On the 2nd July a rearrangement of the front had placed the 56th Division in the VII Corps1, and they remained at Le Cauroy under the orders of that Corps until the 23rd July, when they moved to Eperlecques, near St. Omer, and came under the Fifth Army.
But the division lost Gen. Hull2. It was absolutely necessary that he should undergo a surgical3 operation, and the matter could not be postponed4 any longer, so he went back to England. He was looked upon as a friend as much as a commander, his striking personality had impressed itself on all ranks, and his tall figure was recognised from afar and welcomed whenever he visited the line or billets. The men saw in him a fearless commander who knew his business. We are indebted to Major Newnham for the following anecdote5:
“After the 1st July show (1916), the 169th Brigade held the trenches7 in front of Fouquevillers. The trenches, though on top of a hill, were dreadful. My diary records ‘all C.T.s thigh-deep in mud.’ Gen. Hull doubted our statement, so on Sunday, the 9th July, when he came to Brigade Headquarters, I showed him the state of things. We went up the main C.T., and gradually the slime rose, first ankle, then knee, then thigh-deep. At length, where the C.T. ran in a hollow, I said, ‘Now we get to a really [Pg 145] deep bit, sir!’ He said, ‘Well, I’m damned if I’m going through it—I’m getting out!’ And we went over the top, though in full view from a large part of the Boche positions, and walked back in the open, too!”
And the General was enthusiastic in praise of his division.
“We were a happy family,” he says. And “what pleased me as much as their fighting qualities was their good temper and cheerfulness under all circumstances,” and the circumstances were at times appallingly8 severe. He was himself always cheerful, though his pet dog, an Irish greyhound named Roy, has been described as “a miserable10 hound.” He encouraged his staff to play “bridge” whenever their work permitted, as a means of taking their minds off the war. All work and no play would have made even a G.S.O.1 a dull boy, and relaxation12 was not easy to find. He commanded the 4th Battalion13 Middlesex Regt. at Mons, and was given command of the 10th Brigade on the 17th November 1914. When he first entered the army in 1887, he joined the Royal Scots Fusiliers, and was transferred to the Middlesex Regt. in 1912. We are sorry to say that the “miserable hound,” Roy, who had been with the General since January 1916, cut a tendon and had to be destroyed in Belgium, although he survived the war.
Gen. Hull was not, however, lost to the division, as he returned later. Meanwhile Gen. W. Douglas Smith was given command.
Troops were being massed for the big offensive at Ypres, and the Fifth Army Staff, under Sir Hubert [Pg 146] Gough, had been moved to take command of the greater part of the salient. Sir Herbert Plumer was still there, but on the southern side, and with a reduced army.
* * * * * * *
In July 1917 England reached the summit of her military power in France. There were 52 divisions from the Motherland, 4 from Canada, 5 from Australia, 1 from New Zealand. One might, therefore, expect a year of great results. And so it was, though not perhaps obviously apparent.
Writing of the year as a whole, Sir Douglas Haig says:
“The general conditions of the struggle this year have been very different from those contemplated14 at the conference of the Allied15 Commanders held in November 1916. The great general and simultaneous offensive then agreed on did not materialise. Russia, though some of her leaders made a fine effort at one period, not only failed to give the help expected of her, but even failed to prevent the enemy from transferring some forty divisions from her front in exchange for tired ones used up in the Western theatre, or from replacing losses in his divisions on this side by drafts of fresh and well-trained men drawn16 from divisions in the East.
The combined French and British offensive in the spring was launched before Italy could be ready; and the splendid effort made by Italy at a later period was, unfortunately, followed by developments which resulted in a weakening of the Allied forces in this theatre before the conclusion of our offensive.
In these circumstances the task of the British and French armies has been a far heavier one throughout the year than was originally anticipated, and the [Pg 147] enemy’s means of meeting our attack have been far greater than either he or we could have expected.”
