The style of "The Genealogy15 of Morals" is less aphoristic16 than any of the books which immediately preceded or followed it. Few new doctrines are propounded17 in it; and since it was for the most part an analytic18 commentary on what had gone before, its expositional needs were best met by Nietzsche's earlier style of writing. I have spoken before of the desultory19 and sporadic20 manner in which Nietzsche was necessitated21 to present his philosophy. Nowhere is his method of work better exemplified than in this new work. Nearly every one of his books overlaps22 another. Propositions are sketchily23 stated in one essay, which receive elucidation only in future volumes. "Beyond Good and Evil" was a commentary on "Thus Spake Zarathustra"; "The Genealogy of Morals" is a commentary on the newly propounded theses in "Beyond Good and Evil" and is in addition an elaboration of many of the ideas which took birth as far back as "Human, All-Too-Human." Out of "The Genealogy of Morals" in turn grew "The Antichrist" which dealt specifically with the theological phase of the former's discussion of general morals. And all of these books were but preparations for "The Will to Power." For this reason it is difficult to acquire a complete understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy unless one follows it consecutively26 and chronologically27. The book at present under discussion is a most valuable one from an academic standpoint, for, while it may not set forth any new and important doctrines, it goes deep into the origins and history of moral concepts, and explains many of the important conclusions in Nietzsche's moral code. It brings more and more into prominence28 the main[Pg 206] pillars of his ethical29 system and explains at length the steps in the syllogism30 which led to his doctrine of master-morality. It ascertains31 the origin of the concept of sin, and describes the racial deterioration33 which has followed in the train of Christian34 ideals.
In many ways this book is the profoundest of all the writings Nietzsche left us. For the first time he separates theological and moral prejudices and traces them to different origins. This is one of the most important steps taken by him. By so doing he became an explorer of entirely35 new fields. The moral historians and psychologists who preceded him had considered moral precepts36 and Christian injunctions as stemming from the same source: their genealogies37 had led them to the same common spring. Nietzsche entered the search with new methods. He applied38 the philologie test to all moral values. He brought to his task, in addition to a historical sense, what he calls "an innate39 faculty40 of psychological discrimination par11 excellence41." He posed the following questions, and endeavoured to answer them by inquiring into the minutest aspects of historical conditions: "Under what conditions did Man invent for himself those judgments44 of value, 'good' and 'evil'? And what intrinsic value do they possess in themselves? Have they up to the present hindered or advanced human well-being45"? Are they a symptom of the distress46, impoverishment47, and degeneration of Human Life? Or, conversely, is it in them that is manifested the fulness, the strength, and the will of Life, its courage, its self-confidence, its future?" In his research, Nietzsche first questioned the value of pity. He found it to be a symptom of modern civilisation48—a quality held in contempt by the older philosophers, even by such widely dissimilar[Pg 207] minds as Plato, Spinoza, La Rochefoucauld and Kant—but a quality given high place by the more modern thinkers. Despite the seemingly apparent isolation49 of the problem of pity-morality, Nietzsche saw that in truth it was a question which underlay50 all other moral propositions; and, using it as a ground-work for his research, he began to question the utility of all those values held as "good," to apply the qualities of the "good man" to the needs of civilisation, and to inquire into the results left upon the race by the "bad man."
So great was the misunderstanding which attached to his phrase, "beyond good and evil," and so persistently51 was this phrase interpreted in its narrow sense of "beyond good and bad," that he felt the necessity of drawing the line of distinction between these two diametrically opposed conceptions and of explaining the origin of each. His first essay in "The Genealogy of Morals" is devoted to this task. At the outset he devotes considerable space criticising the methods and conclusions of former genealogists of morals, especially of the English psychologists who attribute an intrinsic merit to altruism52 because at one time altruism possessed53 a utilitarian54 value. Herbert Spencer's theory that "good" is the same as "purposive" brings from Nietzsche a protest founded on the contention55 that because a thing was at one time useful, and therefore "good," it does not follow that the thing is good in itself. By the etymology56 of the descriptive words of morality, Nietzsche traces the history of modern moral attributes through class distinctions to their origin in the instincts of the "nobles" and the "vulgarians." He shows the relationship between the Latin bonus and the "warrior," by deriving57 bonus from duonus. Bellum, he shows, equals duellum which equals duen-lum, in[Pg 208] which word duonus is contained. Likewise, he points out the aristocratic origin of "happiness"—a quality arising from an abundance of energy and the consciousness of power.
