THE FIRST BATTLE OF ARRAS, 1918
Telegrams of congratulation on the action at Cambrai came from Corps1 and Army Headquarters; Sir Douglas Haig also sent a wire. But there was no question of rest for the 56th Division.
The strength of battalions2 on the 1st December was:
Officers. Other ranks.
7th Middlesex 41 760
8th Middlesex 35 571
1st London 43 740
3rd London 37 813
4th London 32 622
12th London 28 754
13th London 36 850
14th London 42 949
2nd London 32 529
5th London 40 730
9th London 31 789
16th London 30 592
On the 3rd the division, less artillery4, moved by tactical trains to the area behind Arras; Divisional Headquarters were at Fosseux; the 167th Brigade in the Montenescourt-Gouves-Wanquentin area; the 168th in the Warlus-Simencourt area; the 169th in the Bernaville-Dainville area. The next day the division moved into the XIII Corps area with Divisional [Pg 210] Headquarters in camp near Roclincourt. Gen. Dudgeon went to see the new line on the 6th, and on the 7th the relief of the 31st Division started.
The line taken over was between Gavrelle and Oppy: Gavrelle was held by us and Oppy by the Germans.
The enemy was very quiet and the weather not too bad for the time of year. There was, of course, rain, and it was very cold; a short time after the division took over the line it began to snow. Battalions had about a week in the front line, a week in support, and then in camp for a week. The great feature of this line was Arras, for at Arras many comforts could be purchased to alleviate5 the life of the soldier.
Identification was obtained by the 168th Brigade—a prisoner from the 7th Reserve Infantry6 Regt., 5th Reserve Division. There were one or two bickerings between patrols, but nothing of importance. And so Christmas Day was passed with the division still in line.
On the 26th December General Swift, U.S.A., and his Chief of Staff joined the division for a week, to study British methods.
On the 9th January the 62nd Division took over the line from the 56th.
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The outstanding events of the year 1917 must be carried in the mind so that the new situation can be appreciated. In the month of February the Germans had started an unrestricted U-boat campaign and America had broken off diplomatic relations with her. War was not declared between these two countries until April, and as an immediate8 consequence it influenced the plans of the Entente9 and Central [Pg 211] Powers according to the time which, in the judgment10 of either, it would be possible for America to make her strength felt.
The Entente Powers looked upon America as a reserve upon which they could count in twelve months’ time, or slightly over. They were free to undertake large operations with ambitious objects, provided they did not either break their armies, or so reduce them in strength as to render their resisting power unequal to any sudden German attack.
On the other hand, the Central Powers had to do something before the American troops arrived and gave the balance of power definitely to the Entente.
Although American action in the future was the deciding factor, the formation of plans could not rest entirely12 on such a direct calculation. At first it seemed that the Entente had no reason to think that the abdication13 of the Tsar would mean the defection of Russia; and the Central Powers could only hope to delay the American Armies by their U-boats. But the Russian debacle began with her defeat in Galicia in the latter part of July, and it soon became evident to the Entente that they would, before the American forces could be used, have to fight for their existence. They had, it is true, brought the Central Powers’ offensive in Italy, which had threatened to cause a disaster, to a standstill, but the Bolshevist coup14 d’état in Russia in November had brought visions of an overwhelming mass of German troops moving to the west. December, January, and February were gloomy months of speculation15 which culminated16 in a state of nervous apprehension17 in March.
During the first half of the year the Central Powers had not much to congratulate themselves upon. [Pg 212] Baghdad was captured in March. The battles of Arras in April and of Messines in June were sudden and definite blows which shook them, and though the Ypres battles in 1917 were a most costly18 affair to the British, the German losses had been sufficiently19 heavy to create consternation20. Well might Ludendorff utter a cry of elation7 when events in Russia opened prospects21 of an early release of the German armies on that front! He no longer believed in the assurance of the German Navy that the U-boats would neutralise American effort, but he saw a chance of victory before the fatal date of effective American intervention22.
He and the Field-Marshal Hindenburg must have known that they would have to make the last fatal throw and that there was barely time to rattle23 the dice24. Austria was done, worn out, exhausted25. It was doubtful whether she could stand against the Italians. Allenby, under whom the 56th Division had fought in April, had gone to Egypt in June, and by December had captured Jerusalem; and Turkey, at the end of her tether, lay at his mercy: events in this theatre of war might move so fast as to bring disaster from that direction on the Central Powers. The Bulgarians were not trusted. And there were signs that the German Army itself had lost its arrogant26 spirit.
Hindenburg could count on a preponderance of numbers on the Western Front, but desertions were appalling27 in number. Tens of thousands, we are told, crossed the frontiers into neutral countries, and a great many more stayed at home, “tacitly tolerated by their fellow-citizens and completely unmolested by the authorities.”
The movement of troops from east to west was [Pg 213] carried out rapidly. By the New Year the Germans had a majority of thirty divisions over the Entente on the Western Front. The plan was to attack with fifty to sixty divisions under massed artillery, varying between twenty and thirty batteries to each kilometre of front attacked, and a multitude of trench28 mortars30 as well.
Meanwhile American troops were arriving and training in the back areas.
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The 56th Divisional Artillery had remained in the M?uvres sector31. Brig.-Gen. Elkington and his headquarters had, however, moved with the infantry, and we quote from the Brigadier’s diary:
“The headquarters of the division and the R.A. were established in huts in Victory Camp, and I took over command of the R.A. covering the division on the 8th [December]. On the 17th and 18th the 56th Divisional Artillery returned to the division and took over in the line. This part of the front was at the time a very quiet one, but much harassing32 fire was done and a certain amount of enemy counter-battery work was done on the battery positions. Work was begun on rear lines and rear battery positions. Very cold weather was experienced in December.
We remained in this sector with headquarters at Victory Camp, which consisted of Nissen huts and was the coldest and bleakest33 spot I encountered—it was a desperately34 cold winter. From the 1st to the 3rd January an American General and his staff officers were attached to the division and went round battery positions and saw some shooting. On the 5th January the 62nd Divisional Infantry relieved the 56th Divisional Infantry, and on the 7th and 8th the R.A. of the 62nd Division came and looked over the batteries in the line.
[Pg 214] On the 9th January the 62nd Divisional Artillery relieved the 56th Divisional Artillery and I handed over to the C.R.A., our batteries going back to the area round Berles for rest and training, the infantry having moved to the Villers-Chatel area. The R.A. Headquarters was established for the first four days at Bertincourt, and afterwards at the chateau35 at Berles, a very comfortable billet owned by a French Count who was very hospitable36 and glad to see us and did everything he could to make us comfortable. Inspection37 and training of batteries took place, but this was greatly hampered38 by the bad and severe weather.”
