In Professor Paulsen's "Introduction to Philosophy" (English translation, N.Y., 1895), there is an interesting introductory chapter on "The Nature and Import of Philosophy" (pp. 1-41). The author pleads for the old notion of philosophy as universal knowledge, though he does not, of course, mean that the philosopher must be familiar with all the details of all the sciences.
Section 6. In justification3 of the meaning given to the word "philosophy" in this section, I ask the reader to look over the list of courses in philosophy advertised in the catalogues of our leading universities at home and abroad. There is a certain consensus4 of opinion as to what properly comes under the title, even among those who differ widely as to what is the proper definition of philosophy.
CHAPTER II, sections 7-10. Read the chapter on "The Mind and the World in Common Thought and in Science" (Chapter I) in my "System of Metaphysics," N.Y., 1904.
One can be brought to a vivid realization5 of the fact that the sciences proceed upon a basis of assumptions which they do not attempt to analyze6 and justify7, if one will take some elementary work on arithmetic or geometry or psychology8 and examine the first few chapters, bearing in mind what philosophical10 problems may be drawn11 from the materials there treated. Section 11. The task of reflective thought and its difficulties are treated in the chapter entitled "How Things are Given in Consciousness" (Chapter III), in my "System of Metaphysics."
CHAPTER III, sections 12-13. Read "The Inadequacy12 of the Psychological Standpoint," "System of Metaphysics," Chapter II. I call especial attention to the illustration of "the man in the cell" (pp. 18 ff.). It would be a good thing to read these pages with the class, and to impress upon the students the fact that those who have doubted or denied the existence of the external material world have, if they have fallen into error, fallen into a very natural error, and are not without some excuse.
Section 14. See "The Metaphysics of the Telephone Exchange," "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XXII, where Professor Pearson's doctrine14 is examined at length, with quotations15 and references.
It is interesting to notice that a doubt of the external world has always rested upon some sort of a "telephone exchange" argument; naturally, it could not pass by that name before the invention of the telephone, but the reasoning is the same. It puts the world at one remove, shutting the mind up to the circle of its ideas; and then it doubts or denies the world, or, at least, holds that its existence must be proved in some roundabout way. Compare Descartes, "Of the Existence of Material Things," "Meditations16," VI.
CHAPTER IV, sections 15-18. See Chapters VI and VII, "What we mean by the External World," and "Sensations and 'Things,'" in my "System of Metaphysics." In that work the discussion of the distinction between the objective order of experience and the subjective17 order is completed in Chapter XXIII, "The Distinction between the World and the Mind." This was done that the subjective order might be treated in the part of the book which discusses the mind and its relation to matter.
As it is possible that the reader may be puzzled by differences of expression which obtain in the two books, a word of explanation is not out of place.
In the "Metaphysics," for example, it is said that sensations so connect themselves together as to form what we call the system of material things (p. 105). It is intimated in a footnote that this is a provisional statement and the reader is referred to later chapters. Now, in the present book (sections 16-17), it is taught that we may not call material things groups of sensations.
The apparent contradiction is due to the fact that, in this volume, the full meaning of the word "sensation" is exhibited at the outset, and sensations, as phenomena18 of the subjective order, are distinguished19 from the phenomena of the objective order which constitute the external world. In the earlier work the word "sensation" was for a while used loosely to cover all our experiences that do not belong to the class called imaginary, and the distinction between the subjective and objective in this realm was drawn later (Chapter XXIII).
I think the present arrangement is the better one, as it avoids from the outset the suggestion that the real world is something subjective—our sensations or ideas—and thus escapes the idealistic flavor which almost inevitably20 attaches to the other treatment, until the discussion is completed, at least.
CHAPTER V, sections 10-21. See Chapters VIII and IX, "System of Metaphysics," "The Distinction between Appearance and Reality" and "The Significance of the Distinction."