"Good and evil," according to Nietzsche, is a sign of slave-morality; while "good and bad" represents the qualities in the master-morality. The one stands for the adopted qualities of the subservient58 races; the other embodies59 the natural functioning of dominating races. The origin of the "good" in these two instances is by no means the same. In the strong man "good" represented an entirely different condition than the "good" in the resentful and weak man; and these two "goods" arose out of different causes. The one was spontaneous and natural—inherent in the individual of strength: the other was a manufactured condition, an optional selection of qualities to soften60 and ameliorate the conditions of existence. "Evil" and "bad," by the same token, became attributes originating in widely separated sources. The "evil" of the weak man was any condition which worked against the manufactured ideals of goodness, which brought about unhappiness—it was the beginning of the conception of a slave-morality, a term applied to all enemies. The "bad" of the strong man was the concept which grew directly out of his feeling for "good," and which had no application to another individual. Thus the ideas of "good" and "bad" are directly inherited from the nobles of the race, and these ideas included within themselves the tendency toward establishing social distinctions.
The second section of "The Genealogy of Morals," called "'Guilt61,' 'Bad Conscience,' and the Like," is another important document, the reading of which is almost[Pg 209] imperative62 for the student who would understand the processes of thought which led to Nietzsche's philosophic conclusions. In this essay Nietzsche traces the origin of sin to debt, thereby disagreeing with all the genealogists of morals who preceded him. He starts with the birth of memory in man and with the corresponding will to forgetfulness, showing that out of these two mental qualities was born responsibility. Out of responsibility in turn grew the function of promising63 and the accepting of promises, which at once made possible between individuals the relationship of "debtor64" and "creditor65." As soon as this relationship was established, one man had rights over another. The creditor could exact payment from the debtor, either in the form of material equivalent or by inflicting66 an injury in which was contained the sensation of satisfaction. Thus the creditor had the right to punish in cases where actual repayment67 was impossible. And in this idea of punishment began not only class distinction but primitive68 law. Later, when the power to punish was transferred into the hands of the community, the law of contract came into existence. Here, says Nietzsche, we find the cradle of the whole moral world of the ideas of "guilt," "conscience," and "duty"; and adds, "Their commencement, like the commencement of all great things in the world, is thoroughly69 and continuously saturated70 in blood."
Carrying out the principle underlying71 the relationship of debtor and creditor we arrive at the formation of the community. In return for protection and for communal72 advantages the individual pledged his good behaviour. When he violated this contract with the community, the community, in the guise73 of the defrauded74 creditor, took its revenge, or exacted its payment, from the debtor, the[Pg 210] criminal. And, as was the case in early history, the community deprived the violator of future advantages and protection. The debtor was divested75 of all rights, even of mercy, for then there were no degrees in law-breaking. Primitive law was martial76 law. Says Nietzsche, "This shows why war itself (counting the sacrificial cult24 of war) has produced all the forms under which punishment has manifested itself in history." Later, as the community gathered strength, the offences of the individual debtors77 were looked upon as less serious. Out of its security grew leniency78 toward the offender79: the penal80 code became mitigated81, and, as in all powerful nations to-day, the criminal was protected. Only when there was a consciousness of weakness in a community did the acts of individual offenders82 take on an exaggerated seriousness, and under such conditions the law was consequently harshest. Thus, justice and the infliction83 of legal penalties are direct outgrowths of the primitive relation of debt between individuals. Herein we have the origin of guilt.