Training of the infantry was, owing to the weather, not very ardent39 during the divisional rest from the 9th January to the 11th February. But it was a welcome rest.
British strength on the Western Front was now on the downward grade. From January divisions were cut down to nine battalions, and from the 30th of that month we must say good-bye to the 1st Battalion3 of the Rangers40, the 1st Battalion of the Queen Victoria’s Rifles, and the 1/3rd London Regt. The headquarters and transport of these battalions joined the 58th Division and were incorporated in the 2nd Battalions of their respective regiments42. The 56th Division retained a certain number of the men, who were split up as follows: Queen Victoria’s Rifles, 5 officers and 150 other ranks to the 13th London (Kensingtons), 12 officers and 250 other ranks to the 16th London (Queen’s Westminster Rifles), 4 officers and 76 other ranks to the 4th London; the Rangers sent 8 officers and 300 other ranks to the London Rifle Brigade; while the rest passed out of the Division (7 officers and 230 other ranks to the 1/23rd London, and [Pg 215] 12 officers and 200 other ranks to the 2nd Battalion Rangers); the 1/3rd London sent 11 officers and 250 other ranks to the 1/1st London, 11 officers and 250 other ranks to the 1/2 London, and 2 officers and 34 other ranks to the 1/4 London (12 officers and 214 other ranks out of the division to their 2nd Battalion).
So far as the infantry were concerned, the forty-seven divisions on the Western Front in March 1918 were reduced by a quarter—this is exclusive of the Canadian and Australian divisions, which retained their original strength, and includes the 41st Division, which returned from Italy on the 2nd March.
The relief of the 62nd Division by the 56th started on the 8th February, and on the 11th Gen. Dudgeon took over command of the line.
Meanwhile “the wind was whistling through the chateaux of the Higher Command!” The severe cold and the snow at Christmas and the commencement of the New Year was followed by a thaw43 and a lot of rain. The result was that most of the trenches44 fell in. A period of feverish45 activity followed; engineers and pioneers were working every night, and the infantry had to provide as many men as was possible. Gradually the defences were reconstructed and new ones added. All this activity, mingled46 with orders and provisions for retirement47, was greeted by the troops with characteristic jeers48.
We do not wish to contribute to the general abuse which was levelled at the heads of the “Staff” or “Red Tabs”—the arrangements made on this front at least were justified49 by the results—but we desire to give as far as we can the feeling of the private soldier and regimental officer.
Arrangements for retreat shock the troops in much [Pg 216] the same way as a coarse expression might shock a drawing-room full of ladies. They are offended. They ask the question: “What’s the idea?” And although they could not enumerate50 the difficulties of a gradual retirement, they seem to “sense” the fearful responsibility that is being thrust upon them. And the very nature of the situation caused orders to be given which suggested uncertainty51 and indecision. The private soldier’s point of view was simple: he wanted to be given orders to fight on a certain spot, but to change the spot where he should fight annoyed him.
The system which was adopted to meet the onslaught of the Germans was to spread the defence over a wide belt of country. The front-line system was not to be held; it was to be occupied by outposts whose duty was to watch the enemy and retire on the next line if he attacked. The fight itself was to take place in what was called the “battle zone”; and behind was yet another line through which the enemy must pass before our defence was broken. If the Germans penetrated52 these lines, they might be said to have broken our first system of defence.
Behind the 56th Division were other defences on which it might fall back, but we are only concerned with the first system.
As to the general distribution of forces to meet the German offensive, one-half of the British strength was devoted53 to protecting the Channel ports, and the rest was thinly dispersed54 over the remaining front. It must be remembered that additional front amounting to 28 miles had been taken over by the British in January, and that Sir Douglas Haig was now responsible for 125 miles. In view of this length of [Pg 217] line and the extreme importance of the Channel ports, the general disposition55 of troops would seem to have been wise.
The Germans claim to have effected a surprise in March 1918—a contention56 which is scarcely justified. In his interesting, lengthy57, but somewhat vague account of the assembly of the great attacking force, Ludendorff says that ammunition58 dumps had been increased all along the British front, that movement of troops was carried out at night, but that German aviators59 sent up to report could see signs of concentration on the area chosen for attack which the blind English were unable to perceive! This is not accurate, but one must admit that the German concentration and preparation were superbly done.
We knew that a general movement of troops from east to west had been started in November, and that roads and railways were being improved, artillery increased, and ammunition accumulated all along the front from Flanders to the Oise, and by the end of February indications became apparent that the attack would be on the Third and Fifth Armies.
On the 19th March the Intelligence Department reported to Sir Douglas Haig that the enemy preparations on the Arras-St. Quentin front were complete and that the attack would probably be launched on the 20th or 21st.
Ludendorff assumes that “nor did the enemy discover anything by other means ... otherwise his defensive60 measures would have been more effective and his reserves would have arrived more quickly.” In this his claim of surprise might seem to be justified, although the charge can be met by a statement of the considerations which influenced Sir Douglas Haig [Pg 218] through this anxious period; he could give up no ground in the northern portion of the British area where the Channel ports were threatened, and he knew that the ground was exceptionally dry and that preparations for an attack had been almost completed from the direction of Menin; the same applied61 to the centre, behind which lay the collieries of northern France, and important tactical features covering his lateral62 communications; in the south, in the Somme area, ground could be given up to a certain extent without serious consequences.
The dispositions63 of British troops according to the above considerations had an effect on the Germans, for Ludendorff tells us that when deciding on the front to be attacked he was faced with strong forces about Ypres, that the condition of the centre (the Lys Valley) would not admit an attack before April (which was late in view of the Americans), that an attack in the direction of Verdun would lead into very hilly country, and that in making his final decisions he was influenced by the time factor and the “weakness of the enemy.”
During the early part of 1918 the whole of the British force in forward areas was concerned with the problem of defence. It was not a cheerful period. Closely typewritten sheets of paper flew about in all directions, giving instructions, making amendments65 to previous instructions, calling for suggestions, and ever warning commanders against attack. The Cheshire Regt. and the Engineers of the 56th Division worked night and day at improving rear lines and constructing alternative ones; fatigue66 parties were called for from battalions both in and out of the line; machine gunners and trench-mortar29 experts moved [Pg 219] restlessly from point to point, selecting possible emplacements for their guns, and the artillery did the same farther back.
The men in the line were always the coolest in the whole of the army, but the officers were gradually being worked up to a state of feverish anxiety and a certain amount of bewilderment.
