78. THE PHILOSOPHICAL1 AND NON-PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES.—We have seen in the preceding chapters that certain of the sciences can scarcely be cultivated successfully in complete separation from philosophy. It has also been indicated in various places that the relation of other sciences to philosophy is not so close.
Thus, the sciences of arithmetic, algebra2, and geometry may be successfully prosecuted3 by a man who has reflected little upon the nature of numbers and who has never asked himself seriously what he means by space. The assumptions which he is justified4 in making, and the kind of operations which he has the right to perform, do not seem, as a rule, to be in doubt.
So it is also in the sciences of chemistry and physics. There is nothing to prevent the chemist or the physicist5 from being a philosopher, but he is not compelled to be one. He may push forward the investigations6 proper to his profession regardless of the type of philosophy which it pleases him to adopt. Whether he be a realist or an idealist, a dualist or a monist, he should, as chemist or physicist, treat the same sort of facts in the same sort of a way. His path appears to be laid out for him, and he can do work the value of which is undisputed by traveling quietly along it, and without stopping to consider consciously what kind of a path it is. There are many who work in this way, and they succeed in making important contributions to human knowledge.
Such sciences as these I call the non-philosophical sciences to distinguish them from the group of sciences I have been discussing at length. What marks them out is, that the facts with which the investigator8 has to deal are known by him with sufficient clearness to leave him usually in little doubt as to the use which he can make of them. His knowledge is clear enough for the purpose in hand, and his work is justified by its results. What is the relation of such sciences as these to philosophy?
79. THE STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES AND METHODS.—It is one thing to have the instinct of the investigator and to be able to feel one's way along the road that leads to new knowledge of a given kind, and it is another thing to have the reflective turn of mind that makes one clearly conscious of just what one has been doing and how one has been doing it. Men reasoned before there was a science of logic9, and the sciences made their appearance before what may be called the logic of the sciences had its birth.
"It may be truly asserted," writes Professor Jevons,[1] "that the rapid progress of the physical sciences during the last three centuries has not been accompanied by a corresponding advance in the theory of reasoning. Physicists10 speak familiarly of Scientific Method, but they could not readily describe what they mean by that expression. Profoundly engaged in the study of particular classes of natural phenomena11, they are usually too much engrossed12 in the immense and ever accumulating details of their special sciences to generalize upon the methods of reasoning which they unconsciously employ. Yet few will deny that these methods of reasoning ought to be studied, especially by those who endeavor to introduce scientific order into less successful and methodical branches of knowledge."
Professor Jevons suggests that it is lack of time and attention that prevents the scientific investigator from attaining13 to a clear conception of what is meant by scientific method. This has something to do with it, but I think we may also maintain that the work of the investigator and that of the critic are somewhat different in kind, and require somewhat different powers of mind. We find a parallel to this elsewhere. Both in literature and in art men may be in the best sense productive, and yet may be poor critics. We are often wofully disappointed when we attend a lecture on poetry by a poet, or one on painting by an artist.
It may be said: If what is maintained above regarding the possibility of prosecuting15 scientific researches without having recourse to reflective thought is true, why should the man of science care whether the principles and methods of the non-philosophical sciences are investigated or are merely taken for granted?
I answer: It should be observed that the statements made in the last section were somewhat guarded. I have used the expressions "as a rule" and "usually." I have spoken thus because one can work in the way described, without danger of error, only where a beaten track has been attained16 and is followed. In Chapter XVI it was pointed14 out that even in the mathematical sciences one may be forced to reflect upon the significance of one's symbols. As I write this, a pamphlet comes to hand which is concerned to prove that "every cause is potentially capable of producing several effects," and proves it by claiming that the square root of four ([square root symbol]4) is a cause which may have as effect either two (2) or minus two (-2).
Is this mathematical reasoning? Are mathematical relations ever those of cause and effect? And may one on the basis of such reasonings claim that in nature the relation of cause and effect is not a fixed17 and invariable one?
Even where there is a beaten track, there is some danger that men may wander from it. And on the confines of our knowledge there are fields in which the accepted road is yet to be established. Science makes constant use of hypotheses as an aid to investigation7. What hypotheses may one frame, and what are inadmissible? How important an investigation of this question may be to the worker in certain branches of science will be clear to one who will read with attention Professor Poincaré's brilliant little work on "Science and Hypothesis." [2]
There is no field in art, literature, or science in which the work of the critic is wholly superfluous18. "There are periods in the growth of science," writes Professor Pearson in his deservedly popular work, "The Grammar of Science," [3] "when it is well to turn our attention from its imposing19 superstructure and to examine carefully its foundations. The present book is primarily intended as a criticism of the fundamental concepts of modern science, and as such finds its justification20 in the motto placed upon its title-page." The motto in question is a quotation21 from the French philosopher Cousin: "Criticism is the life of science."
We have seen in Chapter XVI that a work on logic may be a comparatively simple thing. It may describe the ways in which men reason when they reason correctly, and may not go deep into metaphysical questions. On the other hand, it may be deeply metaphysical.
When we approach the part of logic which deals with the principles and methods of the sciences, this difference is forced upon our attention. One may set forth22 the assumptions upon which a science rests, and may describe the methods of investigation employed, without going much below the plane of common thought. As a type of such works I may mention the useful treatise23 by Professor Jevons cited earlier in this chapter.
On the other hand, our investigations may be more profound, and we may scrutinize24 the very foundations upon which a science rests. Both the other works referred to illustrate25 this method of procedure.
For example, in "The Grammar of Science," we find our author discussing, under the title "The Facts of Science," such problems as the following: the Reality of Things; Sense-impressions and Consciousness; the Nature of Thought; the External Universe; Sensations as the Ultimate Source of the Materials of Knowledge; and the Futility26 of "Things-in-themselves." The philosophical character of such discussions does not need to be pointed out at length.
[1] "The Principles Of Science," London, 1874, Preface.
[2] English translation, New York, 1905.
[3] Second edition, London, 1900.
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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algebra
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| n.代数学 | |
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prosecuted
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| a.被起诉的 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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physicist
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| n.物理学家，研究物理学的人 | |
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investigations
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| （正式的）调查( investigation的名词复数 )； 侦查； 科学研究； 学术研究 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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investigator
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| n.研究者，调查者，审查者 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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physicists
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| 物理学家( physicist的名词复数 ) | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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engrossed
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| adj.全神贯注的 | |
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attaining
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的现在分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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prosecuting
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| 检举、告发某人( prosecute的现在分词 )； 对某人提起公诉； 继续从事（某事物）； 担任控方律师 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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quotation
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| n.引文，引语，语录；报价，牌价，行情 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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scrutinize
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| n.详细检查，细读 | |
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illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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futility
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| n.无用 | |
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