§78. Conjugal6 society is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman; and tho’ it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in one another’s bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet it draws with it mutual7 support and assistance, and a communion of interests too, as necessary not only to unite their care and affection, but also necessary to their common off-spring, who have a right to be nourished, and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themselves.
§79. For the end of conjunction, between male and female, being not barely procreation, but the continuation of the species; this conjunction betwixt male and female ought to last, even after procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment8 and support of the young ones, who are to be sustained by those that got them, till they are able to shift and provide for themselves. This rule, which the infinite wise maker9 hath set to the works of his hands, we find the inferior creatures steadily10 obey. In those viviparous animals which feed on grass, the conjunction between male and female lasts no longer than the very act of copulation; because the teat of the dam being sufficient to nourish the young, till it be able to feed on grass, the male only begets11, but concerns not himself for the female or young, to whose sustenance12 he can contribute nothing. But in beasts of prey13 the conjunction lasts longer: because the dam not being able well to subsist14 herself, and nourish her numerous off-spring by her own prey alone, a more laborious15, as well as more dangerous way of living, than by feeding on grass, the assistance of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common family, which cannot subsist till they are able to prey for themselves, but by the joint16 care of male and female. The same is to be observed in all birds, (except some domestic ones, where plenty of food excuses the cock from feeding, and taking care of the young brood) whose young needing food in the nest, the cock and hen continue mates, till the young are able to use their wing, and provide for themselves.
§80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only reason, why the male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than other creatures, viz. because the female is capable of conceiving, and de facto is commonly with child again, and brings forth17 too a new birth, long before the former is out of a dependency for support on his parents help, and able to shift for himself, and has all the assistance is due to him from his parents: whereby the father, who is bound to take care for those he hath begot18, is under an obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same woman longer than other creatures, whose young being able to subsist of themselves, before the time of procreation returns again, the conjugal bond dissolves of itself, and they are at liberty, till Hymen at his usual anniversary season summons them again to chuse new mates. Wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the great Creator, who having given to man foresight19, and an ability to lay up for the future, as well as to supply the present necessity, hath made it necessary, that society of man and wife should be more lasting20, than of male and female amongst other creatures; that so their industry might be encouraged, and their interest better united, to make provision and lay up goods for their common issue, which uncertain mixture, or easy and frequent solutions of conjugal society would mightily21 disturb.
§81. But tho’ these are ties upon mankind, which make the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting in man, than the other species of animals; yet it would give one reason to enquire22, why this compact, where procreation and education are secured, and inheritance taken care for, may not be made determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time, or upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there being no necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should always be for life; I mean, to such as are under no restraint of any positive law, which ordains23 all such contracts to be perpetual.
§82. But the husband and wife, though they have but one common concern, yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore being necessary that the last determination, i. e. the rule, should be placed somewhere; it naturally falls to the man’s share, as the abler and the stronger. But this reaching but to the things of their common interest and property, leaves the wife in the full and free possession of what by contract is her peculiar24 right, and gives the husband no more power over her life than she has over his; the power of the husband being so far from that of an absolute monarch25, that the wife has in many cases a liberty to separate from him, where natural right, or their contract allows it; whether that contract be made by themselves in the state of nature, or by the customs or laws of the country they live in; and the children upon such separation fall to the father or mother’s lot, as such contract does determine.
§83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under politic5 government, as well as in the state of nature, the civil magistrate26 cloth not abridge27 the right or power of either naturally necessary to those ends, viz. procreation and mutual support and assistance whilst they are together; but only decides any controversy28 that may arise between man and wife about them. If it were otherwise, and that absolute sovereignty and power of life and death naturally belonged to the husband, and were necessary to the society between man and wife, there could be no matrimony in any of those countries where the husband is allowed no such absolute authority. But the ends of matrimony requiring no such power in the husband, the condition of conjugal society put it not in him, it being not at all necessary to that state. Conjugal society could subsist and attain29 its ends without it; nay30, community of goods, and the power over them, mutual assistance and maintenance, and other things belonging to conjugal society, might be varied31 and regulated by that contract which unites man and wife in that society, as far as may consist with procreation and the bringing up of children till they could shift for themselves; nothing being necessary to any society, that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made.
§84. The society betwixt parents and children, and the distinct rights and powers belonging respectively to them, I have treated of so largely, in the foregoing chapter, that I shall not here need to say any thing of it. And I think it is plain, that it is far different from a politic society.
§85. Master and servant are names as old as history, but given to those of far different condition; for a freeman makes himself a servant to another, by selling him, for a certain time, the service he undertakes to do, in exchange for wages he is to receive: and though this commonly puts him into the family of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof; yet it gives the master but a temporary power over him, and no greater than what is contained in the contract between them. But there is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion32 and arbitrary power of their masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited33 their lives, and with it their liberties, and lost their estates; and being in the state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society; the chief end whereof is the preservation34 of property.