On the 9th March the Kensingtons carried out a smart and successful raid, killing67 about 20 and capturing 4 Germans. The prisoners stated that the German offensive was imminent68. Orders were issued for battle positions to be manned at 5 a.m. as from the 13th.
Another raid by the London Rifle Brigade on the 16th was hung up in a mass of uncut wire, but 2/Lieut. Kite Powell hacked69 his way through and, followed by four men, managed to enter the German line and kill half a dozen of them. They secured no prisoner; still, the information that the enemy front line was strongly held and that they were very alert was of value.
Aeroplane activity was very great from the 18th onwards, and a great deal of individual movement was seen behind the enemy lines. Harassing fire by the 56th Divisional Artillery was increased, and with a good percentage of gas shells. The enemy seemed to give a great deal of attention to our wire with his trench mortars during the increasing bursts of artillery fire.
On the 21st March, with one tremendous crash, the great battle opened on a front of 44 miles, the artillery bombardment including the front held by the 56th Division. But the attack was launched farther south between La Fère and Croiselles.
[Pg 220] No less than 68 German divisions took part in the battle on the first day, many more than the whole of the British Army contained. The training, carried out in some cases behind the Russian front, had been so complete as to include the practising of infantry behind an actual, live barrage71. The result was admirable. Swarms73 of men, followed resolutely74 and closely by artillery, broke through the Fifth and the right of the Third Armies, which were composed of a total force of 29 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry75 divisions.
The German 17th Army, composed of 24 divisions, attacked north of Cambrai; the 2nd Army, of 17 divisions, immediately south of Cambrai; and the 18th Army, of 27 divisions, carried the attack down to La Fère.
The 2nd and 18th German Armies made good progress against the British Fifth Army, but the resistance of our Third Army limited the enemy’s success, so that the 17th German Army was not able to cut off the Flesquières salient, near Cambrai, as had been planned. But during the night of 22nd/23rd March the Fifth Army was back at Peronne, and there was a deep bulge76 in the Third Army towards Bapaume. On the 27th the German line ran through Albert and Montdidier. But the right of the German 17th Army was not too comfortable—Arras must be swept aside!
Behind Arras the wildest excitement prevailed. The word “panic,” a humiliating word, can be applied. But, as we have said before, there was always a zone of calmness, and that zone was the forward zone. Had the London men of the 56th Division been able to see the scurrying77 motors and anxious faces of the [Pg 221] “soft job” men behind them, they would have been amazed. But the 56th Division just went on with the ordinary, somewhat strenuous78 routine which had been instituted at the commencement of the year, strengthening the defences, putting out wire, arranging “blocks,” constructing emplacements for machine guns and trench mortars. Being, however, on the flank of the XIII Corps, regimental officers were subjected to the annoyance79 of frequent changes of orders and plans.
On the 19th March an order was given for the 56th Division to alter the method of holding the line from a three-brigade front to a two-brigade front. Each of the two front-line brigades would have two battalions in line and one in reserve, and the division would have an entire brigade in reserve. The necessary moves were made on the night of 21st/22nd March.
An order was issued on the 20th that the division would be relieved by the 62nd Division, but this was cancelled on the 21st. On the 22nd a further warning order was given that the division would be relieved by the 2nd Canadian Division, and this also was cancelled on the 23rd.
The situation of the Third Army, on the right of the 56th Division, brought a multitude of instructions. On the 22nd the XVII Corps had been ordered to withdraw to its third system on the south of the Scarpe, but to continue holding Monchy lightly. But north of the Scarpe the 4th Division, on the right of the 56th, would not move until Monchy had been captured by the enemy, in which case the 56th Division would adjust their line to run through Beatty Post, Bailleul Post, to le Point du Jour Post. General Matheson, commanding the 4th Division, did [Pg 222] not, however, intend to move unless definitely ordered to do so, and if attacked would fight in three successive lines, the last bringing him to the Point du Jour Post.
This last assurance of General Matheson was of a nature to simplify the possible actions of officers of the 56th Division, and was welcome. That the enemy was going to do something was becoming evident. At 5.30 p.m. on the 23rd he exploded a land mine under the wire in front of Towy Post, and appeared to be manning the line opposite the divisional front thicker than usual. Harassing fire was turned on the German trenches, and the reserve brigade was ordered to stand to at 5 a.m. in future.
In the south the Germans were now approaching Albert and Roye. All sorts of rumours81 were flying about behind the lines. On the 24th the 169th Brigade captured a wounded German, and he was sent for examination in the early morning of the 25th. He said that the 101st Reserve and 102nd Reserve Regiments, belonging to the 219th and 23rd (Reserve) Divisions, had occupied the Wotan Stellung, behind the front line, on the night of the 24th. These divisions had come from Riga, and would attack on the 26th together with the 240th and 5th Bavarian Reserve Divisions. They were to advance to a depth of four kilometres with the right flank on Oppy, and then swing round towards Vimy. The battalion section of the 471st Regt. had already 60 trench mortars in position, and 8 more trench mortar companies were to arrive on the night of the 25th. The ammunition was already in the line. One may imagine that Gen. Dudgeon’s conference at 6.30 p.m. was far from a dull affair.
[Pg 223] The artillery were ordered to fire on chosen targets through the night, and patrolling was active.
A great deal of movement had been seen throughout the day of men and light railways. Troops were seen detraining at Vitry.
And that night there was an inter-battalion relief on the right, the Queen’s Westminsters relieving the 2nd London. The party sent to relieve Gavrelle Post found it occupied by two dead men only—the remainder of the garrison82 had entirely disappeared. Signs of a struggle were there, but no one on either flank had reported the post being attacked, and, apparently83, nothing unusual had been seen.
Gen. Dudgeon ordered both brigades to do their utmost to secure a German prisoner. Every effort was made, but the enemy was found more than ever on the alert, with parties lying out to catch patrols. It is curious that one patrol reported the enemy repairing their wire—it is probable that they were cutting it down.
The attack was coming, and Divisional Headquarters strained every nerve to direct, encourage, and advise for the struggle. Some of the orders are not too easy to understand, and one is of interest as an example of rumour80 being accepted as fact.
The artillery, of course, was very busy, and we find an instruction to cut German wire and to keep the gaps open! And the order we refer to as being founded on rumour was as follows: “In view possible appearance enemy agents warn all ranks against use of word RETIRE. Any person using this word before or during an attack to be shot.” This was, no doubt, based on a much-circulated statement that the Fifth Army debacle was largely due to German agents, [Pg 224] dressed as British officers, giving the order to retire. We cannot believe in a swarm72 of disguised Germans.
