[Pg 174]
Nietzsche opens "Beyond Good and Evil" with a long chapter headed "Prejudices of Philosophers," in which he outlines the course to be taken by his dialectic. The exposition is accomplished12 by two methods: first, by an analysis and a refutation of the systems of thinking made use of by antecedent doctrinaires, and secondly13, by defining the hypotheses on which his own philosophy is built. This chapter is a most important one, setting forth14, as it does, the rationale of his doctrine8 of the will to power. It has been impossible to make extracts of any unified15 sequence from this chapter because of its intricate and compact reasoning, and the student would do well to read it in its entirety. It establishes Nietzsche's philosophic16 position and presents a closely knit explanation of the course pursued in the following chapters. The relativity of all truth—the hypothesis so often assumed in his previous work—Nietzsche here defends by analogy and argument. Using other leading forms of philosophy as a ground for exploration, he questions the absolutism of truth and shows wherein lies the difficulty of a final definition. Here we become conscious of that plasticity of mind which was the dominating quality of his thinking. It is not, however, that form of plasticity which on inspection17 resolves itself into amorphic and unstable18 reasoning, but a logical, almost scientific, method of valuing. The mercurial20 habits of the metaphysicians who deny absolutism are nowhere discernible in Nietzsche's thought. His mind is definite without being static. The basis of his argumentation is what one might call floating. It rises and falls with the human tide of causation; yet the structure built upon it remains21 at all times upright and unchanged.
Nietzsche points out that the numerous "logical"[Pg 175] conclusions of philosophers have been for the most part a priori propositions, the results of prejudices or desires, and that the syllogistic22 structures reared to them came as explanations and defences, rather than as dialectic preambles23. In their adopting a hypothetical truth as a premise24, he sees only the advocacy for a point of view, arguing that in order to erect25 a system of logic19 the initial thesis must be proved. Therefore he questions the fundamental worth of certainty as opposed to uncertainty26, and of truth as opposed to falsity, thus striking at the very foundations reared by those philosophers who have assumed, without substantiation27, that only certainty and truth are valuable. Nietzsche calls these absolutists astute28 defenders29 of prejudices, and characterises the verbalistic prestidigitation of Kant as a highly developed form of prejudice-defending. Spinoza, with his mathematical system of reasoning, likewise falls in the category of those thinkers who first assume conclusions and then prepare explanations for them by a process of inverted31 reasoning. Nietzsche proceeds to pose the instinctive32 functions against conscious thinking. He asserts that the channels taken by thought are defined by the thinker's nature, and that even logic is influenced by physiological33 considerations. The whole fabric34 of philosophic thought is held up to the light of immediate35 necessity.
Going further, he inquires into the "impulse to knowledge." He finds that a specific purpose has always been the actuating force of any philosophy, and that consequently philosophy, even in its most abstract form, has had a residuum of autobiography36 in it. In fine, that philosophy, far from being a search, has been an aim toward a definite preconceived result. The moral or[Pg 176] ethical37 impulse, being always imperious, has not infrequently resulted in philosophising, and in all such cases knowledge has been used as an instrument. Thus knowledge which led to a philosophical38 conclusion has been the outgrowth of a personal instinct. In those cases where an impersonal39 "impulse to knowledge" may have existed, it has led, not into philosophical channels, but into practical and often commercial activities. The scholar has ever remained personal in his quest for philosophical formulas. In Kant's "Table of Categories," wherein that philosopher claimed to have found the faculty40 of synthetic41 judgment42 a priori, Nietzsche finds only a circle of reasoning which begins and ends in personal instinct. And in Kant's discovery of a new moral faculty, Nietzsche sees only sophistical invention, and accounts for its widespread acceptance by the moral state of the Germans at that period. Ignoring the possibility of synthetic judgments43 a priori, Nietzsche advances the query44 as to their necessity, and lays stress on the impracticability of truth without belief. The inherent falsity or truth of a proposition has no bearing on philosophical doctrines so long as a contrary belief is present, a belief such as we exert toward the illusions of the world of reality when we make practical use of that world's perspective.
The schemes of personal philosophy, such, for instance, as we find in Schopenhauer, are dealt with by Nietzsche in a single paragraph: "When I analyse the process that is expressed in the sentence, 'I think,' I find a whole series of daring assertions, the argumentative proof of which would be difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance, that it is I who think, that there must necessarily[Pg 177] be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an 'ego,' and finally, that it is already determined45 what is to be designated by thinking—that I know what thinking is. For if I had not already decided46 within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps 'willing' or 'feeling'? In short, the assertion 'I think,' assumes that I compare my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is: on account of this retrospective connection with further 'knowledge,' it has at any rate no immediate certainty for me." Thus the smug materialistic47 philosopher finds himself necessitated48 to fall back on purely49 metaphysical explanations for answers to the questions arising out of his definition of truth.
Locke falls under a critical survey in this chapter. In answer to this thinker's theory regarding the origin of ideas, Nietzsche names the great cycles of philosophical systems and calls attention to the similarity of processes in such cycles. Furthermore, he shows that the foundations of all previous philosophies are discoverable in the new styles of contemporaneous thought. And in those national schools of philosophy conceived in languages which stem from the same origin, he finds an undeniable resemblance. All of which leads to a conclusion incompatible50 with Locke's theory. Nietzsche attacks the conclusions of the physicists51, denying them any place in philosophy because their research consists solely52 in interpretations54 of natural laws in accordance with their own prejudices and beliefs. The theories which might be[Pg 178] deduced from natural phenomena55 are not discoverable in their doctrines; their activities have consisted in twisting natural events to suit preconceived valuations.
Finally Nietzsche inquires into the habits and practices of psychologists. Not even among these workers does he find a basis for philosophy. Psychology56, he argues, has been guided, not by a detached and lofty desire to ascertain57 truth in its relation to the human mind, but by prejudices and fears grounded in moral considerations. He finds a constant desire on the part of experimenters to account for "good" impulses as distinguished58 from "bad" ones. And in this desire lies the superimposing of moral prejudices on a science which, more than all others, deals with problems farthest removed from moral influences. These prejudices in psychology, as well as in all branches of philosophy, are the obstacles which stand in the way of any deep penetration59 into the motives60 beneath human conduct. Nietzsche, in his analyses and criticisms, is not solely destructive: he is subterraneously61 constructing his own philosophical system founded on the will to power. This phrase is used many times in the careful research of the first chapter. As the book proceeds, this doctrine develops.