It was a year of disappointment, but was not a year without achievement. We had failed against the Turk at Gaza, but had succeeded at Baghdad; the French spring offensive had not succeeded, and our own could only be described as a steadying blow at the Germans; Kerensky came on the scene in Russia in May, and no doubt did his best, but discipline had gone, and the offensive of Brussiloff and Korniloff, though it succeeded at first, was well in hand, so far as the Central Powers were concerned, in July. The East was the weak spot in our calculations, with Russia going to ruin and dragging Rumania with her. It was as well that Britain was at the crest17 of the power wave.
After all, battles have a further object than the mere18 killing19 of men. For quite a long while after the commencement of the war the Germans talked boastfully of their “will.” The will to victory was going to crush the moral of their enemies. But although the Russian revolution caused great rejoicing, although the German High Command claimed a long list of victories, it seemed that German moral was somehow flagging, and their enemy’s will to victory was as determined20 as ever.
Ludendorff admits that in the summer of 1917 the position of the Central Powers was better than that of the Entente21, but that there were other causes for “our spiritual decline.” He says that Field-Marshal Hindenburg wrote to the Emperor on the 27th June that “our greatest anxiety at this moment, however, is the decline of the national spirit. It must be [Pg 148] revived or we shall lose the war.” There were speeches in the Reichstag containing the despairing cry that it was impossible to win the war. On the 7th July Hindenburg and Ludendorff met members of the Reichstag to discuss “our defensive23 attitude throughout the first half of 1917, the various failures near Arras, in the Wytsch?te salient, and in Galicia, where we had not as yet attacked, the absence up to date of any decisive result from the submarine war, and our serious situation as regards food and raw materials....” And finally, on the 25th July, General Ludendorff wrote that “it is certain that the Independent Social Democrats24 are carrying on an agitation26 in the army which is in the highest degree detrimental27 to discipline.”
And the allies of Germany were giving her a great deal of trouble.
One can only ask what created this frame of mind? Even a Social Democrat25 must have the ground prepared before his doctrines28 can germinate29 and flourish; it must be fertilised with dissatisfaction and watered with despair. The German and Austrian nations were as one in their desire for war in August 1914, and so strong that they had little difficulty in winning the Turkish and Bulgarian nations to their cause. Then surely we may answer the question by saying that it was the guns of the Allied artillery30 and the rifles of the Allied infantry31 that caused the “will” to falter32, even when the position seemed most favourable33 to the War Lord and his advisers34. It was a slow process, but a sure one.
One must admit disappointment to France and Britain, as the leaders of the countries allied against the Central Powers, but we cannot see the justice of [Pg 149] the German contention35 that their own position was good. In considering the events of this war, it is not easy to appreciate the mind of a man who says “the military situation was good, but the condition of the country behind the army was bad.” Country and army surely hang together. The Germans never looked upon war as a clash of armies alone, but sought by every means in their power, by oppression, by slavery, by terror, to bend the non-combatant population to their will. It is a logical view. This war, at least, was waged by country against country, by nation against nation, and as a nation Germany was cracking, and her allies with her.
This was the state of affairs when the Battles of Ypres, 1917, after an artillery preparation which had been growing in volume for a month, opened with a stupendous crash on the 31st July—an official date.
From the very first the Second and Fifth British Armies, and the First French Army on the left, met with the fiercest resistance. The left of the Fifth Army and the First French Army gained the greatest success—the right of the Fifth Army and the Second Army did little more than capture the enemy first line of defence. Whatever the condition of the German people, the German Army seemed as strong as ever. And yet it was being nursed.
The system with which the Germans started the war was not one based on consideration for lives. Verdun and the Somme had shaken the very foundations of that system, and, if the German Army was still strong and good, German Commanders had already expressed anxiety as to the future conduct of their troops. Loss of lives and loss of moral had been responsible for a new method of defence. The [Pg 150] front line was to be held by few men and many machine guns, and retirement36 before strong enemy fire was advocated. The position was to be regained37 by means of rapid counter-attack. Instead of holding a “line,” a zone was held. Defence in depth was the policy.
This loosened method of defence lessened38 the wastage of troops from artillery fire, and in addition the system of “pill-boxes” was instituted. These small reinforced concrete forts could withstand a direct hit of all but the heaviest shell, and were admirably adapted for the defence of a place like Flanders, where dugouts were almost an impossibility. In fact, the new German pamphlet, “The Defensive Battle,” was a distinct departure from the old “Cannon Fodder” point of view. If the Reichstag was openly saying that the war could not be won, the High Command of the Army was wondering if it would stand many more blows.
