71. COMMON SENSE ETHICS.—We may, if we choose, study the actions of men merely with a view to ascertaining4 what they are and describing them accurately5. Something like this is done by the anthropologist6, who gives us an account of the manners and customs of the various races of mankind; he tells us what is; he may not regard it as within his province at all to inform us regarding what ought to be.
But men do not merely act; they judge their actions in the light of some norm or standard, and they distinguish between them as right and wrong. The systematic7 study of actions as right and wrong yields us the science of ethics.
Like psychology8, ethics is a special science. It is concerned with a somewhat limited field of investigation9, and is not to be confounded with other sciences. It has a definite aim distinct from theirs. And, also like psychology, ethics is classed as one of the philosophical10 sciences, and its relation to philosophy is supposed to be closer than that of such sciences as physics and mathematics. It is fair to ask why this is so. Why cannot ethics proceed on the basis of certain assumptions independently, and leave to some other discipline the whole question of an inquiry11 into the nature and validity of those assumptions?
About half a century ago Dr. William Whewell, one of the most learned of English scholars, wrote a work entitled "The Elements of Morality," in which he attempted to treat the science of ethics as it is generally admitted that one may treat the science of geometry. The book was rather widely read a generation since, but we meet with few references to it in our time.
"Morality and the philosophy of morality," argues the author, "differ in the same manner and in the same degree as geometry and the philosophy of geometry. Of these two subjects, geometry consists of a series of positive and definite propositions, deduced one from another, in succession, by rigorous reasoning, and all resting upon certain definitions and self-evident axioms. The philosophy of geometry is quite a different subject; it includes such inquiries12 as these: Whence is the cogency13 of geometrical proof? What is the evidence of the axioms and definitions? What are the faculties14 by which we become aware of their truth? and the like. The two kinds of speculation15 have been pursued, for the most part, by two different classes of persons,—the geometers and the metaphysicians; for it has been far more the occupation of metaphysicians than of geometers to discuss such questions as I have stated, the nature of geometrical proofs, geometrical axioms, the geometrical faculty16, and the like. And if we construct a complete system of geometry, it will be almost exactly the same, whatever be the views which we take on these metaphysical questions." [1]
Such a system Dr. Whewell wishes to construct in the field of ethics. His aim is to give us a view of morality in which moral propositions are "deduced from axioms, by successive steps of reasoning, so far as to form a connected system of moral truth." Such a "sure and connected knowledge of the duties of man" would, he thinks, be of the greatest importance.
In accordance with this purpose, Dr. Whewell assumes that humanity, justice, truth, purity, order, earnestness, and moral purpose are fundamental principles of human action; and he thinks that all who admit as much as this will be able to go on with him in his development of a system of moral rules to govern the life of man.
It would hardly be worth while for me to speak at length of a way of treating ethics so little likely to be urged upon the attention of the reader who busies himself with the books which are appearing in our own day, were it not that we have here an admirable illustration of the attempt to teach ethics as though it were such a science as geometry. The shortcomings of the method become very evident to one who reads the work attentively17.
Thus, we are forced to ask ourselves, have we really a collection of ultimate moral principles which are analogous18 to the axioms of geometry? For example, to take but a single instance, Dr. Whewell formulates19 the Principle of Truth as follows: "We must conform to the universal understanding among men which the use of language implies";[2] and he remarks later; "The rules: Lie not, Perform your promise, are of universal validity; and the conceptions of lie and of promise are so simple and distinct that, in general, the rules may be directly and easily applied20." [3]
Now, we are struck by the fact that this affirmation of the universal validity of the principle of truth is made in a chapter on "Cases of Conscience," in a chapter concerned with what seem to be conflicts between duties; and this chapter is followed by one which treats of "Cases of Necessity," i.e. cases in which a man is to be regarded as justified21 in violating common rules when there seems to be urgent reason for so doing. We are told that the moralist cannot say: Lie not, except in great emergencies; but must say: Lie not at all. But we are also told that he must grant that there are cases of necessity in which transgressions22 of moral rules are excusable; and this looks very much as if he said: Go on and do the thing while I close my eyes.
This hardly seems to give us a "sure and connected knowledge of the duties of man" deduced from axiomatic23 principles. On what authority shall we suspend for the time being this axiomatic principle or that? Is there some deeper principle which lends to each of them its authority, and which may, for cause, withdraw it? There is no hint of such in the treatment of ethics which we are considering, and we seem to have on our hands, not so much a science, as a collection of practical rules, of the scope of which we are more or less in the dark.
