The Divisional Headquarters opened at Reninghelst on the morning of the 18th August; brigades were quartered at Steenvoorde and Wippenhoek. These forward areas did not give uninterrupted rest; frequent and close attention was paid to them by aeroplanes, and during the following night two lorries were set on fire by bombs dropped by the night birds.
On the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th the division moved back, resting at Busseboom, and eventually arrived at the peaceful area of Eperleques. The 5th Cheshire Regt., however, remained in the battle area until the 29th. A further move started on the 30th, by train, to the ruined villages to the east and south of Bapaume, with Divisional Headquarters at Fremicourt.
Sports, horse-shows, and the Divisional Band now played a more prominent part in the life of the soldier, and we find the divisional canteen being enlarged—a greengrocery, eggs, and butter department being added, also a wholesale1 beer department. And, of course, there was training!
At the commencement of the war the British infantry2 were the greatest riflemen in the world. Then came a period when everyone was mad on throwing bombs, and the rifle was neglected. At the end of [Pg 166] the war one sighed in vain for a half, even a quarter of the efficiency of the pre-war rifleman.
Training in 1917 was based on four weapons, and the platoon. The platoon, we were told, was the smallest unit comprising all the weapons with which the infantry was armed. Exclusive of Headquarters, twenty-eight other ranks was the minimum strength, and when the platoon was below that strength the necessary numbers would be obtained by the temporary amalgamation3 of companies, platoons, or sections. We draw attention to these words because the order was afterwards reversed.
The platoon was comprised of a rifle section, a Lewis-gun section, a bomber4 section, and a rifle-grenade section. The principles governing training were based on these various weapons. The rifle and bayonet were for assault, for repelling5 attack, or for obtaining superiority of fire, and the training of this section was considered of much importance. Each man should be a marksman, first class with bayonet and bomb, and a scout6, in addition to being either a Lewis-gunner or rifle grenadier. Bayonet fighting was recommended to all sections, as it produced “lust for blood.”
The bomb was called the second weapon of all N.C.O.s and men, and was to be used for dislodging the enemy from behind cover or killing7 him below ground. The section should study bombing attacks and the duties of “moppers-up.” These last individuals should work in pairs. They were to drop into their objectives and work laterally8 outwards9. They killed the enemy met with in the trenches10, and they also guarded the entrances to dug-outs and side trenches. They were not to penetrate12 down [Pg 167] dug-outs until the platoon they were working for arrived.
The rifle grenade was described as the howitzer of the infantry, and was used to dislodge the enemy from behind cover and to drive him below ground. The section was trained to a rifle-grenade barrage13.
The Lewis gun was the weapon of opportunity. Its mobility14 and the small target it presented made it peculiarly suitable for working round an enemy’s flank.
In each section sufficient ammunition15 was carried for immediate16 requirements. Every man (except bombers17, signallers, scouts18, runners, and Lewis gunners who carried 50 rounds) carried at least 120 rounds of rifle ammunition and 2 bombs. The Lewis-gun section carried 30 “drums.” The bombers (with the exception of “throwers,” who carried 5) carried at least 10 bombs each.
The men of the rifle-grenade section each carried at least six grenades. With this organisation19 training was carried out in trench11-to-trench warfare20 and the enveloping21 of strong points.
In 1917 the strength of a platoon was not definitely laid down by the Higher Command. It was suggested that a suitable number for each section was nine—1 non-commissioned officer and 8 men. But there was an order to leave 10 officers and 50 other ranks out of line for “reconstruction22.” They would not be available as reinforcements, but were, generally, specialists and good instructors23, on whom the battalion24 could be rebuilt if casualties were heavy. Most units carried out the suggestion of 9 to a section, and any extra men, exclusive of the 50 for reconstruction, were used as reinforcements during the battle.
[Pg 168] On arrival in the Third Army area (now under the command of General Byng, General Allenby having been given command in Egypt), the strength of the 56th Division was very low.
The four battalions25 of the 167th Brigade totalled altogether 63 officers and 1,754 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 7 officers and 150 other ranks; the Trench Mortar26 Battery, 5 officers and 50 other ranks.
The four battalions of the 168th Brigade totalled 94 officers and 2,802 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 7 officers and 160 other ranks; the Trench Mortar Battery, 5 officers and 90 other ranks.
The four battalions of the 169th Brigade totalled 61 officers and 1,921 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 10 officers and 145 other ranks; the Trench Mortar Battery, 2 officers and 75 other ranks.
It was therefore probable that when the period of rest was over the division would go into a quiet bit of the line.
All doubts as to the ultimate destination of the division were laid at rest on the 4th September, when the 168th Brigade relieved the 9th Brigade, 3rd Division, in the Lagnicourt section. The 169th Brigade relieved the 8th Brigade in the Louverval section on the 5th; and the 167th Brigade relieved the 76th Brigade in the Morchies section on the 6th. The situation was quiet, and the weather fine and hot.
Patrolling, of an active nature, commenced at once, and on the 10th September the 167th Brigade secured a man of the 31st Reserve Infantry Regt.; and on the same night the 168th Brigade secured two of the 86th Reserve Infantry Regt. Various enemy posts were visited from time to time, and occasionally [Pg 169] entered, but the gem27 of these small enterprises was that of the Queen’s Westminster Rifles. On the 29th September 2/Lieut. W. H. Ormiston, with thirty men, lay in wait in the middle of No Man’s Land and successfully ambushed28 a patrol of fifteen Germans. Eleven were killed and two brought in; unfortunately, the remaining two proved swift of foot and got away. It was not done without a fight. Six of the Queen’s Westminsters were wounded. Both Corps29 and Army Commanders sent their congratulations to this well-known and gallant30 regiment31, with the added message that the identification was of great importance. The prisoners were of the 414th Infantry Regt.
During this month six hundred gas projectors32 were dug into the 56th Divisional Front.
During the month of October raids were attempted by the London Scottish and the Kensingtons, but the enemy were found alert and the parties failed to enter the German line. The Kensingtons, however, were successful in rescuing a British pilot whose machine was brought down in No Man’s Land, but they had to fight for him.
The only incident of importance in the month of October was a visit of ten days of Major-Gen. Bloxom, U.S.A., with his chief of staff, with the object of gaining experience.
The strength of the division remained about the same.
On the 2nd November a document headed “IV Corps, No. H.R.S. 17/48” was received, into which we must enter at some length.
The Third Army stretched from the little stream of l’Omignon, which runs into the St. Quentin Canal a few miles above that town, to Gavrelle, north of the [Pg 170] Scarpe. It was composed of the VII, III, IV, VI, and XVII Corps from right to left (and later, the V Corps). The III Corps had its right on 22 Ravine, between Villers-Guislain and Gonnelieu, and its left to the east of Trescault. Then came the IV Corps, with its left north of Lagnicourt, on a little stream called the Hirondelle. These two corps were facing the Hindenburg Line, and had in their immediate rear the battlefields of the Somme, and the country which the Germans had laid to waste in their retreat in the early spring.
At the time when our pursuing troops were brought to a standstill in front of this celebrated33 line, preparations were at once commenced for attack. Several actions had been fought on this sector34 before it settled down to a “quiet sector”; assembly trenches existed, and adequate shelter for brigade and battalion headquarters had been constructed. It was now chosen as a sector to be attacked.
At this time our Italian Allies were in serious difficulties, and seven German divisions were engaged in this theatre. And, although the movement of whole divisions had started from Russia without exchange from the Western Front, a mass of enemy troops were still pinned down in Flanders. It seemed as though a sudden surprise attack might benefit the Italian Armies and also improve the position on the Western Front. But there was the obvious difficulty of a lack of troops at Sir Douglas Haig’s disposal; the Flanders adventure had been a most costly35 one for us, for practically the whole of the British Army had passed through the salient inferno36 Ypres. Finally it was decided37 that sufficient troops could be mustered38 to justify39 the attack, and [Pg 171] as the French not only promised to engage the enemy’s attention elsewhere, but actually set aside a large force of cavalry40 and infantry to help in the attack (they started to move on the 20th November), the order was given.
The scheme, as set forth41 in this document, was for the infantry to break through the German defensive42 system with the aid of Tanks on a front from Gonnelieu to Hermies, seize the crossings of the Canal de l’Escaut at Masnières and Marcoing, cut the last of the enemy’s defences on the Beaurevoir-Masnières line, and pass the cavalry through the break thus made.
