80. THE QUESTION OF PRACTICAL UTILITY.—Why should men study philosophy? The question is a natural one, for man is a rational being, and when the worth of a thing is not at once evident to him, he usually calls for proof of its worth. Our professional schools, with the exception of schools of theology, usually pay little attention to philosophical1 studies; but such studies occupy a strong position in our colleges, and a vast number of persons not students in the technical sense think it worth while to occupy themselves with them more or less. Wherever liberal studies are prosecuted2 they have their place, and it is an honored place. Is this as it should be?
Before we ask whether any given study is of practical value, it is wise to determine what the word "practical" shall be taken to mean. Shall we say that we may call practical only such learning as can be turned to direct account in earning money later? If we restrict the meaning of the word in this way, we seem to strike a blow at liberal studies in general.
Thus, no one would think of maintaining that the study of mathematics is not of practical value—sometimes and to some persons. The physicist3 and the engineer need to know a good deal about mathematics. But how is it with the merchant, the lawyer, the clergyman, the physician? How much of their algebra4, geometry, and trigonometry do these remember after they have become absorbed in the practice of their several callings, and how often do they find it necessary to use anything beyond certain simple rules of arithmetic?
Sometimes we are tempted5 to condemn6 the study of the classics as unpractical, and to turn instead to the modern languages and to the physical sciences. Now, it is, of course, a fair question to ask what should and what should not be regarded as forming part of a liberal education, and I shall make no effort to decide the question here. But it should be borne well in mind that one cannot decide it by determining what studies are practical in the sense of the word under discussion.
If we keep strictly7 to this sense, the modern languages are to the majority of Americans of little more practical value than are the Latin and Greek. We scarcely need them except when we travel abroad, and when we do that we find that the concierge8 and the waiter use English with surprising fluency9. As for the sciences, those who expect to earn a living through a knowledge of them, seek, as a rule, that knowledge in a technical or professional school, and the rest of us can enjoy the fruit of their labors10 without sharing them. It is a popular fallacy that because certain studies have a practical value to the world at large, they must necessarily have a practical value to every one, and can be recommended to the individual on that account. It is worth while to sit down quietly and ask oneself how many of the bits of information acquired during the course of a liberal education are directly used in the carrying on of a given business or in the practice of a given profession.
Nevertheless, we all believe that liberal education is a good thing for the individual and for the race. One must not too much restrict the meaning of the word "practical." A civilized11 state composed of men who know nothing save what has a direct bearing upon their especial work in life is an absurdity12; it cannot exist. There must be a good deal of general enlightenment and there must be a considerable number of individuals who have enjoyed a high measure of enlightenment.
This becomes clear if we consider the part played in the life of the state by the humblest tradesman. If he is to be successful, he must be able to read, write, and keep his accounts, and make, let us say, shoes. But when we have said this, we have summed him up as a workman, but not as a man, and he is also a man. He may marry, and make a good or a bad husband, and a good or a bad father. He stands in relations to his neighborhood, to the school, and to the church; and he is not without his influence. He may be temperate14 or intemperate15, frugal16 or extravagant17, law-abiding or the reverse. He has his share, and no small share, in the government of his city and of his state. His influence is indeed far-reaching, and that it may be an influence for good, he is in need of all the intellectual and moral enlightenment that we can give him. It is of the utmost practical utility to the state that he should know a vast number of things which have no direct bearing upon the making and mending of shoes.
And if this is true in the case of the tradesman, it is scarcely necessary to point out that the physician, the lawyer, the clergyman, and the whole army of those whom we regard as the leaders of men and the molders of public opinion have spheres of non-professional activity of great importance to the state. They cannot be mere18 specialists if they would. They must influence society for good or ill; and if they are ignorant and unenlightened, their influence cannot be good.