Section 22. See Chapter XXVI, "The World as Unperceived, and the 'Unknowable,'" where Spencer's doctrine is examined at length, and references are given. I think it is very important that the student should realize that the "Unknowable" is a perfectly21 useless assumption in philosophy, and can serve no purpose whatever.
CHAPTER VI, sections 23-25. See Chapters X and XI, "System of Metaphysics," "The Kantian Doctrine of Space" and "Difficulties connected with the Kantian Doctrine of Space."
It would be an excellent thing for the student, after he has read the above chapters, to take up Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," and read and analyze the argument of Antinomies I and II, with the Observations appended. One can understand these arguments without being familiar with the "Critique" as a whole; at any rate, the account of Kant's philosophy contained in section 51 of this book will serve to explain his use of certain terms, such as "the laws of our sensibility."
Kant's reasonings are very curious and interesting in this part of his book. It seems to be proved that the world must be endless in space and without a beginning or end in time, and just as plausibly22 proved that it cannot be either. It seems to be proved that finite spaces and times are infinitely23 divisible, and at the same time that they cannot be infinitely divisible. The situation is an amusing one, and rendered not the less amusing by the seriousness with which the mutually destructive arguments are taken.
When the student meets such a tangle25 in the writings of any philosopher, I ask him to believe that it is not the human reason that is at fault—at least, let him not assume that it is. The fault probably lies with a human reason.
Section 26. See Chapter XII, "The Berkeleian Doctrine of Space," in my "System of Metaphysics." The argument ought not to be difficult to one who has mastered Chapter V of this volume.
CHAPTER VII, sections 27-29. Compare Chapter XIII, "System of Metaphysics," "Of Time."
With the chapters on Space and Time it would be well for the student to read Chapter XIV, "The Real World in Space and Time," where it is made clear why we have no hesitation26 in declaring space and time to be infinite, although we recognize that it seems to be an assumption of knowledge to declare the material world infinite.
CHAPTER VIII, sections 30-32. Read, in the "System of Metaphysics," Chapters V and XVII, "The Self or Knower" and "The Atomic Self."
Section 33. The suggestions, touching27 the attitude of the psychologist toward the mind, contained in the preface to Professor William James's "Psychology" are very interesting and instructive.
CHAPTER IX, sections 35-36. For a strong argument in favor of interactionism see James's "Psychology," Chapter V. I wish the student would, in reading it, bear in mind what is said in my chapter on "The Atomic Self," above referred to. The subject should be approached with an open mind, and one should suspend judgment29 until both sides have been heard from.
Section 37. Descartes held that the lower animals are automata and that their actions are not indicative of consciousness; he regarded their bodies as machines lacking the soul in the "little pineal gland30." Professor Huxley revived the doctrine of animal automatism and extended it so as to include man. He regarded consciousness as a "collateral31 product" of the working of the body, related to it somewhat as is the steam-whistle of a locomotive engine to the working of the machine. He made it an effect, but not a cause, of motions. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XVIII, "The Automaton32 Theory: its Genesis."
We owe the doctrine of parallelism, in its original form, to Spinoza. It was elaborated by W. K. Clifford, and to him the modern interest in the subject is largely due. The whole subject is discussed at length in my "System of Metaphysics," Chapters XIX-XXI. The titles are: "The Automaton Theory: Parallelism," "What is Parallelism?" and "The Man and the Candlestick." Clifford's doctrine is presented in a new form in Professor Strong's recent brilliant work, "Why the Mind has a Body" N.Y., 1903.
Section 38. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XXIV, "The Time and Place of Sensations and Ideas."
CHAPTER X, sections 40-42. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapters XXVII and XXVIII, "The Existence of Other Minds," and "The Distribution of Minds."
Writers seem to be divided into three camps on this question of other minds.
(1) I have treated our knowledge of other minds as due to an inference. This is the position usually taken.