The cavalry were then to capture Cambrai and Bourlon Wood, cut all railway communications into Cambrai, and to occupy the crossings of the Sensée between Paillencourt and Palleul to the north of Cambrai. They would come up from Gouzeaucourt and Metz-en-Couture.
If this part of the plan was accomplished43, the whole of the Third Army would participate in further operations to complete the surrounding of all the enemy forces in the Quéant salient. Presumably our Allies would have been called upon as well.
The III Corps, composed of the 20th, 6th, 12th, 29th Divisions, and 2nd and 3rd Brigades, Tank Corps (less three companies) would secure the canal crossings at Marcoing and Masnières, and form a flank from Gonnelieu through Bois Lateau, Creve-c?ur, to a spot called la Belle44 Etoile a few miles south-east of Cambrai.
The IV Corps, composed of the 51st, 62nd, 36th, 56th Divisions, and 1st Brigade, Tank Corps, would attack with two divisions, on the left of the III Corps, [Pg 172] and the right of the Canal du Nord, towards Flesquières and Graincourt.
The success of the whole plan depended on the capture of Masnières and Marcoing, at which point the cavalry would be passed through the break, and, as speed was the essence of the operation, in order to obtain liberty of movement before the enemy could organise45 either counter-attack or a fresh line of defence by bringing up fresh troops, the leading cavalry divisions would have to pass through on the afternoon or evening of zero day.
Meanwhile, the IV Corps would be pushing forward on the left, with the first object of establishing a line from Noyelles, along the Canal de l’Escaut, through Fontaines, and relieve the cavalry on Bourlon, or fight for that position, and join with the original front line in the Louverval sector.
Surprise was essential, so there would be no preliminary bombardment, and these instructions insisted that the greatest care should be taken not to divulge46 the presence of increased artillery47 to the enemy. Registration48 and calibration was to be carried out by order of the General Officer Commanding the Third Army Artillery.
One of the first tasks was to erect49 camouflage50 over all positions which would be occupied by the artillery. Then weatherproof cover for ammunition would be constructed. But little more than this could be done in the time at the disposal of the Army. In any case, the accumulation of ammunition would have to be spread over as long a period as possible, so as to minimise the increase of activity on the railways.
The action of the artillery would consist mainly in the formation of smoke screens and barrages51, on [Pg 173] the front and flanks of the attack (to cover the advance of the Tanks), and the neutralisation of hostile batteries, the bombardment of positions of assembly, rest billets, telephone routes, and known centres of communication and command. But the very nature of the operation precluded52 the careful registration of all batteries.
All the elaborate preparations of a trench-to-trench attack would be reduced to a minimum, and in many items must be done away with. Cover from weather would have to be provided for the full number of troops when concentrated, but no extensive scheme of hutting or new camps could be undertaken. In thick woods tents, suitably camouflaged53, could be erected54, and in thin woods wire netting must be stretched horizontally amongst the trees, about ten feet from the ground, and have twigs55 scattered56 on the top of it, thus making a sort of roof under which bivouacs could be pitched.
As to concentration, the idea was to complete the move of the artillery before the infantry was brought into the area, to have the extra infantry in the area as short a time as possible, and to bring up the Tanks at the very last moment.
Finally, No. 15 Squadron R.F.C. was ordered to note particularly whether any of the work being carried out was noticeable from the air.
The r?le of the 56th Division in all this was to make a demonstration57 on Z day and attract the attention of the enemy, and later on take part in the operation of rolling up the Hindenburg Line. When Bourlon Wood had been captured, the IV Corps would secure a line Rumancourt-Buissy-Inchy, which would cut off the German divisions in the Quéant salient and threaten with immediate capture their gun positions. [Pg 174] In this move two brigades of the 36th Division would take part on the east bank of the canal and one brigade on the west of the canal, starting from the Spoil Heap near Hermies and moving in the direction of M?uvres and Inchy.
The 169th Brigade, which would be on the right of the 56th Divisional front, would be responsible for joining hands with the 109th Brigade, 36th Division, and with them attack in the direction of Tadpole58 Copse. In this attack Tanks were to be employed, but the number was never given.
Nothing amuses troops more than to deceive the enemy—and we say “amuse” advisedly, for though it is in the midst of a battle, with death and destruction going on all round them, men will be as keen as children in carrying out the scheme of make-believe, and if it succeeds will roar with laughter. Such a scheme was on foot for the 56th Division.
For the purpose of making the demonstration on the divisional front as realistic as possible, a number of dummy59 Tanks were to be made by the C.R.E., while brigades would amuse themselves by making dummy figures of men to act as supporting infantry. The Tanks were to be put out in No Man’s Land during the night, and would be half hidden by the smoke barrage in the morning when the attack started; the figures would be pushed above the trenches as though infantry were just emerging. A motor-bicycle in the front-line trench was to imitate the noise of a Tank.
As might well be expected, excitement ran high in the division. The construction of dummy figures and dummy Tanks was taken in hand at once, and by the 19th November a dozen full-sized Tanks were ready, [Pg 175] together with some two hundred and fifty figures to each brigade front.
On the 6th November wire-cutting was commenced by trench mortars60 in the neighbourhood of Quéant—250 rounds a day being fired—the Germans would probably think a raid was contemplated61, which would account for any suspicious movements!
The time was short and, as preliminary preparation was to be cut down to a minimum, fatigues62 were not very arduous63. There was a certain amount of work done on the roads near the front line, but the greatest care had to be exercised not to make improvements of an apparent nature. In the back areas, however, the strain was becoming intolerable. There were troops in every hole and corner. Tents were crammed64 full; huts, ruins, any place where men could find a little shelter was used. And the weather was cold, and regulations about lights and fires were very stringent65.
In the front line every precaution against accidents was taken. The attacking divisions occupied their positions in line, but the old troops remained in the outpost line in case the enemy should secure identification; also patrols were ordered to avoid any possibility of capture.
On the 14th November the Corps ordered the 56th Division to hold the line with two brigades instead of three, so as to have a concentrated force ready to act in case of necessity. So on the night of the 18th the 167th Brigade extended its left and took over the frontage of the 168th Brigade, which concentrated in Fremicourt and Beugny, to the east of Bapaume.
On the night of the 19th the dummy Tanks were put in position about 300 yards from the front line. [Pg 176] At 2 a.m. on the 20th gas drums were projected into the German lines where the wire-cutting had taken place (Quéant), and at 6.20 a.m. the whole of the artillery on the Third Army front opened on the enemy lines with one stupendous crash.
In the 56th Division front line all was activity. The parties with the dummy figures moved them up and down in as lifelike a manner as they could, and other parties hurled66 smoke grenades so that the enemy might not see too clearly.
The “make-believe” attack was a great success. The Germans opened frantic67 and furious fire with machine-guns and artillery, and the dummy Tanks were shelled until mid-day!
By 9.15 a.m. the 36th Division (109th Brigade) had advanced along the west bank of the canal from the Spoil Heap to the Bapaume-Cambrai road, where the 169th Brigade joined up with it on the old German outpost line.
Meanwhile, great events had been taking place on the right. The III Corps, on which so much depended, advanced through the Hindenburg Line in grand style and, thanks to the rapid action of the 29th Division (General de Lisle), which was to wait until news arrived of the capture of the Hindenburg Support Line before advancing but attacked instead on observer reports, seized Marcoing and Masnières. The first bit of bad luck happened at Masnières, where the enemy had only partially68 destroyed the iron bridge over the Escault Canal. It might have been sufficiently70 strong for cavalry to cross over, or it might have been repaired to enable them to do so, but a Tank attempted to cross first and broke through it altogether. This unfortunate accident did not stop a squadron of [Pg 177] Canadian cavalry, who, with the dash usually associated with that arm, rode over a flimsy bridge across a lock on the Marcoing side of the town and attacked the enemy on Rumilly Ridge69. It was probably troopers from this very gallant squadron who reached the outskirts71 of Cambrai.
Lieut.-Col. Johnston took the 2nd Hampshires across in a similar way and secured the crossing. But in Marcoing other troops of the 29th Division secured the bridge intact.