Nietzsche's best definition of what he calls the "free spirit," namely: the thinking man, the intellectual aristocrat62, the philosopher and ruler, is contained in the twenty-six pages of the second chapter of "Beyond Good and Evil." In a series of paragraphs—longer than is Nietzsche's wont—the leading characteristics of this superior man are described. The "free spirit," however, must not be confused with the superman. The former is the "bridge" which the present-day man must cross in the process of surpassing himself. In the delineation[Pg 179] and analysis of him, as presented to us here, we can glimpse his most salient mental features. Heretofore, as in "Thus Spake Zarathustra," he has been but partially63 and provisionally defined. Now his instincts and desires, his habits and activities are outlined. Furthermore, we are given an explanation of his relation to the inferior man and to the organisms of his environment. The chapter is an important one, for at many points it is a subtle elucidation of many of Nietzsche's dominant64 philosophic principles. By inference, the differences of class distinction are strictly65 drawn66. The slave-morality (sklavmoral) and the master-morality (herrenmoral), though as yet undefined, are balanced against each other; and the deportmental standards of the masters and slaves are defined by way of differentiating67 between these two opposing human factions68. While the serving class is constantly manifesting its need of a guiding dogma, the ruling class is constantly approaching the state wherein the arbitrary moral mandates69 are denied. Nietzsche sees a new order of philosophers appearing—men who will stand beyond good and evil, who will be not only free spirits, "but something more, higher, greater, and fundamentally different." In describing these men of the future, of which the present free men are the heralds70 and forerunners71, Nietzsche establishes an individualistic ideal which he develops fully73 in later chapters.
A keen and far-reaching analysis of the various aspects assumed by religious faith constitutes a third section of "Beyond Good and Evil." Though touching74 upon various influences of Christianity, this section is more general in its religious scope than even "The Antichrist," many indications of which are to be found here. This chapter has to do with the numerous inner experiences of man,[Pg 180] which are directly or indirectly76 attributable to religious doctrines. The origin of the instinct for faith itself is sought, and the results of this faith are balanced against the needs of the individuals and of the race. The relation between religious ecstasy77 and sensuality; the attempt on the part of religious practitioners78 to arrive at a negation79 of the will; the transition from religious gratitude80 to fear; the psychology at the bottom of saint-worship;—to problems such as these Nietzsche devotes his energies in his inquiry81 of the religious mood. The geographical82 considerations which enter into the character and intensity83 of religious faith form an important basis for study; and the differences between Comte's sociology and Sainte-Beuve's anti-Jesuit utterances84 are explained from a standpoint of national influences. Nietzsche examines the many phases of atheism85 and the principal anti-Christian75 tendencies of all philosophy since Descartes. There is an illuminating86 exposition of the important stages in religious cruelty and of the motives underlying87 the various forms of religious sacrifices. Again we run upon the doctrine of eternal recurrence88, but here, as elsewhere, it may be regarded, not as a basic element in Nietzsche's philosophical scheme, but as a by-product89 of his thought. Nietzsche emphasises the necessity of idleness in all religious lives, and shows how the adherence90 to the religious mood works against the activities, both of mind and of body, which make for the highest efficiency.
A very important phase of Nietzsche's teaching is contained in this criticism of the religious life. The detractors of the Nietzschean doctrine, almost without exception, base their judgments on the assumption that the universal acceptation of his theories would result in social chaos91. As I have pointed92 out before, Nietzsche desired[Pg 181] no such general adoption93 of his beliefs. In his bitterest diatribes94 against Christianity, his object was not to shake the faith of the great majority of mankind in their idols95. He sought merely to free the strong men from the restrictions97 of a religion which fitted the needs of only the weaker members of society. He neither hoped nor desired to wean the mass of humanity from Christianity or any similar dogmatic comfort. On the contrary, he denounced those superficial atheists who endeavoured to weaken the foundations of religion. He saw the positive necessity of such religions as a basis for his slave morality, and in the present chapter he exhorts98 the rulers to preserve the religious faith of the serving classes, and to use it as a means of government—as an instrument in the work of disciplining and educating. In paragraph 61 he says: "The selecting and disciplining influence—destructive as well as creative and fashioning—which can be exercised by means of religion is manifold and varied99, according to the sort of people placed under its spell and protection." Not only is this an expression of the utilitarian100 value of religious formulas, but a definite voicing of one of the main factors in his philosophy. His entire system of ethics is built on the complete disseverance of the dominating class and the serving class; and his doctrine of "beyond good and evil" should be considered only as it pertains101 to the superior man. To apply it to all classes would be to reduce Nietzsche's whole system of ethics to impracticability, and therefore to an absurdity102.
Passing from a consideration of the religious mood, Nietzsche enters a broader sphere of ethical research, and endeavours to trace the history and development of morals. He accuses the philosophers of having avoided[Pg 182] the real problem of morality, namely: the testing of the faith and motives which lie beneath moral beliefs. This is the task he sets for himself, and in his chapter, "The Natural History of Morals," he makes an examination of moral origins—an examination which is extended into an exhaustive treatise103 in "The Genealogy104 of Morals." However, his dissection105 here is carried out on a broader and far more general scale than in his previous books, such as "Human, All-Too-Human" and "The Dawn of Day." Heretofore he had confined himself to codes and systems, to acts of morality and immorality, to judgments of conducts. In "Beyond Good and Evil" he treats of moral prejudices as forces working hand in hand with human progress. In addition, there is a definite attitude of constructive106 thinking here which is absent from his earlier work. He outlines the course to be taken by the men of the future, and points to the results which have accrued107 from the moralities of modern nations. He offers the will to power in place of the older "will to belief," and characterises the foundations of acceptance for all moral codes as "fictions" and "premature108 hypotheses." He defines the racial ideals which have grown up out of moral influences, and, applying them to the needs of the present day, finds them inadequate109 and dangerous. The conclusion to which his observations and analyses point is that, unless the rulers of the race take a stand beyond the outposts of good and evil and govern on a basis of expediency110 divorced from all moral influences, the individual is in constant danger of being lowered to the level of the gregarious111 conscience.
In the chapter, "We Scholars," Nietzsche continues his definition of the philosopher, whom he holds to be the highest type of man. Besides being a mere96 description[Pg 183] of the intellectual traits of this "free spirit," the chapter is also an exposition of the shortcomings of those modern men who pose as philosophers. In the path of these new thinkers Nietzsche sees many difficulties both from within and from without, and points out methods whereby these obstacles may be overcome. Also the man of science and the man of genius are analyzed112 and weighed as to their relative importance in the community. In fact, we have here Nietzsche's most concise113 and complete definition of the individuals upon whom rests the burden of progress. These valuations of the intellectual leaders are important to the student, for by one's understanding them, along with the reasons for such valuations, a comprehension of the ensuing volumes is facilitated. Nietzsche hereby establishes the qualities of those entitled to the master-morality code; and, by thus drawing the line of demarcation in humanity, he defines at the same time that class whose constitutions and predispositions demand the slave-morality. In addition, he affixes115, according to his philosophical formula, a scale of values to such mental attributes as objectivity, power to will, scepticism, positivity and constraint116.
