74. WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?—The reader has probably already remarked that in some of the preceding chapters the adjectives "metaphysical" and "philosophical1" have been used as if they were interchangeable, in certain connections, at least. This is justified2 by common usage; and in the present chapter I shall be expected by no one, I think, to prove that metaphysics is a philosophical discipline. My task will rather be to show how far the words "metaphysics" and "philosophy" have a different meaning.
In Chapters III to XI, I have given a general view of the problems which present themselves to reflective thought, and I have indicated that they are not problems which can conveniently be distributed among the several special sciences. Is there an external world? What is it? What are space and time? What is the mind? How are mind and body related? How do we know that there are other minds than ours? etc. These have been presented as philosophical problems; and when we turn back to the history of speculative3 thought we find that they are just the problems with which the men whom we agree to call philosophers have chiefly occupied themselves.
But when we turn to our treatises4 on metaphysics, we also find that these are the problems there discussed. Such treatises differ much among themselves, and the problems are not presented in the same form or in the same order; but one who can look beneath the surface will find that the authors are busied with much the same thing—with some or all of the problems above mentioned.
How, then, does metaphysics differ from philosophy? The difference becomes clear to us when we realize that the word philosophy has a broader and looser signification, and that metaphysics is, so to speak, the core, the citadel5, of philosophy.
We have seen (Chapter II) that the world and the mind, as they seem to be presented in the experience of the plain man, do not stand forth6 with such clearness and distinctness that he is able to answer intelligently the questions we wish to ask him regarding their nature. It is not merely that his information is limited; it is vague and indefinite as well. And we have seen, too, that, however the special sciences may increase and systematize his information, they do not clear away such vagueness. The man still uses such concepts as "inner" and "outer," "reality," "the mind," "space," and "time," with no very definite notion of what they mean.
Now, the attempt to clear away this vagueness by the systematic7 analysis of such concepts—in other words, the attempt to make a thorough analysis of our experience—is metaphysics. The metaphysician strives to limit his task as well as he may, and to avoid unnecessary excursions into the fields occupied by the special sciences, even those which lie nearest to his own, such as psychology8 and ethics9. There is a sense in which he may be said to be working in the field of a special science, though he is using as the material for his investigations11 concepts which are employed in many sciences; but it is clear that his discipline is not a special science in the same sense in which geometry and physics are special sciences.
Nevertheless, the special sciences stand, as we have already seen in the case of several of them, very near to his own. If he broadens his view, and deliberately12 determines to take a survey of the field of human knowledge as illuminated13 by the analyses that he has made, he becomes something more than a metaphysician; he becomes a philosopher.
This does not in the least mean that he becomes a storehouse of miscellaneous information, and an authority on all the sciences. Sometimes the philosophers have attempted to describe the world of matter and of mind as though they possessed14 some mysterious power of knowing things that absolved15 them from the duty of traveling the weary road of observation and experiment that has ended in the sciences as we have them. When they have done this, they have mistaken the significance of their calling. A philosopher has no more right than another man to create information out of nothing.
But it is possible, even for one who is not acquainted with the whole body of facts presented in a science, to take careful note of the assumptions upon which that science rests, to analyze16 the concepts of which it makes use, to mark the methods which it employs, and to gain a fair idea of its scope and of its relation to other sciences. Such a reflection upon our scientific knowledge is philosophical reflection, and it may result in a classification of the sciences, and in a general view of human knowledge as a whole. Such a view may be illuminating17 in the extreme; it can only be harmful when its significance is misunderstood.
But, it may be argued, why may not the man of science do all this for himself? Why should he leave it to the philosopher, who is presumably less intimately acquainted with the sciences than he is?
To this I answer: The work should, of course, be done by the man who will do it best. All our subdivision of labor18 should be dictated19 by convenience. But I add, that experience has shown that the workers in the special sciences have not as a rule been very successful when they have tried to philosophize.
Science is an imperious mistress; she demands one's utmost efforts; and when a man turns to philosophical reflection merely "by the way," and in the scraps20 of time at his disposal after the day's work is done, his philosophical work is apt to be rather superficial. Moreover, it does not follow that, because a man is a good mathematician21 or chemist or physicist22, he is gifted with the power of reflective analysis. Then, too, such men are apt to be imperfectly acquainted with what has been done in the past; and those who are familiar with the history of philosophy often have occasion to remark that what is laid before them, in ignorance of the fact that it is neither new nor original, is a doctrine23 which has already made its appearance in many forms and has been discussed at prodigious24 length in the centuries gone by.
In certain sciences it seems possible to ignore the past, to a great extent, at least. What is worth keeping has been kept, and there is a solid foundation on which to build for the future. But with reflective thought it is not so. There is no accepted body of doctrine which we have the right to regard as unassailable. We should take it as a safe maxim25 that the reflections of men long dead may be profounder and more worthy26 of our study than those urged upon our attention by the men of our day.