When we consider the life of man in a broad way, we see how essential it is that many men should be brought to have a share in what has been gained by the long travail19 of the centuries past. It will not do to ask at every step whether they can put to direct professional use every bit of information gained. Literature and science, sweetness and light, beauty and truth, these are the heritage of the modern world; and unless these permeate20 its very being, society must undergo degeneration. It is this conviction that has led to the high appreciation21 accorded by intelligent men to courses of liberal study, and among such courses those which we have recognized as philosophical must take their place.
81. WHY PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES ARE USEFUL.—But let us ask a little more specifically what is to be gained by pursuing distinctively22 philosophical studies. Why should those who go to college, or intelligent persons who cannot go to college, care to interest themselves in logic23 and ethics24, psychology25 and metaphysics? Are not these studies rather dry, in the first place, and rather profitless, in the second?
As to the first point, I should stoutly26 maintain that if they are dry, it is somebody's fault. The most sensational27 of novels would be dry if couched in the language which some philosophers have seen fit to use in expressing their thoughts. He who defines "existence" as "the still and simple precipitate28 of the oscillation between beginning to be and ceasing to be" has done his best to alienate29 our affections from the subject of his predilection30.
But it is not in the least necessary to talk in this way about matters philosophical. He who is not a slave to tradition can use plain and simple language. To be sure, there are some subjects, especially in the field of metaphysics, into which the student cannot expect to see very deeply at the outset of his studies. Men do not expect to understand the more difficult problems of mathematics without making a good deal of preparation; but, unhappily, they sometimes expect to have the profoundest problems of metaphysics made luminous31 to them in one or two popular lectures.
Philosophical studies are not dry, when men are properly taught, and are in a position to understand what is said. They deal with the most fascinating of problems. It is only necessary to pierce through the husk of words which conceals32 the thoughts of the philosopher, and we shall find the kernel33 palatable34, indeed. Nor are such studies profitless, to take up our second point. Let us see what we may gain from them.
Let us begin with logic—the traditional logic commonly taught to beginners. Is it worth while to study this? Surely it is. No one who has not tried to introduce the average under-graduate to logic can realize how blindly he uses his reasoning powers, how unconscious he is of the full meaning of the sentences he employs, how easily he may be entrapped35 by fallacious reasonings where he is not set on his guard by some preposterous36 conclusion touching37 matters with which he is familiar.
And he is not merely unconscious of the lapses38 in his processes of reasoning, and of his imperfect comprehension of the significance of his statements; he is unconscious also of the mass of inherited and acquired prejudices, often quite indefensible, which he unquestioningly employs as premises39.
He fairly represents the larger world beyond the walls of the college. It is a world in which prejudices are assumed as premises, and loose reasonings pass current and are unchallenged until they beget40 some unpalatable conclusion. It is a world in which men take little pains to think carefully and accurately41 unless they are dealing42 with something touching which it is practically inconvenient43 to make a mistake.
He who studies logic in the proper way is not filling his mind with useless facts; he is simply turning the light upon his own thinking mind, and realizing more clearly what he has always done rather blindly and blunderingly. He may completely forget the
"Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioque prioris,"
and he may be quite unable to give an account of the moods and figures of the syllogism44; but he cannot lose the critical habit if he once has acquired it, and he cannot but be on his guard against himself as well as against others.
There is a keen pleasure in gaining such insight. It gives a feeling of freedom and power, and rids one of that horrid45 sense that, although this or that bit of reasoning is certainly bad, it is impossible to tell just what is the matter with it. And as for its practical utility, if it is desirable to get rid of prejudice and confusion, and to possess a clear and reasonable mind, then anything that makes for this must be of value.
Of the desirability that all who can afford the luxury of a liberal education should do some serious reading in ethics, it seems hardly necessary to speak. The deficiencies of the ethics of the unreflective have already been touched upon in Chapter XVIII.
