doubt consist? It either consists in a purely verbal performance, the coupling of the adjectives 'real' or 'outwardly existing' (as predicates) to the thing originally conceived (as subject); or it consists in the perception in the given case of that for which these adjectives, abstracted from other similar concrete cases, stand. But what these adjectives stand for, we now know well. They stand for certain relations (immediate, or through intermediaries) to ourselves. Whatever concrete objects have hitherto stood in those relations have been for us 'real,' ' outwardly existing.' So that when we now abstractly admit a thing to be 'real' (without perhaps going through any definite perception of its relations), it is as if we said "it belongs in the same world with those other objects." Naturally enough, we have hourly opportunities for this summary process of belief. All remote objects in space or time are believed in this way. When I believe that some prehistoric306 savage chipped this flint, for example, the reality of the savage and of his act makes no direct appeal either to my sensation, emotion, or volition. What I mean by my belief in it is, imply my dim sense of a continuity between the long dead savage and his doings and the present world of which the hint forms part. It is preeminently a case for applying our doctrine of the 'fringe ' (see Vol. I. p. 258). When I think the savage with one fringe of relationship, I believe in him; when I think him without that fringe, or with another one (e.g., if I should class him with 'scientific vagaries307' in general), I disbelieve him. The word 'real' itself is, in short, a fringe.
Relations of Belief and Will.
We shall see in Chapter XXV that will consists in nothing but a manner of attending to certain objects, or consenting to their stable presence before the mind. The objects, in the case of will, are those whose existence depends on our thought, movements of our own body for example, or facts which such movements executed in future may make real. Objects of belief, on the contrary, are those which do not change according as we think regarding them. I want to get up early tomorrow morning; I believe that I got up late yesterday morning; I will that my foreign bookseller in Boston shall procure me a German book and write to him to that effect. I believe that he will make me pay three dollars for it when it comes, etc. Now the important thing to notice is that this difference between the objects of will and belief is entirely immaterial, as far as the relation of the mind to them goes. All that the mind does is in both cases the same; it looks at the object and consents to its existence, espouses308 it, says 'it shall be my reality.' It turns to it, in short, in the interested active emotional way. The rest is done by nature, which in some cases makes the objects real which we think of in this manner, and in other cases does not. Nature cannot change the past to suit our thinking. She cannot change the stars or the winds; but she does change our bodies to suit our thinking, and through their instrumentality changes much besides; so the great practical distinction between objects which we may will or unwill, and objects which we can merely believe or disbelieve, grows up, and is of course one of the most important distinctions in the world. Its roots, however, do not lie in psychology, but in physiology309; as the chapter on Volition will abundantly make plain. Will and belief, in short, meaning a certain relation between objects and the Self, are two names for one and the same PSYCHOLOGICAL phenomenon. All the questions which arise concerning one are questions which arise concerning the other. The causes and conditions of the peculiar relation must be the same in both. The free-will question arises as regards belief. If our wills are indeterminate, so must our beliefs be, etc. The first act of free-will, in short, would naturally be to believe in free-will, etc. In Chapter XXVI, I shall mention this again.
A practical observation may end this chapter. If belief consists in an emotional reaction of the entire man on an object, how can we believe at will? We cannot control our emotions. Truly enough, a man cannot believe at will abruptly310. Nature sometimes, and indeed not very infrequently, produces instantaneous conversions311 for us. She suddenly puts us in an active connection with objects of which she had till then left us cold. "I realize for the first time," we then say, "what that means!" This happens often with moral propositions. We have often heard them; but now they shoot into our lives; they move us; we feel their living force. Such instantaneous beliefs are truly enough not to be achieved by will. But gradually our will can lead us to same results by I very simple method: we need only in cold blood ACT as if the thing in question were real, and keep acting312 as if it were real, and it infallibly end by growing into such a connection with our life that it will become real. It will become so knit with habit and emotion that our interests in it will be those which characterize belief.