(2) We have seen that Huxley and Clifford cast doubts upon the validity of the inference, but, nevertheless, made it. Professor Strong, in the work mentioned in the notes to the previous chapter, maintains that it is not an inference, and that we do not directly perceive other minds, but that we are assured of their existence just the same. He makes our knowledge an "intuition" in the old-fashioned sense of the word, a something to be accepted but not to be accounted for.
(3) Writers who have been influenced more or less by the Neo-Kantian or Neo-Hegelian doctrine are apt to speak as though we had the same direct evidence of the existence of other minds that we have of the existence of our own. I have never seen a systematic33 and detailed34 exposition of this doctrine. It appears rather in the form of hints dropped in passing. A number of such are to be found in Taylor's "Elements of Metaphysics."
Section 43. The "Mind-stuff" doctrine is examined at length and its origin discussed in Chapter XXXI of the "System of Metaphysics," "Mental Phenomena and the Causal Nexus35." It is well worth while for the student to read the whole of Clifford's essay "On the Nature of Things-in-themselves," even if he is pressed for time.
CHAPTER XI, section 44. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XV, "The World as Mechanism36."
Section 45. See Chapter XXXI, "The Place of Mind in Nature."
Section 46. For a definition of Fatalism, and a description of its difference from the scientific doctrine of Determinism, see Chapter XXXIII, "Fatalism, 'Freewill' and Determinism." For a vigorous defense37 of "Freewill" (which is not, in my opinion, free will at all, in the common acceptation of the word) see Professor James's Essay on "The Dilemma38 of the Determinist," in his volume, "The Will to Believe."
Fatalism and Determinism are constantly confused, and much of the opposition39 to Determinism is attributable to this confusion.
Section 47. See Chapter XXXII, "Mechanism and Teleology40."
CHAPTER XII, section 48. The notes to Chapter III (see above) are in point here. It is well worth the student's while to read the whole of Chapter XI, Book IV, of Locke's "Essay." It is entitled "Of our Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things." Notice the headings of some of his sections:—
Section 1. "It is to be had only by sensation."
Section 2. "Instance whiteness of this paper."
Section 3. "This, though not so certain as demonstration41, yet may be called 'Knowledge,' and proves the existence of things without us."
Locke's argument proceeds, as we have seen, on the assumption that we perceive external things directly,—an assumption into which he slips unawares,—and yet he cannot allow that we really do perceive directly what is external. This makes him uncomfortably conscious that he has not absolute proof, after all. The section that closes the discussion is entitled: "Folly42 to expect demonstration in everything."
Section 49. I wish that I could believe that every one of my readers would sometime give himself the pleasure of reading through Berkeley's "Principles of Human Knowledge" and his "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous." Clearness of thought, beauty of style, and elevation43 of sentiment characterize them throughout.
The "Principles" is a systematic treatise44. If one has not time to read it all, one can get a good idea of the doctrine by running through the first forty-one sections. For brief readings in class, to illustrate45 Berkeley's reasoning, one may take sections 1-3, 14, 18-20, and 38.
The "Dialogues" is a more popular work. As the etymology46 of the names in the title suggests, we have in it a dispute between a man who pins his faith to matter and an idealist. The aim of the book is to confute skeptics and atheists from the standpoint of idealism.
For Hume's treatment of the external world, see his "Treatise of Human
Nature," Part IV, section 2. For his treatment of the mind, see Part
IV, section 6.
Section 50. Reid repeats himself a great deal, for he gives us asseveration rather than proof. One can get the gist28 of his argument by reading carefully a few of his sections. It would be a good exercise to read in class, if time permitted, the two sections of his "Inquiry47" entitled "Of Extension" (Chapter V, section 5), and "Of Perception in General" (Chapter VI, section 20).
Section 51. For an account of the critical Philosophy, see Falckenberg's "History of Modern Philosophy" (English translation, N.Y., 1893). Compare with this the accounts in the histories of philosophy by Ueberweg and H?ffding (English translation of the latter, London, 1900). Full bibliographies48 are to be found especially in Ueberweg.