Nietzsche attempts an elaborate analysis of the history of punishment, in an effort to ascertain32 its true meaning, its relation to guilt and to the community, and its final effects on both the individual and society. It has been impossible to present the sequence of this analysis by direct excerpts84 from his own words, due to the close, synthetic85 manner in which he has made his research. Therefore I offer the following brief exposition of pages 88 to 99 inclusive, in which he examines the causes and effects of punishment. To begin with, Nietzsche disassociates the "origin" and the "end" of punishment, and regards them as two separate and distinct problems. He argues that the final utility of a thing, in the sense that[Pg 211] revenge and deterrence86 are the final utilities of punishment, is in all cases opposed to the origin of that thing; that every force or principle is constantly being put to new purposes by forces greater than itself, thus making it impossible to determine its inception87 by the end for which it is used. Therefore the "function" of punishing was not conceived with a view to punishing, but may have been employed for any number of ends, according as a will to power has overcome that function and made use of it for its own purpose: in short; punishment, like any organ or custom or "thing," has passed through a series of new interpretations88 and adjustments and meanings—and is not a direct and logical progress as to an end.
Having established this point, Nietzsche endeavours to determine the utilisation to which the custom of punishment has been put—to ascertain the meaning which has been interpreted into it. He finds that even in modern times not one but many uses have been made of punishment, and that in ancient times so diverse have been the utilisations of punishment that it is impossible to define them all. In fact, one cannot determine the precise reason for punishment. To emphasise89 this point, Nietzsche gives a long list of possible meanings. Taking up the more popular supposed utilities of punishment at the present time—such as creating in the wrong-doer the consciousness of guilt, which is supposed to evolve into conscience and remorse90—he shows wherein punishment fails in its object. Against this theory of the creation of remorse, he advances psychology91 and shows that, to the contrary, punishment numbs92 and hardens. He argues also that punishment for the purpose of making the wrong-doer conscious of the intrinsic reprehensibility of his crime, fails because the very act for which he is[Pg 212] chastened is practised in the service of justice and is called "good." Eliminating thus the supposed effects of punishment, Nietzsche arrives at the conclusion (included in the excerpts at the end of this chapter) that punishment makes only for caution and secrecy93, and is therefore detrimental94.
In his analysis of the origin of the "bad conscience," Nietzsche lends himself to quotation95. Therefore I have been able to present in his own words a fair resume of the course pursued by him in his examination of the history of conscience. This particular branch of his research is carried into the formation of the "State" which, according to him, grew out of "a herd96 of blonde beasts." The older theory of the state, namely: that it originated in the adoption97 of a contract, is set aside as untenable when dealing98 with a peoples who possessed conquerors99 or masters. These masters, argues Nietzsche, had no need of contracts. By using the "bad conscience" as a ground for inquiry100, the causes for the existence of altruism are shown to be included in the self-cruelty which followed in the wake of the instinct for freedom. (This last point is developed fully101 in the discussion of ascetic102 ideals which is found at the end of the book now under consideration.) Nietzsche traces the birth of deities103 back along the lines of credit and debt. First came the fear of ancestors. Then followed the obligation to ancestors. At length the sacrifice to ancestors marked the beginning of a conception of duty (debt) to the supernatural. The ancestors of powerful nations in time became heroes, and finally evolved into gods. Later monotheism came as a natural consequence, and God became the creditor. In the expiation104 of sin, as symbolised in the crucifixion of Christianity, we have this same[Pg 213] relationship of debtor and creditor carried out into a more complex form through the avenues of self-torture.
The most important essay in "The Genealogy of Morals" is the last, called "What is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?" Nietzsche examines this question in relation to the artist, to the philosopher, to the priest, and to the race generally. In his examination of the problem in regard to artists he uses Wagner as a basis of inquiry, comparing the two phases of Wagner's art—the Parsifalian and the ante-Parsifalian. Artists, asserts Nietzsche, need a support of constituted authority; they are unable to stand alone—"standing25 alone is opposed to their deepest instincts"—and so they make use of asceticism105 as a rampart, as building material, to give their work authority. In his application of the ascetic ideal to philosophers, Nietzsche presents the cases of Schopenhauer and Kant, and concludes that asceticism in such instances is used as an escape from torture—a means to recreation and happiness. With the philosopher the ideal of asceticism is not a denial of existence. Rather is it an affirmation of existence. It permits him freedom of the intellect. It relieves him of the numerous obligations of life. Furthermore, the philosophic spirit, in order to establish itself, found it necessary to disguise itself as "one of the previously106 fixed107 types of the contemplative man," as a priest or soothsayer. Only in such a religious masquerade was philosophy taken with any seriousness or reverence108.