Those to whom God' and 'Duty' are now mere names can make them much more than that, if they make a little sacrifice to them every day. But all this is so well known in moral and religious education that I need say no more.
点击收听单词发音
1 acquiescing | |
v.默认,默许( acquiesce的现在分词 ) | |
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2 acquiescence | |
n.默许;顺从 | |
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3 apprehend | |
vt.理解,领悟,逮捕,拘捕,忧虑 | |
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4 apprehended | |
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 ); 理解 | |
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5 psychic | |
n.对超自然力敏感的人;adj.有超自然力的 | |
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6 allied | |
adj.协约国的;同盟国的 | |
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7 spoke | |
n.(车轮的)辐条;轮辐;破坏某人的计划;阻挠某人的行动 v.讲,谈(speak的过去式);说;演说;从某种观点来说 | |
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8 psychology | |
n.心理,心理学,心理状态 | |
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9 volition | |
n.意志;决意 | |
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10 manifestation | |
n.表现形式;表明;现象 | |
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11 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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12 agitation | |
n.搅动;搅拌;鼓动,煽动 | |
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13 advent | |
n.(重要事件等的)到来,来临 | |
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14 exclusion | |
n.拒绝,排除,排斥,远足,远途旅行 | |
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15 contradictory | |
adj.反驳的,反对的,抗辩的;n.正反对,矛盾对立 | |
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16 repose | |
v.(使)休息;n.安息 | |
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17 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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18 inquiry | |
n.打听,询问,调查,查问 | |
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19 engendered | |
v.产生(某形势或状况),造成,引起( engender的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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20 thereby | |
adv.因此,从而 | |
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21 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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22 exalted | |
adj.(地位等)高的,崇高的;尊贵的,高尚的 | |
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23 utterly | |
adv.完全地,绝对地 | |
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24 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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25 oxide | |
n.氧化物 | |
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26 intoxication | |
n.wild excitement;drunkenness;poisoning | |
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27 mania | |
n.疯狂;躁狂症,狂热,癖好 | |
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28 substantive | |
adj.表示实在的;本质的、实质性的;独立的;n.实词,实名词;独立存在的实体 | |
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29 par | |
n.标准,票面价值,平均数量;adj.票面的,平常的,标准的 | |
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30 chronic | |
adj.(疾病)长期未愈的,慢性的;极坏的 | |
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31 primordial | |
adj.原始的;最初的 | |
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32 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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33 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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34 recondite | |
adj.深奥的,难解的 | |
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35 phenomena | |
n.现象 | |
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36 subjective | |
a.主观(上)的,个人的 | |
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37 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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38 analogous | |
adj.相似的;类似的 | |
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39 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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40 assent | |
v.批准,认可;n.批准,认可 | |
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41 assenting | |
同意,赞成( assent的现在分词 ) | |
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42 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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43 awakens | |
v.(使)醒( awaken的第三人称单数 );(使)觉醒;弄醒;(使)意识到 | |
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44 simultaneously | |
adv.同时发生地,同时进行地 | |
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45 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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46 conditional | |
adj.条件的,带有条件的 | |
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47 onlooking | |
n.目击,旁观adj.旁观的 | |
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48 excellence | |
n.优秀,杰出,(pl.)优点,美德 | |
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49 faculty | |
n.才能;学院,系;(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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50 unintelligible | |
adj.无法了解的,难解的,莫明其妙的 | |
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51 annuls | |