It is well to look at the philosophy of Kant through more than one pair
of eyes. Thus, if one reads Morris's "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason"
(Chicago, 1882), one should read also Sidgwick's "Lectures on the
Philosophy of Kant" (N.Y., 1905).
CHAPTER XIII, section 52. It is difficult to see how Hamilton could regard himself as a "natural" realist (the word is employed by him). See his "Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII, where he develops his doctrine. He seems to teach, in spite of himself, that we can know directly only the impressions that things make on us, and must infer all else: "Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is, thus, only relative; of existence, absolutely and in itself, we know nothing."
Whom may we regard as representing the three kinds of "hypothetical realism" described in the text? Perhaps we may put the plain man, who has not begun to reflect, in the first class. John Locke is a good representative of the second; see the "Essay concerning Human Understanding," Book II, Chapter VIII. Herbert Spencer belonged to the third while he wrote Chapter V of his "First Principles of Philosophy."
Section 53. I have said enough of the Berkeleian idealism in the notes on Chapter XII. As a good illustration of objective idealism in one of its forms I may take the doctrine of Professor Royce; see his address, "The Conception of God" (N.Y., 1902).
Mr. Bradley's doctrine is criticised in Chapter XXXIV (entitled "Of
God"), "System of Metaphysics."
CHAPTER XIV, section 55. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XVI, "The Insufficiency of Materialism51."
Section 56. Professor Strong's volume, "Why the Mind has a Body" (N.Y., 1903), advocates a panpsychism much like that of Clifford. It is very clearly written, and with Clifford's essay on "The Nature of Things-in-themselves," ought to give one a good idea of the considerations that impel52 some able men to become panpsychists.
Section 57. The pantheistic monism of Spinoza is of such importance historically that it is desirable to obtain a clear notion of its meaning. I have discussed this at length in two earlier works: "The Philosophy of Spinoza" (N.Y., 1894) and "On Spinozistic Immortality53." The student is referred to the account of Spinoza's "God or Substance" contained in these. See, especially, the "Introductory Note" in the back of the first-mentioned volume.
Professor Royce is a good illustration of the idealistic monist; see the volume referred to in the note above (section 53). His "Absolute," or God, is conceived to be an all-inclusive mind of which our finite minds are parts.
Section 58. Sir William Hamilton's dualism is developed in his "Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII. He writes: "Mind and matter, as known or knowable, are only two different series of phenomena or qualities; as unknown and unknowable, they are the two substances in which these two different series of phenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere. The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are compelled to make, from the existence of known phenomena; and the distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming incompatibility54 of the two series of phenomena to coinhere in one."
CHAPTER XV, section 60. The reader will find Descartes's path traced in the "Meditations." In I, we have his sweeping55 doubt; in II, his doctrine as to the mind; in III, the existence of God is established; in VI, he gets around to the existence of the external world. We find a good deal of the "natural light" in the first part of his "Principles of Philosophy."
Section 61. We have an excellent illustration of Locke's inconsistency in violating his own principles and going beyond experience, in his treatment of "Substance." Read, in his "Essay," Book I, Chapter IV, section 18, and Book II, Chapter XXIII, section 4. These sections are not long, and might well be read and analyzed56 in class.
Section 62. See the note to section 51.
Section 64. I write this note (in 1908) to give the reader some idea of later developments of the doctrine called pragmatism. There has been a vast amount printed upon the subject in the last two or three years, but I am not able to say even yet that we have to do with "a clear-cut doctrine, the limits and consequences of which have been worked out in detail." Hence, I prefer to leave section 64 as I first wrote it, merely supplementing it here.