§86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these subordinate relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves, united under the domestic rule of a family; which, what resemblance soever it may have in its order, offices, and number too, with a little common-wealth, yet is very far from it, both in its constitution, power and end: or if it must be thought a monarchy35, and the paterfamilias the absolute monarch in it, absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered and short power, when it is plain, by what has been said before, that the master of the family has a very distinct and differently limited power, both as to time and extent, over those several persons that are in it; for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a family, and his power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be any slaves in his family or no) he has no legislative36 power of life and death over any of them, and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he. And he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family, who has but a very limited one over every individual in it. But how a family, or any other society of men, differ from that which is properly political society, we shall best see, by considering wherein political society itself consists.
§87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment37 of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches38 of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness39 of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But because no political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society; there, and there only is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it. And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing4 rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society, with such penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and who are not, in political society together. Those who are united into one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies40 between them, and punish offenders41, are in civil society one with another: but those who have no such common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is no other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before shewed it, the perfect state of nature.
§88. And thus the common-wealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions42 which they think worthy43 of it, committed amongst the members of that society, (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the power of war and peace;) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is possible. But though every man who has entered into civil society, and is become a member of any commonwealth44, has thereby45 quitted his power to punish offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution46 of his own private judgment, yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given up to the legislative in all cases, where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a right to the common-wealth to employ his force, for the execution of the judgments47 of the common-wealth, whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed are his own judgments, they being made by himself, or his representative. And herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society, which is to judge by standing laws, how far offences are to be punished, when committed within the common-wealth; and also to determine, by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated48; and in both these to employ all the force of all the members, when there shall be need.
§89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or civil society. And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme49 government; or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he authorizes50 the society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the society shall require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a common-wealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controversies, and redress51 the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates52 appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.
§90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil-government at all: for the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man’s being judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the* society ought to obey; where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every absolute prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion.
(*The public power of all society is above every soul contained in the same society; and the principal use of that power is, to give laws unto all that are under it, which laws in such cases we must obey, unless there be reason shewed which may necessarily inforce, that the law of reason, or of God, doth enjoin53 the contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 16.)
§91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executive power in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with authority decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any injury or inconviency, that may be suffered from the prince, or by his order: so that such a man, however intitled, Czar, or Grand Seignior, or how you please, is as much in the state of nature, with all under his dominion, as he is with therest of mankind: for where-ever any two men are, who have no standing rule, and common judge to appeal to on earth, for the determination of controversies of right betwixt them, there they are still in the state of* nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the subject, or rather slave of an absolute prince: that whereas, in the ordinary state of nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and according to the best of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal, as those in society ought to have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and so is exposed to all the misery54 and inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted55 with flattery, and armed with power.
(*To take away all such mutual grievances56, injuries and wrongs, i.e. such as attend men in the state of nature, there was no way but only by growing into composition and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining57 some kind of govemment public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govem, by them the peace, tranquillity58 and happy estate of the rest might be procured59. Men always knew that where force and injury was offered, they might be defenders60 of themselves; they knew that however men may seek their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others, it was not to be suffered, but by all men, and all good means to be withstood. Finally, they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own right, and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every man is towards himself, and them whom he greatly affects, partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common consent, all to be ordered by some, whom they should agree upon, without which consent there would be no reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another, Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
§92. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men’s blood, and corrects the baseness of human nature, need read but the history of this, or any other age, to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have been insolent61 and injurious in the woods of America, would not probably be much better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion shall be found out to justify62 all that he shall do to his subjects, and the sword presently silence all those that dare question it: for what the protection of absolute monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be and to what a degree of happiness and security it carries civil society, where this sort of government is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late relation of Ceylon, may easily see.
§93. In absolute monarchies63 indeed, as well as other governments of the world, the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any controversies, and restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks necessary, and believes he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and mankind, who should go about to take it away. But whether this be from a true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as we owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt: for this is no more than what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or greatness, may and naturally must do, keep those animals from hurting, or destroying one another, who labour and drudge64 only for his pleasure and advantage; and so are taken care of, not out of any love the master has for them, but love of himself, and the profit they bring him: for if it be asked, what security, what fence is there, in such a state, against the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler? the very question can scarce be borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves death only to ask after safety. Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there must be measures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace and security: but as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all such circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury, on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the voice of faction65 and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of nature entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of laws, but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of nature, increased with power, and made licentious66 by impunity67. This is to think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what mischiefs68 may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured69 by lions.