v.宣告无效( annul的第三人称单数 );取消;使消失;抹去 | |
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52 contemplate | |
vt.盘算,计议;周密考虑;注视,凝视 | |
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53 dissenting | |
adj.不同意的 | |
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54 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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55 posited | |
v.假定,设想,假设( posit的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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56 incompatible | |
adj.不相容的,不协调的,不相配的 | |
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57 situated | |
adj.坐落在...的,处于某种境地的 | |
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58 interferes | |
vi. 妨碍,冲突,干涉 | |
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59 mare | |
n.母马,母驴 | |
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60 incompatibly | |
不相容地,矛盾地 | |
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61 limbo | |
n.地狱的边缘;监狱 | |
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62 terminology | |
n.术语;专有名词 | |
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63 habitually | |
ad.习惯地,通常地 | |
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64 habitual | |
adj.习惯性的;通常的,惯常的 | |
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65 philosophic | |
adj.哲学的,贤明的 | |
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66 ascertain | |
vt.发现,确定,查明,弄清 | |
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67 ego | |
n.自我,自己,自尊 | |
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68 dealing | |
n.经商方法,待人态度 | |
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69 discriminated | |
分别,辨别,区分( discriminate的过去式和过去分词 ); 歧视,有差别地对待 | |
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70 instinctively | |
adv.本能地 | |
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71 instinctive | |
adj.(出于)本能的;直觉的;(出于)天性的 | |
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72 affinity | |
n.亲和力,密切关系 | |
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73 ethical | |
adj.伦理的,道德的,合乎道德的 | |
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74 aesthetic | |
adj.美学的,审美的,有美感 | |
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75 idol | |
n.偶像,红人,宠儿 | |
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76 idols | |
偶像( idol的名词复数 ); 受崇拜的人或物; 受到热爱和崇拜的人或物; 神像 | |
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77 Christian | |
adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
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78 mythology | |
n.神话,神话学,神话集 | |
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79 fable | |
n.寓言;童话;神话 | |
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80 vagary | |
n.妄想,不可测之事,异想天开 | |
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81 mythological | |
adj.神话的 | |
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82 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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83 hustled | |
催促(hustle的过去式与过去分词形式) | |
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84 molecules | |
分子( molecule的名词复数 ) | |
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85 chaotic | |
adj.混沌的,一片混乱的,一团糟的 | |
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86 lapses | |
n.失误,过失( lapse的名词复数 );小毛病;行为失检;偏离正道v.退步( lapse的第三人称单数 );陷入;倒退;丧失 | |
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87 dominant | |
adj.支配的,统治的;占优势的;显性的;n.主因,要素,主要的人(或物);显性基因 | |
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88 positively | |
adv.明确地,断然,坚决地;实在,确实 | |
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89 prerogative | |
n.特权 | |
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90 nucleus | |
n.核,核心,原子核 | |
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91 everlasting | |
adj.永恒的,持久的,无止境的 | |
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92 inveterate | |
adj.积习已深的,根深蒂固的 | |
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93 propensity | |
n.倾向;习性 | |
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94 mythical | |
adj.神话的;虚构的;想像的 | |
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95 tribal | |
adj.部族的,种族的 | |
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96 curiously | |
adv.有求知欲地;好问地;奇特地 | |
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97 stimulates | |
v.刺激( stimulate的第三人称单数 );激励;使兴奋;起兴奋作用,起刺激作用,起促进作用 | |
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98 essentially | |
adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
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99 attain | |
vt.达到,获得,完成 | |
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100 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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101 transcended | |
超出或超越(经验、信念、描写能力等)的范围( transcend的过去式和过去分词 ); 优于或胜过… | |
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102 superseded | |
[医]被代替的,废弃的 | |
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103 bail | |
v.舀(水),保释;n.保证金,保释,保释人 | |
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104 dangles | |
悬吊着( dangle的第三人称单数 ); 摆动不定; 用某事物诱惑…; 吊胃口 | |
