BATTLE OF ALBERT 1918—BATTLE OF THE SCARPE 1918
It must not be thought that this first great German effort ended like Act I at a theatre, with a curtain dropping for fifteen minutes while the actors rested and changed their clothes, and the spectators found solace1 in nicotine2 or alcohol.
Troops in line, though they were not being attacked, probably worked harder than ever before and the nervous tension was as great as ever. All were conscious that the Germans might erupt again, and, as is usual in such times of stress, the weak-hearted were always ready to endow the enemy with miraculous3 powers of assembling, of covering himself with a cloak of invisibility. The rush had been stopped, but only by the sacrifice of a very considerable area of ground, and at the expense of many reserves; but a mass of enemy divisions was still concentrated on the Somme.
It was certain that the enemy would attack again, and it seemed probable that it would be about the centre of the British line, where his preparations were already complete. Indeed, the situation was more serious than it had ever been.
The British Army had used up all its reserves [Pg 244] in the fighting on the Somme, and in addition ten divisions had been withdrawn4 from the north and replaced with worn-out divisions, reinforced from England. The reasons for draining the north are given by Sir Douglas Haig as being that he could, under urgent necessity, give ground there to a limited extent, but a break-through in the centre, about Vimy, “would mean the realisation of the enemy’s plans, which had been foiled by our defence of Arras on the 28th March, namely, the capture of Amiens and the separation of the bulk of the British Armies from the French and from those British forces acting5 under the direction of the latter.” Therefore, in view of the preparations which had been made on that sector6 by the enemy, British forces could not be reduced.
Certain preparations for an attack north of the La Bassée Canal had been observed prior to the 21st March, and there were indications that the enemy was completing these early in April; but the extent and force of the possible attack could not be gauged7.
On the 7th April a heavy and prolonged bombardment with gas shell was opened by the Germans from Lens to Armentières. And at 4 o’clock in the morning of the 9th the bombardment was reopened with the greatest intensity8. At 7 o’clock, again helped by a thick fog, the enemy attacked the left brigade of the Portuguese9 2nd Division and broke into their trenches11; a few minutes later the attack spread to the north and south. The attack included the left of the First Army and the right of the Second Army.
This great thrust in the direction of Hazebrouck was brought to a standstill between Merville and the Forêt de Nieppe, but the enemy penetrated12 beyond [Pg 245] Bailleul, and in the north took Kemmel Hill and forced a retirement13 from the Passchendaele Ridge14.
This brings the general situation up to the end of April. But we must note that on the 14th Marshal Foch became the Allied15 Generalissimo.
The next German move was on the 27th May, north-west of Rheims, on the Aisne front. The 19th, 21st, 25th, and 50th British Divisions, which had taken part in both the Somme and the Lys Valley fighting, had been sent down to a quiet part of the French front; they were joined by the 8th Division, which had been in some of the hardest fighting on the Somme. These divisions constituted the IX Corps16 and were included in the Sixth French Army. The German attack fell on the IX Corps and the French Corps on their left, which was holding the Chemin des Dames17; they were forced from their positions, and by the 30th May the enemy had reached the Marne. The attacks continued until the 6th June, when they culminated18 in two attempts on the Montagne de Bligny, but here they were held.
By this time the Allied reserves were being used wherever they were wanted. But it had been for the most part French reserves which had come to the aid of the British. At the beginning of July, however, Marshal Foch believed that the enemy was about to attack east and west of Rheims, and he moved the whole of his French troops (eight divisions) from Flanders, and in addition asked for four British divisions to relieve French troops on the Somme. A further four divisions were also sent down as a reserve behind the French front.
As the Marshal had foreseen, the enemy attacked on the 15th July, and, after making progress and [Pg 246] crossing the Marne, was held by French, American, and Italian divisions.
On the 18th July the Marshal launched his great counter-offensive on the Chateau19 Thierry-Soissons front, and in this used the four British divisions he had held in reserve, and which constituted the XXII Corps. (The 56th Division entered this Corps later on.)
In view of the defeats inflicted20 up to the moment of the counter-offensive, it might well be supposed that the troops of the Entente21 were despondent22. The Germans were surprised at M. Clemenceau stating that he would fight before Paris, that he would fight in Paris, and that he would fight behind Paris, and this same spirit certainly pervaded23 the 56th Division. With these great enemy successes throughout the months of March, April, May, and July in mind, the actions of the 56th Division during those months are perhaps the most significant and, in our opinion, the most gallant24 work they performed. There was no set battle. And a set battle is in some ways the easiest kind of attack for the infantry25. The operations through those months were of a minor26 character, calling for a high level of courage and determination from small parties of men, parties so small that the success of the enterprise must depend on individual gallantry, as there was no mass to drag them along. At any time minor operations deserve more praise than is allotted27 to them, and at this time, in the face of a series of German victories, they are worthy28 of the highest admiration29.
Divisional Headquarters were at a place called Acq, to the north-west of Arras, and the brigades in the neighbouring villages. Again the division was not [Pg 247] to know a lengthy30 period of rest, for on the 8th April the 56th Division had relieved the 1st Canadian Division and Gen. Dudgeon took over command of the line. During the week of so-called rest, brigades were called upon to provide anything between 1,200 and 1,500 men each night for fatigues32, digging further lines of defence. “Bow Bells” were active, and those who were not on fatigue31 joined in many a chorus with a flavour and memory of London Town.
The new front was south of the Scarpe and the Arras-Douai railway, ground over which the division had fought in the same month of the previous year. The high ground of Monchy and Orange Hill, on this side of the Scarpe, had been lost on the 28th, and the line now ran through Fampoux, on the north of the river, in front of Feuchy to Bois des B?ufs, to the east of Tilloy, and so to Neuville Vitasse. Bois des B?ufs was about the centre of the line held by the division, which was thus astride of the Arras-Cambrai road. The Corps was the XVII (Fergusson), and had been part of the Third Army, but on the 8th it was transferred to the First Army.
From the moment of taking over the line, patrols were pursuing an aggressive policy. Many small encounters took place in No Man’s Land, the 56th Division gradually gaining the ascendancy33 over the enemy.
On the 19th, at 4.30 a.m., the 168th Brigade carried out a most successful enterprise. The idea was to advance the outpost line on the Tilloy-Wancourt road, and was undertaken by the London Scottish on the right, with one company and a bombing section, and the 4th London Regt. on the [Pg 248] left, with one platoon and two bombing sections. The enemy were taken completely by surprise. One warrant officer and three other ranks were captured, together with nine machine guns and a Grenatenwerfer. The enemy line was held throughout the day, but the hostile artillery34 fire became stronger, the position was not particularly good, and towards the evening orders were given to evacuate35 it. While this was being done at dusk, the Germans launched a counter-attack and a lively scuffle ensued. The enemy was first beaten off, and then the retirement was effected.