Important material touching on many of the fundamental points of Nietzsche's philosophy is embodied117 in the chapter entitled "Our Virtues118." The more general inquiries120 into conduct and the research along the broader lines of ethics are supplanted121 by inquiries into specific moral attributes. The current virtues are questioned, and their historical significance is determined. The value of such virtues is tested in their relation to different types of men. Sacrifice, sympathy, brotherly love, service, loyalty122, altruism123 and similar ideals of conduct are examined, and the results of such virtues are shown to be[Pg 184] incompatible with the demands of modern social intercourse124. Nietzsche poses against these virtues the sterner and more rigid125 forms of conduct, pointing out wherein they meet with the present requirements of human progress. The chapter is a preparation for his establishment of a new morality and also an explanation of the dual72 ethical code which is one of the main pillars in his philosophical structure. Before presenting his precept126 of a dual morality, Nietzsche endeavours to determine woman's place in the political and social scheme, and points out the necessity, not only of individual feminine functioning, but of the preservation127 of a distinct polarity in sexual relationship.
In the final chapter many of Nietzsche's philosophical ideas take definite shape. The doctrine of slave-morality and master-morality, prepared for and partially defined in preceding chapters, is here directly set forth, and those virtues and attitudes which constitute the "nobility" of the master class are specifically defined. Nietzsche designates the duty of his aristocracy, and segregates128 the human attributes according to the rank of individuals. The Dionysian ideal, which underlies129 all the books that follow "Beyond Good and Evil," receives its first direct exposition and application. The hardier130 human traits such as egotism, cruelty, arrogance131, retaliation132 and appropriation133 are given ascendency over the softer virtues such as sympathy, charity, forgiveness, loyalty and humility134, and are pronounced necessary constituents135 in the moral code of a natural aristocracy. At this point is begun the transvaluation of values which was to have been completed in "The Will to Power." The student should read carefully this chapter, for it is an introduction as well as an explanation[Pg 185] for what follows, and was written with that purpose in view.
EXCERPTS136 FROM "BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL"
To recognise untruth as a condition of life: that is certainly to impugn137 the traditional ideas of value in a dangerous manner, and a philosophy which ventures to do so, has thereby138 alone placed itself beyond good and evil. 9
Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal139 instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength—life itself is Will to Power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results thereof. 20
It is the business of the very few to be independent; it is the privilege of the strong. And whoever attempts it, even with the best right, but without being obliged to do so, proves that he is probably not only strong, but also daring beyond measure. 43
The virtues of the common man would perhaps mean vice11 and weakness in a philosopher; it might be possible for a highly developed man, supposing him to degenerate140 and go to ruin, to acquire qualities thereby alone, for the sake of which he would have to be honoured as a saint in the lower world into which he had sunk. 44
Books for the general reader are always ill-smelling books, the odour of paltry141 people clings to them. Where the populace eat and drink, and even where they reverence142, it is accustomed to stink143. One should not go into churches if one wishes to breathe pure air. 44
"Will" can naturally only operate on "will"—and[Pg 186] not on "matter" (not on "nerves," for instance): in short, the hypothesis must be hazarded, whether will does not operate on will wherever "effects" are recognised—and whether all mechanical action, inasmuch as a power operates therein, is not just the power of will, the effect of will. Granted, finally, that we succeed in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification144 of one fundamental form of will—namely, the Will to Power, as my thesis puts it; granted that all organic functions could be traced back to this Will to Power, and that the solution of the problem of generation and nutrition—it is one problem—could also be found therein: one would thus have acquired the right to define all active force unequivocally as Will to Power. The world seen from within, the world defined and designated according to its "intelligible145 character"—it would simply be "Will to Power," and nothing else. 52
Happiness and virtue119 are no arguments. It is willingly forgotten, however, even on the part of thoughtful minds, that to make unhappy and to make bad are just as little counter-arguments. A thing could be true, although it were in the highest degree injurious and dangerous; indeed, the fundamental constitution of existence might be such that one succumbed146 by a full knowledge of it—so that the strength of a mind might be measured by the amount of "truth" it could endure—or to speak more plainly, by the extent to which it required truth attenuated147, veiled, sweetened, damped, and falsified. 53-54
Everything that is profound loves the mask; the profoundest things have a hatred148 even of figure and likeness149. Should not the contrary only be the right disguise for the shame of a God to go about in? 54-55
One must renounce151 the bad taste of wishing to agree[Pg 187] with many people. "Good" is no longer good when one's neighbour takes it into his mouth. And how could there be a "common good." The expression contradicts itself; that which can be common is always of small value. In the end things must be as they are and have always been—the great things remain for the great, the abysses for the profound, the delicacies152 and thrills for the refined, and, to sum up shortly, everything rare for the rare. 57-58
In every country of Europe, and the same in America, there is at present ... a very narrow, prepossessed, enchained class of spirits.... Briefly153 and regrettably, they belong to the levellers, these wrongly named "free spirits"—as glib-tongued and scribe-fingered slaves of the democratic taste and its "modern ideas"; all of them men without solitude154, without personal solitude, blunt honest fellows to whom neither courage nor honourable155 conduct ought to be denied; only, they are not free, and are ludicrously superficial, especially in their innate156 partiality for seeing the cause of almost all human misery157 and failure in the old forms in which society has hitherto existed—a notion which happily inverts158 the truth entirely159. 53-59
We believe that severity, violence, slavery, danger in the street and in the heart, secrecy160, stoicism, tempter's art and revelry of every kind,—that everything wicked, terrible, tyrannical, predatory, and serpentine161 in man, serves as well for the elevation162 of the human species as its opposite.... 59
The Christian faith from the beginning, is sacrifice: the sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of spirit; it is at the same time subjection, self-derision, and self-mutilation. 65
The mightiest163 men have hitherto always bowed reverently164 before the saint, as the enigma165 of self-subjugation166[Pg 188] and utter voluntary privation.—Why did they thus bow? They divined in him—and as it were behind the questionableness167 of his frail168 and wretched appearance—the superior force which wished to test itself by such a subjugation; the strength and love of power, and knew how to honour it: they honoured something in themselves when they honoured the saint.... The mighty169 ones of the world learned to have a new fear before him, they divined a new power, a strange, still unconquered enemy:—it was the "Will to Power" which obliged them to halt before the saint. 70-71
Perhaps the most solemn conceptions that have caused the most fighting and suffering, the conceptions "God" and "sin," will one day seem to us of no more importance than a child's plaything or a child's pain seems to an old man.... 75
To love mankind for God's sake—this has so far been the noblest and remotest sentiment to which mankind has attained170. 79
For those who are strong and independent, destined171 and trained to command, in whom the judgment and skill of a ruling race is incorporated, religion is an additional means for overcoming, betraying and surrendering to the former the conscience of the latter, their inmost heart, which would fain escape obedience172. 80
Asceticism173 and Puritanism are almost indispensable means of educating and ennobling a race which seeks to rise above its hereditary174 baseness and work itself upward to future supremacy175. And finally, to ordinary men, to the majority of the people, who exist for service and general utility, and are only so far entitled to exist, religion gives invaluable176 contentedness177 with their lot and condition, peace of heart, ennoblement of obedience, additional[Pg 189] social happiness and sympathy, with something of transfiguration and embellishment, something of justification178 of all the commonplaceness, all the meanness, all the semi-animal poverty of their souls. 81
"Knowledge for its own sake"—that is the last snare179 laid by morality: we are thereby completely entangled180 in morals once more. 85
He who attains181 his ideal, precisely182 thereby surpasses it. 86
Sympathy for all—would be harshness and tyranny for thee, my good neighbour! 88
To be ashamed of one's immorality is a step on the ladder at the end of which one is ashamed also of one's morality. 89
A discerning one might easily regard himself at present as the animalisation of God. 90
Not their love of humanity, but the impotence of their love, prevents the Christians183 of to-day—burning us. 91
There is no such thing as moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation53 of phenomena. 91
The criminal is often enough not equal to his deed: he extenuates184 and maligns185 it. 91
The great epochs of our life are at the points when we gain courage to rebaptise our badness as the best in us. 92
It is a curious thing that God learned Greek when he wished to turn author—and that he did not learn it better. 93 Even concubinage has been corrupted—by marriage. 93
A nation is a detour186 of nature to arrive at six or seven great men—Yes, and then to get round them. 94
From the senses originate all trustworthiness, all good conscience, all evidence of truth. 95
Our vanity would like what we do best to pass[Pg 190] precisely for what is most difficult to us.—Concerning the origin of many systems of morals. 96
When a woman has scholarly inclinations187 there is generally something wrong with her sexual nature. Barrenness itself conduces to a certain virility188 of taste; man, indeed, if I may say so, is "the barren animal." 96
That which an age considers evil is usually an unseasonable echo of what was formerly189 considered good—the atavism of an old ideal. 97
What is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil. 98
Objection, evasion190, joyous191 distrust, and love of irony192 are signs of health; everything absolute belongs to pathology. 98
