THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE SCARPE, 1917—THE THIRD BATTLE OF THE SCARPE—MINOR1 ACTIONS
The Germans had commenced their retreat, and we know that the British Higher Command had planned large movements. On the 14th March the 169th Brigade took over the front line between Achicourt and Agny, to the south of Arras, with the 30th Division on the right and the 14th Division on the left. Two days after a number of fires were seen in the enemy lines to the south. The Hun was moving, but patrols found him very alert on their immediate2 front.
Brig.-Gen. Coke, 169th Brigade, went round his line on the 15th March, and the diary notes that “trenches4 in a shocking condition, full of mud and dirt”! It was a normal condition for trenches, and one might well be excused for wondering if the Italians or the forces in Salonica fared any better in this respect. Did they find mud on the top of a real mountain? Maybe their position was always in the valley, in the centre of a stream!
As usual, patrols were out on the night of the 17th (the patrolling of the 56th Division is worthy5 of great praise) and noticed nothing in particular. But some scouts6 of the 2nd London Regt., lying close to the enemy wire as dawn was breaking on the 18th, came to the conclusion that the enemy line was not normal. [Pg 115] They investigated and found it empty. This was promptly7 reported to the company commander, who sent out strong fighting patrols and occupied the front line.
Officers in the line acted with the greatest promptitude. Brigades on either side were quick to follow the example of the 2nd London Regt., and all Headquarters were buzzing with excitement, although the situation, in view of what was happening farther south, was not unexpected.
By midday the 2nd London Regt. had occupied Beaurains. The whole Corps8 was ordered to advance; the German second line was occupied, and on the left the 14th Division were in the third line. The Corps order for the advance, however, was cautious. It pointed9 out the probability of the enemy withdrawing to a main line of defence, Telegraph Hill, and the east half of Neuville Vitasse. The 169th Brigade were to keep touch with the enemy, but Brig.-Gen. Coke must avoid becoming involved in a serious engagement at present.
By the early morning of the 19th March patrols had established the fact that the enemy were indeed holding Neuville Vitasse, and on the left he was found at Tilloy, the Harp10, Telegraph Hill, and Nice Trench3. Troops remained in front of Neuville Vitasse and constructed advance trenches.
We have pointed out the salient, between the Ancre and the Scarpe, which was the result of the battles of the Somme; and we have mentioned the actions that had been fought on the right of this salient in preparation to a bigger operation. It was the intention of Sir Douglas Haig to attack the salient from both sides—the Fifth Army in the south operating [Pg 116] on the Ancre Front, and the Third Army about Arras. The plan included the pinching off of the whole area, and on the north of the Scarpe the capture of the Vimy Ridge11. This latter operation was the task of the First Army.
So far as the Fifth Army was concerned, the German retreat had avoided a battle, but on the Third Army front their retirement12 must be limited, as the enemy had no intention of giving up the Vimy Ridge on our First Army front. Indeed, there was no retirement on the left of the VII Corps, just south of Arras, which was the flank of the Hindenburg Line.
But adjustments and new orders were necessary to meet the situation. It was most desirable to attract as many enemy troops to our front before the French offensive was launched in the south, and so the Fifth Army was ordered to follow the enemy closely to the Hindenburg Line, where it would exert the greatest pressure, and the Third and First Armies would, with slight modifications13 of detail, carry out the original attack as planned on their front.
The VII Corps was the most affected14. The objectives of the Third Army had been Mercatel, Hill 90, the German third-line system from Feuchy Chapel15, and the high ground about Monchy. The effect of the enemy withdrawals16 on the VII Corps front was
“to change our task from an attack in a south-easterly direction from prepared positions, to an attack in an easterly and north-easterly direction from improvised17 positions. But the objects of the attack remain the same; that is, to break through the enemy’s defensive18 line on the right of the Third Army front, to overrun all his defences as far as the Green Line (the far side of the Cojeul River), and to clear and hold [Pg 117] the southern side of the gap which the VI Corps, advancing simultaneously19 with us, will have made.”
The VII Corps front was held by the 21st, 30th, 56th, and 14th Divisions in line, with the 50th in reserve. On the right the 21st Division had a very small r?le allotted20 to it. The first attack was to be delivered by the 56th and 14th Divisions with the VI Corps on their left (no German retreat had taken place here), and gradually the 30th and then the 21st Divisions would take part in the advance.
The first phase of the planned attack gave to the 56th Division the task of capturing Neuville Vitasse (the 30th would conform on the right, but even so would not approach the enemy main line), and to the 14th Division the piercing of the extreme left of the Hindenburg Line and part of the Harp; the 3rd Division, VI Corps, on the left would capture Tilloy.
The second phase placed the right of the 30th Division on the south of the Cojeul River and in possession of St. Martin-sur-Cojeul, and the left through the Hindenburg (Cojeul Switch) Line, while the 56th and 14th would be in front of Wancourt.
The 56th and 14th Divisions were not to go beyond Nepal Trench, as the 30th Division, pushing up from the south-west, would cross their front and, passing entirely21 to the south bank of the Cojeul, would join hands with the troops of the VI Corps east of Guemappe. The 21st Division would contribute to the flank thus formed with its right standing22 fast on Croisilles.
After this Green Line, as it was called, there was the usual hopeful reference to a distant objective, Cambrai, and some talk of cavalry23, no doubt a necessary [Pg 118] provision, but one which, nevertheless, was greeted with hilarity24. One thing, however, seems very certain: the German retreat caused very little inconvenience to the Third Army, and none at all to the First.
