69. PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.—I think I have said enough in Chapter II (section 10) about what we mean when we speak of psychology as a natural science and as an independent discipline. Certainly there are many psychologists who would not care to be confused with the philosophers, and there are some that regard philosophy with suspicion.
Nevertheless, psychology is commonly regarded as belonging to the philosophical2 group. That this is the case can scarcely be thought surprising when we see how the psychologist himself speaks of the relation of his science to philosophy.
"I have kept," writes Professor James[1] in that delightful3 book which has become the common property of us all, "close to the point of view of natural science throughout the book. Every natural science assumes certain data uncritically, and declines to challenge the elements between which its own 'laws' obtain, and from which its own deductions4 are carried on. Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1) thoughts and feelings, and (2) a physical world in time and space with which they coexist, and which (3) they know. Of course, these data themselves are discussable; but the discussion of them (as of other elements) is called metaphysics and falls outside the province of this book."
This is an admirable statement of the scope of psychology as a natural science, and also of the relations of metaphysics to the sciences. But it would not be fair to Professor James to take this sentence alone, and to assume that, in his opinion, it is easy to separate psychology altogether from philosophy. "The reader," he tells us in the next paragraph, "will in vain seek for any closed system in the book. It is mainly a mass of descriptive details, running out into queries5 which only a metaphysics alive to the weight of her task can hope successfully to deal with." And in the opening sentence of the preface he informs us that some of his chapters are more "metaphysical" than is suitable for students going over the subject for the first time.
That the author is right in maintaining that it is not easy to draw a clear line between philosophy and psychology, and to declare the latter wholly independent, I think we must concede. An independent science should be sure of the things with which it is dealing6. Where these are vague and indefinite, and are the subject of constant dispute, it cannot march forward with assurance. One is rather forced to go back and examine the data themselves. The beaten track of the special science has not been satisfactorily constructed.
We are forced to admit that the science of psychology has not yet emerged from the state in which a critical examination of its foundations is necessary, and that the construction of the beaten path is still in progress. This I shall try to make clear by illustrations.
The psychologist studies the mind, and his ultimate appeal must be to introspection, to a direct observation of mental phenomena7, and of their relations to external things. Now, if the observation of mental phenomena were a simple and an easy thing; if the mere8 fact that we are conscious of sensations and ideas implied that we are clearly conscious of them and are in a position to describe them with accuracy, psychology would be a much more satisfactory science than it is.
But we are not thus conscious of our mental life. We can and do use our mental states without being able to describe them accurately9. In a sense, we are conscious of what is there, but our consciousness is rather dim and vague, and in our attempts to give an account of it we are in no little danger of giving a false account.
Thus, the psychologist assumes that we perceive both physical phenomena and mental—the external world and the mind. He takes it for granted that we perceive mental phenomena to be related to physical. He is hardly in a position to make this assumption, and then to set it aside as a thing he need not further consider. Does he not tell us, as a result of his investigations10, that we can know the external world only as it is reflected in our sensations, and thus seem to shut the mind up within the circle of mental phenomena merely, cutting off absolutely a direct knowledge of what is extra-mental? If we can know only mental phenomena, the representatives of things, at first hand, how can we tell that they are representatives? and what becomes of the assumption that we perceive that mind is related to an external world?
It may be said, this problem the psychologist may leave to the metaphysician. Certainly, it is one of those problems that the metaphysician discusses; it has been treated in Chapter IV. But my contention12 is, that he who has given no thought to the matter may easily fall into error as to the very nature of mental phenomena.
For example, when we approach or recede13 from a physical object we have a series of experiences which are recognized as sensational14. When we imagine a tree or a house we are also experiencing a mental phenomenon. All these experiences seem plainly to have extension in some sense of the word. We appear to perceive plainly part out of part. In so far, these mental things seem to resemble the physical things which we contrast with what is mental. Shall we say that, because these things are mental and not physical, their apparent extension is a delusion15? Shall we say that they really have no parts? Such considerations have impelled16 psychologists of eminence17 to maintain, in flat contradiction to what seems to be the unequivocal testimony18 of direct introspection, that the total content of consciousness at any moment must be looked upon as an indivisible, part-less unit.
We cannot, then, depend merely on direct introspection. It is too uncertain in its deliverances. If we would make clear to ourselves what mental phenomena really are, and how they | differ from physical phenomena, we must fall back upon the reflective analysis of our experience which occupies the metaphysician (section 34). Until we have done this, we are in great danger of error. We are actually uncertain of our materials.