The Jews—-a people "born for slavery," as Tacitus and the whole ancient world say of them; "the chosen people among the nations," as they themselves say and believe—the Jews performed the miracle of the inversion193 of valuations, by means of which life on earth obtained a new and dangerous charm for a couple of millenniums. Their prophets fused into one the expressions "rich," "godless," "wicked," "violent," "sensual," and for the first time coined the word "world" as a term of reproach. In this inversion of valuations (in which is also included the use of the word "poor" as synonymous with "saint" and "friend") the significance of the Jewish people is to be found; it is with them that the slave-insurrection in morals commences. 117
The beast of prey194 and the man of prey (for instance, C?sar Borgia) are fundamentally misunderstood, "nature" is misunderstood, so long as one seeks a "morbidness195" in the constitution of these healthiest of all tropical monsters and growths.... 118
[Pg 191]
All the systems of morals which address themselves to individuals with a view to their "happiness," as it is called—what else are they but suggestions for behaviour adapted to the degree of danger from themselves in which the individuals live; recipes for their passions, their good and bad propensities196 in so far as such have the Will to Power and would like to play the master; small and great expediencies and elaborations, permeated197 with the musty odour of old family medicines and old-wife wisdom; all of them grotesque198 and absurd in their form—because they address themselves to "all," because they generalise where generalisation is not authorised; all of them speaking unconditionally199, and taking themselves unconditionally; all of them flavoured not merely with one grain of salt, but rather endurable only, and sometimes even seductive, when they are over-spiced and begin to smell dangerously, especially of "the other world." 118-119
In view ... of the fact that obedience has been most practised and fostered among mankind hitherto, one may reasonably suppose that, generally speaking, the need thereof is now innate in every one, as a kind of formal conscience. ... 120
The history of the influence of Napoleon is almost the history of the higher happiness to which the entire century has attained in its worthiest200 individuals and periods. 121
As long as the utility which determines moral estimates is only gregarious utility, as long as the preservation of the community is only kept in view, and the immoral4 is sought precisely and exclusively in what seems dangerous to the maintenance of the community, there can be no "morality of love to one's neighbour." 123
"Love of our neighbour," is always a secondary matter,[Pg 192] partly conventional and arbitrarily manifested in relation to our fear of our neighbour. 123
Everything that elevates the individual above the herd201, and is a source of fear to the neighbour, is henceforth called evil; the tolerant, unassuming, self-adapting, self-equalising disposition114, the mediocrity of desires, attains to moral distinction and honour. 125
The democratic movement is the inheritance of the Christian movement. 127
We, who regard the democratic movement, not only as a degenerating202 form of political organisation203, but as equivalent to a degenerating, a waning204 type of man, as involving his mediocrising and depreciation205: where have we to fix our hopes? In new philosophers—there is no other alternative: in minds strong and original enough to initiate206 opposite estimates of value, to transvalue and invert30 "eternal valuations"; in forerunners, in men of the future, who in the present shall fix the constraints207 and fasten the knots which will compel millenniums to take new paths. To teach men the future of humanity as his will, as depending on human will, and to make preparation for vast hazardous208 enterprises and collective attempts in rearing and educating, in order thereby to put an end to the frightful209 rule of folly210 and chance which has hitherto gone by the name of "history" (the folly of the "greatest number" is only its last form)—for that purpose a new type of philosophers and commanders will some time or other be needed, at the very idea of which everything that has existed in the way of occult, terrible, and benevolent211 beings might look pale and dwarfed212. 128-129
The universal degeneracy of mankind to the level of the "man of the future"—as idealised by the socialistic[Pg 193] fools and shallow-pates—this degeneracy and dwarfing213 of man to an absolutely gregarious animal (or as they call it, to a man of "free society"), this brutalising of man into a pigmy with equal rights and claims, is undoubtedly214 possible! He who has thought out this possibility to its ultimate conclusion knows another loathing215 unknown to the rest of mankind—and perhaps also a new mission!130-131
Supposing ... that in the picture of the philosophers of the future, some trait suggests the question whether they must not perhaps be sceptics in the last-mentioned sense, something in them would only be designated thereby—and not they themselves. With equal right they might call themselves critics; and assuredly they will be men of experiments.... They will be sterner (and perhaps not always towards themselves only) ... they will not deal with the "truth" in order that it may "please" them, or "elevate" and "inspire" them—they will rather have little faith in "truth" bringing with it such revels216 for the feelings. They will smile, those rigorous spirits, when any one says in their presence: "that thought elevates me, why should it not be true?" or; "that artist enlarges me, why should he not be great?" Perhaps they will not only have a smile, but a genuine disgust for all that is thus rapturous, idealistic, feminine and hermaphroditic; and if any one could look into their inmost heart, he would not easily find therein the intention to reconcile "Christian sentiments" with "antique taste," or even with "modern parliamentarism" (the kind of reconciliation217 necessarily found even amongst philosophers in our very uncertain and consequently very conciliatory century). Critical discipline, and every habit that conduces to purity and rigour in intellectual matters,[Pg 194] will not only be demanded from themselves by these philosophers of the future; they may even make a display thereof as their special adornment—nevertheless they will not want to be called critics on that account. It will seem to them no small indignity218 to philosophy to have it decreed, as is so welcome nowadays, that "philosophy itself is criticism and critical science—and nothing else whatever!" 149-151
The real philosophers ... are commanders and law-givers; they say: "Thus shall it be." They determine first the Whither and the Why of mankind, and thereby set aside the previous labour of all philosophical workers, and all subjugators of the past—they grasp at the future with a creative hand, and whatever is and was, becomes for them thereby a means, an instrument, and a hammer. Their "knowing" is creating, their creating is a law-giving, their will to truth is—Will to Tower. ... 152
At present ... when throughout Europe the herding219 animal alone attains to honours, and dispenses220 honours, when "equality of right" can too readily be transformed into equality in wrong: I mean to say into general war against everything rare, strange, and privileged, against the higher man, the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, the creative plenipotence and lordliness—at present it belongs to the conception of "greatness" to be noble, to wish to be apart, to be capable of being different, to stand alone, to have to live by personal initiative; and the philosopher will betray something of his own ideal when he asserts: "He shall be the greatest who can be the most solitary221, the most concealed222, the most divergent, the man beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, and of superabundance of will;[Pg 195] precisely this shall be called greatness: as diversified223 as can be entire, as ample as can be full." 154-155
Morality as attitude is opposed to our taste nowadays. This is also an advance, as it was an advance in our fathers that religion as an attitude finally became opposed to their taste.... 161
The practice of judging and condemning224 morally is the favourite revenge of the intellectually shallow on those who are less so.... 162
Whoever has really offered sacrifice knows that he wanted and obtained something for it—perhaps something from himself for something from himself; that he relinquished225 here in order to have more there, perhaps in general to be more, or even feel himself "more." 164
Wherever sympathy (fellow-suffering) is preached nowadays ... let the psychologist have his ears open: through all the vanity, through all the noise which is natural to these preachers (as to all preachers), he will hear a hoarse226, groaning227, genuine note of self-contempt. 165
We are prepared as no other age has ever been for a carnival228 in the grand style, for the most spiritual festival-laughter and arrogance, for the transcendental height of supreme229 folly and Aristophanic ridicule230 of the world. Perhaps we are still discovering the domain231 of our invention just here, the domain where even we can still be original, probably as parodists of the world's history and as God's Merry-Andrews,—perhaps, though nothing else of the present have a future, our laughter itself may have a future! 168
The discipline of suffering, of great suffering—know ye not that it is only this discipline that has produced all the elevations232 of humanity hitherto? 171
It is desirable that as few people as possible should[Pg 196] reflect upon morals, and consequently it is very desirable that morals should not some day become interesting! 174
Not one of those ponderous233, conscience-stricken herding-animals (who undertake to advocate the cause of egoism as conducive234 to the general welfare) wants to have any knowledge or inkling of the facts that the "general welfare" is no ideal, no goal, no notion that can be at all grasped, but is only a nostrum,—that what is fair to one may not at all be fair to another, that the requirement of one morality for all is really a detriment235 to higher men, in short, that there is a distinction of rank between man and man, and consequently between morality and morality. 175
That which constitutes the painful delight of tragedy is cruelty; that which operates agreeably in so-called tragic236 sympathy, and at the basis even of everything sublime237, up to the highest and most delicate thrills of metaphysics, obtains its sweetness solely from the intermingled ingredient of cruelty. 177
Enlightenment hitherto has fortunately been men's affair, men's gift—we remained therewith "among ourselves"; and in the end, in view of all that women write about "woman," we may well have considerable doubt as to whether woman really desires enlightenment about herself—and can desire it. If woman does not thereby seek a new ornament238 for herself—I believe ornamentation belongs to the eternally feminine?—why, then, she wishes to make herself feared; perhaps she thereby wishes to get the mastery. But she does not want truth—what does woman care for truth. From the very first nothing is more foreign, more repugnant, or more hostile to woman than truth—her great art is falsehood, her chief concern is appearance and beauty. 183
[Pg 197]