The III Corps had therefore done its job, but the IV Corps was not so fortunate. Havrincourt Wood had been of great service to the IV Corps in the assembly. The 51st and 62nd Divisions, with a fringe of the 36th Division in front of them until the last moment, had completed their concentration without a hitch72. On the nights of the 16th, 17th, and 18th all the Tanks were moved into Havrincourt Wood, and except that a battery of 6-inch howitzers got into difficulties farther north, and that a lorry “ran into a train carrying Tanks,” the whole concentration was carried out as desired. But, although we do not believe it made much difference, the enemy were aware of the attack. Unfortunately, some men were captured in a raid on the 36th Divisional front, and from the statements of prisoners they evidently divulged73 the fact that an attack was contemplated. The time and the extent of it, however, seems to have been a complete surprise to the Germans.
At zero hour the Tanks advanced, followed by the 51st and 62nd Divisions. There was in this sector some of the most formidable wire on the whole of the western front, but the Tanks crushed wide lanes through it and the troops advanced steadily74. There [Pg 178] was some obstinate75 fighting in Havrincourt village and park, where parties of the enemy held out until the afternoon, but otherwise the Hindenburg front line was captured by 8 o’clock. A pause of two hours was allowed here to enable troops and Tanks to reorganise for the attack on the Hindenburg Support.
Once more the attack moved forward. The 62nd Division on the left met with little opposition76, and that portion of the support line allotted77 to them was in their hands between 10 and 11 o’clock. But the 51st Division on the right met with resistance at the village of Flesquières. The infantry were prevented from advancing by machine guns and uncut wire, and the Tanks, which came up on the ridge, were at once put out of action by field guns, which had been pulled out of their pits on to the slopes to the north of the village. Six Tanks were to be seen here in a line, smashed to bits by a very gallant German Battery Commander, who, it was said, served and fired the guns himself, when his men had bolted.
The 51st Division could make no progress, but on their left the 62nd moved forward to Graincourt, and the 36th, still farther on the left, had moved along the canal to the Cambrai road. And on the right troops of the III Corps were well on towards Cantaign. The 51st Division made a second attempt with Tanks and again failed.
What follows is one of the mysteries of the Cambrai battle. A patrol of King Edward’s Horse, operating with the 62nd Division, rode into Flesquières soon after mid-day from the direction of Graincourt. They reported only a few of the enemy there and do not appear to have suffered any casualties themselves. But the 1st Cavalry Division, which had been concentrated [Pg 179] in the neighbourhood of Equancourt, had been ordered at 8.25 a.m. to move forward with their head on Metz, ready to advance. This they did. About 11 o’clock they were ordered to push forward through the Hindenburg Support Line, but found that Flesquières was still in the hands of the enemy, and they were unable to pass. About 2.30 p.m. they were ordered to pass at least two regiments78 by Ribecourt and Premy Chapel79 and work round Flesquières from the north-east and assist the 51st Division in their attack from the south. But they found they were unable to carry out this co-operation on account of the delay which had occurred, due to their first effort, and also that Nine Wood was not clear of the enemy. At 4 p.m. the Third Army ordered the cavalry to push forward in full strength through Marcoing and carry out the original plan of a break-through at that point; but darkness had come on and the order was modified, one brigade being ordered to occupy Cantaign and cut off the enemy retreating from Flesquières. Cantaign, however, was found to be too strongly held for the cavalry to capture it, and therefore the leading brigade remained at Noyelles for the night. It would seem that the opportunity was missed.
As dusk fell, the 62nd and 36th Divisions were well forward towards the Bourlon Ridge, the former just short of Anneaux, and then forming a long flank back east of Graincourt and to the west of Flesquières, where they connected with the 51st Division. Farther to the right of the IV Corps the III Corps had also pushed well forward and made a similar flank facing west, the ground between the two points of greatest advance about Orival Wood being occupied by the enemy’s artillery. (Line C.)
[Pg 180] Immediately after the capture of the Hindenburg system the redistribution of the artillery and machine guns began. The machine guns, which had been massed under corps control, reverted80 to their divisions. Four brigades of Field Artillery, one 60-pounder battery, and one, horsed, 6-inch Howitzer battery were placed under the orders of each of the 36th, 62nd, and 51st Divisions. But a fortunate circumstance arose: it was found difficult to get the heavy artillery across No Man’s Land into the Flesquières salient, and the congestion81 there was such that the supply of ammunition would have been uncertain; so it was decided to move the bulk of the artillery to the left, close to the old front line round about Demicourt, Hermies, and Morchies. In this position they assisted very materially in breaking up the great German attack on the 30th November.
During this first day the Queen Victoria’s Rifles were on the right of the 169th Brigade, and worked along the German outpost line in touch with the 109th Brigade, who were clearing the Hindenburg Line, as far as the Cambrai road. The 2nd London Regt. was on the left of the Queen Victoria’s Rifles.
It had been calculated that no large hostile reinforcements would be likely to reach the scene of action for forty-eight hours after the commencement of the attack, and Sir Douglas Haig had informed General Byng that the advance would be stopped after that time, unless the results then gained, and the general situation, justified82 its continuance. Although, as we have said, the movements of the Canadian Cavalry and King Edward’s Horse would seem to suggest that the opportunity of passing other cavalry through had been missed, there remained one day when, given [Pg 181] success, they could still be employed. The 51st and 62nd Divisions were therefore ordered to capture the Bourlon position, when the 1st Cavalry Division would follow up the attack and seize the passages of the Canal du Nord between Palleul and Sains-les-Marquion; and the 36th Division was to continue the advance on the west of the canal, and hold the two brigades on the eastern bank ready to push through and seize the canal, between Sains-les-Marquion and M?uvres, as soon as Bourlon was taken. The 56th Division would be drawn83 farther into the operations on the left in the direction of Tadpole Copse.
When the day broke, Flesquières was found, by the 51st Division, to be unoccupied by the enemy; they therefore pushed on to the Marcoing-Graincourt road, capturing a number of guns in the valley which the enemy had not been able to remove in the night. The 1st Cavalry Division then advanced and took Cantaing, after some stiff fighting in which some of the 51st Division took part. On the left the 62nd Division captured Anneaux and Anneaux Chapel, after heavy fighting, and made more progress north of the Cambrai road, where they established themselves on the ridge west of Bourlon Wood, and also gained a further stretch of the Hindenburg Support Line. On the left of the 62nd the 36th Division advanced along the west bank of the canal, meeting increased opposition, and for a time held the south of the village of M?uvres. On their left again the Queen Victoria’s Rifles worked along the outpost line and captured a machine gun with its crew of seven. Resistance, however, was stiffening84. The dividing line between the 109th and the 169th Brigades was the grid85 line to the west of M?uvres, and any [Pg 182] farther advance to the north would bring the 56th Division in contact with the Hindenburg Line itself.
Meanwhile, in the centre of the battlefield, progress was not what had been hoped it would be. The 51st Division were to work round Bourlon Wood from the east, and join hands with the 62nd Division; but they met with such opposition as delayed their advance, and they did not capture Fontaine until late in the afternoon. The capture of Bourlon was not achieved. At nightfall the 51st Division was holding a line north of Cantaing forward to Fontaine, making a dangerous salient, and then in a westerly direction to the north of Anneaux, where, joining with the 62nd, the line was carried north of the Cambrai road, forming another salient north of the Sugar Factory. The 36th Division then carried on the line, which bent86 back towards the road near the canal bridge and then forward again to M?uvres. Due west of M?uvres the 56th Division held the line to the old British trenches. The Tanks, in diminished numbers, had assisted during the day, but no advance had been made without a struggle. (Line D.)
In the III Corps area there had been some heavy fighting during the day, which resulted in some improvement of our positions. Heavy counter-attacks were launched by the enemy, and much useful and gallant work was done by dismounted cavalry beating off these attacks. But the forty-eight hours had expired, and the high ground at Bourlon Village and Wood, as well as certain tactical features to the east and west of the wood, still remained in the enemy’s hands. It seemed fairly clear that the surprise break-through and complete disorganisation of the enemy’s back areas would not be accomplished. [Pg 183] Sir Douglas Haig had to decide whether to continue the offensive or take up a defensive attitude and rest content with what had been done.
“It was not possible, however, to let matters stand as they were. The positions captured by us north of Flesquières were completely commanded by the Bourlon Ridge, and unless the ridge were gained it would be impossible to hold them, except at excessive cost. If I decided not to go on, a withdrawal87 to the Flesquières ridge would be necessary, and would have to be carried out at once.