It must, however, have been a very weighty consideration which induced the Higher Command to order an extension of divisional front on the 27th. General Sir H. de Lisle, better known as the commander of the 29th Division and now in command of the XIII Corps, was ordered to take over the line to the Souchez River, on his left. This meant that the 56th Division had to relieve the 3rd Canadian Division, on the left, at Tommy and Arleux Posts during the night of 27th/28th March. At the same time the division was again ordered to treat the front line as an outpost line, and to fight on the line between Ditch Post and Willerval South. But at the last moment the front line was ordered to be held as such so as to conform with the 4th Division on the right; the 56th Division was already so stretched out that this curious eleventh-hour change did not make much difference.
The Vimy Ridge84 lay behind the division, but the ground they fought on was not level. The 4th Division, on the right, was on high ground, and Gavrelle lay in a slight depression; the ground rose again towards Bailleul East Post, and fell once more in the direction of Oppy. The division was, however, on a forward slope which gave them good observation from a somewhat exposed position (see map contours).
The rearrangement of the line, which took place during the night, gave the Queen’s Westminsters the right, holding Towy Post and Gavrelle Post with one company, while the other three companies held posts defending Naval85 Trench. The London Rifle Brigade held Mill, Bradford, and Bird Posts with two companies [Pg 225] and one platoon, the remainder of the battalion holding posts on the Marine86 Trench line. The third battalion of the brigade, the 2nd London Regt., held the Ditch, Bailleul, and Bailleul East line. Behind them, in the Farbus line, was one company of the 5th Cheshire Regt., and in reserve the 169th Brigade held two companies of the 1st London Regt., attached from the 167th Brigade, and a detachment of the 176th Tunnelling Company, who were in the Point du Jour Post.
The 168th Brigade, on the left, held Beatty, Wood, and Oppy Posts with two companies of the 4th London Regt., and two in support on the line Duke Street; and Tommy and Arleux Posts with the Kensingtons, two companies in the front line and in support.
The actual distribution of troops on the left is not very clear, as the redistribution was not complete when, at 3 a.m. on the 28th March, the enemy opened a furious bombardment. We find a note that the London Rifle Brigade had not at that hour relieved Bailleul East Post, and that one company of the 1st Canadian Rifles were still holding Sugar Post. This latter company remained at Sugar Post throughout the battle, being placed, with that complete disregard of all, except the winning of the battle, which characterised the Canadians, under the orders of the 168th Brigade. But the London Scottish were also in this Sugar Post-Willerval line. In the Farbus line were two platoons of the 5th Cheshires, and behind them, in the Point du Jour-Ridge Post line, two companies of the 1st London Regt. and one and a half companies of the 5th Cheshires.
[Pg 226] The two remaining battalions of the 167th Brigade and three field companies of Royal Engineers were in Divisional Reserve.
The opening of a modern battle is, with few exceptions, a matter of artillery. Brig.-Gen. Elkington’s diary gives us some interesting facts:
“On the morning of the 28th March the 56th Division was holding a line south of Gavrelle to Arleux, a front of about 5,000 yards. To cover this front the field-guns under the command of the division consisted of the 56th Divisional Artillery and 9 guns of the 52nd Army (Field Artillery Brigade), or 45 18-pounders and 12 4·5 howitzers. Six 6-inch Newton mortars were in action in the first-line system, and three were covering the Bailleul-Willerval line (that is our main line of resistance). Of the former, only two were manned, as all the ammunition at the other mortars had been expended87 previously88, in accordance with orders which, later on, were cancelled, but not before the ammunition had been expended.
Between 3 a.m. and 3.20 a.m. the Germans put down a heavy barrage of gas and H.E. shells of all calibres on the Bailleul-Willerval line and the support line. At 4 a.m. the barrage increased over the whole of the front-line system and our posts were heavily bombarded with trench mortars. From 6 a.m. the hostile barrage of all calibres was heavily concentrated on the front line, and continued to be intense on this area until 7.15 a.m.
During the above periods, that is from 3 a.m. until 7.15 a.m., our artillery was firing heavily on the enemy’s front system of trenches, special concentrations being put down, in co-operation with the heavy artillery, on lines of organised shell-holes. It was considered at the time that these shell-holes were temporary trench-mortar emplacements, but from [Pg 227] information given by prisoners after the attack, it appears likely that they were the assembly positions of the assaulting troops. From 6.45 a.m. onwards “counter preparation” was put into effect. At 7.15 a.m. the hostile barrage lifted from the front line to our support line, and the S.O.S. went up in the Gavrelle sector and was repeated almost immediately in the Oppy sector. Our S.O.S. was put down over the whole of the divisional front at the same time.”
As may be imagined, the effect of this bombardment was terrible. The bulk of the forward posts were obliterated89. But even such concentration as the Germans directed against the front line was not sufficient to destroy all life—it could not deal with the whole of the line. Towy Post and Wood Post had, during the last few days, been subjected to a great deal of enemy attention, and the posts had been moved—but even so the casualties were severe. One survivor90 came out of Mill Post and reported that the trenches had been “blotted out,” and that the entrance to a big dug-out there was blown in and destroyed.
The Germans, advancing almost shoulder to shoulder, entered Gavrelle, which, as we know, was in a hollow. Although there was no living soul there to oppose them, the machine gunners had the place under indirect fire from fourteen guns, and the enemy losses were severe. But the first stages of the battle were centred round Towy and Wood Posts.
Capt. G. A. N. Lowndes, of the Queen’s Westminsters, was in command of Towy Post, and with the lifting of the enemy barrage and the appearance of the first Germans there came from the post the crackling sound of rifle fire, joined, almost at once, [Pg 228] by the rattle sound of Lewis guns, until the whole developed into what might be described as a roar. But the enemy was in Gavrelle and the undefended portions of the front line on either side of Towy Post. Once in the trenches, the storming troops could work slowly forward under some sort of cover. To the rifle fire of the defenders91 was soon added the crash of bombs. The enemy was confident; he worked slowly and surely round the post.
The glorious little band of Queen’s Westminsters knew what was happening, but kept cool. Gradually they were forced into a small and cramped92 area; Lewis guns and rifles dealt with Germans in the open, clearing the ground round about and forcing the enemy to seek the safety of the battered93 trench; but the store of bombs was getting low.
Capt. Lowndes, ably supported by 2/Lieuts. L. W. Friend and J. C. B. Price, after hanging on to the last moment, directed his dwindling94 company to fight through the Germans in rear, using the remaining bombs, and swiftly, desperately, they broke through and reached Naval Trench and joined the rest of the battalion round headquarters.
But the Germans, coming through Mill Post, were already in Marine Trench, and Lieut.-Col. Glazier, commanding the Queen’s Westminsters, passed a portion of his force into Thames Alley64 to form a flank.