The interesting thing to notice is that this view of ethics is very closely akin24 to that adapted unconsciously by the majority of the persons we meet who have not interested themselves much in ethics as a science.
By the time that we have reached years of discretion25 we are all in possession of a considerable number of moral maxims26. We consider it wrong to steal, to lie, to injure our neighbor. Such maxims lie in our minds side by side, and we do not commonly think of criticising them. But now and then we face a situation in which one maxim27 seems to urge one course of action and another maxim a contrary one. Shall we tell the truth and the whole truth, when so doing will bring grave misfortune upon an innocent person? And now and then we are brought to the realization28 that all men do not admit the validity of all our maxims. Judgments29 differ as to what is right and what is wrong. Who shall be the arbiter30? Not infrequently a rough decision is arrived at in the assumption that we have only to interrogate31 "conscience"—in the assumption, in other words, that we carry a watch which can be counted upon to give the correct time, even if the timepieces of our neighbors are not to be depended upon.
The common sense ethics cannot be regarded as very systematic and consistent, or as very profound. It is a collection of working rules, of practical maxims; and, although it is impossible to overestimate32 its value as a guide to life, its deficiencies, when it is looked at critically, become evident, I think, even to thoughtful persons who are not scientific at all.
Many writers on ethics have simply tried to turn this collection of working rules into a science, somewhat as Dr. Whewell has done. This is the peculiar33 weakness of those who have been called the "intuitionalists"—though I must warn the reader against assuming that this term has but the one meaning, and that all those to whom it has been applied should be placed in the same class. Here it is used to indicate those who maintain that we are directly aware of the validity of certain moral principles, must accept them as ultimate, and need only concern ourselves with the problem of their application.
72. ETHICS AND PHILOSOPHY.—When John Locke maintained that there are no "innate34 practical principles," or innate moral maxims, he pointed35 in evidence to the "enormities practiced without remorse36" in different ages and by different peoples. The list he draws up is a curious and an interesting one.[4]
In our day it has pretty generally come to be recognized by thoughtful men that a man's judgments as to right and wrong reflect the phase of civilization, or the lack of it, which he represents, and that their significance cannot be understood when we consider them apart from their historic setting. This means that no man's conscience is set up as an ultimate standard, but that every man's conscience is regarded as furnishing material which the science of ethics must take into account.
May we, broadening the basis upon which we are to build, and studying the manners, customs, and moral judgments of all sorts and conditions of men, develop an empirical science of ethics which will be independent of philosophy?
It does not seem that we can do this. We are concerned with psychological phenomena37, and their nature and significance are by no means beyond dispute. For example, there is the feeling of moral obligation, of which ethics has so much to say. What is this feeling, and what is its authority? Is it a thing to be explained? Can it impel38 a man, let us say, a bigot, to do wrong? And what can we mean by credit and discredit39, by responsibility and free choice, and other concepts of the sort? All this must remain very vague to one who has not submitted his ethical40 concepts to reflective analysis of the sort that we have a right to call philosophical.
Furthermore, it does not seem possible to decide what a man should or should not do, without taking into consideration the circumstances in which he is placed. The same act may be regarded as benevolent41 or the reverse according to its context. If we will but grant the validity of the premises42 from which the medieval churchman reasoned, we may well ask whether, in laying hands violently upon those who dared to form independent judgments in matters of religion, he was not conscientiously43 doing his best for his fellow-man. He tried by all means to save some, and to what he regarded as a most dangerous malady44 he applied a drastic remedy. By what standard shall we judge him?
There can be no doubt that our doctrine45 of the whole duty of man must be conditioned by our view of the nature of the world in which man lives and of man's place in the world. Has ethics nothing to do with religion? If we do not believe in God, and if we think that man's life ends with the death of the body, it is quite possible that we shall set for him an ethical standard which we should have to modify if we adopted other beliefs. The relation of ethics to religion is a problem that the student of ethics can scarcely set aside. It seems, then, that the study of ethics necessarily carries us back to world problems which cannot be approached except by the path of philosophical reflection. We shall see in Chapter XX that the theistic problem certainly belongs to this class.