Men who fought at Ypres will say that they noticed no loss of moral in the enemy, and with this we agree; we only wish to insist that there were indications which had not escaped the eyes of the German Command. As to the hard, heart-breaking fighting of the Battles of Ypres, 1917, it is only just to the gallant39 French and British troops to point out once more the many advantages that lay with their enemies.
For over two years the Germans had held their semicircle round the east of Ypres. The positions they occupied, though only the summits of insignificant40-looking “rises,” not even worthy41 of the name of “hills,” overlooked the whole of the French and British assembly area. Not a move escaped their [Pg 151] observers, who knew every inch of the ground. What a place to prepare for an attack!
Books of reference will give the 31st July as the opening date of the 1917 Battles of Ypres. It is false. The 31st is the date of the assault—the battles started with the first indications of the British intention to attack. Every new trench6, every trace of new digging, every new track taped out, every building, every hamlet, every wood was bombarded by the enemy with guns and aeroplanes, which became extremely active at this period. As the concentration of troops increased, all attempts at concealment42 were abandoned, and camps were pitched in the open. The whole area was a “target,” and was well described by a gunner who remarked, “Every time a coconut43!” Observation, on the other hand, was denied to us.
All this, bad in itself, the troops were able to face. But the enemy had another advantage, being on the defensive, and that was the condition of the ground over which the attackers had to advance.
There is no place on the whole of the Western Front which can be compared to this stretch of Flanders. If an infantryman or an artilleryman attempted to give an adequate account of the conditions, and the horrors which they occasioned, he would not be believed. We will, therefore, give the words of the Higher Command, with the one criticism that they are not strong enough. Sir Douglas Haig wrote:
“The weather had been threatening throughout the day (31st July) and had rendered the work of the aeroplanes very difficult from the commencement of [Pg 152] the battle. During the afternoon, while the fighting was still in progress, rain fell, and fell steadily44 all night. Thereafter for four days the rain continued without cessation, and for several days after the weather remained stormy and unsettled. The lowlying clayey soil, torn by shells and sodden45 with rain, turned into a succession of vast muddy pools. The valleys of the choked and overflowing46 streams were speedily transformed into long stretches of bog47, impassable except by a few well-defined tracks, which became marks for the enemy’s artillery. To leave these tracks was to risk death by drowning, and in the course of the subsequent fighting, on several occasions, both men and pack animals were lost in this way.... As had been the case in the Arras battle, this unavoidable delay in the development of our offensive was of the greatest service to the enemy. Valuable time was lost, the troops opposed to us were able to recover from the disorganisation produced by our first attack, and the enemy was given the opportunity to bring up reinforcements.”
The enemy view of the conditions is given by Ludendorff:
“Enormous masses of ammunition48, such as the human mind had never imagined before the war, was hurled49 upon the bodies of men who passed a miserable existence scattered50 about in mud-filled shell-holes. The horror of the shell-hole area of Verdun was surpassed. It was no longer life at all. It was mere unspeakable suffering. And through this world of mud the attackers dragged themselves, slowly but steadily, and in dense51 masses. Caught in the advance zone by our hail of fire they often collapsed52, and the lonely man in the shell-hole breathed again. Then the mass came on again. Rifle and machine gun jammed with the mud. Man fought against man, [Pg 153] and only too often the mass was successful.... And yet it must be admitted that certain units no longer triumphed over the demoralising effects of the defensive battle as they had done formerly53.”
Illustration: INVERNESS COPSE AND GLENCORSE WOOD, AUGUST 1917
INVERNESS COPSE AND GLENCORSE WOOD, AUGUST 1917
Very naturally Ludendorff claims that statues in bronze should be erected54 to the German soldier for the suffering he experienced at Ypres. But his own picture of the attackers seems somehow to be worse than that of the defenders55, if there are degrees of suffering.