We may fairly consider the three leaders of the pragmatic movement to be Professor William James, Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, and Professor John Dewey. The first has developed his doctrine at length in his volume entitled "Pragmatism" (London, 1907); the second, who calls his doctrine "Humanism," but declares himself a pragmatist, and in essential agreement with Professor James, has published two volumes of philosophical essays entitled "Humanism" (London, 1903) and "Studies in Humanism" (London, 1907); the third has developed his position in the first four chapters of the "Studies in Logical Theory" (Chicago, 1903).
Professor James, in his "Pragmatism" (Lecture II), says that pragmatism, at the outset, at least, stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas, and no doctrines57 save its method. This method means:
"The attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts." He remarks further, however, that pragmatism has come to be used also in a wider sense, as signifying a certain theory of truth (pp. 54-55). This theory is brought forward in Lecture VI.
The theory maintains that: "True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate58, corroborate59, and verify. False ideas are those that we can not" (p. 201). This sounds as though Professor James abandoned his doctrine touching the Turk and the Christian60 mentioned in section 64.
But what do the words "verification" and "validation61" pragmatically mean? We are told that they signify certain practical consequences of the verified and validated62 idea. Our ideas may be said to "agree" with reality when they lead us, through acts and other ideas which they instigate63, up to or towards other parts of experience with which we feel that the original ideas remain in agreement. "The connections and transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive, harmonious64, satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's verification" (p. 202).
Thus, we do not seem to be concerned with verification in the sense in which the word has usually been employed heretofore. The tendency to take as true what is useful or serviceable has not been abandoned. That Professor James does not really leave his Turk in the lurch65 becomes clear to any one who will read his book attentively66 and note his reasons for taking the various pragmatic attitudes which he does take. See, for example, his pragmatic argument for "free-will." The doctrine is simply assumed as a doctrine of "relief" (pp. 110-121).
Briefly67 stated, Dr. Schiller's doctrine is that truths are man-made, and that it is right for man to consult his desires in making them. It is in substantial harmony with the pragmatism of Professor James, and I shall not dwell upon it. Dr. Schiller's essays are very entertainingly written.
Professor Dewey's pragmatism seems to me sufficiently68 different from the above to merit another title. In the "Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods," Volume IV, No. 4, Professor Dewey brings out the distinction between his own position and that of Professor James.
To the periodical literature on pragmatism I cannot refer in detail.
Professor James defends his position against misconceptions in the
"Philosophical Review," Volume XVII, No. 1. See, on the other side,
Professor Perry, in the "Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and
Scientific Methods," Volume IV, pp. 365 and 421; Professor Hibben,
"Philosophical Review," XVII, 4; and Dr. Carus, "The Monist," July,
1908.
CHAPTER XVI, sections 65-68. To see how the logicians have regarded their science and its relation to philosophy, see; Keynes's "Formal Logic13" (London, 1894), Introduction; Hobhouse's "Theory of Knowledge" (London, 1896), Introduction; Aikins's "The Principles of Logic" (N.Y., 1902), Introduction; and Creighton's "Introductory Logic" (N.Y., 1898), Preface.
Professor Aikins writes: "Thus, in so far as logic tries to make us reason correctly by giving us correct conceptions of things and the way in which their relations involve each other, it is a kind of simple metaphysics studied for a practical end."
Professor Creighton says, "Although in treating the syllogistic69 logic I have followed to a large extent the ordinary mode of presentation, I have both here, and when dealing70 with the inductive methods, endeavored to interpret the traditional doctrines in a philosophical way, and to prepare for the theoretical discussions of the third part of the book."
John Stuart Mill tried not to be metaphysical; but let the reader examine, say, his third chapter, "Of the Things denoted by Names," or look over Book VI, in his "System of Logic."
Professor Sigwart's great work, "Logik" (Freiburg, 2d edition, Volume
I, 1889, Volume II, 1893), may almost be called a philosophy of logic.