Preparations for the attack on the Third Army front were carried on swiftly. The enemy made no further move, but to the south, where he had many miles to go before reaching the Hindenburg Line, he was still being closely pursued by the Fifth Army. By the 2nd April the general line was Sélency, Jeancourt, Epéhy, Royaulcourt, Doignies, Mercatel, Beaurains. Between Sélency and Doignies the enemy still held positions in advance of the Hindenburg Line, and minor engagements were continually taking place on this section of the front.
On the night of the 1st April the 167th and 168th Brigades relieved the 169th Brigade in the front line. The bombardment of the enemy positions commenced on the 4th, and was carried on for five days. Meanwhile troops could study the country they were to attack.
While the 169th Brigade had been in the line, training had been carried on extensively by the other two brigades. Some of the instructions and arrangements are worthy of note. For the men, open fighting was the main practice. Regimental officers were told that
“it must be realised that the maintenance of forward movement depends on the determination and power of direction of sections, platoons, companies, and battalions26. The habit of digging a trench and getting into it, or of waiting for scientifically-arranged artillery28 barrages29 before advancing, must be discarded. [Pg 119] A slow advance will give time for the German reinforcements to arrive—the greater the rapidity of an advance the more is resistance likely to lessen31. A few sticky company commanders may not only delay the whole operation but, by giving the enemy time to reinforce, will also cause unnecessary casualties.”
We quote this for comparison with other instructions given at a later date. There is nothing new in it, and nothing to criticise32 in it, but man is a lover of precedent33, and trench warfare34, and failure to get through to open fighting, was the precedent established for him.
Very interesting instructions were issued on the subject of signals between infantry35 and artillery. One of the most curious facts of the war was the general lack of communication between attacking infantry and artillery. True, the infantryman in the front line is not always in the best position to direct artillery fire, but, on the other hand, he is frequently the only man who knows anything at all. We learned, to our cost, the excellence37 of the German control of artillery fire, and though our artillery observation officers performed the most gallant38 feats39, our method never seemed as good as that of the enemy. The instructions issued were in imitation of the German method. Coloured lights were to be fired from any sort of pistol. Green lights were to mean “open fire,” and white lights “increase the range.” These were the only signals to be employed, either by the Forward Observation Officer or by the infantry. The plan does not appear to have answered very well.
There were also definite instructions as to the strength of battalions and the number of officers, [Pg 120] non-commissioned officers, and men to be left out of the fight. We must deal with that in another place, merely noting here that platoons were now made up of one rifle section, one Lewis-gun section, one bombing section, and one rifle grenade section, and that a Divisional Depot41 Battalion27 was formed at Bouquemaison, where all details left out of the battle were sent. The Depot Battalion ensured a number of trained reinforcements being available.
We have left the 167th and 168th Brigades looking at Neuville Vitasse. The way to that heap of ruins seemed clear, with the exception of a strong point, Neuville Mill, situated42 on the right and in a position to enfilade the attacking troops. On the 7th the 1st London Regt. attempted to capture the place, but found it well defended with machine guns, and failed. It was decided43 to deal with it by means of Tanks.
The attack launched by the Third and First Armies on the morning of the 9th April was on a front of fifteen miles, from Croisilles to the northern foot of the Vimy Ridge. It included between four and five miles of the Hindenburg Line.
The 56th Division attacked with the 167th Brigade on the right, having the 3rd London Regt. and 8th Middlesex Regt. in line, with the 1st London Regt. in support and the 7th Middlesex in reserve; the 168th Brigade was on the left, with the 13th and 12th London Regts. in line, the 14th in support, and the 4th in reserve. The Edinburgh Field Coy. R.E. (less two sections) were with the right brigade, and the 513th Field Coy. R.E. (less two sections), one company of the 5th Cheshires, and two sections of the 193rd Divisional M.G. Coy. with the left [Pg 121] brigade. As the whole success of the operation depended on the 14th Division, the left brigade had to be prepared to make a defensive flank—hence the machine guns and pioneers.
The method of attack was what was sometimes called leap-frog. The two battalions in line on each brigade front were to capture Pine Lane and Neuville Vitasse, and then the supporting battalion would “go through” them and capture the second defence, which was the Hindenburg, or Cojeul Switch. In the case of the 167th Brigade, the reserve battalion, the 7th Middlesex, were to carry on the game of leap-frog and capture Nepal Trench.
The weather up to this point had been fine, but on the morning of the 9th dark clouds rolled up, bringing heavy showers. The attack was started by the Corps on the left. The 56th Division moved to the assault at 7.45 a.m.
The first phase of the attack was the capture of Neuville Vitasse. The 3rd London Regt., on the right, progressed well—two Tanks worked on this battalion front and dealt with the strong point, Neuville Mill—and at 10 a.m. had reached their first objective—that is to say, they were in a position short of the Hindenburg Line. The 8th Middlesex Regt. were delayed at first by uncut wire, but soon entered the ruined village. Just before reaching the site of the church they found themselves confronted by a “pocket” of determined44 Germans with several machine guns. Working round the flanks of this “pocket,” bombers45 and riflemen succeeded in enveloping46 the enemy, so that just before eleven o’clock sixty-eight survivors47 surrendered with four machine guns. The battalion then cleared the rest [Pg 122] of Neuville Vitasse and were in touch with the 3rd London Regt.
The Kensingtons swept through the enemy front line with little opposition48, and soon reached Moss49 Trench. Their reserve company, seeing that all was well, moved south into the village and rendered some assistance to the 8th Middlesex.
On the extreme left of the divisional line the 12th London Regt., after going through the first line, met some uncut wire which delayed them, but soon after ten o’clock they were in touch with the Kensingtons in Moss Trench, although their left was thrown back owing to the right of the 14th Division being held up by uncut wire.
Of the two Tanks on the 168th Brigade front, which were supposed to work round the north of the village, only one ever started, and very soon that one was on fire.