On the 31st July the assault of the Fifth Army met with complete success on the left, where the crossing of the Steenbeke was secured. But on the right the II Corps was only partially56 successful. After overrunning the first system of defence about Hooge and Sanctuary57 Wood, divisions were met with tremendous opposition58, and eventually checked at Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood.
On the 4th of August the 56th Division started to move from Eperlecques, and on the 6th Divisional Headquarters were at Reninghelst under the II Corps. Major-Gen. F. A. Dudgeon assumed command of the division on the 10th; and on the 12th the division took over the line from Surbiton Villas59 to Westhoek, facing Glencorse Wood and Nonne Bosschen. But before this date the Divisional Artillery was in action.
* * * * * * *
We cannot do better than quote from Brig.-Gen. Elkington’s most interesting diary:
“On the 2nd and 3rd of August the 56th Divisional Artillery relieved the 8th Divisional Artillery in the line, taking over their gun positions near Hooge. The artillery then experienced what I think was their [Pg 154] worst time during the war. All the battery positions were shelled day and night, more in the nature of harassing60 fire with occasional counter-battery shoots. The ground was so wet that digging was impossible, and the men lived in holes in the ground covered with corrugated61 iron. The early dawn was the only time it was safe to get supplies and ammunition if casualties were to be avoided, and with all precautions most batteries lost 100 per cent. of their gun line strength in killed and wounded. The artillery supported operations on the 10th, 12th, 16th, and 25th August, and answered S.O.S. calls on most days; also a very heavy day on the 24th of August, when the enemy counter-attacked in force. On the 16th and 17th the whole of the guns of D/280 were put out of action; enemy shell fire and exploding ammunition practically blew them to pieces, and except for the actual tubes of the three howitzers, nothing was found worth salving. On the 31st August the artillery came out of the line, and entrained south on the 1st September to rejoin the 56th Division, and all ranks hoped they had seen the last of the Ypres salient.”
We can only add to this that the selection of gun positions was a matter of finding a place where the guns would not disappear in the mud and which was not already occupied by another battery.
The battle of the 16th is the one which concerns us. On that day the Fifth Army attacked from the north-west corner of Inverness Copse to the junction62 with the First French Army south of St. Janshoek [the Battle of Langemarck, 1917]. The French always attacked on the left.
The II Corps, on the right, attacked with the 56th and 8th Divisions. The objective was the same as that of the 31st July, a line drawn to include some [Pg 155] 500 yards in depth of Polygon63 Wood, and so on to the north. But there is not much point in going over orders. Brig.-Gen. Freeth reports (with some bitterness it seems to us): “Orders were received and issued so hurriedly that it was impossible for brigade and battalion staffs to keep pace with them. There was not time for the scheme of operations to be thoroughly64 explained to regimental officers, much less to the men.” Indeed, the mass of documents is appalling9, and, taken together with the facts, point to confusion of a most distressing65 nature.
It must be understood that Gen. Dudgeon was in no better case than Brig.-Gen. Freeth. On the 11th August the division had been ordered to take over the line from the 18th Division and portions of the 25th Division. On that same day the General attended a conference at Corps Headquarters and learnt that the 53rd Brigade of the 18th Division would remain in the line and come under his orders for the battle. He was called upon to attack on a front of 1,500 yards on a depth of 1,700 yards, with a defensive flank of 1,700 yards extending from the south-eastern corner of Stirling Castle to Black Watch Corner. On the 12th the 169th Brigade was ordered to undertake a small operation with the object of improving the line about Glencorse Wood, an undertaking66 which the 18th Division had failed to carry out. But the 169th Brigade met with strong opposition and also failed. On the 14th the enemy attacked the 167th Brigade, on the left of the line, and drove in some posts; they were re-established. Later on that day, at a conference, the Brigadier-General commanding the 53rd Brigade represented that his brigade was not in a state to carry out the attack ordered owing to [Pg 156] heavy casualties. The General then placed the 4th London Regt. under the orders of the 53rd Brigade and the trouble commenced—the Commanding Officer was wounded on his way to interview the Brigadier. The second in command had then to go and reconnoitre on the following day, which left his battalion less than twenty-four hours in which to make the necessary reconnaissance and preparation to get into position.