On the other hand, the enemy showed certain signs of an intention to withdraw. Craters89 had been formed at road junctions90, and troops could be seen ready to move east. The possession of Bourlon Ridge would enable our troops to obtain observation over the ground to the north, which sloped gently down to the Sensée River. The enemy’s defensive lines south of the Scarpe and the Sensée Rivers would thereby92 be turned, his communications exposed to the observed fire of our artillery, and his positions in this sector jeopardised. In short, so great was the importance of the ridge to the enemy that its loss would probably cause the abandonment by the Germans of their carefully prepared defence systems for a considerable distance to the north of it....
It was to be remembered, however, that the hostile reinforcements coming up at this stage could at first be no more than enough to replace the enemy’s losses; and although the right of our advance had been definitely stayed, the enemy had not yet developed such strength about Bourlon as it seemed might not be overcome by the numbers at my disposal. As has already been pointed93 out, on the Cambrai side of the battlefield I had only aimed at securing a defensive flank to enable the advance to be pushed [Pg 184] northwards and north-westwards, and this part of my task had been to a large extent achieved.
An additional and very important argument in favour of proceeding95 with my attack was supplied by the situation in Italy, upon which a continuance of pressure on the Cambrai front might reasonably be expected to exercise an important effect, no matter what measures of success attended my efforts. Moreover, two divisions previously96 under orders for Italy had on this day been placed at my disposal, and with this accession of strength the prospect97 of securing Bourlon seemed good.
After weighing these various considerations, therefore, I decided to continue the operations to gain the Bourlon position.”
But in the morning, about 9.30 a.m., the enemy launched a heavy counter-attack on the 62nd Division west of Bourlon Wood which, although it did not succeed in driving them back, prevented any advance. And about 10.30 they attacked Fontaine from the north-west and east, and after heavy fighting drove the 51st Division out and clear of the village.
During the afternoon the Germans again attacked the 62nd Division, but were again repulsed98, as they had been in the morning. On the left of the 62nd, the 36th were unable to gain ground on the east of the canal, and on the west bank entered M?uvres for the second time, but after an hour or so were driven out. (Line E.)
On this day, the 22nd November, the 56th Division played a more important part. The 169th Brigade were still on the right of the division. The Queen Victoria’s Rifles, in touch with the 109th Brigade, were holding a line of posts across No Man’s Land and in the old German outpost line. The Queen’s [Pg 185] Westminster Rifles were ordered to concentrate, slightly to the north of the Cambrai road, and to advance, in conjunction with the 109th Brigade, at 11 o’clock along the front trench of the Hindenburg Line which runs to Tadpole Copse. They would also work their way up the communication trenches to the second line of the Hindenburg first system, and clear both lines as far as Tadpole Copse. The London Rifle Brigade were ordered to assemble in the captured Hindenburg Line south of the Cambrai road, and follow the attack of the 109th Brigade to where the Hindenburg system turned away from the canal at M?uvres (see Map); they would then follow the Queen’s Westminsters in two columns, one in the first line and one in the second, and reinforce if necessary. The 5,000 yards of British line up to the Hirondelle River were held by the 167th Brigade.
The instructions were to carry out a determined99 advance. The idea, of which this was the preliminary operation, was for the 36th Division to move forward through M?uvres and Inchy, while the 56th Division captured the Hindenburg Line up to Quéant.
It was entirely100 a bombing fight, and was supported by an artillery barrage, which lifted off Swan Lane at 11.30 a.m. and moved forward at the rate of fifty yards every five minutes. The division, until the night 21st/22nd, had been covered by the 281st Brigade R.F.A. only—as was usual in these battles, the artillery was switched about from one command to another—but during the night the 280th Brigade R.F.A. had moved to positions near Boursies and took part in this attack.
It was hard and slow fighting, as is generally the [Pg 186] case in bombing fights. Colonel Glazier, of the Queen’s Westminsters, writes:
“The barrage got some way ahead of our men, but owing to the uncertainty101 of the position of the troops it was impossible to bring it back. At 12.30 p.m. a runner came with a request for more bombs, and the news that our men had passed the Boursies-M?uvres road and were using German bombs.... Bombs were sent forward; large quantities were taken forward by the Queen Victoria’s Rifles.”
News of progress was very slow in coming in, and the first definite information indicating success was obtained from observers, who reported at 2.40 p.m. that the enemy were shelling Tadpole Copse. Not until 5.30 was it known for certain that the copse was occupied by three companies of the Queen’s Westminsters. They captured 3 officers, 70 men, and 3 machine guns.
The London Scottish had arrived at the old British front line about Louverval at mid-day with the object of relieving the Queen’s Westminsters and carrying on the attack. They were informed that the attack would not be continued that day, and so formed a flank from the south of Tadpole Copse to the old British line, although for the moment they were unable to dislodge the enemy from a deep crater88 at the road junctions some two hundred yards south-west of the copse. At dawn they relieved the forward companies of the Queen’s Westminsters and made ready for the morning attack.
Illustration: Local Map Cambrai 1917.
6. Local Map. Front of the Division at Cambrai 1917.
Most useful work was also done during the night by the 416th Field Coy. R.E., who constructed a bridge over the canal at the Cambrai road, although the [Pg 187] enemy kept up a persistent102 shelling of the road, and particularly of the point of intersection103 with the canal. The 512th Coy. R.E. at the same time made good the road from Boursies to the canal.
So the only progress made by the IV Corps on the 22nd was the capture of Tadpole Copse by the Queen’s Westminsters, an important gain as it occupies the high ground to the west of M?uvres. But it became apparent that the enemy was rapidly massing strong forces to stay our farther advance.
The 40th Division passed into the Corps command and was sent to relieve the 62nd. The Corps orders that evening were for the advance to continue on the 23rd, with the assistance of Tanks, the chief objective being Bourlon village. The 51st Division was to attack it from the east and the 40th from the south-west; but when it became known that the 51st Division had been driven out of Fontaine, their task was modified to the recapture of that village. The 36th and 56th Divisions were to continue the advance up the canal, and roll up the Hindenburg Support Line.
All through the night there had been much shell fire on the 56th Divisional front. Two counter-attacks had been successfully repulsed. Owing to darkness and the congested state of the trenches, the London Scottish were late in getting into their assembly positions, but as they were not to move until an hour and a half after zero (6.30 a.m.), which time was occupied by bombardment of the enemy positions, it did not matter.
“It was then found,” Colonel Jackson writes, “that the 169th Brigade had not reached Tadpole Lane, but the communication trench running from front to [Pg 188] support trench on the north-west side of Tadpole Copse, and that a fairly deep valley existed between this communication trench and the Inchy-Louverval road. The Germans could thus directly enfilade the front and support trenches with rifle and machine-gun fire from the other side of the valley, where they had built strong blocks and loopholes during the night. The battalion was thus held up at this point until 2.30 p.m. By this time “D” Company had, with the assistance of the Stokes Mortars (169th), been able to cross the valley, face the block on the other side, and cross the Inchy road, thus surrounding the enemy still holding the block in the front line opposite “B” Company. Ten officers, 69 other ranks, 6 machine guns, and 1 trench mortar—all of the 20th German Division.”
It would appear that the German counter-attacks during the night had gained some ground. The valley alluded104 to by Colonel Jackson is not shown clearly on the British maps and is only indicated by the very unsatisfactory sign of “banks.” An imaginative person might have traced the re-entrant starting in square 7 right up to these banks, but it was not always wise to be too imaginative with the British map; at any rate the shape of the ground seems to have been a surprise.
By 4.30 p.m. the battalion had reached its objective, Adelaide street, and was immediately strongly counter-attacked. The supply of bombs failed—it is extraordinary how many bombs can be thrown on such occasions—and the support line was lost as far as the Inchy road, but the front line was held. In this counter-attack the London Scottish were reinforced by two companies of the 4th London Regt. They were ordered to consolidate105.
The operations on the rest of the Corps front during [Pg 189] the day resulted in fierce fighting through Bourlon Wood, and the capture of Bourlon village by the 40th Division, and a tremendous struggle for Fontaine into which the 51st Division never really penetrated106. Repeated and heavy counter-attacks forced the 40th Division out of Bourlon village to the north edge of Bourlon Wood. The 36th Division had captured and again been forced out of M?uvres, and had not been able to make much progress on the east bank of the canal, a failure which caused the position of the 40th Division to become a somewhat isolated107 one. The gallant 51st Division, which had been used in such ruthless fashion, was relieved by the Guards Division and went back to Albert (Line F).