But I cannot forbear dwelling46 upon it again. What thoughtful man is not struck with the variety of ethical47 standards which obtain in the same community? The clergyman who has a strong sense of responsibility for the welfare of his flock is sometimes accused of not sufficiently48 realizing the importance of a frank expression of the whole truth about things; the man of science, whose duty it seems to be to peer into the mysteries of the universe, and to tell what he sees or what he guesses, is accused of an indifference49 to the effect which his utterances50 may have upon the less enlightened who hear him speak; many criticise51 the lawyer for a devotion to the interests of his client which is at times in doubtful harmony with the interests of justice in the larger sense; in the business world commercial integrity is exalted52, and lapses from the ethical code which do not assail53 this cardinal54 virtue55 are not always regarded with equal seriousness.
It is as though men elected to worship at the shrine56 of a particular saint, and were inclined to overlook the claims of others. For all this there is, of course, a reason; such things are never to be looked upon as mere accident. But this does not mean that these more or less conflicting standards are all to be accepted as satisfactory and as ultimate. It is inevitable57 that those who study ethics seriously, who really reflect upon ethical problems, should sometimes criticise the judgments58 of their fellow-men rather unfavorably.
Of such independent criticism many persons have a strong distrust. I am reminded here of an eminent60 mathematician61 who maintained that the study of ethics has a tendency to distort the student's judgments as to what is right and what is wrong. He had observed that there is apt to be some divergence62 of opinion between those who think seriously upon morals and those who do not, and he gave the preference to the unthinking majority.
Now, there is undoubtedly63 danger that the independent thinker may be betrayed into eccentricities64 of opinion which are unjustifiable and are even dangerous. But it seems a strange doctrine65 that it is, on the whole, safer not to think, but rather to drift on the stream of public opinion. In other fields we are not inclined to believe that the ignorant man, who has given no especial attention to a subject, is the one likely to be right. Why should it be so in morals?
That the youth who goes to college to seek a liberal education has a need of ethical studies becomes very plain when we come to a realization66 of the curious limitations of his ethical training as picked up from his previous experience of the world. He has some very definite notions as to right and wrong. He is as ready to maintain the desirability of benevolence67, justice, and veracity68, as was Bishop69 Butler, who wrote the famous "Analogy "; although, to be sure, he is most inarticulate when called upon to explain what constitutes benevolence, justice, or veracity. But the strangest thing is, that he seems to place some of the most important decisions of his whole life quite outside the realm of right and wrong.
He may admit that a man should not undertake to be a clergyman, unless he possesses certain qualifications of mind and character which evidently qualify him for that profession. But he does not see why he has not the right to become a wearisome professor or an incompetent70 physician, if he chooses to enter upon such a career. Is a man not free to take up what profession he pleases? He must take the risk, of course; but if he fails, he fails.
And when he is asked to consider from the point of view of ethics the question of marriage and its responsibilities, he is at first inclined to consider the whole subject as rather a matter for jest. Has a man not the right to marry or remain single exactly as he pleases? And is he not free to marry any one whom he can persuade to accept him? To be sure, he should be a little careful about marrying quite out of his class, and he should not be hopelessly careless about money matters. Thus, a decision, which may affect his whole life as much as any other that he can be called upon to make, which may practically make it or mar13 it, is treated as though it were not a matter of grave concern, but a private affair, entailing71 no serious consequences to any one and calling for no reflection.
I wish it could be said that the world outside of the college regarded these matters in another light. But the student faithfully represents the opinions current in the community from which he comes. And he represents, unhappily, the teachings of the stage and of the world of current fiction. The influence of these is too often on the side of inconsiderate passion, which stirs our sympathy and which lends itself to dramatic effect. With the writers of romance the ethical philosophers have an ancient quarrel.
It may be said: But the world gets along very well as it is, and without brooding too much upon ethical problems. To this we may answer: Does the world get along so very well, after all? Are there no evils that foresight72 and some firmness of character might have obviated73? And when we concern ourselves with the educated classes, at least, the weight of whose influence is enormous, is it too much to maintain that they should do some reading and thinking in the field of ethics? should strive to attain74 to clear vision and correct judgment59 on the whole subject of man's duties?
Just at the present time, when psychological studies have so great a vogue75, one scarcely feels compelled to make any sort of an apology for them. It is assumed on all hands that it is desirable to study psychology, and courses of lectures are multiplied in all quarters.