Meanwhile the artillery, the 281st, 293rd, and “C” Battery of the 232nd Brigades, had moved across the old German line and taken positions, about a thousand yards west of Neuville Vitasse, by ten o’clock. (It will be noticed that the artillery was “grouped” again.)
Everything was therefore ready for the assault on the northern extremity50 of the Hindenburg Line, and an advance to Nepal Trench. This, as we have said, was to be done by the 14th and 1st London Regts., who were the supporting battalions to each brigade.
The general plan at this point was that the 14th and 56th Divisions should attack simultaneously, and the 30th Division, on the right, was to follow in echelon51. Not until the 7th Middlesex Regt.—which was in reserve to the 167th Brigade, and was detailed52 [Pg 123] to attack and capture Nepal Trench after the Hindenburg Line had been made secure—had passed Neuville Vitasse was the 30th Division to move. As the fighting on this right flank of the 56th Division was the most severe, we will deal first with the left flank.
The attack started at 12.10 p.m., and the London Scottish, passing through the Kensingtons and 12th London Regt., were soon engaged in some lively fighting which lasted about two hours. They killed a number of the enemy, captured 100 of them and one machine gun, and overran the mass of trenches by 1,000 yards. On their left they were in touch with the 14th Division, but their right was in the air. As the 167th Brigade had not progressed so well, the London Scottish position was not too good.
On the right of the 56th Division the situation was obscure. The 30th Division—timed to advance after the 167th Brigade—had failed, and this failure enabled the enemy in Egg and the adjacent trenches to give their undivided attention to the flank of the 56th Division. The attack was held up.
Gen. Hull53 had foreseen strong opposition in this direction, and had given Brig.-Gen. Freeth the 4th London Regt., the reserve battalion of the 168th Brigade, and the Queen Victoria’s Rifles from the 169th Brigade. So when it was seen that the 1st London Regt. had failed to make progress, the 7th Middlesex and 4th London Regts. were launched. Some progress was made, but casualties were heavy, and the position remained uncertain and enveloped54 in a fog of rumour55.
In order to give more stability to the line, Brig.-Gen. Loch, 168th Brigade, ordered the Kensingtons forward into that part of the Hindenburg Line which [Pg 124] the London Scottish had captured, and the latter battalion to withdraw from their forward position and reorganise.
The situation at 6 p.m. is shown (A) on map.
But the 14th Division, on the left, ordered an assault of the Wancourt Line at 6.45 p.m., which attack, owing no doubt to the situation on the 56th and 30th Divisional fronts, failed.
Soon after ten o’clock that night (9th April) the Corps ordered the assault of the Wancourt Line to take place at eight the following morning, but Gen. Hull pointed out that fighting was still going on, that the situation would not be clear until daylight, and that his division would not be able to attack at that hour. The order was, therefore, amended56 so that the attack should take place when the situation on the 56th and 14th Divisional fronts was clear.
In the darkness of the night the 167th Brigade troops bombed the Germans out of all of the Hindenburg Line on their front, but they were still giving much trouble from the 30th Division area. The London Scottish were now able to advance again on the left and get in touch with the 14th Division about 15.
The position did not seem too favourable57 unless something was done on the right, but at 10.45 a.m. the Corps issued a more ambitious order: that the attack was to be carried on to the east of Guemappe.
At midday the attack was launched, but now the whole direction was altered. The left of the line, advancing on Wancourt, was held up, and the right, in order to get elbow room, was forced to clear the Hindenburg Line on the 30th Division front. In this maze58 of trenches the 167th Brigade made steady progress towards the junction59 of the Hindenburg and [Pg 125] Wancourt Lines. This was good work, and the Corps ordered the occupation of Hill 90, on the far side of the Wancourt Line. Gen. Hull, however, informed the Corps that it could not be done that night.
On the left the position was as uncertain as it had been the previous day on the right. The 14th Division claimed to be in the Wancourt Line, and eventually it was found that they had swerved60 to their left and created a large gap between their right and the left of the London Scottish, who were lying out in the open.
So the situation (B) remained through the night. The next day, the 11th, nothing was done on the left of the line, but the 167th Brigade carried on their good work and the Queen Victoria’s Rifles cleared the Hindenburg Line as far as the Cojeul River, and a long length of Nepal Trench, which was part of the Wancourt Line. The difficulty of the 30th Division was apparently61 uncut wire. They seemed to be stuck facing the Hindenburg Line, while the Queen Victoria’s Rifles cleared it. A Corps telegram to this division reads:
“Not satisfied that the infantry are receiving sufficient support from the artillery. The situation demands that as many batteries as possible be pushed forward so that enemy machine guns be dealt with at decisive range.”
The 167th were relieved by the 169th Brigade late in the afternoon, after three days of very severe and successful fighting.
The 169th Brigade were ordered to consolidate62 Hill 90 and to push patrols into Heninel, and later, [Pg 126] when the 30th Division had occupied the Hindenburg Line, to cross the River Cojeul and make good the high ground to the south.
The attack ordered started at 5.15 a.m. on the 12th, and after stiff bombing fights, the 2nd and 5th London Regts., working to the north and south of Hill 90, joined hands on the other side of it. It was found necessary, during this operation, to have a password, so that converging63 parties should not bomb each other. To the great amusement of the men the words “Rum jar” were chosen. The Germans, being bombed from both sides, must have thought it an odd slogan. The enemy were then seen withdrawing from Heninel, and the leading company of the 2nd London Regt. immediately advanced and occupied the village. The 30th Division then crossed to the south of the Cojeul River, and made progress along the Hindenburg Line. Meanwhile the 2nd London Regt. had pushed forward patrols and occupied the high ground to the east of Heninel, where they got in touch with the 30th Division.