At 12.50 a.m. on the 24th the Corps issued orders for the ground gained to be held at all costs. The 40th Division were to consolidate their position and attack Bourlon village with the assistance of twelve Tanks at noon. The Guards Division were to consolidate the line taken over from the 51st, and the 36th and 56th Divisions to continue their clearing of the Hindenburg Line. But, as we have said, the order applying to the 56th Division was subsequently cancelled.
The 168th Brigade, which was now in the centre of the division, took over a stretch of the old British front line from the 167th on the left; the forward position of the 169th was still in the Hindenburg Line on the right. The main strength of the division was concentrated, of course, about the Hindenburg Line to the west of M?uvres, while in the old British line it was strung out and thin. But the division as a whole was strengthened on the 24th by the addition of one brigade of Royal Horse Artillery.
[Pg 190] At three o’clock in the afternoon the enemy again attacked under a very severe barrage, and the London Scottish lost their hold on the second line of the first German system, to the north of Tadpole Copse, but not without a strong fight. The enemy came down all communication trenches at once, while small parties of snipers advanced from shell-hole to shell-hole over the open. The attack was pressed so closely that the supply of bombs could not be maintained, and the London Scottish men had eventually to retire across the open. The front line, however, was still held to a point opposite Adelaide Street.
On the night of the 24th the division passed from the IV Corps to the VI Corps. But although the 56th Division passed from the IV Corps we must not lose sight of the doings of that corps, which continued to press towards the north, with the 56th Division on its flank. During the day many attacks and counter-attacks took place, and in the end the 40th Division retook the village of Bourlon.
By the morning of the 25th the London Scottish had been relieved by the Rangers108 (12th London), in view of an attack to regain109 the stretch of Hindenburg Line lost on the previous day.
The 4th London Regt. were in position on the right and the Rangers (12th) on the left. The 4th Londons, holding the bit of the Second Line north of Tadpole Copse, were to bomb straight ahead while the Rangers, who were in the First Line, would bomb up the communication trenches to the Second Line and join hands with the 4th Londons. The attack started at 1 p.m. and progressed very satisfactorily for a while; but the fighting was very hard and the men very tired. The 4th London at one time reached the [Pg 191] Inchy road, but their arrival there seems to have coincided with a particularly violent effort of the enemy which caused the Rangers to call for protective artillery fire; the artillery responded and the 4th London, being in the zone of fire, had to retire. The attack, which lasted until the evening, ended with a small gain, but left the Germans in possession of the banks about the valley north-west of the copse.
On the 25th the 40th Division was driven out of Bourlon village, but retained the ridge running through Bourlon Wood. They were relieved by the 62nd during the night. Three dismounted battalions of the 2nd Cavalry Division were placed at the disposal of the IV Corps, and did good work during the next three days in Bourlon Wood.
Bomb-fighting was carried on through the night about Tadpole Copse. We have casually110 mentioned that the men were tired, and on the 26th Gen. Dudgeon represented to the Corps that he considered his division was too extended. It had captured and was holding about one mile of the Hindenburg system, and, until M?uvres was captured, his right flank was in danger, while his left flank, on Tadpole Copse spur, was not only exposed but being constantly attacked. Two brigades were involved in the fighting about the Hindenburg system, and, in addition, were holding a flank 2,000 yards long connecting up to the old British front line. The remaining brigade was holding 5,500 yards of British line, and had also to supply one battalion each night to work in the captured position. There was therefore no divisional reserve, nor could any reliefs be arranged for the troops who had been fighting. The VI Corps placed one battalion of the 3rd Division (on the left) at the [Pg 192] disposal of the 167th Brigade, and this enabled the 8th Middlesex Regt. to be placed at the disposal of the 168th Brigade, which eased the situation in the Hindenburg system.
A heavy attack on the 27th was repulsed by the Rangers and the Kensingtons, and on the following two days there is nothing more to record than heavy shelling.
The 26th had been a quiet day for the IV Corps. Certain reliefs were carried out. The 36th Division was replaced by the 2nd Division; the 1st Cavalry Division, which had taken part in the fighting up to this time, was ordered to return to its own corps; and the 47th Division was ordered into the battle area east of the canal.
On the 27th, after a night of storm and snow, the Guards and 62nd Divisions attacked Fontaine and Bourlon villages. Though both divisions entered their objectives, the positions were not held. The resources of the Army were considered to be almost exhausted111 at this stage, which was probably the reason for using only three battalions of the Guards Division for this operation.
The 59th Division was placed at the disposal of the IV Corps and relieved the Guards on the next day, while the 47th Division relieved the weary 62nd. And the Tanks were completely withdrawn112.
The battle had therefore petered out, leaving a most unsatisfactory state of affairs about Bourlon Wood and village; the situation opposite Fontaine was also not good. It will have been noticed that, after the first rush, the fighting was done by the IV Corps against the northern side of the salient which had been created, and the III Corps held an extended [Pg 193] flank which, at the junction91 with the VII Corps on their right, was somewhat thin.
On the face of it it seems as though the mind of the Third Army Staff was concentrated on the doings of the IV Corps and the enemy opposite them. The Bourlon position had a mesmerising effect, and even though the III Corps was suddenly warned by the Army to expect an attack on the 29th, no very great preparation for such an event seems to have been made. The divisions did all they could. The 12th Division on the right of the Corps moved the two battalions in divisional reserve nearer the line, and organised all reinforcements and the 10 per cent. personnel, left out of the line, into a battalion about 850 strong. Other divisions issued a warning to troops in the line. The 55th, on the left of the VII Corps and next to the 12th, sent out a long order:
“Certain indications during the day point to the possibility of the enemy making an attack against our front. All troops will be warned to be specially113 on the alert in trenches and all posts. Special patrols will be sent out at 4 a.m. to watch for enemy movement. Artillery will open fire on the enemy front line, commencing at 5 a.m. The most likely places for concentration to be selected by brigadier-generals commanding infantry brigades in consultation114 with group commanders. In case of enemy attack all posts and trenches will be held to the last at all costs, and there will be no retirement115 from any line to another line. The action of troops available for counter-attack will be considered now. All machine guns will be warned to be specially on the look-out for S.O.S. signals. From 5 a.m. 29th inst., 1/4th North Lancs. will be ready to move at half-hour’s notice from receipt of orders. Remainder of 164th Brigade [Pg 194] will be ready to move at one hour’s notice from the same time.”
On the other hand, the Guards and 62nd Divisions had already started to move out of the salient.
Nothing happened on the 29th, but on the 30th the enemy launched a big attack on the III and IV Corps with the intention of pinching off the salient and capturing all the troops in the area.
The enemy broke through the III Corps, the weight of his attack being directed at the junction of the 55th and 12th Divisions. General H. B. Scott, commanding the 12th Division, says:
“I do not consider that the troops in the front system were in any way surprised. In fact, far from it, as on some portions there was a heavy bombardment and the Divisional Artillery had opened fire on S.O.S. lines at 6.30 a.m. Also on the evening of the 29th November warning had been sent to all infantry brigades and the C.R.A. that an attack was possible on the eastern flank.
In my opinion, the troops in the centre of the 12th Division were pushed back by the force of numbers. The question of the flanks being turned is another one for which I have no evidence to show what actually happened to bring about those situations. From all accounts the flanks of the division were turned before the troops vacated the Banteaux Spur and Lateau Wood. This is verified by those in the vicinity of those places.
The enemy had great facilities in assembling unknown to us in Banteaux, in the factory, and in the wood. Undoubtedly116 these were the places he used. The main attacks were, I consider, made along the Banteaux Ravine, keeping south of the Banteaux Spur; up the ravine from Banteaux to [Pg 195] R23c (in the direction of la Vacquerie) and from the factory and wood (in the valley north of Banteaux) towards the western edge of Bonavis Ridge.
I am confident that the enemy suffered heavy losses. Undoubtedly he attacked in force, and some must have been caught by the artillery and machine-gun barrage during the assembly and the initial stages of his advance. Besides this, there was much close fighting and many counter-attacks.”
The gallant 29th Division held on to Masnières like grim death, and the enemy never moved them an inch, but he advanced as far as Gouzeaucourt and was threatening Metz, through which lay the only good road to the IV Corps.