It is worthy46 of our consideration that the vast majority of writers on ethics have felt strongly that their science runs out into metaphysics. We can scarcely afford to treat their testimony47 lightly. Certainly it is not possible for one who has no knowledge of philosophy to understand the significance of the ethical systems which have appeared in the past. The history of ethics may be looked upon as a part of the history of philosophy. Only on the basis of some general view as to nature and man have men decided48 what man ought to do. As we have seen above, this appears sufficiently49 reasonable.
73. AESTHETICS.—Of aesthetics, or the science of the beautiful, I shall say little. There is somewhat the same reason for including it among the philosophical sciences that there is for including ethics.
Those who have paid little attention to science or to philosophy are apt to dogmatize about what is and what is not beautiful just as they dogmatize about what is and what is not right. They say unhesitatingly; This object is beautiful, and that one is ugly. It is as if they said: This one is round, and that one square.
Often it quite escapes their attention that what they now regard as beautiful struck them as unattractive a short time before; and will, perhaps, when the ceaseless change of the fashions has driven it out of vogue50, seem strange and unattractive once more. Nor do they reflect upon the fact that others, who seem to have as good a right to an opinion as they, do not agree with them in their judgments; nor upon the further fact that the standard of beauty is a thing that has varied51 from age to age, differs widely in different countries, and presents minor52 variations in different classes even in the same community.
The dogmatic utterances53 of those who are keenly susceptible54 to the aesthetic2 aspects of things but are not given to reflection stand in striking contrast to the epitome55 of the popular wisdom expressed in the skeptical56 adage57 that there is no disputing about tastes.
We cannot interpret this adage broadly and take it literally58, for then we should have to admit that men's judgments as to the beautiful cannot constitute the material of a science at all, and that there can be no such thing as progress in the fine arts. The notion of progress implies a standard, and an approximation to an ideal. Few would dare to deny that there has been progress in such arts as painting and music; and when one has admitted so much as this, one has virtually admitted that a science of aesthetics is, at least, possible.
The science studies the facts of the aesthetic life as ethics studies the facts of the moral life. It can take no man's taste as furnishing a standard: it must take every man's taste as a fact of significance. It is driven to reflective analysis—to such questions as, what is beauty? and what is meant by aesthetic progress? It deals with elusive59 psychological facts the significance of which is not easily grasped. It is a philosophical science, and is by no means in a position to follow a beaten path, dispensing60 with a reflective analysis of its materials.
[1] Preface.
[2] section 269.
[3] section 376.
[4] "Essay concerning Human Understanding," Book I, Chapter III.
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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aesthetic
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| adj.美学的，审美的，有美感 | |
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aesthetics
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| n.(尤指艺术方面之)美学，审美学 | |
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ascertaining
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的现在分词 ) | |
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accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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anthropologist
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| n.人类学家，人类学者 | |
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systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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cogency
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| n.说服力；adj.有说服力的 | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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attentively
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| adv.聚精会神地；周到地；谛；凝神 | |
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analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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formulates
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| v.构想出( formulate的第三人称单数 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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transgressions
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| n.违反，违法，罪过( transgression的名词复数 ) | |
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axiomatic
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| adj.不需证明的，不言自明的 | |
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akin
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| adj.同族的，类似的 | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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realization
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| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
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judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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arbiter
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| n.仲裁人，公断人 | |
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interrogate
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| vt.讯问，审问，盘问 | |
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overestimate
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| v.估计过高，过高评价 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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innate
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| adj.天生的，固有的，天赋的 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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remorse
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| n.痛恨，悔恨，自责 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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impel
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| v.推动；激励，迫使 | |
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discredit
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| vt.使不可置信；n.丧失信义；不信，怀疑 | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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benevolent
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| adj.仁慈的，乐善好施的 | |
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premises
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| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
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conscientiously
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| adv.凭良心地；认真地，负责尽职地；老老实实 | |
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malady
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| n.病，疾病(通常做比喻) | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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Vogue
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| n.时髦，时尚；adj.流行的 | |
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varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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utterances
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| n.发声( utterance的名词复数 )；说话方式；语调；言论 | |
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susceptible
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| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
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epitome
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| n.典型，梗概 | |
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skeptical
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| adj.怀疑的，多疑的 | |
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adage
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| n.格言，古训 | |
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literally
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| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
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elusive
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| adj.难以表达(捉摸)的；令人困惑的；逃避的 | |
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dispensing
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| v.分配( dispense的现在分词 )；施与；配（药） | |
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