Some twelve years ago, Dr. Draper published a bulky volume entitled “A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe,” in which his professed1 purpose was to show that nations or races pass through certain definable epochs of development, analogous3 to the periods of infancy4, childhood, youth, manhood, and old age in individuals. But while announced with due formality, the carrying out of the argument was left for the most part to the headings and running-titles of the several chapters, while in the text the author peacefully meandered5 along down the stream of time, giving us a succession of pleasant though somewhat threadbare anecdotes6, as well as a superabundance of detached and fragmentary opinions on divers7 historical events, having apparently8 quite forgotten that he had started with a thesis to prove. In the arrangement of his “running heads,” some points were sufficiently9 curious to require a word of explanation, as, for example, when the early ages of Christianity were at one time labelled as an epoch2 of progress and at another time as an epoch of decrepitude11. But the argument and the contents never got so far en rapport12 with each other as to clear up such points as this. On the contrary, each kept on the even tenour of its way without much regard to the other. From the titles of the chapters one was led to expect some comprehensive theory of European civilization continuously expounded13. But the text merely showed a great quantity of superficial and second-hand15 information, serving to illustrate16 the mental idiosyncrasies of the author. Among these idiosyncrasies might be noted17 a very inadequate18 understanding of the part played by Rome in the work of civilization, a singular lack of appreciation19 of the political and philosophical21 achievements of Greece under Athenian leadership, a strong hostility22 to the Catholic Church, a curious disposition23 to overrate semi-barbarous. or abortive24 civilizations, such as those of the old Asiatic and native American communities, at the expense of Europe, and, above all, an undiscriminating admiration25 for everything, great or small, that has ever worn the garb26 of Islam or been associated with the career of the Saracens. The discovery that in some respects the Mussulmans of the Middle Ages were more highly cultivated than their Christian10 contemporaries, has made such an impression on Dr. Draper’s mind that it seems to be as hard for him to get rid of it as it was for Mr. Dick to keep the execution of Charles I. out of his “Memorial.” Even in an essay on the “Civil Policy of America,” the turbaned sage27 figures quite prominently; and it is needless to add that he reappears, as large as life, when the subject of discussion is the attitude of science toward religion.
Speaking briefly28 with regard to this matter, we may freely admit that the work done by the Arabs, in scientific inquiry29 as well as in the making of events, was very considerable. It was a work, too, the value of which is not commonly appreciated in the accounts of European history written for the general reader, and we have no disposition to find fault with Dr. Draper for describing it with enthusiasm. The philosophers of Bagdad and Cordova did excellent service in keeping alive the traditions of Greek physical inquiry at a time when Christian thinkers were too exclusively occupied with transcendental speculations30 in theology and logic31. In some departments, as in chemistry and astronomy, they made original discoveries of considerable value; and if we turn from abstract knowledge to the arts of life, it cannot be denied that the mediaeval Mussulmans had reached a higher plane of material comfort than their Christian contemporaries. In short, the work of all kinds done by these people would furnish the judicious32 advocate of the claims of the Semitic race with materials for a pleasing and instructive picture. Dr. Draper, however, errs33, though no doubt unintentionally, by so presenting the case as to leave upon the reader’s mind the impression that all this scientific and practical achievement was the work of Islamism, and that the Mohammedan civilization was of a higher type than the Christian. It is with an apparent feeling of regret that he looks upon the ousting34 of the Moors35 from dominion36 in Spain; but this is a mistaken view. As regards the first point, it is a patent fact that scientific inquiry was conducted at the cost of as much theological obloquy37 in the Mohammedan as in the Christian world. It is true there was more actual tolerance38 of heresy39 on the part of Moslem40 governments than was customary in Europe in those days; but this is a superficial fact, which does not indicate any superiority in Moslem popular sentiment. The caliphate or emirate was a truly absolute despotism, such as the Papacy has never been, and the conduct of a sceptical emir in encouraging scientific inquiry goes but little way toward proving anything like a general prevalence of tolerance or of free-thinking. And this brings us to the second point — that Mohammedan civilization was, on the whole, rather a skin-deep affair. It was superficial because of that extreme severance41 between government and people which has never existed in European nations within historic times, but which has always existed among the principal races that have professed Moslemism. Nowhere in the Mohammedan world has there ever been what we call a national life, and nowhere do we find in its records any trace of such an intellectual impulse, thrilling through every fibre of the people and begetting42 prodigious43 achievements in art, poetry, and philosophy, as was awakened44 in Europe in the thirteenth century and again in the fifteenth. Under the peculiar45 form of unlimited46 material and spiritual despotism exemplified in the caliphate, a few men may discover gases or comment on Aristotle, but no general movement toward political progress or philosophical inquiry is possible. Such a society is rigid47 and inorganic48 at bottom, whatever scanty49 signs of flexibility50 and life it may show at the surface. There is no better illustration of this, when well considered, than the fact that Moorish51 civilization remained, politically and intellectually, a mere14 excrescence in Spain, after having been fastened down over half the country for nearly eight centuries.