It betrays corruption239 of the instincts—apart from the fact that it betrays bad taste—when a woman refers to Madame Roland, or Madame de Sta?l, or Monsieur George Sand, as though something were proved thereby in favour of "woman as she is." Among men, these are the three comical women as they are—nothing more—and just the best involuntary counter-arguments against feminine emancipation240 and autonomy. 184
Stupidity in the kitchen; woman as cook; the terrible thoughtlessness with which the feeding of the family and the master of the house is managed. Woman does not understand what food means, and she insists on being cook. If woman had been a thinking creature, she should certainly, as cook for thousands of years, have discovered the most important physiological facts, and should likewise have got possession of the healing art. Through bad female cooks—through the entire lack of reason in the kitchen—the development of mankind has been longest retarded241 and most interfered242 with, 184-185
To be mistaken in the fundamental problem of "man and woman," to deny here the profoundest antagonism243 and the necessity for an eternally hostile tension, to dream here perhaps of equal rights, equal training, equal claims and obligations: that is a typical sign of shallow-mindedness; and a thinker who has proved himself shallow at this dangerous spot—shallow in instinct—may generally be regarded as suspicious, nay244 more, as betrayed, as discovered: he will probably prove too "short" for all fundamental questions of life, future as well as present, and will be unable to descend245 into any of the depths. On the other hand, a man who has depth of spirit as well as of desires, and has also the depth of benevolence246 which is capable of severity and harshness, and easily[Pg 198] confounded with them, can only think of woman as Orientals do: he must conceive of her as a possession, as confinable property, as a being predestined for service and accomplishing her mission therein.... 186-187
The weaker sex has in no previous age been treated with so much respect by men as at present—this belongs to the tendency and fundamental taste of democracy, in the same way as disrespectfulness to old age—what wonder is it that abuse should be immediately made of this respect? They want more, they learn to make claims, the tribute of respect is at last felt to be well-nigh galling247.... 187
Wherever the industrial spirit has triumphed over the military and aristocratic spirit, woman strives for the economic and legal independence of a clerk: "woman as clerkess" is inscribed248 on the portal of the modern society which is in course of formation. While she thus appropriates new rights, aspires249 to be "master," and inscribes250 "progress" of woman on her flags and banners, the very opposite realises itself with terrible obviousness: woman retrogrades. Since the French Revolution the influence of woman in Europe has declined in proportion as she has increased her rights and claims; and the "emancipation of woman," in so far as it is desired and demanded by women themselves (and not only by masculine shallow-pates), thus proves to be a remarkable251 symptom of the increased weakening and deadening of the most womanly instincts. There is stupidity in this movement, an almost masculine stupidity, of which a well-reared woman—who is always a sensible woman—might be heartily252 ashamed. 187-188
Every elevation of the type "man," has hitherto been the work of an aristocratic society—and so will it always[Pg 199] be—a society believing in a long scale of gradations of rank and differences of worth among human beings, and requiring slavery in some form or other. 223
The essential thing ... in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it should not regard itself as a function either of the kingship or the commonwealth253, but as the significance and highest justification thereof—that it should therefore accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, for its sake, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society is not allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher existence. ... 225
Life itself is essentially254 appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion255 of peculiar256 forms, incorporation257, and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation.... 226
People now rave258 everywhere, even under the guise150 of science, about coming conditions of society in which "the exploiting character" is to be absent:—that sounds to my ears as if they promised to invent a mode of life which should refrain from all organic functions. "Exploitation" does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and primitive259 society; it belongs to the nature of the living being as a primary organic function; it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is precisely the Will to Life. 226
In a tour through the many finer and coarser moralities which have hitherto prevailed or still prevail on the earth, I found certain traits recurring260 regularly together and[Pg 200] connected with one another, until finally two primary types revealed themselves to me, and a radical261 distinction was brought to light. There is master-morality and slave-morality;—I would at once add, however, that in all higher and mixed civilisations, there are also attempts at the reconciliation of the two moralities; but one finds still oftener the confusion and mutual262 misunderstanding of them, indeed, sometimes their close juxtaposition—even in the same man, within one soul. 227
The noble type of man regards himself as a determiner of values; he does not require to be approved of; he passes the judgment: "What is injurious to me is injurious in itself"; he knows that it is he himself only who confers honour on things; he is a creator of values. He honours whatever he recognises in himself: such morality is self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of plenitude, of power, which seeks to overflow263, the happiness of high tension, the conscientiousness264 of a wealth which would fain give and bestow:—the noble man also helps the unfortunate, but not—or scarcely—out of pity, but rather from an impulse generated by the superabundance of power. The noble man honours in himself the powerful one, him also who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and how to keep silence, who takes pleasure in subjecting himself to severity and hardness, and has reverence for all that is severe and hard. 229
A morality of the ruling class ... is ... especially foreign and irritating to present-day taste in the sternness of its principle that one has duties only to one's equals; that one may act towards beings of a lower rank, towards all that is foreign, just as seems good to one, or "as the heart desires," and in any case "beyond good and evil": it is here that sympathy and similar sentiments[Pg 201] can have a place. The ability and obligation to exercise prolonged gratitude and prolonged revenge—both only within the circle of equals,—artfulness in retaliation, raffinement of the idea in friendship, a certain necessity to have enemies as outlets265 for the emotions of envy, quarrelsomeness, arrogance—in fact, in order to be a good friend: all these are typical characteristics of the noble morality. 229-230
Slave-morality is essentially the morality of utility. Here is the seat of the origin of the famous antithesis266 "good" and "evil":—power and dangerousness are assumed to reside in the evil, a certain dreadfulness, subtlety267, and strength, which do not admit of being despised. According to slave-morality, therefore, the "evil" man arouses fear; according to master-morality, it is precisely the "good" man who arouses fear and seeks to arouse it, while the bad man is regarded as the despicable being. The contrast attains its maximum when, in accordance with the logical consequences of slave-morality, a shade of depreciation—it may be slight and well-intentioned—at last attaches itself even to the "good" man of this morality; because, according to the servile mode of thought, the good man must in any case be the safe man: he is good-natured, easily deceived, perhaps a little stupid, un bonhomme. Everywhere that slave-morality gains the ascendency, language shows a tendency to approximate the significations of the words "good" and "stupid."—A last fundamental difference: the desire for freedom, the instinct for happiness and the refinements268 of the feeling of liberty belong as necessarily to slave-morals and morality, as artifice269 and enthusiasm in reverence and devotion are the regular symptoms of an aristocratic mode of thinking and estimating. 231
[Pg 202]
A species originates, and a type becomes established and strong in the long struggle with essentially constant unfavourable conditions. On the other hand, it is known by the experience of breeders that species which receive superabundant nourishment270, and in general a surplus of protection and care, immediately tend in the most marked way to develop variations, and are fertile in prodigies271 and monstrosities (also in monstrous272 vices). 234
I submit that egoism belongs to the essence of a noble soul, I mean the unalterable belief that to a being such as "we," other beings must naturally be in subjection, and have to sacrifice themselves. 240
Woman would like to believe that love can do everything—it is the superstition273 peculiar to her. Alas274, he who knows the heart finds out how poor, helpless, pretentious275, and blundering even the best and deepest love is—he finds that it rather destroys than saves! 246
Signs of nobility: never to think of lowering our duties to the rank of duties for everybody; to be unwilling276 to renounce or to share our responsibilities; to count our prerogatives277, and the exercise of them, among our duties. 249
A man strives after great things, looks upon every one whom he encounters on his way either as a means of advance, or a delay and hindrance—or as a temporary resting-place. 249
If one wishes to praise at all, it is a delicate and at the same time a noble self-control, to praise only where one does not agree.... 254
All society makes one somehow, somewhere, or sometimes—"commonplace." 254-255
The noble soul has reverence for itself. 256
A man who can conduct a case, carry out a resolution,[Pg 203] remain true to an opinion, keep hold of a woman, punish and overthrow278 insolence279; a man who has his indignation and his sword, and to whom the weak, the suffering, the oppressed, and even the animals willingly submit and naturally belong; in short, a man who is a master by nature—when such a man has sympathy, well, that sympathy has value! 259
I would even allow myself to rank philosophers according to the quality of their laughing—up to those who are capable of golden laughter. 260
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1
animated
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| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
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gut
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| n.[pl.]胆量；内脏；adj.本能的；vt.取出内脏 | |
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elucidation
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| n.说明，阐明 | |
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immoral
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| adj.不道德的，淫荡的，荒淫的，有伤风化的 | |
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immorality
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| n. 不道德, 无道义 | |
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formulate