It is not quite clear whether this was the main German attack or not. About six divisions seem to have been used, but, judging by the length of the attack and its ferocity, the big effort is indicated on the other side, the northern side of the salient.
On the north side of the salient the divisions ran: the 59th, the 47th (London Territorials), the 2nd, and the 56th. On the 56th Divisional front the brigades holding the captured Hindenburg system were disposed as follows:
The Queen’s Westminster Rifles on the right and the 2nd London Regt. on the left of the 169th Brigade front in the Hindenburg Line, the London Rifle Brigade and Queen Victoria’s Rifles being in the old British line behind them.
The 168th Brigade, reinforced by one battalion, came next in the Hindenburg Line, with the 8th Middlesex (attached) on the right and the London Scottish on the left, and the 4th London Regt. holding the defensive flank back to the old British front line. [Pg 196] The Kensingtons were in support in the old British front line, and the Rangers were at Beugny.
The 167th Brigade had been relieved by the 3rd Division, and had marched back to Fremicourt.
At about 10 o’clock in the morning the 2nd Division, who were astride the canal holding the ground won by the 36th Division, reported a heavy concentration of the enemy on the east of Quarry117 Wood, between the wood and the canal, and just behind M?uvres, also a division entering M?uvres itself. But before this mass of troops was reported, the London Scottish, 8th Middlesex, and Queen’s Westminster Rifles had noticed unusual happenings in the enemy lines.
The enemy had started registration by aeroplane, which caused other observers than sentries118 to be on the watch. And then it was seen that the Germans were wearing steel helmets instead of the usual soft caps. The aerial activity increased, and soon heavy enemy fire was opened between M?uvres and Bourlon. The registration on the 56th Divisional front was followed by slow, steady bombardment, which increased, until about a quarter to ten a heavy barrage crashed down on the whole front. It was obvious that an attack was impending119, and the S.O.S. rockets were sent up.
The enemy barrage, which consisted of light howitzers, field guns, and trench mortars, was particularly heavy on the blocks in the captured communication trenches. Gradually the German guns lifted, and at 10.15 a.m. the enemy swarmed120 forward to the attack.
Illustration: The Battle of Cambrai
7. The Battle of Cambrai.
A glance at the map will show the precarious121 position, not only of the 56th Division and neighbouring [Pg 197] units, but of the whole of the Third Army troops engaged in the salient. South of the salient the Germans were through our lines, and if they broke through in the north an unparalleled disaster would be inflicted122 on the British Army. The Germans tried hard. During the day no less than five set attacks were launched, the heaviest with eleven lines of infantry advancing in succession to the assault. We wish to emphasise124 the position of the IV and III Corps and the general situation in the salient, for if the 56th Division failed to stand fast (and we know they could not be called fresh troops) the fate of the two Corps was sealed. On no portion of the front attacked could the Germans hope to gain a greater success than on the part held by the 56th Division.
The intricate nature of the Hindenburg Line, although it afforded the attackers cover for assembly close up to the troops of the 56th Division, had its disadvantages. Small bodies of defenders125 could inflict123 incalculable loss and, though surrounded, could break up the attack so that it only trickled126 through feebly; but, of course, they must be good men.
The 56th proved themselves once more to be good men. The German storming parties were most cleverly supported by their trench mortars and field artillery. A deluge127 of shells descended128 on the posts holding the blocks in the communication trenches, and the enemy infantry supplemented the bombardment with rifle grenades. The artillery lifted slowly, and as it moved so the infantry, assembled at the other side of the blocks, leapt out on the parapet and attempted to rush the defending post. At the same time other infantry advanced over the open from the main trenches.
[Pg 198] With such a short distance between opposing troops one might well suppose that this form of attack would succeed. It was sudden, it was confusing, inasmuch as Germans appeared everywhere. But the men of the 56th Division showed the most astonishing, the most praiseworthy calmness. The training of the division in the new organisation, with platoons composed of rifle, bombing, rifle grenadier, and Lewis-gun sections, combined with the coolness of the men now bore fruit. Volleys from the rifle grenadier sections shook the Germans as they emerged from their trenches; the riflemen picked off individuals who were getting too close; Lewis guns, sited to sweep enemy avenues of approach, sent streams of bullets into the mass of the enemy; and where the Germans succeeded in reaching the trenches they had to deal with the bombers.
In the tremendous battle that followed, the Stokes mortar batteries supported their comrades in exemplary fashion. The most striking individual work of all that was done by these batteries was that carried out by Corporal Macintosh, of the 168th Battery. This corporal had done extraordinarily129 good work on the 24th, but on this occasion he surpassed his previous record. Captain Crawford writes of his utter disregard for his personal safety, of his standing130 exposed, not only to the fire of artillery and trench mortars, but the more deadly sniper, calmly directing the fire of his gun where it was most urgently needed. And what of Private Woods?
“Private Woods had been forced to withdraw his gun from its original position, and in doing so he lost the stand. He took up a new position with [Pg 199] another gun, and carried on firing incessantly131; and later, when the stand of his gun was giving way through excessive firing, continued to use the primary ammunition on the enemy whilst holding the barrel of the gun between his legs.”
The Germans attacked with the greatest determination, and pressed forward with a multitude of men. Posts all along the front line were gradually surrounded, but the grim, steadfast132 fierceness of the men of the 56th Division was doing its work. The enemy losses were appalling133. The losses of the 56th Division were great, and where gaps occurred the enemy slipped through. They appeared in the front line (the support line of the Hindenburg front system), on the right, in the centre, on the left. Hard fighting had reached the second line of the Queen’s Westminsters and the 2nd Londons. Col. Pank, of the 8th Middlesex, was in his headquarter dug-out, situated134 in the support line (German front line), when he was told the enemy was in the front line; he ordered his runners, signallers, everybody to man the trench outside, and, leading the way himself, clambered out of one entrance to the dug-out while the Germans threw bombs down the other. Col. Pank slipped down the communication trench which ran to the old German outpost line, and gathering135 together the first men he could find of his support company, with a supply of bombs led them back to attack.
The London Scottish were on the extreme left, holding the old German front line through Tadpole Copse and across the Inchy road, and therefore a continuation of the 8th Middlesex second line. Col. Jackson was suddenly startled by finding the enemy in his line. But the fierce attack led [Pg 200] by Col. Pank shook the enemy, and though the London Scottish had their hands fairly full on their front and left flank, they dealt with the party in their trench. Col. Pank then cleared the whole of his section of the old German front line. This was the point of deepest penetration136 by the enemy, and was reached somewhere about one o’clock.
We must point out that dug-outs in this line were far from comfortable quarters. Their positions were naturally known to the Germans and they were continually bombarded with enormous trench mortars, said to be 12-inch. In the expressive137 language of the Cockney, they were “bumped” from morning to night. To get some idea of the effect of these engines on those in the dug-outs, we need only say that each explosion extinguished all the candles and left the occupants in darkness.
The Kensingtons had been sent up to Barbican, the sunken road in No Man’s Land, as reinforcements, but in view of the uncertainty of the position they were ordered to remain there.
One cannot hope to give a detailed138 account of attack and counter-attack in this mass of trenches. Every hour brought a new situation, now in our favour, now against us. The Queen’s Westminsters and the 2nd Londons had suffered severe casualties. Everywhere the line stood firm in the old German front line. Two companies of the London Rifle Brigade had reinforced the Queen’s Westminsters, and three companies of the Queen Victoria’s Rifles had gone to the 2nd Londons. Practically the whole of the 169th Brigade was engaged, and gradually they wore down the German attack.
The message “Am holding on—hard pressed” came [Pg 201] by pigeon and runner with distressing139 frequency. The Rangers were put under the orders of the 169th Brigade. The remaining battalions of the 167th Brigade and the 5th Cheshires were marching towards the battle. The S.O.S. was signalled by the London Scottish at 4 p.m. At 6 p.m. fierce bombing was still going on in all trenches forward.
The position was that the 169th and 168th Brigades held the old German front line with blocks in all the communication trenches running to the second line. The Queen’s Westminsters (in touch with the 2nd Division on the right), 2nd London, and 8th Middlesex, on whom the greatest weight of the attack had fallen, had lost the old German second line; the London Scottish, faced with the flank of the German attack, but nevertheless a hotly pressed attack, had lost no ground.