And this leads me to make a remark upon the titles given to works on metaphysics. It seems somewhat misleading to label them: "Outlines of Metaphysics" or "Elements of Metaphysics." Such titles suggest that we are dealing27 with a body of doctrine which has met with general acceptance, and may be compared with that found in handbooks on the special sciences. But we should realize that, when we are concerned with the profounder investigations into the nature of our experience, we tread upon uncertain ground and many differences of opinion obtain. We should, if possible, avoid a false semblance28 of authority.
75. EPISTEMOLOGY.—We hear a great deal at the present day of Epistemology, or the Theory of Knowledge. I have not classed it as a distinct philosophical science, for reasons which will appear below.
We have seen in Chapter XVI that it is possible to treat of logic29 in a simple way without growing very metaphysical; but we have also seen that when we go deeply into questions touching30 the nature of evidence and what is meant by truth and falsity, we are carried back to philosophical reflection at once.
We may, for convenience, group together these deeper questions regarding the nature of knowledge and its scope, and call the subject of our study "Epistemology."
But it should be remarked, in the first place, that, when we work in this field, we are exercising a reflective analysis of precisely31 the type employed in making the metaphysical analyses contained in the earlier chapters of this book. We are treating our experience as it is not treated in common thought and in science.
And it should be remarked, in the second place, that the investigation10 of our knowledge inevitably32 runs together with an investigation into the nature of things known, of the mind and the world. Suppose that I give the titles of the chapters in Part III of Mr. Hobhouse's able work on "The Theory of Knowledge." They are as follows: Validity; the Validity of Knowledge; the Conception of External Reality; Substance; the Conception of Self; Reality as a System; Knowledge and Reality; the Grounds of Knowledge and Belief.
Are not these topics metaphysical? Let us ask ourselves how it would affect our views of the validity and of the limits of our knowledge, if we were converted to the metaphysical doctrines33 of John Locke, or of Bishop34 Berkeley, or of David Hume, or of Thomas Reid, or of Immanuel Kant.
We may, then, regard epistemology as a part of logic—the metaphysical part—or as a part of metaphysics; it does not much matter which we call it, since we mean the same thing. But its relation to metaphysics is such that it does not seem worth while to call it a separate discipline.
Before leaving this subject there is one more point upon which I should touch, if only to obviate35 a possible misunderstanding.
We find in Professor Cornelius's clear little book, "An Introduction to Philosophy" (Leipzig, 1903; it has unhappily not yet been translated into English), that metaphysics is repudiated36 altogether, and epistemology is set in its place. But this rejection37 of metaphysics does not necessarily imply the denial of the value of such an analysis of our experience as I have in this work called metaphysical. Metaphysics is taken to mean, not an analysis of experience, but a groping behind the veil of phenomena38 for some reality not given in experience. In other words, what Professor Cornelius condemns40 is what many of the rest of us also condemn39 under another name. What he calls metaphysics, we call bad metaphysics; and what he calls epistemology, we call metaphysics. The dispute is really a dispute touching the proper name to apply to reflective analysis of a certain kind.
As it is the fashion in certain quarters to abuse metaphysics, I set the reader on his guard. Some kinds of metaphysics certainly ought to be repudiated under whatever name they may be presented to us.
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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treatises
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| n.专题著作，专题论文，专著( treatise的名词复数 ) | |
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citadel
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| n.城堡；堡垒；避难所 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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investigations
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| （正式的）调查( investigation的名词复数 )； 侦查； 科学研究； 学术研究 | |
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deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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illuminated
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| adj.被照明的；受启迪的 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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absolved
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| 宣告…无罪，赦免…的罪行，宽恕…的罪行( absolve的过去式和过去分词 )； 不受责难，免除责任 [义务] ,开脱（罪责） | |
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analyze
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| vt.分析，解析 (=analyse) | |
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illuminating
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| a.富于启发性的，有助阐明的 | |
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labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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scraps
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| 油渣 | |
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mathematician
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| n.数学家 | |
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physicist
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| n.物理学家，研究物理学的人 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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prodigious
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| adj.惊人的，奇妙的；异常的；巨大的；庞大的 | |
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maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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semblance
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| n.外貌，外表 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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bishop
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| n.主教，（国际象棋）象 | |
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obviate
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| v.除去，排除，避免，预防 | |
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repudiated
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| v.（正式地）否认( repudiate的过去式和过去分词 )；拒绝接受；拒绝与…往来；拒不履行（法律义务） | |
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rejection
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| n.拒绝，被拒，抛弃，被弃 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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condemns
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| v.（通常因道义上的原因而）谴责( condemn的第三人称单数 )；宣判；宣布…不能使用；迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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