The history of asceticism in the priest I have been able to set forth with a certain degree of completeness in Nietzsche's own words. The priest was the sick physician who administered to the needs of a sick populace. His was the mission of mitigating109 suffering and of performing[Pg 214] every kind of consolation110. Wherein he failed, says Nietzsche, was in not going to the source, the cause, of suffering, but in dealing merely with its manifestations111. These manifestations were the result of physiological112 depressions which prevailed at intervals113 among portions of the population. These depressions were the outgrowth of diverse causes, such as long wars, emigration to unsuitable climates, wrong diet, miscegenation114 on a large scale, disease, etc. According to Nietzsche the cure for such physiological phenomena115 can be found only in the realm of moral psychology, for here the origin is considered and administered to by disciplinary systems grounded in true knowledge. But the method employed by the priest was far from scientific. He combated these depressions by reducing the consciousness of life itself to the lowest possible degree—that is, by a doctrine of asceticism, of self-abnegation, equanimity117, self-hypnotism. By thus minimising the consciousness of life, these depressions took on more and more the aspect of normality. The effects of this treatment, however, were transient, for the starving of the physical desires and the abstinence from exercising the physical impulses paved the way for all manner of mental disorders118, excesses and insanity119. Herein lies Nietzsche's explanation for religious ecstasies120, hallucinations, and sensual outbursts.
Another form of treatment devised by the ascetic priests for a depressed121 people gave birth to the "blessedness" which, under the Christian code, attaches to work. These priests attempted to turn the attention of the people from their suffering by the establishment of mechanical activity, namely: work, routine and obedience122. The sick man forgot himself in the labour which had received sanctification. The priests also combated depression by[Pg 215] permitting pleasure through the creation and production of joy. That is, they set men to helping123 and comforting each other, by instilling125 in them the notion of brotherly love. Thereby the community mutually strengthened itself, and at the same time it reaped the joy of service which had been sanctioned by the priests. Out of this last method sprang many of the Christian virtues126, especially those which benefit others rather than oneself.
Such methods as these—devitalisation, labour, brotherly love—are called by Nietzsche the "innocent" prescriptions128 in the fight against depression. The "guilty" ones are far different, and are embodied129 in the one method: the production of emotional excess. This, the priests understood, was the most efficacious manner in overcoming protracted130 depression and pain. Confronted by the query131: By what means can this emotional excess be produced? they made use of "the whole pack of hounds that rage in the human kennel"—rage, fear, lust132, revenge, hope, despair, cruelty and the like. And once these emotional excesses became established, the priests, when asked by the "patients" for a "cause" of their suffering, declared it to be within the man himself, in his own guiltiness. Thus was the sick man turned into a sinner. Here originated also the conception of suffering as a state of punishment, the fear of retribution, the iniquitous133 conscience, and the hope of redemption. Nietzsche goes further, and shows the racial and individual decadence134 which has followed in the train of this system of treatment. Dr. Oscar Levy135 says with justice that this last essay, considered in the light which it throws upon the attitude of the ecclesiast to the man of resentment136 and misfortune, "is one of the most valuable contributions to sacerdotal psychology."