On this day the Divisional Artillery had fired on S.O.S. lines continuously from soon after ten in the morning until six at night. A number of fleeting140 targets and enemy batteries were also engaged with good results. The Germans attempted to press forward with their batteries; in fact, they believed they were going to break through, and the batteries could be seen galloping141 into action. On one occasion, about 1 p.m., a brigade of three German 77-mm. batteries raced into the open, and were engaged so swiftly by the 280th Brigade R.F.A. that only one battery was able to get off a round before being knocked out. As usual the 56th Divisional Artillery supported the gallantry of the infantry with equal gallantry and determination.
The German counter-battery fire had increased rapidly every day from the commencement of the [Pg 202] operations, gas being used chiefly at night. But at no time did it reach anything like the same intensity142 as was experienced on the Ypres front, or even on the Somme. Hostile aircraft were very active, flying low over the front line and battery positions during the latter part of the battle; and on two or three occasions they hindered batteries in the open by machine-gunning their crews when they were firing on S.O.S. lines.
On the right of the 56th Division, and on the west side of the canal, the 6th Brigade (2nd Division) stood firmly in line with the 56th. The attack on the east of the canal fell on the 99th Brigade of the 2nd Division and the 140th Brigade of the 47th Division, holding the crest143 of the ridge running from Bourlon Wood to the Bapaume-Cambrai road. The attack came on, time after time, only to be hurled back by the fire of the guns and the machine guns, and the fine fighting of the infantry. Full-strength attacks were delivered at 9.30 a.m., 11.25 a.m., and at 2.30 p.m., but the enemy gained nothing more than a few advanced posts, and an advance of about 300 yards near Bourlon Wood.
The situation in the morning had been a precarious one, indeed the greatest anxiety prevailed throughout the day. The Guards Division had stopped the German rush on the south side of the salient during the early afternoon, but if the 56th, 2nd, and 47th Divisions had not stood firm on the northern side, the Third Army would have suffered a heavy defeat. There were some frantic telegrams sent at times. At 10.30 a.m. the 2nd, 47th, 59th, and 62nd Artillery were ordered to be prepared to move their guns from the Graincourt Valley, and to have their teams up in [Pg 203] readiness, but these same guns did fearful execution. The 47th Division reported at 11.35 a.m.: “Waves attacking over crest F21 (Fontaine) held up by our barrage, which is very accurate. Our guns have broken up concentration on E16 (west of Bourlon Wood). Dense144 waves moving along crest E to W. Our guns apparently145 drawing them.”
But the relief felt by the General Staff found expression in a booklet entitled The Story of a Great Fight. (Being an account of the operations of the 47th, 2nd, and 56th Divisions in the neighbourhood of Bourlon Wood and M?uvres, on the 30th November, 1917.) We can only give extracts which concern us:
“The 56th Division had been in line prior to the British attack of the 20th November, in which its right brigade had taken part, and since that date had captured and held about a mile of the Hindenburg Line west of M?uvres, including Tadpole Copse. Almost constant fighting had taken place in this area since our attack, and the division, which at one time had been holding a front of 11,000 yards, had already been subjected to a very severe strain.... The story of the subsequent fighting on the Bourlon-M?uvres front is one so brimful of heroism146 that it deserves to take its place in English history for all time. The most determined attacks of four German divisions, with three other German divisions in support, were utterly147 crushed by the unconquerable resistance of the three British divisions in line. The 30th November, 1917, will be a proud day in the lives of all those splendid British soldiers who, by their single-hearted devotion to duty, prevented what would have become a serious situation had they given way.... At 9.20 a.m. the enemy had been seen advancing from the north towards the Canal du Nord, and subsequently attack [Pg 204] after attack was delivered by him on both sides of the canal against the 6th and 169th Infantry Brigades. South of M?uvres the enemy succeeded in gaining an entry, but was driven back by a bombing attack after heavy fighting.... From M?uvres westward94 to Tadpole Copse a desperate struggle was taking place for the possession of the Hindenburg Line, in the course of which the enemy at one time reached the Battalion Headquarters of the 8th Middlesex Regt., attached to the 168th Brigade, 56th Division. Here the German infantry were stopped by the gallant defence of the officer commanding the battalion, who, with the assistance of his headquarters staff, held off the enemy with bombs until further help was organised and the trench regained148. Though much reduced in strength by the fighting of the preceding days, and hard-pressed by superior forces, the troops of the 168th and 169th Brigades beat off all attacks. Queen’s Westminsters, London Scottish, and the men of the 1/2nd Bn. London Regt. and 1/8th Bn. Middlesex Regt. vied with one another in the valour of their resistance.... At the end of this day of high courage and glorious achievement, except for a few advanced positions, some of which were afterwards regained, our line had been maintained intact. The men who had come triumphantly149 through this mighty150 contest felt, and rightly felt, that they had won a great victory, in which the enemy had come against them in full strength and had been defeated with losses at which even the victors stood aghast.”
The survivors151 will at least agree that when General Headquarters took the trouble to print anything of this sort it had been well earned.
During the night of the 30th November reliefs took place. On the 169th Brigade front the London Rifle Brigade relieved the Queen’s Westminsters and [Pg 205] the 3rd London (attached) relieved the 2nd London. On the 168th Brigade front the Rangers relieved the London Scottish and the 1st London the 8th Middlesex. The Queen’s Westminsters and the 2nd London, being the most worn troops, were sent into the divisional reserve at Louverval, while the rest occupied the old British line. The reliefs were not complete until 5 a.m. on the 1st December.
At about 3.30 p.m. the enemy commenced a heavy bombardment of the trenches held in the Hindenburg Line and the S.O.S. went up. From movement noticed beforehand on the north-west of Tadpole Copse it seemed likely that he would attack again, but the attempt, if it was to be made, was crushed by the artillery.
On the night of the 1st December the 51st Division started to relieve the 56th, but, so as not to involve the 51st Division until the following night, the front line was not relieved before the night of the 2nd December.
Gen. Dudgeon makes some interesting remarks on the battle:
“Although up to Z day the r?le of the division was to attack with Tanks over the open, the fighting which developed was almost entirely trench fighting with bombs. No shortage of bombs occurred, but the men employed at the divisional dump (eleven men) worked day and night detonating, and at one time the Divisional Artillery Column echélon had to be drawn on.
It was found that pigeon messages were very slow, probably owing to the season of the year. Trench wireless152 sets were used with success from positions within 200 yards of the enemy, being erected only at [Pg 206] night and dismantled153 by day. The reliable method of communication was by runner from the captured trenches to our old line, viz. over about 2,300 yards of No Man’s Land, and a series of relay posts was arranged.
The 168th Brigade, with the help of, on an average, two companies 1/5th Cheshire Regt. and one battalion 167th Brigade (occasional help), dug a communication trench ... (about 1,500 yards). This trench, being rather in line with the Inchy road, was somewhat subject to shell fire. 169th Brigade also, with the help of one company of Pioneers and one Field Company, dug a trench ... (1,300 yards), which was less shelled. The Barbican and Houndsditch provided some shelter, but in most cases reinforcements and supplies had to go over the open in full view of M?uvres, from which it was impossible to obtain concealment154.”
During these operations the 56 machine guns in the division (two companies of 16 guns and two companies of 12 guns) were used as follows: With each infantry brigade, 8 guns; in Divisional Pool, 32 guns. The 32 guns of the pool were employed on the 20th inst. in barrage work outside the divisional area to cover the attack of the 36th and 62nd Divisions. They returned to divisional control on the night of the 20th November. On the 21st and subsequent days the headquarters of the Divisional Pool were in a central position in Beaumetz.... On subsequent days the guns in the pool were used for protection of the flank (a maximum of 10 guns were employed on this); protective barrage on the Hindenburg Line and on the Hindenburg Support; machine-gun defence behind the infantry.
We have mentioned the word “mystery” with [Pg 207] regard to the battle of Cambrai and the handling of the cavalry. Though they fought on foot with the best at Bourlon Wood and Villers Guislan, there seems to have been some hesitation155 on the first day of the battle. It is, however, debatable whether they could have done much. Of the other mysteries the success of the Germans on the southern side of the salient is one. Early in the proceedings156 General Sir O’D. Snow, commanding the VII Corps, is reported to have placed his fingers on a map at the point of Twenty-two Ravine, and said, “If I were a German, I should attack there”! No attempt was ever made to reinforce divisions before the German counter-attack, although the Army was aware that one was threatened. And this brings us to another mystery. Sir Douglas Haig repeats several times in his dispatch a suggestion that he had a very limited number of troops at his command. But we know that he had the offer of French troops. He closes his account of the fighting on the 30th November by recording—
“my obligation to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies for the prompt way in which he placed French troops within reach for employment in case of need at the unfettered discretion157 of the Third Army Commander. Part of the artillery of this force actually came into action, rendering158 valuable service; and though the remainder of the troops were not called upon, the knowledge that they were available should occasion arise was a great assistance.”