A curious incident occurred during this brush with the enemy. The Germans, as usual, sent up a multitude of lights, and a combination of these appear to have presented to the artillery observers a cluster of lights such as our S.O.S. rocket contained at that moment. The S.O.S. barrage36 was accordingly put down, much to the surprise of the London Scottish.
The prisoners were of the 65th Infantry Regt., 185th Division.
On the 23rd April the 56th Division took over from the 15th Division the sector north of the Arras-Cambrai road, and held the whole of the XVII Corps front.
The enemy raided on the 24th, and occupied for a short period a gun-pit post. He was ejected and gained no identification, but two of his dead were found and proved to be of the 28th Infantry Regt., 185th Division. But the next night two prisoners were captured by a patrol on the extreme left of the line, near Broken Mill, belonging to the 14th Bavarian Regt., 16th Bavarian Division, which indicated a relief of the 185th Division.
[Pg 249] Gen. Dudgeon, who had led the division through some very heavy fighting, fell ill on the 25th and was sent to hospital. His record with the division is a fine one. At the third battle of Ypres he had scarcely time to look round, knew no one in the division, and his position might be described as most unenviable; at the battle of Cambrai he was called upon to carry out a most difficult task; at Arras he went through a most anxious and trying period. At none of these places did he falter37. The ordeals38 which were thrust upon him were heavy, but he brought the division through them triumphantly39.
Brig.-Gen. Freeth assumed temporary command of the division, until Gen. Hull40 arrived on the 4th May.
No man had such power over the 56th Division as Gen. Hull. The wonderful pugnacious41 spirit they had shown in the Laventie-Richebourg line was roused to its highest pitch when, after a quiet ten days’ study of the line, the General ordered a whole series of raids, which at last caused the Germans to erect42 a board, in their line, on which was chalked: “Please don’t raid us any more!”
On the 21st May the 8th Middlesex raided near the Tilloy-Wancourt road and captured four prisoners and a machine gun. They established the important fact that the 16th Bavarian Division had been relieved by the 214th, the prisoners being of the 50th Regt.
On the 27th patrols ran into strong parties of the enemy covering a large number of men engaged in wiring the enemy front. The next night a somewhat ambitious raid was made on a wide front of either side of the Tilloy-Wancourt road. On the left was [Pg 250] the 7th Middlesex, in three parties (one company in all), on the right two platoons of the 1st London Regt.
The raid was a great success. Under an excellent barrage, of which everyone spoke43 with the highest praise, the raiders entered the enemy lines. They found it packed with men north of the road. The 1st Londons claimed to have killed 40 south of the road, and the 7th Middlesex appear to have spread terror and devastation44 in their area.
The right party of Middlesex estimated that they had killed 32 of the enemy and captured 1 machine gun. The centre party first met the enemy in shell-holes outside their wire, and quickly disposed of them; they claimed 35 Germans killed, 1 prisoner, and 1 machine gun. The left party counted the damage they inflicted as no less than 60 killed. The artillery had also done fearful execution. Although many of the enemy were seen running away, the total casualties inflicted by this raid were reckoned to be 200. Making every allowance for exaggeration—for it is extremely difficult to count dead men during a raid—the facts remain that the raid was a huge success and the casualties inflicted exceedingly heavy.
No attempt was made to advance our outpost line and our wounded were taken safely back. The total casualties of the raiding parties were 2 officers killed and 2 wounded, 2 other ranks killed and 49 wounded—the wounds were mostly slight. The identification procured45 was normal—50th Regt., 214th Division.
On the 30th May the Kensingtons sent out an enterprising patrol which rushed an enemy post and captured two more prisoners. Identification normal.
The month of June opened with a raid by the [Pg 251] Kensingtons near the Cambrai road. Many of the enemy were killed and 27 taken prisoners. The Germans did not show much fight on this occasion, but in most cases emerged from dug-outs with no rifles or equipment. They were again of the 50th Infantry Regt., 214th Division. The Kensingtons’ casualties were 1 killed and 17 wounded.
On the 10th June the 7th Middlesex raided on the left of the line, near Broken Mill, and secured two prisoners of the 358th Infantry Regt., 214th Division.
One company of the London Rifle Brigade suddenly raided at 3 o’clock in the afternoon on the 12th June south of the Cambrai road. They advanced under cover of smoke and killed about 24 of the enemy and captured 1 machine gun. Their casualties were only 3 killed and 11 wounded, in spite of their daring. Identification normal.
Soon after this raid the Germans were seen to be active in their lines. Many officers were noticed examining our lines on the 24th June, and the next night a platoon of the 1st Londons and a platoon of the 8th Middlesex entered the enemy lines on the left and inflicted casualties, but failed to obtain identification. This was soon secured, however, by the London Rifle Brigade, who brought in a man of the 50th Infantry Regt. on the 3rd July.
The Queen’s Westminsters sent a company over into some fortified46 gun-pits on the 8th July, and secured three prisoners of the 358th Regiment47, 214th Division. They took over with them some heavy charges of ammonal, as it was known that a deep dug-out existed. As soon as the raiders reached the gun-pits the garrison48, led by an officer, attempted to come out of the dug-out. The officer was promptly49 [Pg 252] shot, though he missed the leading man of the Queen’s Westminsters by a hair’s-breadth, and a charge of the explosive was thrown down the dug-out. A terrific explosion completely destroyed that entrance. The raiders then found the second entrance and treated it in the same fashion. The prisoners stated that between fifty and sixty men were in the dug-out with two officers.
This ended the series of raids, and it would seem as though the 185th and 214th German Divisions had good cause to remember the 56th Division. But it is an exceedingly fine record, and speaks highly of the moral of the London men and the inspiring leadership of their General.
Gen. Hull handed over to the 2nd Canadian Division on the 15th July, and the division moved through Roellecourt to Villers Chatel.
Before leaving this period we must quote from Brig.-Gen. Elkington’s diary:
“In addition to the 56th Divisional Artillery I had several other R.A. brigades under my command to assist in covering the front, namely the 29th, 277th, and 311th R.A. Brigades. During April and May Gen. Dudgeon suffered from severe rheumatism50 and had to give up command of the division. Major-Gen. Hull returned and took over command. Reconnaissances and selection of several back lines, in case of withdrawal51 being necessary on this front, were carried out, and all battery positions carefully marked and their observation posts selected, also their lines of retreat if necessary. Continual training in moving warfare52 was also carried out by means of skeleton drill with full staff. A polo ground was used near Dainville and play went on twice a week until the enemy elected to shell the ground, when it [Pg 253] had to be stopped. During this period the artillery supported many successful raids by our infantry and the Canadians on our right.... The ‘Bow Bells’ established themselves in a hut near our headquarters and gave many excellent shows to crowded houses. Towards the end of May Indian drivers were sent to us from the Divisional Ammunition53 Column to release the European personnel. These drivers did very well after they had been trained, but suffered rather from the cold during the winter. On the 15th July the 56th Divisional Infantry was relieved by the 2nd Canadian Division, and I remained in the line commanding the R.A. until the 21st July, when we were relieved.”