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105 melancholic | |
忧郁症患者 | |
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106 perversion | |
n.曲解;堕落;反常 | |
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107 sheathed | |
adj.雕塑像下半身包在鞘中的;覆盖的;铠装的;装鞘了的v.将(刀、剑等)插入鞘( sheathe的过去式和过去分词 );包,覆盖 | |
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108 penetrates | |
v.穿过( penetrate的第三人称单数 );刺入;了解;渗透 | |
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109 alteration | |
n.变更,改变;蚀变 | |
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110 binds | |
v.约束( bind的第三人称单数 );装订;捆绑;(用长布条)缠绕 | |
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111 ripening | |
v.成熟,使熟( ripen的现在分词 );熟化;熟成 | |
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112 reign | |
n.统治时期,统治,支配,盛行;v.占优势 | |
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113 inorganic | |
adj.无生物的;无机的 | |
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114 insanity | |
n.疯狂,精神错乱;极端的愚蠢,荒唐 | |
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115 paramount | |
a.最重要的,最高权力的 | |
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116 revert | |
v.恢复,复归,回到 | |
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117 rivalry | |
n.竞争,竞赛,对抗 | |
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118 primitive | |
adj.原始的;简单的;n.原(始)人,原始事物 | |
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119 savage | |
adj.野蛮的;凶恶的,残暴的;n.未开化的人 | |
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120 superstition | |
n.迷信,迷信行为 | |
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121 superstitions | |
迷信,迷信行为( superstition的名词复数 ) | |
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122 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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123 discrepancies | |
n.差异,不符合(之处),不一致(之处)( discrepancy的名词复数 ) | |
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124 pungency | |
n.(气味等的)刺激性;辣;(言语等的)辛辣;尖刻 | |
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125 stimulating | |
adj.有启发性的,能激发人思考的 | |
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126 dread | |
vt.担忧,忧虑;惧怕,不敢;n.担忧,畏惧 | |
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127 admiration | |
n.钦佩,赞美,羡慕 | |
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128 congruity | |
n.全等,一致 | |
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129 unity | |
n.团结,联合,统一;和睦,协调 | |
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130 simplicity | |
n.简单,简易;朴素;直率,单纯 | |
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131 dependence | |
n.依靠,依赖;信任,信赖;隶属 | |
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132 molecular | |
adj.分子的;克分子的 | |
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133 vibrations | |
n.摆动( vibration的名词复数 );震动;感受;(偏离平衡位置的)一次性往复振动 | |
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134 physicist | |
n.物理学家,研究物理学的人 | |
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135 Saturn | |
n.农神,土星 | |
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136 wrecks | |
n.沉船( wreck的名词复数 );(事故中)遭严重毁坏的汽车(或飞机等);(身体或精神上)受到严重损伤的人;状况非常糟糕的车辆(或建筑物等)v.毁坏[毁灭]某物( wreck的第三人称单数 );使(船舶)失事,使遇难,使下沉 | |
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137 solicit | |
vi.勾引;乞求;vt.请求,乞求;招揽(生意) | |
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138 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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139 obduracy | |
n.冷酷无情,顽固,执拗 | |
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140 devoid | |
adj.全无的,缺乏的 | |
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141 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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142 diffuses | |
(使光)模糊,漫射,漫散( diffuse的第三人称单数 ); (使)扩散; (使)弥漫; (使)传播 | |
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143 superstitious | |
adj.迷信的 | |
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144 relics | |
[pl.]n.遗物,遗迹,遗产;遗体,尸骸 | |
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145 procure | |
vt.获得,取得,促成;vi.拉皮条 | |
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146 affected | |
adj.不自然的,假装的 | |
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147 precedent | |
n.先例,前例;惯例;adj.在前的,在先的 | |
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148 Christians | |
n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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149 zealous | |
adj.狂热的,热心的 | |
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150 miraculous | |
adj.像奇迹一样的,不可思议的 | |
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151 contiguity | |
n.邻近,接壤 | |
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152 vivacity | |
n.快活,活泼,精神充沛 | |
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153 upbraided | |
v.责备,申斥,谴责( upbraid的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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154 postures | |
姿势( posture的名词复数 ); 看法; 态度; 立场 | |
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155 fervor | |
n.热诚;热心;炽热 | |
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156 reminder | |
n.提醒物,纪念品;暗示,提示 | |
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157 pungent | |