One naturally asks the question: “What would have happened if French troops had been used even as late as the 21st November?” If they were still too far away, there were undoubtedly British divisions [Pg 208] quite close up and quite fresh which could have been used to press the first great advantage gained, and the French would still have been in hand as a reserve.
Casualties from the 20th November to the 3rd December were 9 officers killed, 202 other ranks killed, 43 officers and 1,003 other ranks wounded, 17 officers and 352 other ranks missing.
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1
wholesale
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| n.批发；adv.以批发方式；vt.批发，成批出售 | |
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2
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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3
amalgamation
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| n.合并，重组；；汞齐化 | |
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4
bomber
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| n.轰炸机，投弹手，投掷炸弹者 | |
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5
repelling
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| v.击退( repel的现在分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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6
scout
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| n.童子军，侦察员；v.侦察，搜索 | |
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7
killing
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| n.巨额利润；突然赚大钱，发大财 | |
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8
laterally
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| ad.横向地；侧面地；旁边地 | |
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9
outwards
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| adj.外面的，公开的，向外的；adv.向外；n.外形 | |
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10
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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11
trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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12
penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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13
barrage
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| n.火力网，弹幕 | |
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14
mobility
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| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
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15
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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16
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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17
bombers
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| n.轰炸机( bomber的名词复数 )；投弹手；安非他明胶囊；大麻叶香烟 | |
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18
scouts
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| 侦察员[机，舰]( scout的名词复数 )； 童子军； 搜索； 童子军成员 | |
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19
organisation
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| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
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20
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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21
enveloping
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| v.包围，笼罩，包住( envelop的现在分词 ) | |
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22
reconstruction
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| n.重建，再现，复原 | |
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23
instructors
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| 指导者，教师( instructor的名词复数 ) | |
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24
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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25
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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26
mortar
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| n.灰浆，灰泥；迫击炮；v.把…用灰浆涂接合 | |
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27
gem
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| n.宝石，珠宝；受爱戴的人 [同]jewel | |
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28
ambushed
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| v.埋伏( ambush的过去式和过去分词 )；埋伏着 | |
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29
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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30
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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31
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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32
projectors
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| 电影放映机，幻灯机( projector的名词复数 ) | |
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33
celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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34
sector
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| n.部门，部分；防御地段，防区；扇形 | |
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35
costly
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| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
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36
inferno
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| n.火海；地狱般的场所 | |
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37
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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38
mustered
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| v.集合，召集，集结（尤指部队）( muster的过去式和过去分词 )；（自他人处）搜集某事物；聚集；激发 | |
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39
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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40
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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41
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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42
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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43
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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44
belle
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| n.靓女 | |
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45
organise
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| vt.组织，安排，筹办 | |
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46
divulge
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| v.泄漏(秘密等)；宣布，公布 | |
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47
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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48
registration
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| n.登记，注册，挂号 | |
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49
erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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50
camouflage
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| n./v.掩饰，伪装 | |
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51
barrages
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| n.弹幕射击( barrage的名词复数 )；火力网；猛烈炮火；河上的堰坝v.火力攻击（或阻击）( barrage的第三人称单数 )；以密集火力攻击（或阻击） | |
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52
precluded
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| v.阻止( preclude的过去式和过去分词 )；排除；妨碍；使…行不通 | |
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53
camouflaged
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| v.隐蔽( camouflage的过去式和过去分词 )；掩盖；伪装，掩饰 | |
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54
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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55
twigs
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| 细枝，嫩枝( twig的名词复数 ) | |
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56
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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57
demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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58
tadpole
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| n.[动]蝌蚪 | |
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59
dummy
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| n.假的东西；(哄婴儿的)橡皮奶头 | |
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60
mortars
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| n.迫击炮( mortar的名词复数 )；砂浆；房产；研钵 | |
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61
contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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62
fatigues
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| n.疲劳( fatigue的名词复数 )；杂役；厌倦；（士兵穿的）工作服 | |
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63
arduous
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| adj.艰苦的，费力的，陡峭的 | |
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64
crammed
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| adj.塞满的，挤满的；大口地吃；快速贪婪地吃v.把…塞满；填入；临时抱佛脚( cram的过去式) | |
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65
stringent
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| adj.严厉的；令人信服的；银根紧的 | |
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66
hurled
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| v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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67
frantic
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| adj.狂乱的，错乱的，激昂的 | |
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68
partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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69
ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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70
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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71
outskirts
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| n.郊外，郊区 | |
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72
hitch
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| v.免费搭(车旅行)；系住；急提；n.故障；急拉 | |
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73
divulged
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| v.吐露，泄露( divulge的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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74
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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75
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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76
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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77
allotted
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| 分配，拨给，摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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78
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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79
chapel
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| n.小教堂，殡仪馆 | |
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80
reverted
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| 恢复( revert的过去式和过去分词 )； 重提； 回到…上； 归还 | |
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81
congestion
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| n.阻塞，消化不良 | |
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82
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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83
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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84
stiffening
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| n. (使衣服等)变硬的材料, 硬化 动词stiffen的现在分词形式 | |
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85
grid
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| n.高压输电线路网；地图坐标方格；格栅 | |
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86
bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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87
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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88
crater
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| n.火山口，弹坑 | |
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89
craters
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| n.火山口( crater的名词复数 )；弹坑等 | |
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90
junctions
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| 联结点( junction的名词复数 )； 会合点； （公路或铁路的）交叉路口； （电缆等的）主结点 | |
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91
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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92
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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93
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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94
westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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95
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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96
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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97
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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98
repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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99
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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100
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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101
uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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102
persistent
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| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
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103
intersection
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| n.交集，十字路口，交叉点；[计算机] 交集 | |
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104
alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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105
consolidate
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| v.使加固，使加强；(把...)联为一体，合并 | |
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106
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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107
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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108
rangers
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| 护林者( ranger的名词复数 )； 突击队员 | |
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109
regain
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| vt.重新获得，收复，恢复 | |
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110
casually
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| adv.漠不关心地，无动于衷地，不负责任地 | |
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111
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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112
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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113
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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114
consultation
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| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
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115
retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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116
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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quarry
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| n.采石场；v.采石；费力地找 | |
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sentries
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| 哨兵，步兵( sentry的名词复数 ) | |
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impending
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| a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
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swarmed
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| 密集( swarm的过去式和过去分词 )； 云集； 成群地移动； 蜜蜂或其他飞行昆虫成群地飞来飞去 | |
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precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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emphasise
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| vt.加强...的语气，强调，着重 | |
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defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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126
trickled
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| v.滴( trickle的过去式和过去分词 )；淌；使)慢慢走；缓慢移动 | |
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127
deluge
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| n./vt.洪水，暴雨，使泛滥 | |
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descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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extraordinarily
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| adv.格外地；极端地 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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incessantly
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| ad.不停地 | |
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steadfast
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| adj.固定的，不变的，不动摇的；忠实的；坚贞不移的 | |
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appalling
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| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
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situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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penetration
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| n.穿透，穿人，渗透 | |
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expressive
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| adj.表现的，表达…的，富于表情的 | |
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detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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distressing
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| a.使人痛苦的 | |
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fleeting
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| adj.短暂的，飞逝的 | |
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galloping
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| adj. 飞驰的, 急性的 动词gallop的现在分词形式 | |
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intensity
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| n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度 | |
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crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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heroism
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| n.大无畏精神，英勇 | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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regained
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| 复得( regain的过去式和过去分词 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地 | |
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triumphantly
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| ad.得意洋洋地；得胜地；成功地 | |
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mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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survivors
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| 幸存者，残存者，生还者( survivor的名词复数 ) | |
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wireless
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| adj.无线的；n.无线电 | |
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dismantled
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| 拆开( dismantle的过去式和过去分词 )； 拆卸； 废除； 取消 | |
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concealment
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| n.隐藏, 掩盖，隐瞒 | |
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hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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