But we are in danger of forgetting our main theme, as Dr. Draper seems to do, while we linger with him over these interesting wayside topics. We may perhaps be excused, however, if we have not yet made any very explicit52 allusion53 to the “Conflict between Religion and Science,” because this work seems to be in the main a repetition en petit of the “Intellectual Development of Europe,” and what we have said will apply as well to one as to the other. In the little book, as in the big one, we hear a great deal about the Arabs, and something about Columbus and Galileo, who made men accept sundry54 truths in the teeth of clerical opposition55; and, as before, we float gently down the current of history without being over well-informed as to the precise didactic purpose of our voyage. Here, indeed, even our headings and running-titles do not materially help us, for though we are supposed to be witnessing, or mayhap assisting in, a perennial56 conflict between “science” and “religion,” we are nowhere enlightened as to what the cause or character of this conflict is, nor are we enabled to get a good look at either of the parties to the strife57. With regard to it “religion” especially are we left in the dark. What this dreadful thing is towards which “science” is always playing the part of Herakles towards the Lernaean Hydra58, we are left to gather from the course of the narrative59. Yet, in a book with any valid60 claim to clearsightedness, one would think such a point as this ought to receive very explicit preliminary treatment.
The course of the narrative, however, leaves us in little doubt as to what Dr. Draper means by a conflict between science and religion. When he enlarges on the trite61 story of Galileo, and alludes62 to the more modern quarrel between the Church and the geologists63, and does this in the belief that he is thereby64 illustrating65 an antagonism66 between religion and science, it is obvious that he identifies the cause of the anti-geologists and the persecutors of Galileo with the cause of religion. The word “religion” is to him a symbol which stands for unenlightened bigotry67 or narrow-minded unwillingness68 to look facts in the face. Such a conception of religion is common enough, and unhappily a great deal has been done to strengthen it by the very persons to whom the interests of religion are presumed to be a professional care. It is nevertheless a very superficial conception, and no book which is vitiated by it can have much philosophic20 value. It is simply the crude impression which, in minds unaccustomed to analysis, is left by the fact that theologians and other persons interested in religion are usually alarmed at new scientific truths, and resist them with emotions so highly wrought69 that they are not only incapable70 of estimating evidence, but often also have their moral sense impaired71, and fight with foul72 means when fair ones fail. If we reflect carefully on this class of phenomena73, we shall see that something besides mere pride of opinion is involved in the struggle. At the bottom of changing theological beliefs there lies something which men perennially74 value, and for the sake of which they cling to the beliefs as long as possible. That which they value is not itself a matter of belief, but it is a matter of conduct; it is the searching after goodness — after a higher life than the mere satisfaction of individual desires. All animals seek for fulness of life; but in civilized75 man this craving76 has acquired a moral significance, and has become a spiritual aspiration77; and this emotional tendency, more or less strong in the human race, we call religious feeling or religion. Viewed in this light, religion is not only something that mankind is never likely to get rid of, but it is incomparably the most noble as well as the most useful attribute of humanity.
Now, this emotional prompting toward completeness of life requires, of course, that conduct should be guided, as far as possible, in accordance with a true theory of the relations of man to the world in which he lives. Hence, at any given era the religious feeling will always be found enlisted78 in behalf of some theory of the universe. At any time, whatever may be their shortcomings in practice, religious men will aim at doing right according to their conceptions of the order of the world. If men’s conceptions of the order of nature remained constant, no apparent conflict between their religious feelings and their knowledge need ever arise. But with the first advance in our knowledge of nature the case is altered. New and strange theories are naturally regarded with fear and dislike by persons who have always been accustomed to find the sanction and justification79 of their emotional prompting toward righteousness in old familiar theories which the new ones are seeking to supplant80. Such persons oppose the new doctrine81 because their engrained mental habits compel them to believe that its establishment will in some way lower men’s standard of life, and make them less careful of their spiritual welfare. This is the case, at all events, when theologians oppose scientific conclusions on religious grounds, and not simply from mental dulness or rigidity82. And, in so far as it is religious feeling which thus prompts resistance to scientific innovation, it may be said, with some appearance of truth, that there is a conflict between religion and science.