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| v.用公式表示；规划；设计；系统地阐述 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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unified
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| (unify 的过去式和过去分词)； 统一的； 统一标准的； 一元化的 | |
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philosophic
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| adj.哲学的，贤明的 | |
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inspection
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| n.检查，审查，检阅 | |
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unstable
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| adj.不稳定的，易变的 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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mercurial
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| adj.善变的，活泼的 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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syllogistic
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| adj.三段论法的，演绎的，演绎性的 | |
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preambles
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| n.序( preamble的名词复数 )；绪言；（法令、文件等的）序文；前言 | |
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premise
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| n.前提；v.提论，预述 | |
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erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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substantiation
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| n. 实体化, 证实, 证明 | |
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astute
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| adj.机敏的，精明的 | |
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defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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invert
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| vt.使反转，使颠倒，使转化 | |
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inverted
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| adj.反向的，倒转的v.使倒置，使反转( invert的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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instinctive
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| adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的 | |
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physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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fabric
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| n.织物，织品，布；构造，结构，组织 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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autobiography
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| n.自传 | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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impersonal
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| adj.无个人感情的，与个人无关的，非人称的 | |
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faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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synthetic
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| adj.合成的，人工的；综合的；n.人工制品 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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query
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| n.疑问，问号，质问；vt.询问，表示怀疑 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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materialistic
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| a.唯物主义的，物质享乐主义的 | |
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necessitated
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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physicists
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| 物理学家( physicist的名词复数 ) | |
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52
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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interpretations
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| n.解释( interpretation的名词复数 )；表演；演绎；理解 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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57
ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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penetration
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| n.穿透，穿人，渗透 | |
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60
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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61
subterraneously
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| adj.地下的，隐匿的 | |
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aristocrat
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| n.贵族，有贵族气派的人，上层人物 | |
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partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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64
dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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differentiating
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| [计] 微分的 | |
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factions
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| 组织中的小派别，派系( faction的名词复数 ) | |
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mandates
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| 托管（mandate的第三人称单数形式） | |
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70
heralds
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| n.使者( herald的名词复数 )；预报者；预兆；传令官v.预示( herald的第三人称单数 )；宣布（好或重要） | |
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forerunners
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| n.先驱( forerunner的名词复数 )；开路人；先兆；前兆 | |
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dual
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| adj.双的；二重的，二元的 | |
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73
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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75
Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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ecstasy
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| n.狂喜，心醉神怡，入迷 | |
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practitioners
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| n.习艺者，实习者( practitioner的名词复数 )；从业者（尤指医师） | |
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negation
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| n.否定；否认 | |
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gratitude
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| adj.感激，感谢 | |
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81
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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82
geographical
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| adj.地理的；地区(性)的 | |
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intensity
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| n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度 | |
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utterances
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| n.发声( utterance的名词复数 )；说话方式；语调；言论 | |
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85
atheism
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| n.无神论，不信神 | |
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86
illuminating
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| a.富于启发性的，有助阐明的 | |
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87
underlying
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| adj.在下面的，含蓄的，潜在的 | |
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88
recurrence
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| n.复发，反复，重现 | |
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89
by-product
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| n.副产品，附带产生的结果 | |
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90
adherence
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| n.信奉，依附，坚持，固着 | |
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91
chaos
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| n.混乱，无秩序 | |
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92
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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93
adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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94
diatribes
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| n.谩骂，讽刺( diatribe的名词复数 ) | |
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95
idols
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| 偶像( idol的名词复数 )； 受崇拜的人或物； 受到热爱和崇拜的人或物； 神像 | |
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96
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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97
restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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98
exhorts
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| n.劝勉者，告诫者，提倡者( exhort的名词复数 )v.劝告，劝说( exhort的第三人称单数 ) | |
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99
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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100
utilitarian
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| adj.实用的，功利的 | |
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101
pertains
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| 关于( pertain的第三人称单数 )； 有关； 存在； 适用 | |
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102
absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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103
treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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104
genealogy
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| n.家系，宗谱 | |
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105
dissection
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| n.分析；解剖 | |
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106
constructive
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| adj.建设的，建设性的 | |
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107
accrued
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| adj.权责已发生的v.增加( accrue的过去式和过去分词 )；（通过自然增长）产生；获得；（使钱款、债务）积累 | |
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108
premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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109
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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110
expediency
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| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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111
gregarious
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| adj.群居的，喜好群居的 | |
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112
analyzed
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| v.分析( analyze的过去式和过去分词 )；分解；解释；对…进行心理分析 | |
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113
concise
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| adj.简洁的，简明的 | |
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114
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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115
affixes
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| v.附加( affix的第三人称单数 )；粘贴；加以；盖（印章） | |
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116
constraint