Again. The psychologist speaks of the relation of mind and body. Some psychologists incline to be parallelists, some are warm advocates of interactionism. Now, any theory of the relation of mind to body must depend on observation ultimately. If we had not direct experience of a relation between the physical and the mental somewhere, no hypothesis on the subject would ever have emerged.
But our experiences are not perfectly19 clear and unequivocal to us. Their significance does not seem to be easily grasped. To comprehend it one is forced to that reflective examination of experience which is characteristic of the philosopher (Chapter IX).
Here it may again be said: Leave the matter to the meta-physician and go on with your psychological work. I answer: The psychologist is not in the same position as the botanist21 or the zo?logist. He is studying mind in its relation to body. It cannot but be unsatisfactory to him to leave that relation wholly vague; and, as a matter of fact, he usually takes up with one theory or another. We have seen (section 36) that he may easily adopt a theory that leads him to overlook the great difference between physical phenomena and mental phenomena, and to treat them as though they were the same. This one may do in spite of all that introspection has to say about the gulf22 that separates them.
Psychology is, then, very properly classed among the philosophical sciences. The psychologist is not sufficiently23 sure of his materials to be able to dispense24 with reflective thought, in many parts of his field. Some day there may come to be a consensus25 of opinion touching26 fundamental facts, and the science may become more independent. A beaten track may be attained27; but that has not yet been done.
70. THE DOUBLE AFFILIATION28 OF PSYCHOLOGY.—In spite of what has been said above, we must not forget that psychology is a relatively29 independent science. One may be a useful psychologist without knowing much about philosophy.
As in logic20 it is possible to write a text-book not greatly different in spirit and method from text-books concerned with the sciences not classed as philosophical, so it is possible to make a useful study of mental phenomena without entering upon metaphysical analyses. In science, as in common life, we can use concepts without subjecting them to careful analysis.
Thus, our common experience reveals that mind and body are connected. We may, for a specific purpose, leave the nature of this connection vague, and may pay careful attention to the physiological30 conditions of mental phenomena, studying in detail the senses and the nervous system. We may, further, endeavor to render our knowledge of mental phenomena more full and accurate by experimentation31. In doing this we may be compelled to make use of elaborate apparatus32. Of such mechanical aids to investigation11 our psychological laboratories are full.
It is to such work as this that we owe what is called the "physiological" and the "experimental" psychology. One can carry on such investigations without being a metaphysician. But one can scarcely carry them on without having a good knowledge of certain sciences not commonly supposed to be closely related to psychology at all. Thus, one should be trained in chemistry and physics and physiology33, and should have a working knowledge of laboratory methods. Moreover, it is desirable to have a sufficient knowledge of mathematics to enable one to handle experimental data.
The consideration of such facts as these sometimes leads men to raise the question: Should psychology affiliate34 with philosophy or with the physical sciences? The issue is an illegitimate one. Psychology is one of the philosophical sciences, and cannot dispense with reflection; but that is no reason why it should not acknowledge a close relation to certain physical sciences as well. Parts of the field can be isolated35, and one may work as one works in the natural sciences generally; but if one does nothing more, one's concepts remain unanalyzed, and, as we have seen in the previous section, there is some danger of actual misconception.
[1] "Psychology," Preface.
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psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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delightful
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| adj.令人高兴的，使人快乐的 | |
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deductions
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| 扣除( deduction的名词复数 )； 结论； 扣除的量； 推演 | |
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queries
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| n.问题( query的名词复数 )；疑问；询问；问号v.质疑，对…表示疑问( query的第三人称单数 )；询问 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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investigations
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| （正式的）调查( investigation的名词复数 )； 侦查； 科学研究； 学术研究 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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recede
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| vi.退(去)，渐渐远去；向后倾斜，缩进 | |
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sensational
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| adj.使人感动的，非常好的，轰动的，耸人听闻的 | |
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delusion
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| n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑 | |
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impelled
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| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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eminence
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| n.卓越，显赫；高地，高处；名家 | |
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testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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botanist
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| n.植物学家 | |
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gulf
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| n.海湾；深渊，鸿沟；分歧，隔阂 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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dispense
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| vt.分配，分发；配(药)，发(药)；实施 | |
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consensus
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| n.(意见等的)一致，一致同意，共识 | |
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touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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affiliation
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| n.联系，联合 | |
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relatively
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| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
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physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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experimentation
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| n.实验，试验，实验法 | |
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apparatus
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| n.装置，器械；器具，设备 | |
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physiology
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| n.生理学，生理机能 | |
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affiliate
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| vt.使隶(附)属于；n.附属机构，分公司 | |
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isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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