The occupation of Hill 90, which had been made possible by the 167th Brigade and the Queen Victoria’s Rifles (attached), also caused the enemy to vacate the village of Wancourt, which was entered by patrols of the London Rifle Brigade about eleven o’clock. The 14th Division moved two battalions, one on either side of the village, with a view to continuing the advance to the high ground east of the Cojeul River, and at 1 p.m. the Corps ordered the advance to be continued to the Sensée River; but these orders were modified and the 56th Division was told to consolidate (C) and prepare for an advance on the 13th.
On the 13th April nothing much was done. The [Pg 127] 56th Division held the ridge from 35 to Wancourt Tower; on the right the 33rd Division, which had relieved the 30th, failed to advance; on the left the 50th Division, which had relieved the 14th on the preceding night, also failed to advance, having been held up by machine-gun fire from Guemappe. But the Corps ordered a general advance on the next day, the objective being the line of the Sensée River.
During the night the enemy blew up Wancourt Tower, which seemed to suggest that he was contemplating64 retirement. At 5.30 a.m. our attack was launched, but almost at once the 169th Brigade reported that the Queen’s Westminster Rifles had gone forward with no one on their left. About five hundred yards in front of them were some practice trenches which the enemy had used for bombing. Capt. Newnham writes of the attack dissolving about the line of these trenches. Apparently Guemappe had not been taken on the left, and a perfect hail of machine-gun fire enfiladed the advancing troops from this village. The Queen Victoria’s Rifles, who attacked on the right, met with no better fate, the leading waves being wiped out. From the diary of 169th Brigade we learn that
“the 151st Brigade attack on our left never developed, leaving our flank exposed. Enemy met with in considerable strength; they had just brought up fresh troops, and the allotment of machine guns, according to prisoners, was two per battalion. The 151st Brigade attack was ordered with their left flank on Wancourt Tower, which was our left and the dividing-line between brigades. Great confusion consequently on our left front, where two battalions of Durhams were mixed up with the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, [Pg 128] and the London Rifle Brigade, moving up in support, added to the congestion65. Casualties were heavy—Queen’s Westminster Rifles, 12 officers, 300 other ranks; Queen Victoria’s Rifles, 15 officers and 400 other ranks.”
The attack had not, however, dissolved at all points, as a thin line of troops undoubtedly66 advanced a thousand yards, and more, beyond the practice trenches. But these gallant fellows soon found themselves in a very lonely position, and as the 30th and 50th Divisions failed to make any ground at all, they had Germans practically on all sides of them. They remained for some time and eventually withdrew.
The next two days, the 15th and 16th, were occupied in consolidating67 the ground gained. The division had alarms of counter-attack, but nothing developed on their front. On the left, however, the enemy attacked and recaptured Wancourt Tower from the 50th Division. This point was not retaken by us until the next day, but the 56th Division were not concerned. Further advance was postponed68 until the 22nd April, and on the 18th the 30th Division took over the line from the 56th Division.
This was the opening battle of the Arras series, and is known as the First Battle of the Scarpe, 1917, and is linked up with the Battle of Vimy Ridge. The student would do well to consider the two battles as one. The capture of Vimy Ridge by the Canadians, and of Monchy by troops of the Third Army, gave us positions of great importance and improved the situation round Arras. The feeling of the 56th Division was that it had been a great fight, and that they had proved themselves undoubtedly better men than the Germans. The capture of [Pg 129] Neuville Vitasse and subsequent rolling up of the Hindenburg Line to the south of Heninel was a feat40 of which they felt proud. And they had killed a lot of the enemy at close quarters.
It is an interesting battle, as it undoubtedly inflicted69 a terrifying defeat on the enemy. Ludendorff says of it[4]:
“The 10th April and the following days were critical. The consequences of a break through, of 12 to 15 kilometres wide and 6 or more kilometres deep, are not easy to meet. In view of the heavy losses in men, guns, and ammunition70 resulting from such a break through, colossal71 efforts are needed to make good the damage.... A day like 9th April threw all calculations to the winds. Many days had to pass before a line could really be formed and consolidated72. The end of the crisis, even if troops were available, depended very largely, as it generally does in such cases, on whether the enemy, after his first victory, would attack again, and by further success aggravate73 the difficulty of forming a new line. Our position having been weakened, such victories were to be won only too easily....”
Hindenburg also confesses to very anxious moments, and suggests that “the English did not seem to have known how to exploit the success they had gained to the full.”
In his dispatch on this battle Sir Douglas Haig said that:
“With the forces at my disposal, even combined with what the French proposed to undertake in co-operation, I did not consider that any great strategical [Pg 130] results were likely to be gained by following up a success on the front about Arras, and to the south of it, beyond the capture of the objectives aimed at.... It was therefore my intention to transfer my main offensive to another part of the front after these objectives had been secured.
The front selected for these operations was in Flanders. They were to be commenced as soon as possible after the Arras offensive, and continued throughout the summer, so far as the forces at my disposal would permit.”
It must be remembered that the plans for the year were drawn74 up in consultation75 with our Allies, and the battles of Arras must be taken as a part only of those plans. The First and Third Armies secured positions which Sir Douglas Haig intended that they should secure; they inflicted great loss on the enemy, more than 13,000 prisoners and over 200 guns; they drew German reserves until at the end of the operations there were twice as many enemy troops on that front as at the beginning, which materially helped our Allies, who were on the point of launching a big offensive on the Aisne and in Champagne76. On the whole, these battles fulfilled their object and may be viewed with satisfaction.