Probably some of this interest has its root in the fallacy touched upon earlier in this chapter. The science of psychology has revolutionized educational theory. When those of us who have arrived at middle life look back and survey the tedious and toilsome path along which we were unwillingly76 driven in our schoolboy days, and then see how smooth and pleasant it has been made since, we are impelled77 to honor all who have contributed to this result. Moreover, it seems very clear that teachers of all grades should have some acquaintance with the nature of the minds that they are laboring78 to develop, and that they should not be left to pick up their information for themselves—a task sufficiently difficult to an unobservant person.
These considerations furnish a sufficient ground for extolling79 the science of psychology, and for insisting that studies in it should form some part of the education of a teacher. But why should the rest of us care for such studies?
To this one may answer, in the first place, that nearly all of us have, or ought to have, some responsibility for the education of children; and, in the second, that we deal with the minds of others every day in every walk in life, and it can certainly do no harm to have our attention called to the way in which minds function. To be sure, some men are by nature tactful, and instinctively80 conscious of how things strike the minds of those about them. But even such persons may gain helpful suggestions, and, at least, have the habit of attention to the mental processes of others confirmed in them. How often we are impressed at church, at the public lecture, and in private conversations, with the fact that the speaker lives in blissful unconsciousness of what can be understood by or can possibly interest his hearers! For the confirmed bore, there is, perhaps, no cure; but it seems as though something might be done for those who are afflicted81 to a minor82 degree.
And this brings me to another consideration, which is that a proper study of psychology ought to be of service in revealing to a man his own nature. It should show him what he is, and this is surely a first step toward becoming something better. It is wonderful how blind men may be with regard to what passes in their own minds and with regard to their own peculiarities83. When they learn to reflect, they come to a clearer consciousness of themselves—it is as though a lamp were lighted within them. One may, it is true, study psychology without attaining84 to any of the good results suggested above; but, for that matter, there is no study which may not be pursued in a profitless way, if the teacher be sufficiently unskilled and the pupil sufficiently thoughtless.
82. METAPHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.—Perhaps it will be said: For such philosophical studies as the above a good defense85 may perhaps be made, but can one defend in the same way the plunge86 into the obscurities of metaphysics? In this field no two men seem to be wholly agreed, and if they were, what would it signify? Whether we call ourselves monists or dualists, idealists or realists, Lockians or Kantians, must we not live and deal with the things about us in much the same way?
Those who have dipped into metaphysical studies deeply enough to see what the problems discussed really are; who have been able to reach the ideas concealed87, too often, under a rather forbidding terminology88; who are not of the dogmatic turn of mind which insists upon unquestioned authority and is repelled89 by the uncertainties90 which must confront those who give themselves to reflective thought,—these will hardly need to be persuaded that it is desirable to give some attention to the question: What sort of a world, after all, is this world in which we live? What is its meaning?
To many men the impulse to peer into these things is over-powering, and the pleasure of feeling their insight deepen is extremely keen. What deters91 us in most instances is not the conviction that such investigations92 are not, or should not be, interesting, but rather the difficulty of the approach. It is not easy to follow the path which leads from the world of common thought into the world of philosophical reflection. One becomes bewildered and discouraged at the outset. Sometimes, after listening to the directions of guides who disagree among themselves, we are tempted to believe that there can be no certain path to the goal which we have before us.
But, whatever the difficulties and uncertainties of our task, a little reflection must show that it is not one which has no significance for human life.
Men can, it is true, eat and sleep and go through the routine of the day, without giving thought to science or religion or philosophy, but few will defend such an existence. As a matter of fact, those who have attained93 to some measure of intellectual and moral development do assume, consciously or unconsciously, some rather definite attitude toward life, and this is not independent of their conviction as to what the world is and means.