Now trouble came from the right. The Lancashire Fusiliers, of the 4th Division, fell back on to the Ditch Post line, and the enemy entered Humid Trench. Col. Glazier swung back his right flank into Towy Alley, and held the Germans firmly. And then for a moment the fortunes of war turned against the Queen’s Westminsters.
[Pg 229] The 56th Divisional Artillery, aware that the enemy were in our lines, attempted to adjust their barrage in consultation95 with brigadiers. It was a most difficult task, for, needless to say, communication was almost non-existent. At the junction96 of Naval and Towy Trenches was a block, and in front of it the enemy was held, but the artillery, probably seeing the Germans in Humid and the end of Naval Trenches, put down their barrage too close and blew in our block. The German hordes97 quickly took advantage of this bit of luck and swarmed98 down Naval Trench, either killing or capturing the garrison up to the Gavrelle road.
About the same time the block on the left of the line, near Thames Valley, was forced by the enemy, and the whole of the Naval Line was in his hands. But the Queen’s Westminsters, gallantly99 led by Col. Glazier, were still in front of the Germans on the line Keiller, Pelican101, and Thames Posts. Every bit of the communication trenches which gave a good fire position, every dump-hole, even the shell-holes were manned, and, as the Germans advanced over the open, in reorganised lines, from Naval Trench, they were met with a fresh rattle and roar of rifle fire. The ground was covered with silent and groaning102 figures in the field-grey uniform, and the enemy had to resort once more to bombing.
Again the Queen’s Westminsters gave up a little ground, but the enemy’s effort was smashed. At 11 a.m. the position was: we held a block in Towy Alley, about 300 yards east of the Ditch-Bailleul East line, and Castleford Post, and the rest of the battalion had joined the 2nd London Regt. in the Bailleul-Willerval line.
[Pg 230] The account given by the London Rifle Brigade on the left of the Queen’s Westminsters is short, but in it one can read the desperate nature of the fighting and the gallant100 resistance which was put up. The relief of Bradford and Bird Posts was not completed until 3.30 a.m., when the bombardment which heralded103 the attack commenced. All forward and lateral communication was at once cut. Wire and posts defending the front line were wiped out. When the enemy infantry advanced, they simply walked into the front line, rushed the few men left at the blocks in Belvoir and Brough, and commenced bombing towards Naval Trench. The battalion was almost annihilated104, and what was left joined the Queen’s Westminsters in Thames Valley and became mixed up with them. The fighting strength of this battalion at the commencement of the battle was 23 officers and 564 other ranks; it was reduced to 8 officers and about 60 other ranks.
The whole of the 169th Brigade now stood on the Bailleul-Willerval line and the enemy was held. Twice he attacked over the open, with aeroplanes flying low and pouring a hail of bullets on the defenders, while field guns were dragged by plunging105 horses and straining men across No Man’s Land as far as Naval Trench, but each time he was defeated. The field guns fired no more than twenty rounds before being silenced by the 56th Divisional Artillery; and though the enemy infantry had a novel method of advancing—they stood up, threw their rifles forward into a shell-hole, held up their hands, and advanced, only to drop by the side of their arms, which they immediately proceeded to use—they made no further progress.
[Pg 231] The right of the 56th Division was, at 11 a.m., in touch with the 4th Division. A battalion of the 167th Brigade was placed under the orders of the 169th, and six machine guns were sent up to Point du Jour, and two field companies of the Engineers to Tongue and Blanch106 Posts, so that the right flank of the division seemed secure.
The 4th Londons, on the right of the 168th Brigade, put up a most gallant defence. Wood Post, held by 2 officers and 45 other ranks, had been moved before the bombardment and so was untouched. The full garrison was there to meet the enemy, who advanced in a solid line on the left of the wood, but came through the wood in groups of about ten men each, 40 yards or so apart, and followed by further groups of about thirty men each some 200 yards in rear.
The enemy was completely checked in the wood and on the left; but Beatty Post, on the right, which had been badly battered about by trench mortars, was occupied. The garrison, consisting at first of 3 officers and 84 other ranks, though much depleted107 when the assault was launched, was overwhelmed by sheer numbers, and only 1 officer and 6 men ever returned. The enemy then started to work round to the rear of Wood Post, but for over an hour this hard little band held out and repulsed108 the enemy.
Oppy Post was also smothered109 by artillery and trench mortars, and eventually overwhelmed by the storming infantry. Of the 2 officers and 48 other ranks forming the garrison, 1 officer and 5 other ranks were left.
Fifteen minutes after the assault was launched, the enemy was in the Earl Lane and Viscount Street, but were held for a time by the troops in Ouse Alley. [Pg 232] But so long as Wood Post held, the enemy did not make any great progress.
Major F. A. Phillips was in command of the forward fighting, and moved about encouraging his men, who were inflicting110 heavy casualties on the enemy whenever an attempt was made to advance over the open. But Wood Post fell back just before 9 o’clock, and soon after the enemy began to force their way up Ouse Alley from Viscount Street, in rear of the troops who were fighting so successfully in Marquis Trench. Major Phillips promptly112 attacked over the open with about twenty details from headquarters, and drove them back.
The enemy had built up heavy rifle fire from Oppy Wood, although he was suffering severely113 there from our artillery fire, and attacked the left of the battalion many times over the open; but the Marquis line held, and at 11 o’clock the position was extraordinary. The 169th Brigade on the right was back in the Bailleul-Willerval line; and while the advance companies of the 4th London were still holding the Marquis line, the enemy was in Ouse Alley and bombing his way towards the Bailleul line, also he was advancing over the open south of Ouse Alley. The position then was very precarious114, and the reserve company, which Colonel Marchment had sent to get in touch with the forward troops and form a flank, was unable to reach the forward troops. Major Phillips decided115 to withdraw.
The withdrawal116 was witnessed by Colonel Marchment from his headquarters:
“I watched it through my glasses. It was carried out in a very steady and orderly way, the men [Pg 233] leaving in groups of about a dozen. Although exposed to a heavy fire from front and flanks, they made excellent use of the ground, and suffered very few casualties.... The men of the reserve company met the survivors117 returning and covered their retirement.”
The Kensingtons on the left of the division were not attacked. Some fifty of the enemy approached Tommy Post, but were at once driven off with casualties. But the battalion gave invaluable118 aid to the 4th Londons, on the right, inflicting heavy losses by Lewis gun, rifle, and rifle grenade fire on the German support troops as they came up to the wood. About 11.30 a.m. the battalion was ordered to retire, in conjunction with the right of the 3rd Canadian Division, on the left, and so came into line with the rest of the division.