On the 16th April the French attacked the Chemin-des-Dames, north-west of Rheims, and in the Champagne, south of Rheims. They met with very heavy losses and most obstinate77 resistance. These were the much-discussed operations under Gen. Nivelle, and, in order to assist, Sir Douglas Haig agreed to continue the operations round Arras longer than was his first intention. Plans, which had been made for a rearrangement of artillery and troops for the [Pg 131] operations at Ypres, were cancelled, and orders were issued for a continuance, with shallow objectives, of the fighting at Arras.
The First Battle of the Scarpe and the Battle of Vimy Ridge were, therefore, the original scheme, and the subsequent battles should be considered with this fact in mind. They were: the Second Battle of the Scarpe, 1917, 23rd-24th April; the Battle of Arleux, 28th-29th April; the Third Battle of the Scarpe, 1917, 3rd-4th May. The Battle of Bullecourt, 3rd-17th May, and a number of actions must also be included in the subsequent Arras offensive.
A few days’ rest was granted to the 56th Division. The 167th Brigade was round Pommier, the 168th round Couin, the 169th round Souastre. Divisional Headquarters were first at Couin and then at Hauteville. On the 25th Gen. Hull was ordered to hold himself in readiness to move into either the VI or the VII Corps, and the next day was definitely ordered into the VI Corps. On the 27th the 167th Brigade relieved the 15th Division in the front line, and Divisional Headquarters opened in Rue36 de la Paix, Arras.
* * * * * * *
From the Harp, which it will be remembered was the original line, to east of Monchy there runs a ridge of an average height of 100 metres; at Monchy itself it rises above 110 metres. This ridge shoots out a number of spurs towards the Cojeul River to the south. The position taken over by the 167th Brigade was from a small copse south-east of Monchy to the Arras-Cambrai road, about 500 yards from the Cojeul, and on the reverse slope of one of these spurs. [Pg 132] Observation for them was bad, and the enemy trenches were well sited and frequently over the crest78 of the hill.
On the 29th the 169th Brigade took over the right of the line from the 167th. The front line was then held by the London Rifle Brigade, the 2nd London Regt., the 1st London Regt., and the 7th Middlesex Regiment25. The Queen Victoria’s Rifles were in support of the Queen’s Westminster Rifles in reserve to the right brigade, and the 3rd London Regt. in support and the 8th Middlesex Regt. in reserve to the left brigade.
With a view to the important operations which the French were to carry out on the 5th May, it was decided to attack on an extended front at Arras on the 3rd. While the Third and First Armies attacked from Fontaine-les-Croisilles to Fresnoy, the Fifth Army launched an attack on the Hindenburg Line about Bullecourt. This gave a total front of over sixteen miles. [The Third Battle of the Scarpe, 1917.]
Zero hour was 3.45 a.m., and in the darkness, illumined by wavering star-shells fired by a startled enemy, and with the crashing of the barrage30, the men of the 56th Division advanced from their assembly trenches. As soon as the first waves topped the crest, they were met with a withering79 machine-gun and rifle fire. The ground was confusing and the darkness intense—officers, as was so often the case in night attacks, found it impossible to direct their men. Exactly what happened will never be known in detail. No reports came in for a considerable time.
With daylight the artillery observation officers began to communicate with headquarters. Our men, [Pg 133] they said, had advanced 1,000 yards on the right, and were digging in near a factory (Rohart) on the bank of the Cojeul, and the 14th Division on their right seemed to have reached its objectives. About 300 yards over the crest of the spur was a trench known as Tool, and this seemed to be occupied by the enemy.
Soon after this the 169th Brigade reported that the London Rifle Brigade were holding a pit near the factory and a trench about the same place; the 2nd London Regt. had a footing in Tool Trench. The latter position is doubtful, but the 2nd Londons were well forward.
Cavalry Farm, near and to the right of the original line, was still held by the enemy, and about 10 o’clock the Queen Victoria’s Rifles, after a short bombardment by the Stokes mortars81, rushed and secured the farm. They found a number of dugouts, which they bombed, and secured 22 prisoners. The farm was connected with Tool Trench, and they proceeded to bomb their way up it. It would appear, therefore, that the 2nd London Regt. held a small section of this trench farther to the north, if any at all.
We must now follow the 167th Brigade on the left. The two attacking battalions had been met with even worse machine-gun fire than the 169th Brigade. There was no news of them for a long time. It is clear that neither the 1st London Regt. nor the 7th Middlesex ever held any of Tool Trench, but a few gallant parties did undoubtedly overrun Tool, and, crossing a sunken road known as Stirrup Lane, reached Lanyard Trench, quite a short distance from the men of the London Rifle Brigade, who had lodged82 themselves in the pit near Rohart Factory. [Pg 134] They were, however, not in sufficient numbers to join hands with the London Rifle Brigade, or some small groups of the 2nd London, who were also in advanced shell-holes, and about 8 o’clock in the evening were forced to surrender. (A small party was seen marching east without arms.) The remaining 1st London and 7th Middlesex men lay out in shell-holes in front of Tool Trench.
Soon after the Queen Victoria’s Rifles had captured Cavalry Farm and started to bomb up Tool Trench, with the forward artillery and trench mortars helping83 them, the 3rd Division on the left of the 56th declared that their men were in the northern end of Tool. They asked that the artillery should be lifted off the trench, as they were going to bomb down towards the Queen Victoria’s Rifles. But it appears that they were very soon driven out, as by 3 p.m. the 3rd Division were definitely reported to be in touch with the 7th Middlesex in the original line.
Meanwhile the 14th Division, on the right, which had made good progress at the start, had been violently counter-attacked, and at 11.50 a.m. reported that they had been driven back to their original line.
Brig.-Gen. Coke, of the 169th Brigade, now found his men in a queer position. The troops on either flank of his brigade were back in the line they had started from; he ascertained84 that none of his brigade were north of the Arras-Cambrai road, and so he held a long tongue in the valley of the Cojeul open to attack from the high ground on either side of it.