Refitting and training were carried out, and after two weeks in the back area, which was not free from enemy attention in the nature of aeroplane bombs, the division started on the 31st July to relieve portions of the 1st Canadian Division in the Tilloy and Vitasse sections of the line. The Telegraph Sector was relieved during the night of the following day, and on the 2nd August Gen. Hull took over command of the line.
The weather generally was very good and the line quiet. The 167th Brigade obtained identification on the 4th showing that the 185th German Division had been relieved by the 39th Division. On the 8th the division projected gas on Neuville Vitasse, but otherwise everything was quiet.
On the 15th the 167th Brigade was relieved by the 44th Brigade, 15th Division, and moved by rail to Izel-les-Hameau area. On the 18th the 168th Brigade was relieved by the 46th Brigade and moved to Mazières area. And on the 18th the 169th Brigade went to Arras.
[Pg 254] At that date there was a proposal that the XVII Corps should attack Orange Hill and Chapel54 Hill, and the 56th Division was to take part in this attack. Days, however, were spent in moving about.
On the 20th Sir Douglas Haig visited Gen. Hull. The same day the 169th Brigade moved to Avesne-le-Comte area, and the 168th to Lignereuil. At mid-day on the 21st the 56th Division was transferred from the XVII Corps to the VI Corps, and the whole division moved to the Bavincourt area, when an entirely55 new scheme of attack came into being.
* * * * * * *
In his dispatch covering this period Sir Douglas Haig writes:
“The definite collapse56 of the ambitious offensive launched by the enemy on the 15th July, and the striking success of the Allied counter-offensive south of the Aisne, effected a complete change in the whole military situation.”
This first big operation of Marshal Foch had inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Ten divisions were broken up and the remnants used as reinforcements to others. The attempt to make the Entente Powers sue for peace before the arrival of the Americans had failed—not only were a million troops from the United States in France, but the English divisions had been largely made up to strength. Between May and June ten English divisions had been reduced to cadres—seven of these were reconstituted during July and August. And German General Headquarters had been forced to take momentous57 decisions. They had to withdraw from the salient between Rheims and Soissons, and [Pg 255] also abandon their idea of a new offensive in Flanders. “By the beginning of August,” says Ludendorff, “we had suspended our attack and reverted58 to the defensive59 on the whole front.”
At a conference, held on the 23rd July, it was arranged by Marshal Foch that the British, French, and American Armies should each prepare plans for a local offensive. The objectives on the British front were the disengagement of Amiens and the freeing of the Paris-Amiens railway by an attack on the Albert-Montdidier front. The r?le of the French and American Armies was to free other strategic railways farther south and east.
There seems a suggestion in his dispatches that the British Commander-in-Chief was somewhat perturbed60 by this decision. He had the safety of the Channel ports and the danger of a fresh German offensive in that direction ever in his mind, and we know that it was Ludendorff’s plan. There is an indication that Sir Douglas Haig was urging a counter-stroke in the north. “These different operations,” he says, “had already been the subject of correspondence between Marshal Foch and myself.” Ultimately he came to the conclusion that the tasks assigned to the British forces east of Amiens should take precedence “as being the most important and the most likely to give large results.”
The attack opened on the 8th August on a front of over eleven miles from just south of the Amiens-Roye road to Morlancourt. On the right was the Canadian Corps, in the centre the Australian Corps, and on the left the III Corps. The attack of the First French Army was timed to take place an hour later between Moreuil and the British right. By the [Pg 256] 12th August 22,000 prisoners and over 400 guns had been captured, and the line had been advanced to a depth of twelve miles, to the old German positions in 1916.
The 8th August was the black day of the German Army in the history of this war, says Ludendorff.[5]
“The Emperor told me later that, after the failure of the July offensive and after the 8th August, he knew the war could no longer be won. The official report of the evening of the 8th announced briefly61 that the enemy had penetrated our line south of the Somme on a wide front. Early the following morning General von Cramon rang me up from Baden. He informed me that my report had caused great alarm in Vienna. I could not leave him in any doubt as to the serious view I took of the situation. Nevertheless he begged me to remember how detrimentally62 the blunt admission of defeat must affect our allies, who had placed all their hopes in Germany. This occurred again on the 2nd September.
The impression made on our Allies by the failure on the Western Front was great. The Emperor Charles announced his intention of coming to Spa in the middle of August.”
The great salient the Germans had created towards Amiens was disappearing, and Sir Douglas Haig was faced with the old positions of the opening of the battle of the Somme in 1916. But there was a difference. The situation and his reasoning are succinctly63 related in his dispatch:
“In deciding to extend the attack northwards to the [Pg 257] area between the Rivers Somme and Scarpe I was influenced by the following considerations.
The enemy did not seem prepared to meet an attack in this direction, and, owing to the success of the Fourth Army, he occupied a salient the left flank of which was already threatened from the south. A further reason for my decision was that the ground north of the Ancre River was not greatly damaged by shell-fire, and was suitable for the use of Tanks. A successful attack between Albert and Arras in a south-easterly direction would turn the line of the Somme south of Péronne, and give every promise of producing far-reaching results. It would be a step towards the strategic objective, St. Quentin-Cambrai.
This attack, moreover, would be rendered easier by the fact that we now held the commanding plateau south of Arras about Bucquoy and Ablainzeville, which in the days of the old Somme fighting had lain well behind the enemy’s lines. In consequence we were here either astride or to the east of the intricate system of trench10 lines which in 1916 we had no choice but to attack frontally, and enjoyed advantages of observation which at that date had been denied us.
It was arranged that on the morning of the 21st August a limited attack should be launched north of the Ancre to gain the general line of the Arras-Albert railway, on which it was correctly assumed that the enemy’s main line of resistance was sited. The day of the 22nd August would then be used to get troops and guns into position on this front, and to bring forward the left of the Fourth Army between the Somme and the Ancre. The principal attack would be delivered on the 23rd August by the Third Army and the divisions of the Fourth Army north of the Somme, the remainder of the Fourth Army assisting by pushing forward south of the river to cover the flank of the main operation. Thereafter, if success attended our efforts, the whole of both [Pg 258] armies were to press forward with the greatest vigour64 and exploit to the full any advantage we might have gained.”
* * * * * * *
It will be seen, therefore, that as the attack from Amiens advanced, it was being taken up by troops on the left. On the 21st August the IV Corps was engaged, with the 42nd, New Zealand, and 37th Divisions, and the VI Corps, with the 2nd and Guards Divisions. On the 23rd a series of strong assaults were delivered on practically the whole front of thirty-three miles from our junction65 with the French at Lihons.