adj.(气味、味道)刺激性的,辛辣的;尖锐的 | |
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158 solidifies | |
(使)成为固体,(使)变硬,(使)变得坚固( solidify的第三人称单数 ); 使团结一致; 充实,巩固; 具体化 | |
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159 likeness | |
n.相像,相似(之处) | |
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160 quills | |
n.(刺猬或豪猪的)刺( quill的名词复数 );羽毛管;翮;纡管 | |
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161 silhouettes | |
轮廓( silhouette的名词复数 ); (人的)体形; (事物的)形状; 剪影 | |
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162 stoutly | |
adv.牢固地,粗壮的 | |
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163 professed | |
公开声称的,伪称的,已立誓信教的 | |
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164 invincibly | |
adv.难战胜地,无敌地 | |
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165 symbolized | |
v.象征,作为…的象征( symbolize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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166 linguistic | |
adj.语言的,语言学的 | |
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167 graphic | |
adj.生动的,形象的,绘画的,文字的,图表的 | |
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168 abridges | |
节略( abridge的第三人称单数 ); 减少; 缩短; 剥夺(某人的)权利(或特权等) | |
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169 clairvoyant | |
adj.有预见的;n.有预见的人 | |
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170 aesthetically | |
adv.美地,艺术地 | |
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171 adverted | |
引起注意(advert的过去式与过去分词形式) | |
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172 tactile | |
adj.触觉的,有触觉的,能触知的 | |
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173 tangible | |
adj.有形的,可触摸的,确凿的,实际的 | |
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174 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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175 woe | |
n.悲哀,苦痛,不幸,困难;int.用来表达悲伤或惊慌 | |
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176 dagger | |
n.匕首,短剑,剑号 | |
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177 tangibles | |
n.有形资产; 值钱之物;明确的( tangible的名词复数 );确凿的;可触摸的;可触知的 | |
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178 anticipatory | |
adj.预想的,预期的 | |
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179 skeptical | |
adj.怀疑的,多疑的 | |
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180 misery | |
n.痛苦,苦恼,苦难;悲惨的境遇,贫苦 | |
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181 inciting | |
刺激的,煽动的 | |
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182 constrains | |
强迫( constrain的第三人称单数 ); 强使; 限制; 约束 | |
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183 unified | |
(unify 的过去式和过去分词); 统一的; 统一标准的; 一元化的 | |
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184 descend | |
vt./vi.传下来,下来,下降 | |
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185 curdle | |
v.使凝结,变稠 | |
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186 thumping | |
adj.重大的,巨大的;重击的;尺码大的;极好的adv.极端地;非常地v.重击(thump的现在分词);狠打;怦怦地跳;全力支持 | |
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187 impelled | |
v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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188 curbs | |
v.限制,克制,抑制( curb的第三人称单数 ) | |
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189 engenders | |
v.产生(某形势或状况),造成,引起( engender的第三人称单数 ) | |
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190 imminent | |
adj.即将发生的,临近的,逼近的 | |
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191 credence | |
n.信用,祭器台,供桌,凭证 | |
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192 vestiges | |
残余部分( vestige的名词复数 ); 遗迹; 痕迹; 毫不 | |
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193 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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194 thoroughly | |
adv.完全地,彻底地,十足地 | |
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195 prelude | |
n.序言,前兆,序曲 | |
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196 scroll | |
n.卷轴,纸卷;(石刻上的)漩涡 | |
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197 creed | |
n.信条;信念,纲领 | |
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198 myriads | |
n.无数,极大数量( myriad的名词复数 ) | |
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199 desolated | |
adj.荒凉的,荒废的 | |
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200 redeemed | |
adj. 可赎回的,可救赎的 动词redeem的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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201 intensity | |
n.强烈,剧烈;强度;烈度 | |
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202 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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203 undoubtedly | |
adv.确实地,无疑地 | |
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204 commotion | |
n.骚动,动乱 | |
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205 immortality | |
n.不死,不朽 | |
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206 yearning | |
a.渴望的;向往的;怀念的 | |
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207 bowels | |
n.肠,内脏,内部;肠( bowel的名词复数 );内部,最深处 | |
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208 providence | |
n.深谋远虑,天道,天意;远见;节约;上帝 | |