The intense anxiety at Brigade and Divisional Headquarters can best be imagined. For the first two hours of the battle little news could be gained from Battalion Headquarters as to the progress of the fight. The whole battlefield was enveloped119 in smoke, and interest was chiefly centred on the fine stand which was being made by the Queen’s Westminsters at Towy Post, where a power buzzer120 was installed, and messages were received from the signallers even after the capture of the post. At one time, while the 4th Londons were still holding the front-line system, the enemy was attacking Bailleul East Post, held by the London Scottish, and had captured two machine guns with crews just in front of the post. A well-timed counter-attack from this gallant regiment41 drove the enemy back and released the guns and crews.
[Pg 234] As the smoke cleared from the field, the Divisional Artillery took every advantage of their well-situated observation posts. But, though the struggle was going on before them, observers found that both sides were frequently so mixed up that they could give no help. Small bodies of our infantry could be seen clearly, fighting with Germans on all sides of them.
On the right the situation of the 4th Division was very obscure. The division was reported to have lost touch with its own brigades, while the lateral line between the 169th and 12th Brigades was also cut.
With the withdrawal of the 56th Division to the Bailleul-Willerval line the situation cleared. They were then in touch with the 4th Division, and the artillery was able to put down a protective barrage in front of this line. The 3rd Canadian Division gave valuable assistance with nine 18-pounders.
Illustration: The First Battle of Arras 1918
8. The First Battle of Arras 1918.
“From this time till about 3 p.m.” (writes Brig.-Gen. Elkington), “many excellent targets in the open were engaged by both field and heavy artillery with great effect. Unfortunately, owing to the limited number of guns available, and that many had to be used for the immediate protection of our infantry, only a few could be used for the excellent targets in the open. At about 3.30 p.m. the enemy made a heavy attack against the Bailleul line, particularly on Bailleul East Post; this was completely shattered by a concentrated barrage and by rifle and machine-gun fire. With the exception of hostile bombing attacks up the communication trenches leading to the Bailleul line, the enemy made no further serious effort to attack. All battery positions were heavily shelled throughout the day by all calibres of ordnance121, the shelling being [Pg 235] more of the nature of area shoots than definite counter-battery work. As a result, from dawn on the 28th to dawn on the 29th twelve 18-pounders were destroyed or put out of action by enemy shell-fire. In addition two 18-pounders in position as an enfilade section near Arleux, facing south-east, had to be destroyed and abandoned when our line was withdrawn122 to the Bailleul line. This section engaged many targets with observation from the vicinity of the guns, and was fought until our infantry withdrew through it. The detachments then retired123 after damaging the guns, burning the dug-outs, and removing dial sights and breach124 blocks. All the six 6-inch mortars in the front line were lost to the enemy, and no news was available as to the fate of the officers and detachments of the two that were manned (they were afterwards found to have been made prisoners).... During the night of the 28th/29th, with the exception of two batteries, all the Divisional Artillery was withdrawn to positions at an average of about 3,600 yards to our new front, this move being carried out by single batteries in turns.... The ammunition expended from the early morning of the 28th to the early morning of the 29th by the 56th Divisional Artillery alone was: 23,000 rounds of 18-pounder and 8,000 rounds of 4·5 howitzer.... As a result of an urgent request to the Corps on the afternoon of the 28th for new guns to replace the damaged ones, six new ones were sent up—these turned out to be 15-pounders, for which we had no ammunition.... The Germans in their official communiqué reported that the 56th Division had been annihilated!”
The German attack was definitely crushed in the morning, but during the afternoon a number of half-hearted and tentative attacks were made. The situation, however, became more quiet about 6 p.m., [Pg 236] and the 169th Brigade was relieved by the 167th, with the 5th Canadian Mounted Rifles in support at Point du Jour.
During the night the engineers were employed in blocking and filling-in the communication trenches in front of the new line, and patrolling was actively125 carried out. The Kensingtons penetrated into Arleux Loop South, Kent Road, and the junction of Tommy and Baron126, which seems to show that the enemy were dazed.
On the 29th, except for some demonstrations127 at the bombing blocks, the enemy made no move. There were many reports that he was massing for further attacks, but it became evident that he was relieving his storming troops. As night fell, the first platoons of the 4th Canadian Division started to relieve, and during the night the 167th Brigade moved back to Villers au Bois, the 168th to Mont St. Eloi, and the 169th to Ecoivres.
On the 30th General Dudgeon visited the First Army Headquarters, where he was congratulated by His Majesty128 the King.
There is little doubt that the enemy hoped to achieve great results by this new stroke, and that its failure was a serious set-back. Five divisions attacked the 4th and 56th Divisions north of the Scarpe and, according to captured documents, when the line Vimy-Bailleul-St. Laurent-Blangy had been won, three special divisions were to attack and capture the Vimy Ridge on the following day. South of the Scarpe eleven divisions were launched, with the object of capturing Arras and carrying the attack as far south as Bucquoy. The German official list (published 1919) gives eleven divisions attacking north [Pg 237] and south of the Scarpe, one division at Neuville Vitasse, and one at Moyenneville—thirteen in all. It makes no mention of an attack south of Moyenneville. But the eleven which attacked on the Scarpe were beaten by the four British divisions which held that line—the 4th and 56th on the north, and the 3rd and 15th on the south.
From this date onward70 the great German offensive began to decline, and ended in the Somme area with a final effort to separate the French and British Armies on the 4th and 5th April, by an attack on the north and south of the Somme. “It was an established fact,” says Ludendorff, “that the enemy’s resistance was beyond our strength.” Strategically the Germans had not won what the events of the 23rd, 24th, and 25th March had led them to hope for—the failure to take Amiens was a great disappointment.
The total casualties of the division were 55 officers and 1,433 other ranks—not excessive, considering the weight of the attack and the immortal129 triumph gained by the 56th Division. The importance of this battle is so great that we give the comments of the two brigadiers.
Brig.-Gen. Coke says that during the six weeks his brigade had been in the line, the Cheshire Regt. had worked splendidly, and had put up double apron130 belts of wire where they would be most effective—the Naval-Marine line was protected by five belts of wire—and this stood the bombardment well enough to be a serious obstacle. When the smoke, which had enveloped the field at the commencement of the battle, had cleared, excellent observation was obtainable, and the divisional observers and artillery [Pg 238] observers did splendid work. The enemy batteries, which came into action in the open during the afternoon, were brought up under cover of smoke, and started to fire point-blank at the Bailleul line, but the Divisional Artillery silenced them in a few minutes. There was no shortage of ammunition or bombs. The system of keeping a plentiful131 supply in deep dug-outs proved sound.