On the 15th instant, as the result of a conference with the Corps Commander and the G.O.C. 8th Division, the starting line was altered.
Owing to the date fixed67 for the attack, an inter-battalion relief was necessary on the night 14/15th. In fact the ground was so bad that there were reliefs, or remains68 of reliefs, going on every night. It was not possible to undertake any patrolling to gain a knowledge of the ground, and in daylight the shelling was so constant and accurate that study of the country was most difficult.
The General writes:
“The darkness of the night, the boggy69 state of the ground, heavy shelling of all approaches, and the fact that the division was strange to the ground and had little opportunity for reconnaissance and preparation presented great difficulties in carrying out the assembly ... but the difficulties were surmounted70 and the troops assembled in time, though there is no doubt that the state of the ground caused much fatigue71.”
So by 4 a.m. the 53rd Brigade, with the 7th Bedford, 6th Berkshire, and 4th London Regts. in line, was on the right. In the centre was the 169th Brigade with the 5th and 2nd London Regts. in line. On the left [Pg 157] the 167th Brigade with the 8th Middlesex and 1st London Regts. in line.
At 4.45 a.m. on the 16th August the barrage72 opened and the assaulting troops clambered out of their mud holes. Red and green lights were fired from the enemy rear lines, but his barrage did not answer to these signals for some minutes. But the new enemy system of defence in depth and by means of concrete forts was to be met for the first time by the 56th Division. The barrage was good and, if anything, crept forward too slowly, but the concrete fort was immune from damage by shells from the lighter73 batteries, and the German machine-gunner was able to fire through our barrage.
The 7th Bedford Regt. was stopped at once by one of these forts on the north-west of Inverness Copse. The failure to capture this point reacted on the 4th London Regt., which suffered very heavy loss and was brought to a standstill to the north of the western side of the wood; they managed to work their way forward and form a defensive flank along the southern edge of Glencorse Wood.
* * * * * * *
The 169th Brigade progressed well at first. The London Rifle Brigade and the 2nd London Regt. disposed of isolated74 parties with machine guns dotted about in shell holes on their front, but soon bumped into a marsh22. The 2nd London Regt. edged to the right, pushing the London Rifle Brigade still farther away. And the same obstruction75 being met by the 167th Brigade, the 8th Middlesex edged to the left, to avoid the marsh, pushing the 1st London Regt. as they did so. There was then a big gap between the two Brigades very soon after the start.
[Pg 158] The enemy resistance was found by the 169th Brigade beyond the marsh in the centre of Glencorse Wood. Here, along a sunken road, was a line of concrete forts, or pill-boxes. Hard fighting and heavy casualties followed. The artillery was no longer helpful, but Glencorse Wood was finally cleared. The leading waves of the two battalions76 then went on and reached Polygon Wood, but what happened to them is not known. The second waves were checked at Polygon Wood by heavy fire from the front and the flanks, and before they could steady themselves were thrown back by a counter-attack which was only stopped by the Queen Victoria’s Rifles, who were coming up in support. Later in the day a second and heavier counter-attack from the east and south drove the whole of the brigade back to the original front line.
Illustration: The Battle of Langemarck 1917
5. The Battle of Langemarck 1917.
The 167th Brigade, on the left, made better progress than any of the others—for a time. The gap between the 169th and 167th Brigades was never filled, so that when the 8th Middlesex came across a second lake of mud, four feet deep, about the north end of Nonne Bosschen, their right flank was exposed. And on the left the 1st London Regt. had been heavily shelled before the start, so that when they did advance the rear waves pressed on the leading wave until all became mixed, and no one carried out the special task of clearing the ground as it was won; the position was that, although the main weight of the attack was carried forward to the left of the 8th Middlesex, many enemy snipers were behind both battalions of the 167th Brigade. There is also, on this flank, the mystery of a company that disappeared. Although it seems pretty clear that the waves bunched up [Pg 159] together, they must also have split; the third wave, composed of the larger part of a company, was reported by its company commander, in writing sent by runner, to be in a position north of Polygon Wood; and no doubt he got there, but neither he nor his men were heard of again. A thin wave of the 8th Division reached this same line, but were immediately driven back by a massed and carefully timed counter-attack.