As the attack spread to the north, so activity in Corps, Division, and Brigade Headquarters preceded actual movement of troops. A state of brain and nerve tension prevailed. There was, too, a change of plan, which is always one of the trials of the regimental soldier. It is as well to recapitulate66 some of the movements.
The relief in the line was completed on the 18th August, and on the 19th the 169th Brigade was sent to Arras to carry out preparations for an attack on Orange and Chapel Hills. Owing to the change of plan this brigade was sent back to the Avesnes-le-Comte area on the 21st, and on the same day the 168th Brigade marched from the Mazières area to Lignereuil. The 56th Division now came under the VI Corps (Haldane), and Gen. Hull at once visited Corps Headquarters, but did not succeed in gaining any exact information as to the r?le the division would play in the forthcoming operations. During the night 21st/22nd the division marched to the area Barly-St. Amand-Saulty-Bavincourt.
[Pg 259] Early in the morning of the 22nd Gen. Hull was called to a conference at Corps Headquarters, where the operations for the next day were decided67 upon. He did not get back to Bavincourt until 10.30 a.m., when he held a conference and explained the operations to all concerned. Officers of all brigades were then sent off to reconnoitre; and the 168th Brigade marched at 3.30 p.m. to Blairville, a distance of seven and a half miles.
Time was now getting on and the Corps Operation order had not been received. Gen. Hull, however, sent out his orders based on what had been said at the conference in the morning, and at 9 p.m. the 168th Brigade, with the 1st London Regt. attached, moved to the assembly area, a march of another four and a half miles, ready to attack on the left of the Guards Division. In the midst of all this movement and with only a short time at their disposal, officers had no opportunity of seeing the forward assembly areas or the objectives. They assembled in the dark and attacked in the morning, never having seen the ground before.
The artillery was no better off than the infantry.
“On the 21st August orders were received to join the VI Corps, and I went off to see the Corps R.A., who were a long way back, and also to see the 40th Division Artillery and the Guards Artillery and to try to reconnoitre the new front. On the evening of the 21st I received instructions from the R.A. VI Corps that all arrangements were at once to be made to put the 56th Artillery in action to cover the attack of the 56th Division on the morning of the 23rd, the divisional front being roughly from 500 yards north of Hamelincourt to just north of Boiry [Pg 260] Becquerelle. The Divisional Artillery, for purposes of the initial attack, consisted of six brigades R.F.A., as follows: (a) Guards Divisional Artillery, (b) 57th, (c) 56th. On the 21st August these brigades were as follows: (a) in action on the front, (b) in reserve near St. Pol, (c) in reserve at Simencourt and Berneville. Reconnaissance was carried out during the morning of the 22nd, and at 8 p.m. that evening the brigades moved off to occupy the positions selected, and ammunition to the extent of 400 rounds per gun had to be dumped at the same time. This involved an immense amount of work, but it was successfully carried out by the brigades of the 56th Divisional Artillery by 2 a.m. on the 23rd; but the brigades of the 57th Divisional Artillery, though all guns were got into action, were delayed by heavy gas shelling, and were as a result unable to complete the gun-dumps by the opening of the barrage. At this time the artillery covering the division was organised as follows:
Right group:
74th and 75th Brigades R.F.A. Guards Divisional Artillery, in action west of Boisleux-au-Mont.
Centre group:
285th and 286th Brigades R.F.A. 57th Divisional Artillery, in action south-east of Boisleux-au-Mont.
Left group:
280th and 281st Brigades R.F.A. 56th Divisional Artillery, in action south-west of Boisleux-au-Mont.
As far as the field artillery was concerned, the strength of the barrage was about one 18-pounder gun per 27 yards.
Affiliated68 Heavy Artillery group—two brigades R.G.A.”?[Gen. Elkington.]
[Pg 261] The position from which the division attacked was a very strong one for defence. The Cojeul River has two branches. The northern branch, running from the high ground by Adinfer Wood, passes to the north of Boisleux-St. Marc and Boiry Becquerelle. The southern branch, running across the front of the division, is underground between Hamelincourt and Boyelles, where it comes to the surface and joins the main stream south of Henin.
The left flank of the division rested on Cojeul (north). There was, therefore, a wide field of vision in front of them, with the one exception of the spur which shoots out between the two branches of the river to the north of Boyelles, and which afforded the enemy a concealed69 position on that portion of the front. The general run of the valley was across the direction of the 56th Division attack, and Croisilles and St. Leger were over the ridge on the far side of the valley. Beyond these villages the Hindenburg Line ran roughly from Arras in a south-easterly direction, obliquely70 across the line of attack.
The first objective of the 168th Brigade, which was to make the attack, was the blue line—that is, the two villages of Boyelles and Boiry Becquerelle; and the brigade would then push out a fringe of posts in front. Twenty-one Tanks (two companies, 11th Battalion71 Tank Corps) were to help in this attack.
As the battalions72 of the 168th Brigade marched to their positions, the Germans used gas freely and respirators had to be worn. Fortunately the night was light, but even so progress was slow, and such light as there was did not help officers, when they had placed their men in position, to see very much of what sort of a place it was they would attack in the [Pg 262] morning. It seemed that the enemy was very alert, as he fired a great deal with machine guns and light trench mortars73 during the night.
At 4.55 a.m. in the murky75 light of dawn the barrage, which had opened at 4 a.m. at Gommecourt on the right of the VI Corps, crashed down in front of the 56th Division. The Kensingtons, on the right, north of Hamelincourt, the 4th Londons in the centre, and the London Scottish on the left advanced to the assault twelve minutes later. The Tanks cleared the way for the Kensingtons very effectively, only a few small parties of the enemy showing much fight. The battalion, however, was worried by machine-gun fire from the left, and it was seen that the 4th Londons were meeting with more determined76 opposition77. Two platoons of the Kensingtons were, therefore, sent to assist by attacking Boyelles from the south. By 6 o’clock the Kensingtons had reached their objective.
The 4th Londons had the village of Boyelles and the curious circular Marc system in front of them. The ruins of the village could be seen from the right, but Marc system was blind. Actually the ground between our front-line trench and the enemy line was level, but it dropped suddenly from the German line and was helped by a sunken road, so that there was plenty of shelter from the barrage. The left of the 4th Londons was held up in front of this place. For some reason no Tank attacked the forward Marc system, and until a platoon enfiladed the sunken road from the south, and the London Scottish threatened from the north, the garrison held up the advance and inflicted heavy casualties. When the troops pressed in from the flanks, however, [Pg 263] the Germans, 2 officers and 80 men, surrendered.
Much the same thing happened to the right company of the 4th Londons in the village of Boyelles. But here four Tanks came on the scene, and again the garrison surrendered with eleven machine guns. Six light, heavy, and medium trench mortars were captured in the banks on the north of the stream.
The London Scottish on the left met with opposition from Boiry Becquerelle, but carried out a smart enveloping78 movement, closing on the village from the flanks, and eventually getting behind it. Over 100 prisoners and 8 machine guns were taken by this well-known battalion.