Illustration: The Battles of Arras 1917
4. The Battles of Arras 1917.
Much movement by the enemy was observed during the afternoon; reinforcements were assembling in Tool and the sunken road behind it. About 10 o’clock [Pg 135] in the evening the Germans started a fierce bombardment of the tongue of land held by the London Rifle Brigades and 2nd London Regts., and, after an hour of ceaseless fire, counter-attacked and drove the troops back to their original lines.
Gen. Hull then ordered them to hold their original line and reorganise, but before the orders could reach them these two fine battalions had attacked again and reoccupied all the positions they had gained in the morning with the exception of Cavalry Farm. But they were in a bad situation. With the enemy holding the Cambrai road in force, the only communication with the advanced troops was down the bottom of the valley, a place of much water and mud. Brig.-Gen. Coke therefore withdrew his men just before sunrise. They brought with them, however, a German officer and 15 men who had surrendered in the neighbourhood of Cavalry Farm.
It had been a day of very hard fighting, and the gain on the whole of the sixteen miles of front attacked was Fresnoy, which had been taken by the Canadians, and a portion of the Hindenburg Line, east of Bullecourt, captured by the Australians. The enemy had been terribly frightened by the successful start of the battles of Arras. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were putting into effect their new system of holding the front in depth, but thin in the forward zones, with many machine guns, and strong supports for immediate counter-attack. It seemed as though their system had broken down at the first test, and, as the Russians were no longer a menace to them, they poured reinforcements across Germany. But, as we know, this continuation of the offensive was with the object of helping our Allies by holding troops [Pg 136] and guns which might otherwise have been used against them.
The 167th and 169th Brigades held the line for one day more, and were relieved by the 168th on the 5th May. The latter brigade also took over a stretch of extra line to the north.
The enemy was exceedingly quiet and our patrols very active. If any indication is wanted of the high moral of the 56th Division, it can be found in this patrol work. After an action of this kind, when the two brigades lost just on a thousand men, really audacious reconnoitring deserves the highest praise. Again and again attempts were made by patrols to enter Tool Trench, only to find the enemy alert. Cavalry Farm, on the right, and the copse, on the left, were both entered and found unoccupied; but the exact position of the enemy in Tool Trench was ascertained.
Meanwhile the heavy artillery kept up a steady fire on Tool Trench, causing large numbers of Germans to run over the open and seek safer ground. And troops worked hard on our trenches, which were greatly improved.
At 8.30 p.m. on the 11th May the 4th London Regt. on the right and the London Scottish on the left attacked Cavalry Farm and the trench on the far side of it, and Tool Trench.
A practice barrage on the previous day had drawn heavy fire in a few minutes, and it had been decided not to have a barrage, but to keep the heavy artillery firing steadily85 to the last minute. The enemy, who held the line in full strength, were taken by surprise. Only Cavalry Farm was visible from our line, and the 4th London Regt. swept into this place with no difficulty. [Pg 137] But the right of the enemy line was able to put up a fight, and the left company of the London Scottish suffered somewhat severely86. Except for this one point, the trench was vacated by its garrison87 in a wild scramble88. They could not, however, escape the Lewis gunners and brigade machine-gunners, who did some good execution. Quite a lot of the enemy were killed in the trench and a round dozen taken prisoner—they were of the 128th Infantry Regt. and the 5th Grenadier Regt. Eight machine guns were also found.
Tool Trench was only a part of the enemy line which ran up the hill on the east of Monchy. To the south of the copse it was Tool and to the north it was Hook. The very northern end of Tool and all of Hook remained in the hands of the enemy. A block was made by filling in about forty yards of the trench and the new line was consolidated.
The new line had been much damaged by our fire, but it was soon reconstructed, and two communication trenches were dug to the old line. Meanwhile the trench mortars kept up a steady bombardment of Hook Trench, and snipers picked off the enemy as he attempted to seek the safer shell-holes in the open.
During the next few days several deserters from the 5th Grenadier Regt. came in, and they, in common with other prisoners, persisted in stating that the enemy was contemplating a retirement. Patrols, however, always found Lanyard Trench and Hook fully89 garrisoned90. The 167th Brigade had taken over the line from the 168th, and the 8th Middlesex attempted to rush both Lanyard and Hook; this was not done in force, but was more in the nature of a surprise by strong patrols. They found the enemy too alert.
On the 19th something in the nature of an attack [Pg 138] in force was carried out. The 8th Middlesex made a night attack, in conjunction with the 29th Division, on Hook Trench and the support line behind it. The Middlesex men gained the junction of Hook and Tool, but were very “bunched”; the 187th Brigade on the left made no progress at all. It is probable that the Middlesex were more to the left than they imagined, as they were heavily bombed from both flanks, and eventually forced to withdraw.
On the 20th May the weary troops of the 56th Division were relieved by the 37th Division.
In these actions and in the battle on the 3rd May the objectives were shallow and the enemy fully prepared to resist, with large reinforcements of men and guns in the field. The enemy barrage was considered the heaviest that had, as yet, been encountered. The positions attacked were well sited and frequently masked, and there was also the complication of night assaults at short notice. Brig.-Gen. Freeth, in an interesting report of the battle on the 3rd, says:
“... Owing to the darkness it was extremely difficult for the assaulting troops to keep direction or the correct distances between waves. The tendency was for rear waves to push forward too fast for fear of losing touch with the wave in front of them. Consequently, by the time the leading wave was approaching Tool Trench, all the rear waves had telescoped into it. Even if Tool Trench had been taken, much delay would have been caused in extricating91 and moving forward waves allotted to the further objectives.”
Anyone who has taken part in a night attack will appreciate these difficulties. If it goes well it is very well, but if not the confusion is appalling92.