“All concerned are convinced that the enemy losses were extremely heavy in front of this brigade. The fullest use was made of Lewis guns and rifles, and every attempt of the enemy to advance on the Bailleul line over the open was checked by these means. The fire-bays constructed along Towy Alley proved specially132 valuable, and very considerable losses were inflicted133 on the enemy from them during our withdrawal to the Bailleul line.
Many officers testify to the gallant way in which the Machine Gun Battalion served its guns to the last and to the good results of the machine-gun fire.
Our artillery inflicted the maximum amount of damage possible. The number of guns available for the brigade section was quite inadequate134 to cover effectively such a wide front. But the infantry testify to the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy owing to the quick way in which the group and battery commanders engaged each good target as soon as it was observed.
Gallant work was done by the 169th Light Trench Mortar Battery during the day. Three of the teams disappeared with the garrisons135 in the left sector. During the withdrawal, mortars were placed to cover Pelican and Bailleul Posts.”
It was widely noticed by the men of this brigade that the enemy approached in a slow, dazed manner. The brigadier thinks that this may have been due [Pg 239] to the great weight carried by the German infantry, who seem, amongst other things, to have carried a week’s rations11. The enemy advanced in three or four lines and almost shoulder to shoulder.
Brig.-Gen. Loch sent in a frank and interesting paper, in which he points out:
“(a) The uselessness of locking up large garrisons in the front-line posts which are clearly known to the enemy and are within effective trench-mortar range. Front-line posts should be held lightly, and be used as observation posts and to keep the enemy patrols from approaching our main line of defence. They should be carefully concealed136, need have no regular communication trenches, and should be frequently changed. The garrisons should be small and frequently relieved. If rushed and captured from time to time, little harm is done, provided the garrison have no identification marks. Deep dug-outs in such posts are a positive danger and should not be allowed; shelters against the weather are ample. If heavily attacked, the r?le of such posts should be to put up the S.O.S. and withdraw. The sole exception to this r?le is in the case of posts whose whereabouts can be properly hidden from the enemy. Such posts can be strongly garrisoned137 and may have machine guns, as they will have to break up and delay an attack. The losses in the forward posts are sufficient commentary on the unsoundness of the (present) system.
(b) The value of changing the actual position of the garrison in any post--vide Wood Post.
(c) The grave danger of altering carefully thought-out dispositions at the eleventh hour. On the evening of the 27th inst. my dispositions, which had been most minutely worked out to meet the situation of an attack on my right flank at the junction with the left of the 169th Brigade, about Viscount Street, [Pg 240] and covering Bradford and Mill Posts, had to be changed as the result of orders, and consequently this portion of the line (always weak) was rendered hopelessly incapable138 of withstanding a strong attack. It is recognised that larger questions were involved, and no doubt decided the redistribution, which was not complete before the attack developed.
(d) The uselessness of Stokes mortars in the actual front line. Such weapons can only open on their S.O.S. lines, and are very vulnerable from attacks on the flanks. The four forward guns only fired about 50 rounds before being surrounded. Had they been behind the main defensive line covering the communication trenches, and themselves covered by the infantry, they would have been far more valuable, and would not possibly have been overrun.
(e) The value of trench blocks was fully111 found out. Such blocks should be prepared ready against penetration139 laterally140, so as to localise it.
(h) Previous rehearsals141 and thorough knowledge of overland routes are essential. To the fact that these points had received proper attention is attributable the successful delaying action of this brigade.
(i) Defensive flanks prepared as such are invaluable.
(j) Infantry and machine guns must establish closer liaison142.... It should be recognised once and for all that all machine guns in a brigade sector must come under the senior machine-gun officer in that sector.... Nothing herein said, however, should be permitted to detract from the principle that the battalion commander can and should issue orders to the guns covering him if he considers the situation demands it....
(k) Main forward communication trenches should never be traced to lead into strong points.... Such communication trenches are mere143 covering approaches to these strong points and afford easy access to the [Pg 241] enemy. Our main battle zone should not be covered by a single trench, e.g. the Red Line (Bailleul), but should consist of at least three trenches with strong points so constructed as not to be apparent and obvious. As with garrisons of forward posts, so with garrisons of battle trenches, they should be constantly moved so as to avoid giving away the position actually held.”
A captured German officer of the 152nd I.R., 41st Division, gave as the main causes of the failure of the attack (a) the intensity144 of the machine-gun barrage, which caused heavy casualties. His regiment lost 12 officers and the 16th I.R. lost 24 officers; (b) watches did not appear to have been correctly synchronised. We have mentioned the service rendered by the Machine Gun Battalion, but, unfortunately, there is no record of Lieut.-Col. E. C. S. Jervis’ dispositions. This gallant and able officer says that the “tender spots” in his defence were the low ridges145 running due east and west through Bradford Post, and from Mill Post, south of Belvoir Alley, and then west. The former could not be covered by machine-gun fire, the latter was. And we know that the enemy, having exterminated146 the garrison, were mown down, in and round Gavrelle, from the indirect fire of fourteen machine-guns.
Apart from the heavy artillery fire, which, in itself, caused heavy casualties, Colonel Jervis points out an interesting feature in this battle: the complete mastery of the air which the enemy had throughout the day, resulting in machine-guns being spotted147 and engaged by low-flying aeroplanes, which also directed the fire of specially detailed148 heavy artillery. Needless to say, machine-guns are very vulnerable [Pg 242] to this form of attack; and we must also point out, having mentioned the capture of guns, that when once the enemy has penetrated the trench system machine-gunners have great difficulty in dealing149 with bombing attacks from the flanks. The Machine Gun Battalion, however, had a great opportunity in this battle, and took full advantage of it.
Brig.-Gen. Elkington expresses the opinion that this was the best action fought by the 56th Division. We do not go quite so far as this. It was more satisfactory to the troops, no doubt, but there is a great difference between defence and attack. A successful defence is more cheering to the infantry and artillery, inasmuch as they can more easily estimate the damage they do to the enemy; but it would not be fair to say that this was better than the hard fighting at Gommecourt and south of Arras in April 1917, or indeed on the Somme in 1916 and Ypres in 1917. The fact remains150, however, that the 56th Division had, by its stout151 defence, twice saved the situation, which had been imperilled by enemy successes elsewhere.