But the attack of the 167th Brigade was completely held up. At 7 a.m. the 8th Middlesex saw the troops of the 169th Brigade falling back through Glencorse Wood; they then took up a position to their rear, their southern flank being refused so as to gain touch with the 169th Brigade. The situation remained unaltered through the afternoon.
About 3 p.m. the enemy was reported to be massing opposite the 25th Brigade on the left of the 56th Division, and shortly after to be attacking all along the 167th Brigade front. In view of the barrier of mud it is probable that he was only trying to reoccupy the ground from which he had retired78. But our artillery had direct observation and heavy fire was opened on him, and his troops dispersed79.
About 5 p.m. the 167th Brigade again retired to a more favourable position, which gave them a net gain of 400 yards beyond their original line. They were then in touch with the 25th Brigade, 8th Division.
All attacking battalions were withdrawn80 and the line was held by the Queen Victoria’s Rifles, the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, and the 7th Middlesex Regt. The division was relieved the following night by the 14th Division, and moved to Steenvoorde E., Ouderdom, Wippenhoek, the brigades being quartered in that numerical order.
[Pg 160] The total casualties from the 13th to the 17th August were 111 officers and 2,794 other ranks. The loss in senior officers was particularly heavy: Lieut.-Col. H. Campbell, Major V. A. Flower, Major J. E. L. Higgins, and Major M. R. Harris, all of the 13th London Regt. (Kensingtons); Lieut.-Col. R. R. Husey of the 5th London Regt.; Lieut.-Col. J. P. Kellett of the 2nd London Regt.; Lieut.-Col. P. L. Ingpen of the 8th Middlesex; and Lieut.-Col. F. W. D. Bendall of the 7th Middlesex Regt. were all wounded.
Maybe the confusion was inevitable81, but it makes a sorry story in which the great gallantry of the London Territorials82 stands forth83 like something clean and honest in the midst of slime and mud. Gen. Dudgeon gives us some of the causes of the failure to reach the desired objective.
“Insufficient84 time for preparation and explanation of the scheme of attack to those taking part, and insufficient time to study the terrain85.
The portion of the 25th Division relieved by the 167th Brigade had only been in the line twenty-four hours previously86, and could not assist much.
Lack of previous preparation. No dumps of any kind were taken over in the area, and there was insufficient time to form all those that were necessary.
Indifferent communications. Tracks east of Chateau87 Wood were non-existent, and the tapes were soon obliterated88 by the mud.
Difficulty of maintaining signal communication.
Fatigue of troops previous to the attack, owing to the bad weather.
The condition of the ground over which the attack took place. The bog at the source of the Hanebeck made a gap between the 169th and 167th Brigades, [Pg 161] which laid their left and right flanks respectively open to counter-attack. It also caused great fatigue to the troops.
The nature of the hostile defences and new system of defence in depth. The enemy’s counter-attacks were so timed as to strike the leading waves about the same time as they reached their objectives, when they were more or less disorganised, and had been unable to consolidate89 the ground gained.
The concentration of hostile guns opposite the front. The heavy shelling prevented the moving up of reinforcements, machine guns, and replenishment90 of ammunition.”
It seems very certain that the British Staff was somewhat rattled91 by the German tactics in defence. Questions—long lists of them—were sent out, and reports asked for. The pill-box, it was agreed, disorganised our assaulting waves, although it did not stop them. But there is a limit to the possible advance of troops in a rush, and this had been calculated by the enemy, who placed his main forces so as to counter-attack the exhausted92 leading waves of attackers before they had time to consolidate, or even mop up the ground behind them. How was this to be overcome?
All officers of the 56th Division seemed to agree on this question. The answer was, “Do not try to penetrate93 too deeply.” Five hundred yards was a distance which troops could cover without exhaustion94, and they would then be at such a distance from any troops assembled for counter-attack as would give them time to consolidate, bring up machine guns, and be ready for the counter-attack. Something of the sort was eventually done, so the experience of the 56th Division was of some service.