Metaphysical speculations94 run out into the philosophy of religion; and, on the other hand, religious emotions and ideals have again and again prompted men to metaphysical construction. A glance at history shows that it is natural to man to embrace some attitude toward the system of things, and to try to justify95 this by reasoning. Vigorous and independent minds have given birth to theories, and these have been adopted by others. The influence of such theories upon the evolution of humanity has been enormous.
Ideas have ruled and still rule the world, some of them very abstract ideas. It does not follow that one is uninfluenced by them, when one has no knowledge of their source or of their original setting. They become part of the intellectual heritage of us all, and we sometimes suppose that we are responsible for them ourselves. Has not the fact that an idealistic or a materialistic96 type of thought has been current at a particular time influenced the outlook on life of many who have themselves devoted97 little attention to philosophy? It would be interesting to know how many, to whom Spencer is but a name, have felt the influence of the agnosticism of which he was the apostle.
I say this without meaning to criticise here any of the types of doctrine referred to. My thesis is only that philosophy and life go hand in hand, and that the prying98 into the deeper mysteries of the universe cannot be regarded as a matter of no practical moment. Its importance ought to be admitted even by the man who has little hope that he will himself be able to attain to a doctrine wholly satisfactory and wholly unshakable.
For, if the study of the problems of metaphysics does nothing else for a given individual, it, at least, enables him to comprehend and criticise intelligently the doctrines99 which are presented for his acceptance by others. It is a painful thing to feel quite helpless in the face of plausible100 reasonings which may threaten to rob us of our most cherished hopes, or may tend to persuade us of the vanity of what we have been accustomed to regard as of highest worth. If we are quite unskilled in the examination of such doctrines, we may be captured by the loosest of arguments—witness the influence of Spencer's argument for the "Unknowable," in the "First Principles"; and if we are ignorant of the history of speculative101 thought, we may be carried away by old and exploded notions which pose as modern and impressive only because they have been given a modern dress.
We can, of course, refuse to listen to those who would talk with us. But this savors102 of bigotry103, and the world will certainly not grow wiser, if men generally cultivate a blind adherence104 to the opinions in which they happen to be brought up. A cautious conservatism is one thing, and blind obstinacy105 is another. To the educated man (and it is probable that others will have to depend on opinions taken at second hand) a better way of avoiding error is open.
Finally, it will not do to overlook the broadening influence of such studies as we are discussing. How dogmatically men are in the habit of expressing themselves upon those obscure and difficult problems which deal with matters that lie on the confines of human knowledge! Such an assumption of knowledge cannot but make us uncomprehending and unsympathetic.
There are many subjects upon which, if we hold an opinion at all, we should hold it tentatively, waiting for more light, and retaining a willingness to be enlightened. Many a bitter and fruitless quarrel might be avoided, if more persons found it possible to maintain this philosophical attitude of mind. Philosophy is, after all, reflection, and the reflective man must realize that he is probably as liable to error as are other men. He is not infallible, nor has the limit of human knowledge been attained in his day and generation. He who realizes this will not assume that his neighbor is always wrong, and he will come to have that wide, conscientious106 tolerance107, which is not indifference, but which is at the farthest remove from the zeal108 of mere bigotry.