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| n.(on)约束，限制；限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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117
embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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118
virtues
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| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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119
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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120
inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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121
supplanted
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| 把…排挤掉，取代( supplant的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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122
loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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123
altruism
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| n.利他主义，不自私 | |
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124
intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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125
rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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126
precept
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| n.戒律；格言 | |
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127
preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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128
segregates
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| （使）分开( segregate的第三人称单数 )； 分离； 隔离； 隔离并区别对待（不同种族、宗教或性别的人） | |
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129
underlies
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| v.位于或存在于（某物）之下( underlie的第三人称单数 )；构成…的基础（或起因），引起 | |
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130
hardier
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| 能吃苦耐劳的，坚强的( hardy的比较级 )； （植物等）耐寒的 | |
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131
arrogance
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| n.傲慢，自大 | |
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132
retaliation
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| n.报复，反击 | |
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133
appropriation
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| n.拨款，批准支出 | |
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134
humility
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| n.谦逊，谦恭 | |
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135
constituents
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| n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素 | |
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136
excerpts
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| n.摘录，摘要( excerpt的名词复数 )；节选（音乐，电影）片段 | |
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137
impugn
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| v.指责，对…表示怀疑 | |
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138
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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139
cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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140
degenerate
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| v.退步，堕落；adj.退步的，堕落的；n.堕落者 | |
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141
paltry
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| adj.无价值的，微不足道的 | |
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142
reverence
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| n.敬畏，尊敬，尊严；Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称；v.尊敬，敬畏，崇敬 | |
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143
stink
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| vi.发出恶臭；糟透，招人厌恶；n.恶臭 | |
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144
ramification
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| n.分枝，分派，衍生物 | |
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145
intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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146
succumbed
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| 不再抵抗（诱惑、疾病、攻击等）( succumb的过去式和过去分词 )； 屈从； 被压垮； 死 | |
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147
attenuated
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|
| v.（使）变细( attenuate的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）变薄；（使）变小；减弱 | |
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148
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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149
likeness
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| n.相像，相似（之处） | |
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150
guise
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| n.外表，伪装的姿态 | |
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151
renounce
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| v.放弃；拒绝承认，宣布与…断绝关系 | |
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152
delicacies
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| n.棘手( delicacy的名词复数 )；精致；精美的食物；周到 | |
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153
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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154
solitude
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| n. 孤独; 独居,荒僻之地,幽静的地方 | |
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155
honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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156
innate
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| adj.天生的，固有的，天赋的 | |
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157
misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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158
inverts
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| v.使倒置，使反转( invert的第三人称单数 ) | |
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159
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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160
secrecy
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| n.秘密，保密，隐蔽 | |
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161
serpentine
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| adj.蜿蜒的，弯曲的 | |
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162
elevation
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| n.高度；海拔；高地；上升；提高 | |
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163
mightiest
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| adj.趾高气扬( mighty的最高级 )；巨大的；强有力的；浩瀚的 | |
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164
reverently
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| adv.虔诚地 | |
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165
enigma
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| n.谜，谜一样的人或事 | |
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166
subjugation
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| n.镇压，平息，征服 | |
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167
questionableness
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| 可疑的，有疑问的 | |
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168
frail
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| adj.身体虚弱的；易损坏的 | |
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169
mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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170
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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171
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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172
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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173
asceticism
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| n.禁欲主义 | |
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174
hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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175
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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176
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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177
contentedness
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178
justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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179
snare
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| n.陷阱，诱惑，圈套；（去除息肉或者肿瘤的）勒除器；响弦，小军鼓；vt.以陷阱捕获，诱惑 | |
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180
entangled
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|
| adj.卷入的；陷入的；被缠住的；缠在一起的v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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181
attains
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的第三人称单数 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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182
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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183
Christians
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| n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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184
extenuates
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| v.（用偏袒的辩解或借口）减轻( extenuate的第三人称单数 )；低估，藐视 | |
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185
maligns
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| vt.污蔑，诽谤（malign的第三人称单数形式） | |
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186
detour
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| n.绕行的路，迂回路；v.迂回，绕道 | |
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187
inclinations
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| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
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188
virility
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| n.雄劲，丈夫气 | |
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189
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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190
evasion
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| n.逃避，偷漏(税) | |
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191
joyous
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| adj.充满快乐的；令人高兴的 | |
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192
irony
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| n.反语，冷嘲；具有讽刺意味的事，嘲弄 | |
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193
inversion
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| n.反向，倒转，倒置 | |
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194
prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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195
morbidness
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| （精神的）病态 | |
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196
propensities
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| n.倾向，习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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197
permeated
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| 弥漫( permeate的过去式和过去分词 )； 遍布； 渗入； 渗透 | |
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198
grotesque
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| adj.怪诞的，丑陋的；n.怪诞的图案，怪人（物） | |
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199
unconditionally
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| adv.无条件地 | |