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209 pecuniary | |
adj.金钱的;金钱上的 | |
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210 dreaded | |
adj.令人畏惧的;害怕的v.害怕,恐惧,担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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211 wretch | |
n.可怜的人,不幸的人;卑鄙的人 | |
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212 vertigo | |
n.眩晕 | |
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213 delusions | |
n.欺骗( delusion的名词复数 );谬见;错觉;妄想 | |
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214 animate | |
v.赋于生命,鼓励;adj.有生命的,有生气的 | |
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215 frenzied | |
a.激怒的;疯狂的 | |
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216 bailing | |
(凿井时用吊桶)排水 | |
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217 conqueror | |
n.征服者,胜利者 | |
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218 foe | |
n.敌人,仇敌 | |
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219 witchcraft | |
n.魔法,巫术 | |
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220 necromancer | |
n. 巫师 | |
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221 illustrate | |
v.举例说明,阐明;图解,加插图 | |
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222 incite | |
v.引起,激动,煽动 | |
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223 formerly | |
adv.从前,以前 | |
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224 swarming | |
密集( swarm的现在分词 ); 云集; 成群地移动; 蜜蜂或其他飞行昆虫成群地飞来飞去 | |
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225 chaos | |
n.混乱,无秩序 | |
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226 materialism | |
n.[哲]唯物主义,唯物论;物质至上 | |
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227 formulated | |
v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 );规划;确切地阐述;用公式表示 | |
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228 unimpeachable | |
adj.无可指责的;adv.无可怀疑地 | |
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229 incurably | |
ad.治不好地 | |
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230 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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231 incompatibility | |
n.不兼容 | |
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232 uncertainty | |
n.易变,靠不住,不确知,不确定的事物 | |
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233 propensities | |
n.倾向,习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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234 annihilate | |
v.使无效;毁灭;取消 | |
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235 pessimism | |
n.悲观者,悲观主义者,厌世者 | |
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236 adoption | |
n.采用,采纳,通过;收养 | |
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237 prophesy | |
v.预言;预示 | |
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238 eternity | |
n.不朽,来世;永恒,无穷 | |
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239 extradition | |
n.引渡(逃犯) | |
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240 enraptured | |
v.使狂喜( enrapture的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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241 rapture | |
n.狂喜;全神贯注;着迷;v.使狂喜 | |
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242 loathsome | |
adj.讨厌的,令人厌恶的 | |
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243 tedium | |
n.单调;烦闷 | |
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244 annihilates | |
n.(彻底)消灭( annihilate的名词复数 );使无效;废止;彻底击溃v.(彻底)消灭( annihilate的第三人称单数 );使无效;废止;彻底击溃 | |
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245 pertinency | |
有关性,相关性,针对性; 切合性 | |
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246 aspirations | |
强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 ); 志向; 发送气音; 发 h 音 | |
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247 monstrously | |
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248 postulate | |
n.假定,基本条件;vt.要求,假定 | |
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249 cosmos | |
n.宇宙;秩序,和谐 | |
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250 fortitude | |
n.坚忍不拔;刚毅 | |
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251 unwillingly | |
adv.不情愿地 | |
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252 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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253 prey | |
n.被掠食者,牺牲者,掠食;v.捕食,掠夺,折磨 | |
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254 craving | |
n.渴望,热望 | |
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255 mentality | |
n.心理,思想,脑力 | |
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256 fleeting | |
adj.短暂的,飞逝的 | |
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257 fang | |
n.尖牙,犬牙 | |
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258 attains | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的第三人称单数 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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259 postponed | |
vt.& vi.延期,缓办,(使)延迟vt.把…放在次要地位;[语]把…放在后面(或句尾)vi.(疟疾等)延缓发作(或复发) | |
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260 effaced | |
v.擦掉( efface的过去式和过去分词 );抹去;超越;使黯然失色 | |
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261 vaguely | |