[Pg 139] The casualties from the 29th April to 21st May were 79 officers and 2,022 other ranks.
The general situation was that on the 5th May the French had delivered their attack on the Chemin-des-Dames and achieved their object, but on the whole the French offensive was disappointing. On the British front, however, 19,500 prisoners and 257 guns had been captured, and the situation round Arras greatly improved. The spring offensive was at an end.
But fighting did not cease round Arras and over the width of the sixty square miles of regained93 country. The Messines attack in the north was in course of preparation, and the orders to the Fifth, Third, and First Armies were to continue operations, with the forces left to them, with the object of keeping the enemy in doubt as to whether the offensive would be continued. Objectives, of a limited nature, were to be selected, and importance given to such actions by combining with them feint attacks. They were successful in their object, but there was bitter with the sweet, as Sir Douglas Haig writes:
“These measures seem to have had considerable success, if any weight may be attached to the enemy’s reports concerning them. They involved, however, the disadvantage that I frequently found myself unable to deny the German accounts of the bloody94 repulse95 of extensive British attacks which, in fact, never took place.”
The attack on Messines was launched on the 7th June, and was a complete success. With the first crash of our concentrated artillery nineteen mines were exploded, and our troops swept forward all along the line. By the evening 7,200 prisoners, 67 guns, [Pg 140] 94 trench mortars, and 294 machine-guns had been captured.
The 56th Division indulged in a little well-earned rest. We read of sports and horse shows in the vicinity of Habarcq, of concerts given by the “Bow Bells” concert party (formed in 1916 at Souastre), and diaries have the welcome entries “troops resting” as the only event of the day. But this was not for long. Battalions were soon back in the line, though much reduced in strength. For the first time we find, in spite of reinforcements, that the average strength of battalions fell to just over eight hundred.
The 169th Brigade lost Capt. Newnham, who went to the New Zealand Division as G.S.O.2. He instituted a form of official diary which is a delight to read—concise, but with occasional reflections of a dry, humorous nature. Capt. Carden Roe96, from the 29th Division, took his place as Brigade Major.
During the 9th, 10th, and 11th of June the division relieved the 61st Division in the line. The position was the same—Tool Trench from the copse, on the left, to Cavalry Farm, but it was extended to Wancourt Tower on the right.
The front now held measured 2,700 yards. Wancourt Tower was on the summit of the high spur which runs parallel to the Cojeul River on the south bank. The line can, then, be visualised stretching across the valley, with right and left flanks of the division on the high ground on either side of the river. From the right good observation was obtained over the enemy lines on the left of the divisional front, and from the copse, on the left of the line, similar observation could be had over the enemy on the right.
The 3rd Division was on the left of the 56th, and [Pg 141] on the 14th June, at 7.30 a.m., the former launched an attack on Hook Trench. The attack was a complete success; the division came level with the 56th and captured 175 prisoners.
The right of the 56th Division was held by the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, and a few minutes after five o’clock in the evening sentries97 noticed enemy movement behind a wood (Bois du Vert) which was opposite the 3rd Division and on the left flank of the 56th. Careful watching revealed the massing of troops. A warning was sent over the telephone. The 76th Brigade, immediately on the left of the 56th Division, was informed, as was the artillery.
Killing98 human beings is not dear to the heart of Englishmen. Green troops would stand violent shelling, merely looking a bit tense about the face, but although they saw their comrades fall, shattered to pieces, or badly wounded, they would sometimes show a great disinclination to fire on Germans walking in the open behind the enemy lines. It seemed as though the idea was that the particular German in question was not trying to injure them—he might have been carrying a plank99 or a bag of rations—and so they would watch him and no one would attempt to shoot unless there was an old soldier with them. This frame of mind, however, did not last long.
But the evening of the 14th June was an occasion for glee. The Hun was going to attack and all was ready for him. At 5.30 the grey waves left the enemy trenches, and at once a storm of artillery, machine-gun, and rifle fire met them. The Queen’s Westminster Rifles, of course, could not fire, but they watched the action with great joy, and kept Brigade and Divisional Headquarters informed of every [Pg 142] enemy move. The attack was smashed up and, thanks to the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, the enemy was chased out of sight by the artillery.
After this costly100 lesson the Germans tried a night attack on the 16th at 2.30 a.m. This time they succeeded in entering two posts, but the 3rd Division drove them out and the men of the 56th inflicted heavy casualties from the flank.
Nothing more was done in this line beyond some skirmishing round a post. The division was relieved on the 4th July and moved to the Le Cauroy area.
* * * * * * *
We have said very little about the Divisional Artillery, but to follow them too closely in these engagements would lead to confusion. They supported the 56th Division during the battle of Arras—in the original scheme—and when the division moved on the 20th April the artillery remained where it was. Brig.-Gen. Elkington writes:
“The 56th Divisional Artillery remained in the line in this sector101, under different C.R.A.s and covering different divisions, and were not under my command again until the end of May, as I remained with the 56th Division and commanded the artillery covering them. All the divisional artilleries became much mixed up, and very few of the C.R.A.s had their own artillery under their own command....
On the 24th May the division moved to the Habarcq area, and remained there until the 9th June. I established the R.A. Headquarters at Beaumetz, so as to keep in touch with our artillery, who were still in the line. At the end of May I got four days’ leave and went to Paris with Hawkes, Jorgensen, and Robinson, and we were joined there by Cols. Groves102 [Pg 143] and Lemon. We all had an excellent time, and enjoyed it immensely.... On the 5th July the 56th Divisional Artillery returned to my command, and we started to march to the Ypres area, and arrived at Oudezeele on the 13th July 1917. This was a very clean and comfortable village, and all ranks were well billeted. We remained there until the 28th July, a very pleasant and well-earned rest for both officers and men, beautiful weather, and many sports were organised for officers and men. Several fatigue103 parties had to be furnished to assist the heavy artillery in the supply of ammunition, and these had very hard work and some casualties. During the later part our trench mortar80 batteries, under Capt. Robinson, went into the line with the Guards Division, and had rather a strenuous104 time doing excellent work. On the 9th July I went home on ten days’ leave, and I got married on the 12th July....”