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200
worthiest
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| 应得某事物( worthy的最高级 )； 值得做某事； 可尊敬的； 有（某人或事物）的典型特征 | |
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201
herd
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| n.兽群，牧群；vt.使集中，把…赶在一起 | |
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202
degenerating
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| 衰退，堕落，退化( degenerate的现在分词 ) | |
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203
organisation
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| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
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204
waning
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| adj.（月亮）渐亏的，逐渐减弱或变小的n.月亏v.衰落( wane的现在分词 )；（月）亏；变小；变暗淡 | |
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205
depreciation
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| n.价值低落，贬值，蔑视，贬低 | |
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206
initiate
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| vt.开始，创始，发动；启蒙，使入门；引入 | |
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207
constraints
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| 强制( constraint的名词复数 )； 限制； 约束 | |
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208
hazardous
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| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
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209
frightful
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| adj.可怕的；讨厌的 | |
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210
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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benevolent
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| adj.仁慈的，乐善好施的 | |
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212
dwarfed
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| vt.（使）显得矮小（dwarf的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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dwarfing
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| n.矮化病 | |
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214
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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215
loathing
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| n.厌恶，憎恨v.憎恨，厌恶( loathe的现在分词)；极不喜欢 | |
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216
revels
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| n.作乐( revel的名词复数 )；狂欢；着迷；陶醉v.作乐( revel的第三人称单数 )；狂欢；着迷；陶醉 | |
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217
reconciliation
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| n.和解，和谐，一致 | |
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218
indignity
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| n.侮辱，伤害尊严，轻蔑 | |
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219
herding
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| 中畜群 | |
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dispenses
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| v.分配，分与；分配( dispense的第三人称单数 )；施与；配（药） | |
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221
solitary
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| adj.孤独的，独立的，荒凉的；n.隐士 | |
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222
concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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223
diversified
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| adj.多样化的，多种经营的v.使多样化，多样化( diversify的过去式和过去分词 )；进入新的商业领域 | |
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224
condemning
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| v.（通常因道义上的原因而）谴责( condemn的现在分词 )；宣判；宣布…不能使用；迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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225
relinquished
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| 交出，让给( relinquish的过去式和过去分词 )； 放弃 | |
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226
hoarse
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| adj.嘶哑的，沙哑的 | |
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227
groaning
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| adj. 呜咽的, 呻吟的 动词groan的现在分词形式 | |
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228
carnival
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| n.嘉年华会，狂欢，狂欢节，巡回表演 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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230
ridicule
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| v.讥讽，挖苦；n.嘲弄 | |
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domain
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| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
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elevations
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| （水平或数量）提高( elevation的名词复数 )； 高地； 海拔； 提升 | |
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ponderous
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| adj.沉重的，笨重的，(文章)冗长的 | |
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234
conducive
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| adj.有益的，有助的 | |
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235
detriment
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| n.损害；损害物，造成损害的根源 | |
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tragic
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| adj.悲剧的，悲剧性的，悲惨的 | |
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sublime
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| adj.崇高的，伟大的；极度的，不顾后果的 | |
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238
ornament
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| v.装饰，美化；n.装饰，装饰物 | |
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239
corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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240
emancipation
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| n.（从束缚、支配下）解放 | |
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241
retarded
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| a.智力迟钝的，智力发育迟缓的 | |
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242
interfered
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| v.干预( interfere的过去式和过去分词 )；调停；妨碍；干涉 | |
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antagonism
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| n.对抗，敌对，对立 | |
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244
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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245
descend
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| vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降 | |
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246
benevolence
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| n.慈悲，捐助 | |
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247
galling
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| adj.难堪的,使烦恼的,使焦躁的 | |
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248
inscribed
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| v.写，刻( inscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；内接 | |
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249
aspires
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| v.渴望，追求( aspire的第三人称单数 ) | |
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inscribes
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| v.写，刻( inscribe的第三人称单数 ) | |
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251
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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252
heartily
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| adv.衷心地，诚恳地，十分，很 | |
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253
commonwealth
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| n.共和国，联邦，共同体 | |
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254
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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255
obtrusion
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| n.强制，莽撞 | |
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256
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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257
incorporation
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| n.设立，合并，法人组织 | |
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258
rave
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| vi.胡言乱语；热衷谈论；n.热情赞扬 | |
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259
primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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260
recurring
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| adj.往复的，再次发生的 | |
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261
radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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262
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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263
overflow
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| v.(使)外溢，(使)溢出；溢出，流出，漫出 | |
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264
conscientiousness
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| 责任心 | |
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265
outlets
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| n.出口( outlet的名词复数 )；经销店；插座；廉价经销店 | |
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266
antithesis
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| n.对立；相对 | |
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267
subtlety
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| n.微妙，敏锐，精巧；微妙之处，细微的区别 | |
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268
refinements
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| n.（生活）风雅；精炼( refinement的名词复数 )；改良品；细微的改良；优雅或高贵的动作 | |
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269
artifice
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| n.妙计，高明的手段；狡诈，诡计 | |
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270
nourishment
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| n.食物，营养品；营养情况 | |
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271
prodigies
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| n.奇才，天才（尤指神童）( prodigy的名词复数 ) | |
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272
monstrous
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| adj.巨大的；恐怖的；可耻的，丢脸的 | |
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273
superstition
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| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
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274
alas
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| int.唉(表示悲伤、忧愁、恐惧等) | |
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275
pretentious
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| adj.自命不凡的，自负的，炫耀的 | |
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276
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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277
prerogatives
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| n.权利( prerogative的名词复数 )；特权；大主教法庭；总督委任组成的法庭 | |
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278
overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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279
insolence
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| n.傲慢；无礼；厚颜；傲慢的态度 | |
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