§94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people’s understandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and when they perceive, that any man, in what station soever, is out of the bounds of the civil society which they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth against any harm, they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of nature, in respect of him whom they find to be so; and to take care, as soon as they can, to have that safety and security in civil society, for which it was first instituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at first, (as shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the following part of this discourse) some one good and excellent man having got a pre -eminency amongst the rest, had this deference70 paid to his goodness and virtue71, as to a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, with arbitration72 of their differences, by a tacit consent devolved into his hands, without any other caution, but the assurance they had of his uprightness and wisdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as some men would persuade us) sacredness of customs, which the negligent73, and unforeseeing innocence74 of the first ages began, had brought in successors of another stamp, the people finding their properties not secure under the government, as then it was, (whereas government has no other end but the preservation of * property) could never be safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil society, till the legislature was placed in collective bodies of men, call them senate, parliament, or what you please. By which means every single person became subject, equally with other the meanest men, to those laws, which he himself, as part of the legislative, had established; nor could any one, by his own authority; avoid the force of the law, when once made; nor by any pretence75 of superiority plead exemption76, thereby to license77 his own, or the miscarriages78 of any of his dependents.** No man in civil society can be exempted79 from the laws of it: for if any man may do what he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on earth, for redress or security against any harm he shall do; I ask, whether he be not perfectly80 still in the state of nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil society; unless any one will say, the state of nature and civil society are one and the same thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy81 as to affirm.
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1
sect
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| n.派别，宗教，学派，派系 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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conjugal
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| adj.婚姻的，婚姻性的 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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nourishment
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| n.食物，营养品；营养情况 | |
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maker
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| n.制造者，制造商 | |
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steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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begets
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| v.为…之生父( beget的第三人称单数 )；产生，引起 | |
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sustenance
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| n.食物，粮食；生活资料；生计 | |
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prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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subsist
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| vi.生存，存在，供养 | |
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laborious
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| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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begot
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| v.为…之生父( beget的过去式 )；产生，引起 | |
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foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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mightily
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| ad.强烈地；非常地 | |
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enquire
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| v.打听，询问；调查，查问 | |
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ordains
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| v.任命（某人）为牧师( ordain的第三人称单数 )；授予（某人）圣职；（上帝、法律等）命令；判定 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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abridge
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| v.删减，删节，节略，缩短 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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forfeited
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| （因违反协议、犯规、受罚等）丧失，失去( forfeit的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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breaches
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| 破坏( breach的名词复数 )； 破裂； 缺口； 违背 | |
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heinousness
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controversies
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| 争论 | |
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offenders
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| n.冒犯者( offender的名词复数 )；犯规者；罪犯；妨害…的人（或事物） | |
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transgressions
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| n.违反，违法，罪过( transgression的名词复数 ) | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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commonwealth
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| n.共和国，联邦，共同体 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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vindicated
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| v.澄清（某人/某事物）受到的责难或嫌疑( vindicate的过去式和过去分词 )；表明或证明（所争辩的事物）属实、正当、有效等；维护 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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authorizes
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| 授权，批准，委托( authorize的名词复数 ) | |
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redress
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| n.赔偿，救济，矫正；v.纠正，匡正，革除 | |
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magistrates
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| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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enjoin
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| v.命令；吩咐；禁止 | |
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misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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corrupted
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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grievances
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| n.委屈( grievance的名词复数 )；苦衷；不满；牢骚 | |
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ordaining
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| v.任命（某人）为牧师( ordain的现在分词 )；授予（某人）圣职；（上帝、法律等）命令；判定 | |
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tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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insolent
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| adj.傲慢的，无理的 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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monarchies
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| n. 君主政体, 君主国, 君主政治 | |
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drudge
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| n.劳碌的人；v.做苦工，操劳 | |
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faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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licentious
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| adj.放纵的，淫乱的 | |
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impunity
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| n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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mischiefs
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| 损害( mischief的名词复数 )； 危害； 胡闹； 调皮捣蛋的人 | |
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devoured
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| 吞没( devour的过去式和过去分词 )； 耗尽； 津津有味地看； 狼吞虎咽地吃光 | |
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deference
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| n.尊重，顺从；敬意 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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arbitration
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| n.调停，仲裁 | |
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negligent
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| adj.疏忽的；玩忽的；粗心大意的 | |
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innocence
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| n.无罪；天真；无害 | |
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pretence
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| n.假装，作假；借口，口实；虚伪；虚饰 | |
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exemption
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| n.豁免，免税额，免除 | |
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license
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| n.执照，许可证，特许；v.许可，特许 | |
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miscarriages
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| 流产( miscarriage的名词复数 ) | |
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exempted
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| 使免除[豁免]( exempt的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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