At one period of the war it was thought that the artillery had a “soft” time, but as the war progressed it was seen that the zone which included the lighter105 guns included also conditions which rendered the comfort of artillerymen scarcely more enviable than that of the infantry. We shall soon be able to throw a little more light on the work of this very gallant arm of the Service.
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1
minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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5
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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6
scouts
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| 侦察员[机，舰]( scout的名词复数 )； 童子军； 搜索； 童子军成员 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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10
harp
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| n.竖琴；天琴座 | |
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ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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13
modifications
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| n.缓和( modification的名词复数 )；限制；更改；改变 | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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chapel
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| n.小教堂，殡仪馆 | |
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withdrawals
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| n.收回，取回，撤回( withdrawal的名词复数 )；撤退，撤走；收回[取回，撤回，撤退，撤走]的实例；推出（组织），提走（存款），戒除毒瘾，对说过的话收回，孤僻 | |
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17
improvised
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| a.即席而作的,即兴的 | |
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18
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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19
simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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allotted
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| 分配，拨给，摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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hilarity
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| n.欢乐；热闹 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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barrages
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| n.弹幕射击( barrage的名词复数 )；火力网；猛烈炮火；河上的堰坝v.火力攻击（或阻击）( barrage的第三人称单数 )；以密集火力攻击（或阻击） | |
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barrage
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| n.火力网，弹幕 | |
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lessen
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| vt.减少，减轻；缩小 | |
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criticise
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| v.批评，评论；非难 | |
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precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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rue
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| n.懊悔，芸香，后悔；v.后悔，悲伤，懊悔 | |
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excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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39
feats
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| 功绩，伟业，技艺( feat的名词复数 ) | |
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feat
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| n.功绩；武艺，技艺；adj.灵巧的，漂亮的，合适的 | |
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depot
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| n.仓库，储藏处；公共汽车站；火车站 | |
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42
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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bombers
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| n.轰炸机( bomber的名词复数 )；投弹手；安非他明胶囊；大麻叶香烟 | |
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46
enveloping
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| v.包围，笼罩，包住( envelop的现在分词 ) | |
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survivors
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| 幸存者，残存者，生还者( survivor的名词复数 ) | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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moss
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| n.苔，藓，地衣 | |
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50
extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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51
echelon
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| n.梯队；组织系统中的等级；v.排成梯队 | |
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52
detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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53
hull
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| n.船身；(果、实等的)外壳；vt.去(谷物等)壳 | |
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enveloped
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| v.包围，笼罩，包住( envelop的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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rumour
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| n.谣言，谣传，传闻 | |
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Amended
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| adj. 修正的 动词amend的过去式和过去分词 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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maze
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| n.迷宫，八阵图，混乱，迷惑 | |
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junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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swerved
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| v.（使）改变方向，改变目的( swerve的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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consolidate
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| v.使加固，使加强；(把...)联为一体，合并 | |
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converging
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| adj.收敛[缩]的，会聚的，趋同的v.（线条、运动的物体等）会于一点( converge的现在分词 )；（趋于）相似或相同；人或车辆汇集；聚集 | |
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contemplating
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| 深思，细想，仔细考虑( contemplate的现在分词 )； 注视，凝视； 考虑接受（发生某事的可能性）； 深思熟虑，沉思，苦思冥想 | |
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65
congestion
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| n.阻塞，消化不良 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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consolidating
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| v.（使）巩固， （使）加强( consolidate的现在分词 )；（使）合并 | |
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68
postponed
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| vt.& vi.延期，缓办，（使）延迟vt.把…放在次要地位；[语]把…放在后面（或句尾）vi.（疟疾等）延缓发作（或复发） | |
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69
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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71
colossal
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| adj.异常的，庞大的 | |
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consolidated
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| a.联合的 | |
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aggravate
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| vt.加重(剧)，使恶化；激怒，使恼火 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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consultation
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| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
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champagne
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| n.香槟酒；微黄色 | |
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obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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withering
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| 使人畏缩的，使人害羞的，使人难堪的 | |
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mortar
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| n.灰浆，灰泥；迫击炮；v.把…用灰浆涂接合 | |
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mortars
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| n.迫击炮( mortar的名词复数 )；砂浆；房产；研钵 | |
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lodged
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| v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 )；暂住；埋入；（权利、权威等）归属 | |
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helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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scramble
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| v.爬行，攀爬，杂乱蔓延，碎片，片段，废料 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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extricating
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| v.使摆脱困难，脱身( extricate的现在分词 ) | |
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appalling
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| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
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regained
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| 复得( regain的过去式和过去分词 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地 | |
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bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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repulse
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| n.击退，拒绝；vt.逐退，击退，拒绝 | |
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roe
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| n.鱼卵；獐鹿 | |
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sentries
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| 哨兵，步兵( sentry的名词复数 ) | |
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killing
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| n.巨额利润；突然赚大钱，发大财 | |
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plank
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| n.板条，木板，政策要点，政纲条目 | |
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costly
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| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
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sector
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| n.部门，部分；防御地段，防区；扇形 | |
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groves
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| 树丛，小树林( grove的名词复数 ) | |
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fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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strenuous
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| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
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lighter
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| n.打火机，点火器；驳船；v.用驳船运送；light的比较级 | |
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