All the first objective was then in our hands.
At 9.15 a.m. the 168th Brigade was ordered to continue the advance so as to conform with the 2nd Guards Brigade on the right. The brigade was to gain touch with the Guards at Bank Copse on the east side of the railway curve into St. Leger. But this order had to be transmitted by runner and distances were great; it did not reach the centre battalion until 11.15 a.m.
The Kensingtons started their advance at 1.30 p.m., and almost at once met with strong machine-gun and artillery fire. The advance was held up on the Ervillers-Boyelles road, and much confused fighting ensued. Two platoons managed to get round the opposition and joined the Guards, with whom they attacked the railway bank to the west of Bank Copse. The remainder of the battalion was apparently79 fighting in small groups and was much scattered80. The commanding officer, Lieut.-Col. R. S. F. Shaw, went forward to try to clear up the situation and was [Pg 264] killed by a sniper. The position on this battalion front was not certain until 9.30 p.m., when it was ascertained81 that they were on the line of the Ervillers-Boyelles road.
The 4th Londons did not advance until 4.30 p.m. They attacked in widely extended formation and casualties were very light. There was opposition from five enemy machine guns, but these were outflanked and overcome. The line of Boyelles Reserve was reached and patrols pushed out 500 yards beyond without encountering any of the enemy.
The London Scottish attacked at the same time as the 4th Londons and encountered strong opposition at Boiry Work, at the northern end of Boyelles Reserve. For one hour the London Scottish worked slowly to get round this position, but before they closed in the garrison surrendered—86 prisoners. They were then in line with the 4th Londons and their posts pushed out some 500 yards in advance.
In spite of the hurried orders it had been a successful day for the 56th Division. The Kensingtons had had the worst time, but they captured in all 167 prisoners, while the 4th Londons had 243, and the London Scottish 253.
Commenting on the attack, Brig.-Gen. Loch says that the chief difficulty was the short notice given, and the fact that the brigade was billeted in a much scattered area made the rapid issue of orders impossible. It was also impossible to reconnoitre the ground, and the approach march was made in exceptionally hot weather. There had been no preparation of the front prior to the attack, and signal communications were poor. Visual signalling was of little value, owing to the dust and the heavy state [Pg 265] of the atmosphere, and reliance had to be placed, as it invariably was, on runners who worked well, but as the distances were ever increasing it was a slow method.
“The Tanks,” he says, “were most valuable, although through various causes they, in some cases, arrived late in the assembly areas. Their greater speed enabled them to catch up the infantry, and by working forward and then to a flank they evidently much demoralised the enemy and caused them to surrender more freely than usual.”
The machine guns, which since the beginning of March had been formed into a battalion, were controlled by Lieut.-Col. Jervis, who was with the Brigade Headquarters, and were echéloned in depth, the forward line advancing with the assaulting infantry.
The enemy was in considerable strength, as is shown by the number of prisoners, 663, and the 59 machine guns and 18 trench mortars which were captured.
Other divisions of the VI and IV Corps were equally successful, and the Germans holding the defences to the south, about Thiepval (which had caused us such efforts to win in 1916), were in a precarious82 position. The attack was pressed without giving the enemy breathing-space, and he was becoming disorganised and showing signs of confusion.
But in writing of this great and last advance we are conscious that a division, which until this moment had always appeared to be a large and important unit in any operations, was being swamped by the numbers set in motion. One of five or six is such a much bigger proportion than one of fifty-seven [Pg 266] or fifty-eight. And the French, American, and Belgian Armies were moving too.
During the night the London Scottish were placed under the orders of the 167th Brigade, which relieved the Kensingtons and 4th London Regiment. The 169th Brigade moved to the Basseux area and, in the morning of the 24th, to the Purple Line behind Boisleux-au-Mont.
The 167th Brigade were ordered to attack the next day, the 24th, with Summit Trench as their first objective, refusing their left flank so as to join with the 52nd Division on the northern boundary. The second objective was Fooley Reserve-Hill Switch-Cross Switch, with the object of enveloping Croisilles from the north, while the Guards Division carried out a similar operation from the south. Twelve Tanks and one company of the Machine Gun Battalion were to assist.
At 7 a.m. the barrage opened on the enemy frontline posts, and, after ten minutes, crept forward, at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes, followed by the infantry. The whole of the brigade, of course, attacked—the 8th Middlesex being on the right, the 7th Middlesex in the centre, and the 1st London Regiment on the left. The Guards Division also attacked on the right, and the 52nd on the left.
The 8th Middlesex reached their objective in Summit Trench and Ledger83 Reserve about 10 o’clock. Opposition was not of a fierce nature and took the form of “patchy” machine-gun fire and rifle fire. Small parties of men kept working forward and could be seen, with Tanks, in and about Summit Trench by 8.30 a.m. The 7th Middlesex and 1st Londons [Pg 267] advanced in a similar fashion and with the same opposition.
But news came from the Corps which, for the moment, checked the advance. From prisoners’ statements it was learned that three fresh divisions had arrived in Bullecourt and Hendicourt, and the 56th Division was ordered to make preparations to meet a counter-attack. The 169th Brigade was ordered forward behind Boyelles, and the 167th Brigade was told to occupy Croisilles “by peaceful penetration84.” Meanwhile the right brigade of the 52nd Division, which was attacking Henin Hill, had been compelled to withdraw and was echéloned on the forward slopes to the left rear of the 56th Division.
Patrols began to probe the country before them, and at 1.30 p.m. the situation was: the 8th Middlesex had one company on the western side of Croisilles with patrols on the outskirts85 of the village, two companies in Summit Trench and that end of Leger Reserve, and one company in Boyelles Reserve. The 7th Middlesex had two companies in Summit Trench, with patrols in front, and support and reserve companies in depth in rear. The 1st Londons had two companies in Summit Trench, in touch with the 52nd Division, and support and reserve companies in rear.
Reports tended to show that Croisilles had been evacuated86, and after a consultation87 with Brig.-Gen. Freeth, Gen. Hull ordered the Brigade to attack and establish itself in the Hindenburg Support Line between Hump Lane and River Road (Sensée River). Six Tanks were to be used, and the 52nd Division was to attack on the left.
[Pg 268] Attempts made by the 8th Middlesex to enter Croisilles were not successful, and at zero hour, 7.30 p.m., the village was still in the hands of the enemy.
The attack was met with determined and very heavy machine-gun and artillery fire, and failed to gain any ground. Only one Tank came into action, and that was met with gas which rendered it useless. Croisilles Trench had been reached by troops, but found to be only 2 feet deep at the most, and quite useless as a reorganising point for further advance. This trench had unfortunately been shown as an organised and deep defensive work. Brig.-Gen. Freeth, therefore, ordered Summit Trench to be held as the line of resistance.