adv.含糊地,暖昧地 | |
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262 datum | |
n.资料;数据;已知数 | |
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263 unwillingness | |
n. 不愿意,不情愿 | |
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264 incongruity | |
n.不协调,不一致 | |
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265 reverence | |
n.敬畏,尊敬,尊严;Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称;v.尊敬,敬畏,崇敬 | |
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266 manifestations | |
n.表示,显示(manifestation的复数形式) | |
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267 revival | |
n.复兴,复苏,(精力、活力等的)重振 | |
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268 emancipating | |
v.解放某人(尤指摆脱政治、法律或社会的束缚)( emancipate的现在分词 ) | |
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269 repentance | |
n.懊悔 | |
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270 repent | |
v.悔悟,悔改,忏悔,后悔 | |
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271 obloquy | |
n.斥责,大骂 | |
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272 renaissance | |
n.复活,复兴,文艺复兴 | |
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273 verity | |
n.真实性 | |
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274 corruptions | |
n.堕落( corruption的名词复数 );腐化;腐败;贿赂 | |
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275 obedience | |
n.服从,顺从 | |
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276 veracity | |
n.诚实 | |
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277 humble | |
adj.谦卑的,恭顺的;地位低下的;v.降低,贬低 | |
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278 enveloping | |
v.包围,笼罩,包住( envelop的现在分词 ) | |
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279 faculties | |
n.能力( faculty的名词复数 );全体教职员;技巧;院 | |
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280 disciple | |
n.信徒,门徒,追随者 | |
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281 irrelevant | |
adj.不恰当的,无关系的,不相干的 | |
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282 pertinent | |
adj.恰当的;贴切的;中肯的;有关的;相干的 | |
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283 definitive | |
adj.确切的,权威性的;最后的,决定性的 | |
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284 emphatic | |
adj.强调的,着重的;无可置疑的,明显的 | |
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285 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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286 creeds | |
(尤指宗教)信条,教条( creed的名词复数 ) | |
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287 expectancy | |
n.期望,预期,(根据概率统计求得)预期数额 | |
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288 sensuous | |
adj.激发美感的;感官的,感觉上的 | |
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289 harmonious | |
adj.和睦的,调和的,和谐的,协调的 | |
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290 complexity | |
n.复杂(性),复杂的事物 | |
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291 unravel | |
v.弄清楚(秘密);拆开,解开,松开 | |
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292 rhythmic | |
adj.有节奏的,有韵律的 | |
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293 regularity | |
n.规律性,规则性;匀称,整齐 | |
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294 impute | |
v.归咎于 | |
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295 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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296 entities | |
实体对像; 实体,独立存在体,实际存在物( entity的名词复数 ) | |
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297 materialistic | |
a.唯物主义的,物质享乐主义的 | |
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298 sentimental | |
adj.多愁善感的,感伤的 | |
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299 corroborated | |
v.证实,支持(某种说法、信仰、理论等)( corroborate的过去式 ) | |
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300 postulates | |
v.假定,假设( postulate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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301 reset | |
v.重新安排,复位;n.重新放置;重放之物 | |
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302 pervaded | |
v.遍及,弥漫( pervade的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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303 backwards | |
adv.往回地,向原处,倒,相反,前后倒置地 | |
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304 chronological | |
adj.按年月顺序排列的,年代学的 | |
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305 coalesce | |
v.联合,结合,合并 | |
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306 prehistoric | |
adj.(有记载的)历史以前的,史前的,古老的 | |
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307 vagaries | |
n.奇想( vagary的名词复数 );异想天开;异常行为;难以预测的情况 | |
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308 espouses | |
v.(决定)支持,拥护(目标、主张等)( espouse的第三人称单数 ) | |
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309 physiology | |
n.生理学,生理机能 | |
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310 abruptly | |
adv.突然地,出其不意地 | |
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311 conversions | |
变换( conversion的名词复数 ); (宗教、信仰等)彻底改变; (尤指为居住而)改建的房屋; 橄榄球(触地得分后再把球射中球门的)附加得分 | |
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312 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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