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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prosecuted
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| a.被起诉的 | |
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physicist
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| n.物理学家，研究物理学的人 | |
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algebra
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| n.代数学 | |
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tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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concierge
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| n.管理员；门房 | |
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fluency
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| n.流畅，雄辩，善辩 | |
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labors
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| v.努力争取(for)( labor的第三人称单数 )；苦干；详细分析；（指引擎）缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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mar
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| vt.破坏，毁坏，弄糟 | |
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temperate
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| adj.温和的，温带的，自我克制的，不过分的 | |
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intemperate
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| adj.无节制的，放纵的 | |
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frugal
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| adj.节俭的，节约的，少量的，微量的 | |
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extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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mere
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travail
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| n.阵痛；努力 | |
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permeate
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| v.弥漫，遍布，散布；渗入，渗透 | |
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appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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distinctively
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| adv.特殊地，区别地 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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stoutly
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sensational
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precipitate
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alienate
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| vt.使疏远，离间；转让(财产等) | |
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predilection
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| n.偏好 | |
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luminous
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| adj.发光的，发亮的；光明的；明白易懂的；有启发的 | |
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conceals
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kernel
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| n.(果实的)核，仁；(问题)的中心，核心 | |
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palatable
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| adj.可口的，美味的；惬意的 | |
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entrapped
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| v.使陷入圈套，使入陷阱( entrap的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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preposterous
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| adj.荒谬的，可笑的 | |
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touching
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lapses
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| n.失误，过失( lapse的名词复数 )；小毛病；行为失检；偏离正道v.退步( lapse的第三人称单数 )；陷入；倒退；丧失 | |
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premises
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| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
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beget
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| v.引起；产生 | |
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accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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inconvenient
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| adj.不方便的，令人感到麻烦的 | |
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syllogism
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| n.演绎法，三段论法 | |
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horrid
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| adj.可怕的；令人惊恐的；恐怖的；极讨厌的 | |
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dwelling
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| n.住宅，住所，寓所 | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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utterances
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| n.发声( utterance的名词复数 )；说话方式；语调；言论 | |
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criticise
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| v.批评，评论；非难 | |
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exalted
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| adj.(地位等)高的，崇高的；尊贵的，高尚的 | |
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assail
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| v.猛烈攻击，抨击，痛斥 | |
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cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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shrine
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| n.圣地，神龛，庙；v.将...置于神龛内，把...奉为神圣 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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mathematician
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| n.数学家 | |
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divergence
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| n.分歧，岔开 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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eccentricities
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| n.古怪行为( eccentricity的名词复数 )；反常；怪癖 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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realization
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| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
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benevolence
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| n.慈悲，捐助 | |
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veracity
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| n.诚实 | |
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bishop
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| n.主教，（国际象棋）象 | |
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incompetent
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| adj.无能力的，不能胜任的 | |
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entailing
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| 使…成为必要( entail的现在分词 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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obviated
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| v.避免，消除（贫困、不方便等）( obviate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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Vogue
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| n.时髦，时尚；adj.流行的 | |
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unwillingly
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| adv.不情愿地 | |
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impelled
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| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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laboring
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| n.劳动，操劳v.努力争取(for)( labor的现在分词 )；苦干；详细分析；（指引擎）缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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extolling
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| v.赞美( extoll的现在分词 )；赞颂，赞扬，赞美( extol的现在分词 ) | |
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instinctively
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| adv.本能地 | |
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afflicted
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| 使受痛苦，折磨( afflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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peculiarities
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| n. 特质, 特性, 怪癖, 古怪 | |
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attaining
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的现在分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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plunge
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| v.跳入，(使)投入，(使)陷入；猛冲 | |
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concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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terminology
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| n.术语；专有名词 | |
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repelled
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| v.击退( repel的过去式和过去分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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uncertainties
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| 无把握( uncertainty的名词复数 )； 不确定； 变化不定； 无把握、不确定的事物 | |
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deters
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| v.阻止，制止( deter的第三人称单数 ) | |
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investigations
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| （正式的）调查( investigation的名词复数 )； 侦查； 科学研究； 学术研究 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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speculations
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| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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materialistic
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| a.唯物主义的，物质享乐主义的 | |
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devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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prying
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| adj.爱打听的v.打听，刺探（他人的私事）( pry的现在分词 )；撬开 | |
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99
doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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101
speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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102
savors
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| v.意味，带有…的性质( savor的第三人称单数 )；给…加调味品；使有风味；品尝 | |
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103
bigotry
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| n.偏见，偏执，持偏见的行为[态度]等 | |
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104
adherence
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| n.信奉，依附，坚持，固着 | |
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105
obstinacy
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| n.顽固；（病痛等）难治 | |
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106
conscientious
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| adj.审慎正直的，认真的，本着良心的 | |
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107
tolerance
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| n.宽容；容忍，忍受；耐药力；公差 | |
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zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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