The days’ fighting had resulted in an appreciable88 gain, but the enemy’s resistance was increasing. The Corps ordered an attack on the Hindenburg Support the following day, without the help of Tanks, and Gen. Hull had to point out that the resistance was not only very strong, as he had proved that day, but that the Hindenburg system was very heavily wired. Tanks would have dealt with this wire had they been available. The Corps then modified the order and instructed the General to capture Croisilles and obtain a footing in Sensée Avenue, to the north-east, so as to conform with the 52nd Division, who were to attack on the left.
During the night the front-line battalions were heavily shelled with gas, which forced them to wear gas-masks, in one case for six hours. Patrols, however, went out, and their reports coincided with that of the Guards Division on the right, that Croisilles was full of machine guns. Also the 52nd [Pg 269] Division on the left reported that the Hindenburg Line was very strongly held. It was decided to bombard the village while patrols would try to gain ground.
But the 25th August was a negative day. Some posts were established in front of the main line, but the village itself was too strongly held and the bombardment, apparently, failed to dislodge the enemy.
Meanwhile the 169th Brigade reconnoitred the position with a view of attacking and enveloping Croisilles from the north and capturing the Hindenburg Line.
At 8 a.m. the 56th and 52nd Divisions had been moved from the command of the VI Corps to that of the XVII Corps, and it was decided that the 167th Brigade should attack on the 26th and establish itself on the line of the shallow Croisilles Trench and Fooley Reserve. Roughly the XVII Corps faced the Hindenburg Line, which swung round the left flank of the 56th Division, and on this flank the 52nd Division were to advance on the Hindenburg Line in conjunction with the attack of the 167th Brigade. Farther north the Canadian Corps were to assault the actual Hindenburg Line, and if they were successful the 52nd Division would continue to push down the system and roll it up in a south-easterly direction.
The attack of the 167th Brigade took place at 3 a.m., and was nowhere successful. The wire was still uncut (there were in some spots five belts of it), and the machine guns in Croisilles poured a devastating89 hail of bullets on the assaulting troops. But to the north the Canadian Corps had been successful and had [Pg 270] pierced the Hindenburg system. The 52nd Division had thrust one battalion into the celebrated90 line, and was progressing towards Henin Hill.
During the afternoon the 52nd Division reported the line from the Cojeul River to Henin Hill clear of the enemy, and the 167th Brigade was then relieved at 6 o’clock by the 169th.
The battalions in line from the right were the Queen’s Westminsters, the London Rifle Brigade, and the 2nd Londons. On taking over, the 2nd Londons attempted to clear the situation on the left by a “stealth” raid with two platoons. The experiment was bad, as the platoons were almost wiped out by machine guns.
The battle was continued the following day, the 27th, at 9.30 a.m. The task was to keep in touch with the 52nd Division and sweep round the north of the village. The Queen’s Westminsters, therefore, stood fast while the London Rifle Brigade and the 2nd Londons executed a wheel to the right. This was successful in reaching Farmers’ Avenue and Sensée Avenue, while, on the left, the 52nd Division reached Fontaine Croisilles and established themselves to the east of that village. A glance at the map will show how the Hindenburg Line was being rolled up, how desperate was the case of the Germans opposite the 56th Division, and how necessary it was for them to concentrate their fiercest resistance against the advance of the 56th Division. The day was noteworthy for the good work done by the 2nd Londons in what was the nearest approach to open warfare which had as yet been attempted.
Croisilles was the obstacle which stood in our way. The Guards Division attacked on the right of it, and [Pg 271] after an initial success was counter-attacked so severely91 that they fell back on Leger Reserve, and left a gap on the right of the Queen’s Westminsters, which was filled by two platoons of the latter regiment. Farther to the south troops were fighting on the Somme battlefield of the month of September 1916—still some way from the Hindenburg Line. But, as has been pointed92 out, the whole of the old Somme positions were being turned from the north.
During the afternoon the 168th Brigade took over the frontage held by the right and centre battalions of the 169th Brigade. These two battalions were then able to enter the Hindenburg system which had been captured by the 52nd Division, and move along it towards the Sensée River, where they would start the attack. The 2nd Londons meanwhile cleared their front of some small parties of the enemy and crossed the Sensée to Nelly Avenue, part of an outpost line to the main defences. The division then stood fast under orders to attack the Bullecourt area the next day.
During the night dispositions93 were altered. The 167th Brigade took over the right of the Divisional front, with the 8th Middlesex, to the west of Croisilles, and the 168th Brigade moved in position to support the 169th in the attack along the Hindenburg Line. Also, the 168th Brigade was to protect the flank of the 169th, if the village was not taken, and “mop up” generally behind the attacking troops.
The first objective for the 169th Brigade was given as Queen’s Lane-Jove Lane; the second was the trenches south-east of Bullecourt.
Patrols of the 8th Middlesex attempted to enter Croisilles several times during the night, but were [Pg 272] always met with machine-gun fire. In the morning of the 28th, however, an aeroplane reported the village empty, but at 8.30 a.m. patrols of the 8th Middlesex found only the western portion of the village clear. The whole battalion then advanced, and after some lively fighting occupied the village.
The 52nd Division, which had been relieved by the 57th Division, passed through the troops in the line and joined in the general attack of the 56th Division at 12.30 p.m. The action that followed is one of the utmost confusion. The Queen’s Westminsters, who led the attack, started from the line Nelly Avenue. The Germans on the right, in Guardian94 Reserve, held out, and the 167th Brigade found sufficient of the enemy to hold them up on the railway south-east of Croisilles. But two companies of the Queen’s Westminsters and part of the 2nd Londons lost direction, and seem to have become inextricably mixed with troops of the 57th Division somewhere to the north of Hendicourt.
Apparently trouble started on the previous day (27th), when the Queen’s Westminsters and part of the London Rifle Brigade were relieved by the London Scottish in front of Croisilles. The two former battalions had to march to a flank to get into the Hindenburg Line, and were severely shelled in doing so. On arriving at the Hindenburg Line, progress to their positions of assembly was seriously impeded95 by the 52nd Division, who, at that moment, were also assembling to attack on the following day. Col. Savill, who was commanding the Queen’s Westminsters, says that his men arrived “dead beat” at Nelly Avenue and Burg Support, having been on the move all night. He gives as the cause of the loss [Pg 273] of direction the heavy machine-gun fire which his troops met from the right on emerging from the trenches, but a glance at the map suggests another and more probable reason. He was unable to assemble his battalion on a front conforming with the general line of advance. The right of his leading companies was in Nelly Avenue, and the left in Burg Support with orders “to swing round at right angles to the Hindenburg system.”
It was pointed out at the battle of the Somme that the complicated man?uvre of changing direction at the commencement of an assault should be avoided. It is probable that the commanding officer had no other alternative, but the lesson is once more demonstrated. To the difficult task imposed upon them must be added the further embarrassment96 of never having seen the ground. True that the attack did not start until 12.30 p.m., but it was extremely difficult to fix landmarks97 owing to the country being so overgrown with long grass and weeds, and in any case there was rising ground between Burg Support and Bullecourt, so that the few hours from dawn to the attack were of little benefit.