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1
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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alleviate
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| v.减轻，缓和，缓解(痛苦等) | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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elation
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| n.兴高采烈，洋洋得意 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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rations
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| 定量( ration的名词复数 )； 配给量； 正常量； 合理的量 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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abdication
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| n.辞职；退位 | |
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coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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culminated
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| v.达到极点( culminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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costly
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| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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consternation
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| n.大为吃惊，惊骇 | |
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prospects
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| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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rattle
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| v.飞奔，碰响；激怒；n.碰撞声；拨浪鼓 | |
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dice
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| n.骰子；vt.把（食物）切成小方块，冒险 | |
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exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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arrogant
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| adj.傲慢的，自大的 | |
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appalling
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| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
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trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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mortar
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| n.灰浆，灰泥；迫击炮；v.把…用灰浆涂接合 | |
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mortars
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| n.迫击炮( mortar的名词复数 )；砂浆；房产；研钵 | |
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sector
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| n.部门，部分；防御地段，防区；扇形 | |
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harassing
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| v.侵扰，骚扰( harass的现在分词 )；不断攻击（敌人） | |
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bleakest
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| 阴冷的( bleak的最高级 )； （状况）无望的； 没有希望的； 光秃的 | |
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desperately
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| adv.极度渴望地，绝望地，孤注一掷地 | |
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chateau
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| n.城堡，别墅 | |
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hospitable
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| adj.好客的；宽容的；有利的，适宜的 | |
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inspection
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| n.检查，审查，检阅 | |
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hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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ardent
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，强烈的，烈性的 | |
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rangers
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| 护林者( ranger的名词复数 )； 突击队员 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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thaw
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| v.（使）融化，（使）变得友善；n.融化，缓和 | |
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trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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feverish
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| adj.发烧的，狂热的，兴奋的 | |
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mingled
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| 混合，混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 )； 混进，与…交往[联系] | |
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retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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jeers
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| n.操纵帆桁下部（使其上下的）索具；嘲讽( jeer的名词复数 )v.嘲笑( jeer的第三人称单数 ) | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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enumerate
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| v.列举，计算，枚举，数 | |
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uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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52
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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53
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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54
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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55
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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56
contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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57
lengthy
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| adj.漫长的，冗长的 | |
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58
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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59
aviators
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| 飞机驾驶员，飞行员( aviator的名词复数 ) | |
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60
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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61
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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62
lateral
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| adj.侧面的，旁边的 | |
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63
dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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64
alley
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| n.小巷，胡同；小径，小路 | |
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65
amendments
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| （法律、文件的）改动( amendment的名词复数 )； 修正案； 修改； （美国宪法的）修正案 | |
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66
fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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67
killing
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| n.巨额利润；突然赚大钱，发大财 | |
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68
imminent
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| adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的 | |
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69
hacked
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| 生气 | |
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70
onward
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| adj.向前的，前进的；adv.向前，前进，在先 | |
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71
barrage
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| n.火力网，弹幕 | |
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72
swarm
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| n.(昆虫)等一大群；vi.成群飞舞；蜂拥而入 | |
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73
swarms
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| 蜂群，一大群( swarm的名词复数 ) | |
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74
resolutely
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| adj.坚决地，果断地 | |
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75
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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76
bulge
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| n.突出，膨胀，激增；vt.突出，膨胀 | |
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77
scurrying
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| v.急匆匆地走( scurry的现在分词 ) | |
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78
strenuous
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| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
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79
annoyance
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| n.恼怒，生气，烦恼 | |
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80
rumour
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| n.谣言，谣传，传闻 | |
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81
rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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82
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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83
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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84
ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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85
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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86
marine
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| adj.海的；海生的；航海的；海事的；n.水兵 | |
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87
expended
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| v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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88
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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89
obliterated
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| v.除去( obliterate的过去式和过去分词 )；涂去；擦掉；彻底破坏或毁灭 | |
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90
survivor
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| n.生存者，残存者，幸存者 | |
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91
defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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92
cramped
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| a.狭窄的 | |
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93
battered
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| adj.磨损的；v.连续猛击；磨损 | |
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94
dwindling
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| adj.逐渐减少的v.逐渐变少或变小( dwindle的现在分词 ) | |
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95
consultation
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| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
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96
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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97
hordes
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| n.移动着的一大群( horde的名词复数 )；部落 | |
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98
swarmed
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| 密集( swarm的过去式和过去分词 )； 云集； 成群地移动； 蜜蜂或其他飞行昆虫成群地飞来飞去 | |
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99
gallantly
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| adv. 漂亮地，勇敢地，献殷勤地 | |
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100
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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101
pelican
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| n.鹈鹕，伽蓝鸟 | |
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102
groaning
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| adj. 呜咽的, 呻吟的 动词groan的现在分词形式 | |
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103
heralded
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| v.预示( herald的过去式和过去分词 )；宣布（好或重要） | |
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104
annihilated
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| v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃 | |
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105
plunging
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| adj.跳进的，突进的v.颠簸( plunge的现在分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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106
blanch
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| v.漂白；使变白；使(植物)不见日光而变白 | |
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107
depleted
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| adj. 枯竭的, 废弃的 动词deplete的过去式和过去分词 | |
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108
repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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109
smothered
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| （使）窒息， （使）透不过气( smother的过去式和过去分词 )； 覆盖； 忍住； 抑制 | |
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110
inflicting
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的现在分词 ) | |
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111
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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112
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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113
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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114
precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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115
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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116
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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117
survivors
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| 幸存者，残存者，生还者( survivor的名词复数 ) | |
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118
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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119
enveloped
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| v.包围，笼罩，包住( envelop的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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120
buzzer
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| n.蜂鸣器；汽笛 | |
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121
ordnance
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| n.大炮，军械 | |
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122
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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123
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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124
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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125
actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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126
baron
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| n.男爵；(商业界等)巨头，大王 | |
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127
demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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128
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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129
immortal
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| adj.不朽的；永生的，不死的；神的 | |
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130
apron
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| n.围裙；工作裙 | |
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131
plentiful
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| adj.富裕的，丰富的 | |
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132
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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133
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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134
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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135
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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136
concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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137
garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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138
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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139
penetration
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| n.穿透，穿人，渗透 | |
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140
laterally
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| ad.横向地；侧面地；旁边地 | |
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141
rehearsals
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| n.练习( rehearsal的名词复数 )；排练；复述；重复 | |
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142
liaison
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| n.联系，（未婚男女间的）暖昧关系，私通 | |
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143
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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144
intensity
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| n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度 | |
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145
ridges
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| n.脊( ridge的名词复数 )；山脊；脊状突起；大气层的)高压脊 | |
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146
exterminated
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| v.消灭，根绝( exterminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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147
spotted
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| adj.有斑点的，斑纹的，弄污了的 | |
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148
detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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149
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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150
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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