But there must always be two parties to a quarrel, and our statement has to be modified as soon as we consider what the scientific innovator83 impugns84. It is not the emotional prompting toward righteousness, it is not the yearning85 to live im Guten, Ganzen, Wahren, that he seeks to weaken; quite likely he has all this as much at heart as the theologian who vituperates him. Nor is it true that his discoveries, in spite of him, tend to destroy this all-important mental attitude. It would be ridiculous to say that the fate of religious feeling is really involved in the fate of grotesque86 cosmogonies and theosophies framed in the infancy of men’s knowledge of nature; for history shows us quite the contrary. Religious feeling has survived the heliocentric theory and the discoveries of geologists; and it will be none the worse for the establishment of Darwinism. It is the merest truism to say that religion strikes its roots deeper down into human nature than speculative87 opinion, and is accordingly independent of any particular set of beliefs. Since, then, the scientific innovator does not, either voluntarily or involuntarily, attack religion, it follows that there can be no such “conflict” as that of which Dr. Draper has undertaken to write the history. The real contest is between one phase of science and another; between the more-crude knowledge of yesterday and the less-crude knowledge of to-day. The contest, indeed, as presented in history, is simply the measure of the difficulty which men find in exchanging old views for new ones. All along, the practical question has been, whether we should passively acquiesce88 in the crude generalizations89 of our ancestors or venture actively90 to revise them. But as for the religious sentiment, the perennial struggle in which it has been engaged has not been with scientific inquiry, but with the selfish propensities91 whose tendency is to make men lead the lives of brutes92.
The time is at hand when the interests of religion can no longer be supposed to be subserved by obstinate93 adherence94 to crude speculations bequeathed to us from pre-scientific antiquity95. One good result of the doctrine of evolution, which is now gaining sway in all departments of thought, is the lesson that all our opinions must be held subject to continual revision, and that with none of them can our religious interests be regarded as irretrievably implicated96. To any one who has once learned this lesson, a book like Dr. Draper’s can be neither interesting nor useful. He who has not learned it can derive97 little benefit from a work which in its very title keeps open an old and baneful98 source of error and confusion.
November. 1875.
![](../../../skin/default/image/4.jpg)
点击
收听单词发音
![收听单词发音](/template/default/tingnovel/images/play.gif)
1
professed
![]() |
|
公开声称的,伪称的,已立誓信教的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
2
epoch
![]() |
|
n.(新)时代;历元 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
3
analogous
![]() |
|
adj.相似的;类似的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
4
infancy
![]() |
|
n.婴儿期;幼年期;初期 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
5
meandered
![]() |
|
(指溪流、河流等)蜿蜒而流( meander的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
6
anecdotes
![]() |
|
n.掌故,趣闻,轶事( anecdote的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
7
divers
![]() |
|
adj.不同的;种种的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
8
apparently
![]() |
|
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
9
sufficiently
![]() |
|
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
10
Christian
![]() |
|
adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
11
decrepitude
![]() |
|
n.衰老;破旧 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
12
rapport
![]() |
|
n.和睦,意见一致 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
13
expounded
![]() |
|
论述,详细讲解( expound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
14
mere
![]() |
|
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
15
second-hand
![]() |
|
adj.用过的,旧的,二手的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
16
illustrate
![]() |
|
v.举例说明,阐明;图解,加插图 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
17
noted
![]() |
|
adj.著名的,知名的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
18
inadequate
![]() |
|
adj.(for,to)不充足的,不适当的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
19
appreciation
![]() |
|
n.评价;欣赏;感谢;领会,理解;价格上涨 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
20
philosophic
![]() |
|
adj.哲学的,贤明的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
21
philosophical
![]() |
|
adj.哲学家的,哲学上的,达观的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
22
hostility
![]() |
|
n.敌对,敌意;抵制[pl.]交战,战争 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
23
disposition
![]() |
|
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
24
abortive
![]() |
|
adj.不成功的,发育不全的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
25
admiration
![]() |
|
n.钦佩,赞美,羡慕 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
26
garb
![]() |
|
n.服装,装束 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
27
sage
![]() |
|
n.圣人,哲人;adj.贤明的,明智的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
28
briefly
![]() |
|
adv.简单地,简短地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
29
inquiry
![]() |
|
n.打听,询问,调查,查问 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
30
speculations
![]() |
|
n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 );思考;投机活动;推断 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
31
logic
![]() |
|
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
32
judicious
![]() |
|
adj.明智的,明断的,能作出明智决定的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
33
errs
![]() |
|
犯错误,做错事( err的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
34
ousting
![]() |
|
驱逐( oust的现在分词 ); 革职; 罢黜; 剥夺 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
35
moors
![]() |
|
v.停泊,系泊(船只)( moor的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