The change of front by the left of the attacking force was further complicated by the thick wire between the trenches of the Hindenburg System. Before any man?uvre of the sort could be undertaken, these belts of wire had to be passed, and by the time this had been accomplished98, all idea of direction had fled.
The London Rifle Brigade, in close support to the Queen’s Westminsters, had three companies in line, the fourth company being in support on the right and Battalion Headquarters on the left. The left [Pg 274] and centre companies followed the Queen’s Westminsters—even in field practice this would probably occur.
The 2nd London Regt. was already reduced to 11 officers and 193 other ranks, and assembled in King’s Avenue. The two left companies followed the Queen’s Westminsters, while the two right companies fought down Tunnel Trench.
Col. Savill, believing his battalion to be more or less on their way to Bullecourt, moved with his headquarters down Burg Support and very soon encountered the enemy. He was joined by the headquarters of the London Rifle Brigade and the 2nd London Regt. It was thought that the “mopping-up” had been badly done, and a message was sent for reinforcements while the staff details tried to bomb their way forward.
Soon after the attack opened, therefore, the 169th Brigade was trying to capture Bullecourt with two companies of the London Rifle Brigade on the right, three battalion headquarter staffs and a few scattered men of the Queen’s Westminsters in the centre, and two companies of the 2nd London Regt. (not a hundred men) on the left. The right, which was the strongest part of the total force, was definitely held up by a strong enemy garrison in Guardian, and in other parts of the front the enemy resistance was too strong to be overcome by so weak a force.
Eventually a company of the 4th London Regt. was sent up Burg Support, and by 5 p.m. progress had been made as far as the Hump. But on the right the enemy, who were being continually reinforced by troops falling back from the attack of the 167th Brigade through Croisilles, still held Guardian [Pg 275] Reserve. “Guardian Reserve,” writes Brig.-Gen. Coke, “was a thorn in the side of the brigade until 6 p.m.” Not only was the advance severely harassed99 from this place, but no track for carrying ammunition, etc., was available until it had been captured. By 6 p.m., however, the London Rifle Brigade, reinforced by two companies of the Kensingtons and the 168th Trench Mortar74 Battery, drove the greater part of the remaining Germans to surrender.
The advance continued on the right as far as Pelican100 Avenue, but in the centre the Knuckle101 was not cleared until 5 a.m. on the 29th. The situation all through the afternoon and night of the 28th August was most complicated, the 2nd London, London Rifle Brigade, 4th London, and Kensington Regts. being involved in a series of separate operations dealing102 with scattered machine-gun nests, disposed in trenches and in broken ground.
During the afternoon the 168th Brigade had been ordered to move to Leg Lane and get in touch with the 167th Brigade, also to be prepared to move into Pelican Avenue with the object of attacking Bullecourt early in the morning of the 29th. But, owing to the state of affairs in the main Hindenburg System, this was impossible, and troops were moved into position in daylight on the 29th.
Meanwhile, all those troops who had gone careering about on the left had become mixed up with the 172nd Brigade in the neighbourhood of Cemetery103 Avenue to the north of Hendicourt. They had suffered a number of casualties, and the remaining captain of the Queen’s Westminsters had returned wounded during the afternoon, and had reported to the 169th Brigade that he and the force of which he [Pg 276] assumed command had occupied Pelican Lane. This will give some idea of the difficulties which confronted Brig.-Gen. Coke.
The attack was resumed in strength at 1 p.m. on the 29th. The 168th Brigade were in Pelican Avenue, with the Kensingtons on the right and the London Scottish on the left, right and left support being the 4th and 1st London Regts.
Pelican Lane appears to have been held by small parties of the enemy, and the 169th Brigade assembled in the trenches north-west of that place. But the missing companies, with the exception of the 2nd London Regt., had not returned. The London Rifle Brigade led the attack with two companies, having in close support 40 men of the Queen’s Westminsters (which were all that could be found), and behind them the 2nd Londons, with a total strength of 7 officers and 95 other ranks.
The objective for the division was the trench system east of Bullecourt and south of Riencourt. At the very start of the attack the Kensingtons were held up at Station Redoubt; but the London Scottish made good progress on the left, and by 2.15 p.m. were through Bullecourt. The weak 169th Brigade made progress as far as Saddler Lane and the sunken road on the left of the village. And the 57th Division reported that they had captured Riencourt and were through Hendicourt.
Tank Avenue was strongly held by the enemy and successfully arrested any further advance in the centre; and on the flanks the first check was not overcome. And so the line remained with the London Scottish bulged104 out round Bullecourt, and the Kensingtons bringing the right flank back to [Pg 277] Station Redoubt, and the 169th Brigade the left flank to Saddler Lane. The right of the division was in touch with the 3rd Division, but the position of the 57th was obscure.
The 167th Brigade then relieved the whole of the divisional front, and the night passed in comparative quietness.
At about 5 a.m. on the 30th the enemy counter-attacked the line Hendicourt-Bullecourt-Ecoust in strength, and drove the 167th Brigade out of Bullecourt to the line Pelican Lane and Pelican Avenue. At the same time the 3rd Division on the right was driven out of Ecoust, and on the left the 57th Division lost Riencourt and fell back on the Bullecourt-Hendecourt road, the enemy securing the factory on that road.
The 167th Brigade at once attempted to regain105 Bullecourt; but the enemy forces in Bullecourt received such strong support from the Station Redoubt that all efforts failed. Gen. Hull arranged for a bombardment of the Station Redoubt by the heavy artillery.
Orders from the Corps fixed106 the 31st August for a renewal107 of the attack in conjunction with the VI Corps on the left. And so the 168th Brigade was once more ordered to take Bullecourt and the Station Redoubt, relieving the 167th Brigade on that portion of the front. A company of the latter brigade would then take up a position on the left of the 168th Brigade and attack the factory. The objective was Tank Support with the left flank thrown back to the factory.
The relief took place, and all preparations were completed. At 5.15 a.m. on the 31st the brigade [Pg 278] advanced under a creeping barrage, with the London Scottish on the right, the 4th London Regt. in the centre, and the 7th Middlesex on the left.
The London Scottish carried the Station Redoubt, and attacked Bullecourt Avenue at 8 o’clock, obtaining touch with the 4th Londons. But the latter regiment was held up in front of Bullecourt; and on the left the 7th Middlesex were unable to capture the factory. A company of the Kensingtons was sent up on the left, and by 10.15 a.m. the factory was captured, and touch obtained with the 171st Brigade of the division on that flank. Meanwhile, the London Scottish had captured Bullecourt Avenue.
At 1 o’clock an artillery observer reported the enemy advancing over the open and assembling in Tank Avenue and Support. All field guns and the heavy artillery was concentrated on this target, and no counter-attack developed. But the plans were modified to the capture of the village only.