CHAPTER XVII, section 69. Compare with Professor James's account of the scope of psychology the following from Professor Baldwin: "The question of the relation of psychology to metaphysics, over which a fierce warfare71 has been waged in recent years, is now fairly settled by the adjustment of mutual24 claims. . . . The terms of the adjustment of which I speak are briefly these: on the one hand, empirical investigation72 must precede rational interpretation73, and this empirical investigation must be absolutely unhampered by fetters74 of dogmatism and preconception; on the other hand, rational interpretation must be equally free in its own province, since progress from the individual to the general, from the detached fact to its universal meaning, can be secured only by the judicious75 use of hypotheses, both metaphysical and speculative76. Starting from the empirical we run out at every step into the metempirical." "Handbook of Psychology," Preface, pp. iii and iv.
CHAPTER XVIII, section 71. The teacher might very profitably take extracts from the two chapters of Whewell's "Elements of Morality" referred to in the text, and read them with the class. It is significant of the weakness of Whewell's position that he can give us advice as long as we do not need it, but, when we come to the cross-roads, he is compelled to leave the matter to the individual conscience, and gives us no hint of a general principle that may guide us.
Section 72. Wundt, in his volume "The Facts of the Moral Life" (N.Y., 1897), tries to develop an empirical science of ethics77 independent of metaphysics; see the Preface.
Compare with this: Martineau's "Types of Ethical78 Theory" (London, 1885), Preface; T. H. Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics," Introduction; Muirhead's "The Elements of Ethics" (N.Y., 1892); Mackenzie's "A Manual of Ethics" (London, 1893); Jodl's "Gesduchte der Ethik" (Stuttgart, 1882), Preface. I give but a few references, but they will serve to illustrate how close, in the opinion of ethical writers, is the relation between ethics and philosophy.
CHAPTER XIX, section 74. The student who turns over the pages of several works on metaphysics may be misled by a certain superficial similarity that is apt to obtain among them. One sees the field mapped out into Ontology (the science of Being or Reality), Rational Cosmology, and Rational Psychology. These titles are mediaeval landmarks79 which have been left standing49. I may as well warn the reader that two men who discourse80 of Ontology may not be talking about the same thing at all. Bear in mind what was said in section 57 of the different ways of conceiving the "One Substance"; and bear in mind also what was said in Chapter V of the proper meaning of the word "reality."
I have discarded the above titles in my "System of Metaphysics," because I think it is better and less misleading to use plain and unambiguous language.
Section 75. See the note to Chapter XVI.
CHAPTER XX, sections 76-77. One can get an idea of the problems with which the philosophy of religion has to deal by turning to my "System of Metaphysics" and reading the two chapters entitled "Of God," at the close of the book. It would be interesting to read and criticise50 in class some of the theistic arguments that philosophers have brought forward. Quotations and references are given in Chapter XXXIV.
CHAPTER XXI, sections 78-79. What is said of the science of logic, in Chapter XVI, has, of course, a bearing upon these sections. I suggest that the student examine a few chapters of "The Grammar of Science"; the book is very readable.
CHAPTER XXII, sections 80-82. The reader will find in lectures I and II in Sir William Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics" a discussion of the utility of philosophy. It has a pleasant, old-fashioned flavor, and contains some good thoughts. What is said in Chapters XVI-XXI of the present volume has a good deal of bearing upon the subject. See especially what is said in the chapters on logic, ethics, and the philosophy of religion.
CHAPTER XXIII, sections 83-87. There is a rather brief but good and thoughtful discussion of the importance of historical study to the comprehension of philosophical doctrines in Falckenberg's "History of Modern Philosophy" (English translation, N.Y., 1893); see the Introduction.
We have a good illustration of the fact that there may be parallel streams of philosophic9 thought (section 87) when we turn to the Stoics81 and the Epicureans. Zeno and Epicurus were contemporaries, but they were men of very dissimilar character, and the schools they founded differed widely in spirit. Zeno went back for his view of the physical world to Heraclitus, and for his ethics to the Cynics. Epicurus borrowed his fundamental thoughts from Democritus.