36
dominion
![]() |
|
n.统治,管辖,支配权;领土,版图 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
37
obloquy
![]() |
|
n.斥责,大骂 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
38
tolerance
![]() |
|
n.宽容;容忍,忍受;耐药力;公差 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
39
heresy
![]() |
|
n.异端邪说;异教 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
40
Moslem
![]() |
|
n.回教徒,穆罕默德信徒;adj.回教徒的,回教的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
41
severance
![]() |
|
n.离职金;切断 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
42
begetting
![]() |
|
v.为…之生父( beget的现在分词 );产生,引起 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
43
prodigious
![]() |
|
adj.惊人的,奇妙的;异常的;巨大的;庞大的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
44
awakened
![]() |
|
v.(使)醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 );(使)觉醒;弄醒;(使)意识到 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
45
peculiar
![]() |
|
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
46
unlimited
![]() |
|
adj.无限的,不受控制的,无条件的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
47
rigid
![]() |
|
adj.严格的,死板的;刚硬的,僵硬的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
48
inorganic
![]() |
|
adj.无生物的;无机的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
49
scanty
![]() |
|
adj.缺乏的,仅有的,节省的,狭小的,不够的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
50
flexibility
![]() |
|
n.柔韧性,弹性,(光的)折射性,灵活性 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
51
moorish
![]() |
|
adj.沼地的,荒野的,生[住]在沼地的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
52
explicit
![]() |
|
adj.详述的,明确的;坦率的;显然的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
53
allusion
![]() |
|
n.暗示,间接提示 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
54
sundry
![]() |
|
adj.各式各样的,种种的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
55
opposition
![]() |
|
n.反对,敌对 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
56
perennial
![]() |
|
adj.终年的;长久的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
57
strife
![]() |
|
n.争吵,冲突,倾轧,竞争 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
58
hydra
![]() |
|
n.水螅;难于根除的祸患 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
59
narrative
![]() |
|
n.叙述,故事;adj.叙事的,故事体的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
60
valid
![]() |
|
adj.有确实根据的;有效的;正当的,合法的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
61
trite
![]() |
|
adj.陈腐的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
62
alludes
![]() |
|
提及,暗指( allude的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
63
geologists
![]() |
|
地质学家,地质学者( geologist的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
64
thereby
![]() |
|
adv.因此,从而 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
65
illustrating
![]() |
|
给…加插图( illustrate的现在分词 ); 说明; 表明; (用示例、图画等)说明 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
66
antagonism
![]() |
|
n.对抗,敌对,对立 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
67
bigotry
![]() |
|
n.偏见,偏执,持偏见的行为[态度]等 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
68
unwillingness
![]() |
|
n. 不愿意,不情愿 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
69
wrought
![]() |
|
v.引起;以…原料制作;运转;adj.制造的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
70
incapable
![]() |
|
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
71
impaired
![]() |
|
adj.受损的;出毛病的;有(身体或智力)缺陷的v.损害,削弱( impair的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
72
foul
![]() |
|
adj.污秽的;邪恶的;v.弄脏;妨害;犯规;n.犯规 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
73
phenomena
![]() |
|
n.现象 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
74
perennially
![]() |
|
adv.经常出现地;长期地;持久地;永久地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
75
civilized
![]() |
|
a.有教养的,文雅的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
76
craving
![]() |
|
n.渴望,热望 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
77
aspiration
![]() |
|
n.志向,志趣抱负;渴望;(语)送气音;吸出 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
78
enlisted
![]() |
|
adj.应募入伍的v.(使)入伍, (使)参军( enlist的过去式和过去分词 );获得(帮助或支持) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
79
justification
![]() |
|
n.正当的理由;辩解的理由 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
80
supplant
![]() |
|
vt.排挤;取代 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
81
doctrine
![]() |
|
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
82
rigidity
![]() |
|
adj.钢性,坚硬 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
83
innovator
![]() |
|
n.改革者;创新者 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
84
impugns
![]() |
|
v.非难,指谪( impugn的第三人称单数 );对…有怀疑 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
85
yearning
![]() |
|
a.渴望的;向往的;怀念的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
86
grotesque
![]() |
|
adj.怪诞的,丑陋的;n.怪诞的图案,怪人(物) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
87
speculative
![]() |
|
adj.思索性的,暝想性的,推理的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
88
acquiesce
![]() |
|
vi.默许,顺从,同意 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
89
generalizations
![]() |
|
一般化( generalization的名词复数 ); 普通化; 归纳; 概论 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
90
actively
![]() |
|
adv.积极地,勤奋地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
91
propensities
![]() |
|
n.倾向,习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
92
brutes
![]() |
|
兽( brute的名词复数 ); 畜生; 残酷无情的人; 兽性 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
93
obstinate
![]() |
|
adj.顽固的,倔强的,不易屈服的,较难治愈的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
94
adherence
![]() |
|
n.信奉,依附,坚持,固着 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
95
antiquity
![]() |
|
n.古老;高龄;古物,古迹 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
96
implicated
![]() |
|
adj.密切关联的;牵涉其中的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
97
derive
![]() |
|
v.取得;导出;引申;来自;源自;出自 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
98
baneful
![]() |
|
adj.有害的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
欢迎访问英文小说网 |