[Pg 162] The attack was not renewed on this sector95 of the front until the 20th September, when the Second Army (Sir Herbert Plumer’s command was extended to his left) captured Glencorse and the half of Polygon Wood.
The fighting in Flanders was carried on until November. The French launched a big attack at Verdun on the 20th August, which met with notable success. Ludendorff confesses to a feeling of despair. Concrete had failed him, and as to his troops, “At some points they no longer displayed the firmness which I, in common with the local commanders, had hoped for.” By limiting the depth of penetration96 and breaking up the German counter-attacks with artillery fire the British troops were slowly eating their way through the defences in Flanders, in spite of having to wade97 through mud. Many were the consultations98 at German Headquarters. “Our defensive tactics had to be developed further, somehow or other.” The wastage of troops had “exceeded all expectations.” Seven divisions were sent to Italy. A countering blow was the best defence.
Sir Douglas Haig hoped that the phenomenal wet summer would be followed by a normal autumn, and continued his attacks through October. But the wet still continued, and important engagements, with large numbers of troops and tremendous expenditure99 of ammunition, only resulted in a “nibble” at the enemy territory.
The German-Austrian attack on Italy started on the 24th October, and resulted in the Italian Armies being driven back almost to the outskirts100 of Venice. This misfortune had the immediate77 effect of reducing the British Army on the Western Front by several [Pg 163] divisions, which were sent under the command of Sir Herbert Plumer, and later of Lord Cavan, to help our Italian Allies; it also determined Sir Douglas Haig to continue his operations in Flanders. The fierce battle for Passchendaele, in which the proud divisions from Canada added to their immortal101 fame, was fought, and operations in Flanders reached their final stages about the middle of November.
For the effort expended102, the gain in territory was small, the number of prisoners was 24,065, the number of guns captured (74) was insignificant. But the balancing of results is a very delicate affair. During the three and a half months of the offensive the enemy had employed 78 divisions (18 of them had been engaged a second or third time after having rested and refitted). Deductions103 from such facts, however, are a weak basis for argument. Sir Douglas Haig wrote: “It is certain that the enemy’s losses considerably104 exceeded ours,” but, apart from considerations of expediency105, it is not clear how he arrived at this startling conclusion.
To compare the number of prisoners we captured with the number of bayonets which the Germans could transfer from the Russian front is absurd. What then have we left to show as a result for this costly106 enterprise? Only damage to that highly important but very elusive107 thing which we call “enemy moral.” The enemy charges us, perhaps with some truth, with being clumsy soldiers with no imagination, but he speaks with respect of the determination of the British infantry, in a manner which suggests a growing conviction that they could never be defeated.
* * * * * * *
An interesting figure was compiled by the II Corps [Pg 164] giving the amount of ammunition fired by the artillery of that corps from the 23rd June to 31st August—2,766,824 rounds with a total weight of 85,396 tons, delivered by 230 trains of 37 trucks and one of 29 trucks.
The battles of Ypres, 1917, are as follows: Battle of Pilckem Ridge11, 31st July-2nd August; Battle of Langemarck, 16th-18th August; Battle of the Menin Road Ridge, 20th-25th September; Battle of Polygon Wood, 26th September-3rd October; Battle of Broodseinde, 4th October; Battle of Poelcappelle, 9th October; First Battle of Passchendaele, 12th October; Second Battle of Passchendaele, 26th October-10th November.
Illustration: Title or description
BATTERY POSITION, ZOUAVE WOOD, HOOGE, AUGUST 1917
From a photograph taken by Lt. Wallis Muirhead, R.F.A.