On the other hand, philosophers may sometimes be regarded as links in the one chain. Witness the series of German thinkers: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer; or the series of British thinkers: Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill. Herbert Spencer represents a confluence82 of the streams. The spirit of his doctrine is predominantly British; but he got his "Unknowable" from Kant, through Hamilton and Mansel.
At any point in a given stream there may be a division. Thus, Kant was awakened83 to his creative effort by Hume. But Mill is also the successor of Hume, and more truly the successor, for he carries on the traditional way of approaching philosophical problems, while Kant rebels against it, and heads a new line.
CHAPTER XXIV, sections 88-93. I hardly think it is necessary for me to comment upon this chapter. The recommendations amount to this: that a man should be fair-minded and reasonable, free from partisanship84, cautious, and able to suspend judgment where the evidence is not clear; also that where the light of reason does not seem to him to shine brightly and to illumine his path as he could wish, he should be influenced in his actions by the reflection that he has his place in the social order, and must meet the obligations laid upon him by this fact. When the pragmatist emphasizes the necessity of accepting ideals and living by them, he is doing us a service. But we must see to it that he does not lead us into making arbitrary decisions and feeling that we are released from the duty of seeking for evidence. Read together sections 64, 91, and 93.
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justification
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consensus
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realization
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justify
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infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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tangle
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| n.纠缠；缠结；混乱；v.(使)缠绕；变乱 | |
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hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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gist
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| n.要旨；梗概 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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gland
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| n.腺体，(机)密封压盖，填料盖 | |
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collateral
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| adj.平行的；旁系的；n.担保品 | |
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automaton
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| n.自动机器，机器人 | |
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systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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nexus
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| n.联系；关系 | |
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mechanism
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| n.机械装置；机构，结构 | |
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defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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dilemma
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| n.困境，进退两难的局面 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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teleology
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| n.目的论 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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elevation
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| n.高度；海拔；高地；上升；提高 | |
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treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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etymology
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| n.语源；字源学 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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bibliographies
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| （有关某一专题或某一作者的著作的）书目( bibliography的名词复数 )； 书志学，文献学 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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criticise
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| v.批评，评论；非难 | |
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materialism
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| n.［哲］唯物主义，唯物论；物质至上 | |
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impel
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| v.推动；激励，迫使 | |
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immortality
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| n.不死，不朽 | |
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incompatibility
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| n.不兼容 | |
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sweeping
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| adj.范围广大的，一扫无遗的 | |
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analyzed
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| v.分析( analyze的过去式和过去分词 )；分解；解释；对…进行心理分析 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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validate
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| vt.（法律）使有效，使生效 | |
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corroborate
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| v.支持，证实，确定 | |
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Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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validation
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| n.确认 | |
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validated
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| v.证实( validate的过去式和过去分词 )；确证；使生效；使有法律效力 | |
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instigate
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| v.教唆，怂恿，煽动 | |
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harmonious
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| adj.和睦的，调和的，和谐的，协调的 | |
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lurch
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| n.突然向前或旁边倒；v.蹒跚而行 | |
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attentively
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| adv.聚精会神地；周到地；谛；凝神 | |
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briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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syllogistic
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| adj.三段论法的，演绎的，演绎性的 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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fetters
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| n.脚镣( fetter的名词复数 )；束缚v.给…上脚镣，束缚( fetter的第三人称单数 ) | |
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judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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landmarks
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| n.陆标( landmark的名词复数 )；目标；（标志重要阶段的）里程碑 ~ (in sth)；有历史意义的建筑物（或遗址） | |
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discourse
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| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
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stoics
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| 禁欲主义者，恬淡寡欲的人，不以苦乐为意的人( stoic的名词复数 ) | |
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confluence
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| n.汇合，聚集 | |
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awakened
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| v.（使）醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
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Partisanship
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| n. 党派性, 党派偏见 | |
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