Two companies of the Kensingtons were sent up as reinforcements, and bombing from the flanks was carried on round the village. By the time it was dark only the eastern portion was not cleared up; and the enemy remained in Gordon Reserve.
The 56th Division was then relieved by the 52nd, and marched out of the line to rest about Boyelles. The captures during these operations were:
29 officers, 1,047 other ranks.
2 77-mm. guns and 1 8-inch howitzer.
200 machine guns and over 50 trench mortars
The casualties of the division were:
123 officers and 2,381 other ranks.
Illustration: Battles of Albert and Scarpe 1918
9. The Battles of Albert & the Scarpe 1918.
The hard-working but cheery artillery remained in the line. All through the battle they had pushed [Pg 279] forward close behind the infantry. On the 25th August the Guards Artillery had returned to their own division, and as a consequence the 56th Divisional front had been covered by the 57th Divisional Artillery on the right and their own artillery on the left. At this time the 13th and 22nd Brigades of the Royal Garrison Artillery had been affiliated with the 56th Divisional Artillery. The enemy paid the closest attention to our artillery, bombarding the battery positions incessantly108 with high-explosive and gas shells.
On the 29th, early in the morning, all brigades of artillery advanced to the outskirts of Croisilles. In the previous fighting they had been 1,200 yards behind the infantry in Summit Trench. On this same day the 232nd Army Brigade R.F.A. was transferred to the 56th Division, and formed an independent group with S.O.S. lines superimposed. After the advance in the morning the 56th Divisional Artillery became the right group and the 57th the left group. And the next day the 40th Divisional Artillery replaced the 57th.
The artillery passed under the command of the 40th and then the 63rd Divisions, and eventually withdrew from the line on the 5th September, all ranks and horses having suffered severely from gas.
There was to be little rest.
It is interesting to note that the official report of the Battles Nomenclature Committee gives the Battle of Albert the dates 21st-23rd August and boundaries Road Chaulnes—Lamotte—Corbie—Warloy—Acheux—Souastre—Berles-au-Bois—Brétencourt—Héninel; and the Battle of the Scarpe 1918 the dates 26th-30th August and boundaries Noreuil (exclusive)—St. Leger [Pg 280] (exclusive)—Boisleux-au-Mont—Roclincourt—Bailleul—Oppy. The ground from the right of Boyelles (about the station) to Mercatel is therefore included in both battle fronts—the Battle of the Scarpe opening with the 167th Brigade attack on Croisilles Trench and Fooley Reserve—and places the 56th Division operating on the flank in each battle.
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solace
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| n.安慰；v.使快乐；vt.安慰(物)，缓和 | |
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nicotine
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| n.(化)尼古丁，烟碱 | |
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miraculous
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| adj.像奇迹一样的，不可思议的 | |
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withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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sector
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| n.部门，部分；防御地段，防区；扇形 | |
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gauged
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| adj.校准的；标准的；量规的；量计的v.（用仪器）测量( gauge的过去式和过去分词 )；估计；计量；划分 | |
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intensity
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| n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度 | |
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Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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13
retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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dames
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| n.（在英国）夫人（一种封号），夫人（爵士妻子的称号）( dame的名词复数 )；女人 | |
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culminated
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| v.达到极点( culminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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chateau
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| n.城堡，别墅 | |
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inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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despondent
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| adj.失望的，沮丧的，泄气的 | |
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pervaded
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| v.遍及，弥漫( pervade的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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allotted
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| 分配，拨给，摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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lengthy
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| adj.漫长的，冗长的 | |
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fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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fatigues
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| n.疲劳( fatigue的名词复数 )；杂役；厌倦；（士兵穿的）工作服 | |
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ascendancy
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| n.统治权，支配力量 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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35
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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barrage
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| n.火力网，弹幕 | |
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37
falter
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| vi.(嗓音)颤抖，结巴地说；犹豫；蹒跚 | |
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38
ordeals
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| n.严峻的考验，苦难的经历( ordeal的名词复数 ) | |
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triumphantly
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| ad.得意洋洋地；得胜地；成功地 | |
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hull
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| n.船身；(果、实等的)外壳；vt.去(谷物等)壳 | |
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pugnacious
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| adj.好斗的 | |
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erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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devastation
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| n.毁坏；荒废；极度震惊或悲伤 | |
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procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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46
fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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50
rheumatism
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| n.风湿病 | |
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51
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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52
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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53
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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54
chapel
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| n.小教堂，殡仪馆 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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collapse
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| vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷 | |
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momentous
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| adj.重要的，重大的 | |
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reverted
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| 恢复( revert的过去式和过去分词 )； 重提； 回到…上； 归还 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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perturbed
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| adj.烦燥不安的v.使（某人）烦恼，不安( perturb的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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detrimentally
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| adv.有害地，不利地 | |
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succinctly
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| adv.简洁地；简洁地，简便地 | |
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vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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recapitulate
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| v.节述要旨，择要说明 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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affiliated
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| adj. 附属的, 有关连的 | |
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concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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obliquely
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| adv.斜； 倾斜； 间接； 不光明正大 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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mortars
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| n.迫击炮( mortar的名词复数 )；砂浆；房产；研钵 | |
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mortar
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| n.灰浆，灰泥；迫击炮；v.把…用灰浆涂接合 | |
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murky
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| adj.黑暗的，朦胧的；adv.阴暗地，混浊地；n.阴暗；昏暗 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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enveloping
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| v.包围，笼罩，包住( envelop的现在分词 ) | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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ledger
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| n.总帐，分类帐；帐簿 | |
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penetration
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| n.穿透，穿人，渗透 | |
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outskirts
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| n.郊外，郊区 | |
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86
evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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consultation
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| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
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appreciable
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| adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的 | |
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devastating
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| adj.毁灭性的，令人震惊的，强有力的 | |
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celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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guardian
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| n.监护人；守卫者，保护者 | |
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impeded
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| 阻碍，妨碍，阻止( impede的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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embarrassment
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| n.尴尬；使人为难的人(事物)；障碍；窘迫 | |
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landmarks
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| n.陆标( landmark的名词复数 )；目标；（标志重要阶段的）里程碑 ~ (in sth)；有历史意义的建筑物（或遗址） | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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pelican
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| n.鹈鹕，伽蓝鸟 | |
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101
knuckle
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| n.指节；vi.开始努力工作；屈服，认输 | |
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102
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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103
cemetery
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| n.坟墓，墓地，坟场 | |
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104
bulged
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| 凸出( bulge的过去式和过去分词 )； 充满； 塞满（某物） | |
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regain
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| vt.重新获得，收复，恢复 | |
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106
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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107
renewal
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| adj.(契约)延期，续订，更新，复活，重来 | |
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108
incessantly
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| ad.不停地 | |
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