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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hull
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| n.船身；(果、实等的)外壳；vt.去(谷物等)壳 | |
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surgical
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| adj.外科的，外科医生的，手术上的 | |
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postponed
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| vt.& vi.延期，缓办，（使）延迟vt.把…放在次要地位；[语]把…放在后面（或句尾）vi.（疟疾等）延缓发作（或复发） | |
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anecdote
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| n.轶事，趣闻，短故事 | |
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trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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appallingly
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| 毛骨悚然地 | |
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appalling
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| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
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miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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relaxation
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| n.松弛，放松；休息；消遣；娱乐 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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18
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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19
killing
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| n.巨额利润；突然赚大钱，发大财 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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21
entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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marsh
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| n.沼泽，湿地 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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democrats
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| n.民主主义者，民主人士( democrat的名词复数 ) | |
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democrat
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| n.民主主义者，民主人士；民主党党员 | |
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agitation
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| n.搅动；搅拌；鼓动，煽动 | |
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detrimental
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| adj.损害的，造成伤害的 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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29
germinate
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| v.发芽；发生；发展 | |
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30
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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31
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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falter
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| vi.(嗓音)颤抖，结巴地说；犹豫；蹒跚 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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advisers
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| 顾问，劝告者( adviser的名词复数 )； （指导大学新生学科问题等的）指导教授 | |
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contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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regained
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| 复得( regain的过去式和过去分词 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地 | |
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38
lessened
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| 减少的，减弱的 | |
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gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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41
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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concealment
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| n.隐藏, 掩盖，隐瞒 | |
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43
coconut
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| n.椰子 | |
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steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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sodden
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| adj.浑身湿透的；v.使浸透；使呆头呆脑 | |
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overflowing
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| n. 溢出物,溢流 adj. 充沛的，充满的 动词overflow的现在分词形式 | |
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47
bog
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| n.沼泽；室...陷入泥淖 | |
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48
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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49
hurled
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| v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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52
collapsed
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| adj.倒塌的 | |
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53
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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54
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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57
sanctuary
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| n.圣所，圣堂，寺庙；禁猎区，保护区 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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villas
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| 别墅，公馆( villa的名词复数 )； （城郊）住宅 | |
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harassing
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| v.侵扰，骚扰( harass的现在分词 )；不断攻击（敌人） | |
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corrugated
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| adj.波纹的；缩成皱纹的；波纹面的；波纹状的v.（使某物）起皱褶(corrugate的过去式和过去分词) | |
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junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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polygon
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| n.多边形；多角形 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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distressing
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| a.使人痛苦的 | |
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66
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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67
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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68
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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boggy
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| adj.沼泽多的 | |
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70
surmounted
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| 战胜( surmount的过去式和过去分词 )； 克服（困难）； 居于…之上； 在…顶上 | |
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71
fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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72
barrage
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| n.火力网，弹幕 | |
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73
lighter
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| n.打火机，点火器；驳船；v.用驳船运送；light的比较级 | |
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74
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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75
obstruction
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| n.阻塞，堵塞；障碍物 | |
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76
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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80
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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81
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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82
territorials
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| n.（常大写）地方自卫队士兵( territorial的名词复数 ) | |
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83
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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84
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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85
terrain
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| n.地面，地形，地图 | |
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86
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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87
chateau
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| n.城堡，别墅 | |
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88
obliterated
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| v.除去( obliterate的过去式和过去分词 )；涂去；擦掉；彻底破坏或毁灭 | |
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89
consolidate
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| v.使加固，使加强；(把...)联为一体，合并 | |
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90
replenishment
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| n.补充(货物) | |
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91
rattled
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| 慌乱的，恼火的 | |
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92
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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93
penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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94
exhaustion
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| n.耗尽枯竭，疲惫，筋疲力尽，竭尽，详尽无遗的论述 | |
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95
sector
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| n.部门，部分；防御地段，防区；扇形 | |
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96
penetration
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| n.穿透，穿人，渗透 | |
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97
wade
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| v.跋涉，涉水；n.跋涉 | |
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98
consultations
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| n.磋商（会议）( consultation的名词复数 )；商讨会；协商会；查找 | |
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99
expenditure
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| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
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100
outskirts
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| n.郊外，郊区 | |
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101
immortal
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| adj.不朽的；永生的，不死的；神的 | |
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102
expended
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| v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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103
deductions
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| 扣除( deduction的名词复数 )； 结论； 扣除的量； 推演 | |
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104
considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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105
expediency
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| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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106
costly
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| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
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107
elusive
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| adj.难以表达(捉摸)的；令人困惑的；逃避的 | |
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