[Pg 216]
EXCERPTS FROM "THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS"
The pathos137 of nobility and distance.... the chronic138 and despotic esprit de corps139 and fundamental instinct of a higher dominant140 race coming into association with a meaner race, an "under race," this is the origin of the antitheses141 of good and bad. 20
The knightly-aristocratic "values" are based on a careful cult of the physical, on a flowering, rich, and even effervescing142 healthiness, that goes considerably143 beyond what is necessary for maintaining life, on war, adventure, the chase, the dance, the tourney—on everything, in fact, which is contained in strong, free, and joyous145 action. The priestly aristocratic mode of valuation is—we have seen—based on other hypotheses: it is bad enough for this class when it is a question of war! Yet the priests are, as is notorious, the worst enemies—why? Because they are the weakest. 29
The slave-morality requires as the condition of its existence an external and objective world, to employ physiological terminology146, it requires objective stimuli147 to be of action at all—its action is fundamentally a reaction. The contrary is the case when we come to the aristocrat's system of values: it acts and grows spontaneously, it merely seeks its antithesis148 in order to pronounce a more grateful and exultant149 "yes" to its own self.... 35
The aristocratic man conceives the root idea "good" spontaneously and straight away, that is to say, out of himself, and from that material then creates for himself a concept of "bad"! This "bad" of aristocratic origin and that "evil" out of the cauldron of unsatisfied hatred150—the former an imitation, an "extra," an additional[Pg 217] nuance151; the latter, on the other hand, the original, the beginning, the essential act in the conception of a slave-morality—these two words "bad" and "evil," how great a difference do they mark in spite of the fact that they have an identical contrary in the idea "good." 39
It is impossible not to recognise at the core of all these aristocratic races the beast of prey152; the magnificent blonde brute153, avidly154 rampant155 for spoil and victory; this hidden core needed an outlet156 from time to time, the beast must get loose again, must return into the wilderness—the Roman, Arabic, German, and Japanese nobility, the Homeric heroes, the Scandinavian Vikings, are all alike in this need. It is the aristocratic races who have left the idea "Barbarian157" on all the tracks in which they have marched; nay158, a consciousness of this very barbarianism, and even a pride in it, manifests itself even in their highest civilisation. 40
What produces to-day our repulsion towards "man"?—for we suffer from "man," there is no doubt about it. It is not fear; it is rather that we have nothing more to fear from men; it is that the worm "man" is in the foreground and pullulates; it is that the "tame man," the wretched mediocre159 and unedifying creature, has learnt to consider himself a goal and a pinnacle160, an inner meaning, an historic principle, a "higher man.".... 42-43
In the dwarfing161 and levelling of the European man lurks162 our greatest peril163, for it is this outlook which fatigues—we see to-day nothing which wishes to be greater, we surmise164 that the process is always still backwards165, still backwards towards something more attenuated166, more inoffensive, more cunning, more comfortable, more mediocre, more indifferent, more Chinese, more Christian. 44
[Pg 218]
To require of strength that it should not express itself as strength, that it should not be a wish to overpower, a wish to overthrow167, a wish to become master, a thirst for enemies and antagonisms168 and triumphs, is just as absurd as to require of weakness that it should express itself as strength. A quantum of force is just such a quantum of movement, will, action. 45
The impotence which requites170 not, is turned to "goodness," craven baseness to meekness171, submission172 to those whom one hates, to obedience (namely, obedience to one of whom they say that he ordered this submission—they call him God). The inoffensive character of the weak, the very cowardice173 in which he is rich, his standing at the door, his forced necessity of waiting, gain here fine names, such as "patience," which is also called "virtue127"; not being able to avenge174 one's self, is called not wishing to avenge one's self, perhaps even forgiveness. 48
They are miserable175, there is no doubt about it, all these whisperers and counterfeiters in the corners, although they try to get warm by crouching176 close to each other, but they tell me that their misery177 is a favour and distinction given to them by God, just as one beats the dogs one likes best; that perhaps this misery is also a preparation, a probation178, a training; that perhaps it is still more something which will one day be compensated179 and paid back with a tremendous interest in gold, nay in happiness. This they call "Blessedness." 45-49
The two opposing values "good and bad," "good and evil," have fought a dreadful, thousand-year fight in the world, and though indubitably the second value has been for a long time in the preponderance, there are not wanting places where the fortune of the fight is still[Pg 219] undecisive. It can almost be said that in the meanwhile the fight reaches a higher and higher level, and that in the meanwhile it has become more and more intense, and always more and more psychological; so that nowadays there is perhaps no more decisive mark of the higher nature, of the more psychological nature, than to be in that sense self-contradictory, and to be actually still a battle-ground for those two opposites. The symbol of this fight, written in a writing which has remained worthy180 of perusal181 throughout the course of history up to the present time, is called "Rome against Jud?a, Jud?a against Rome." Hitherto there has been no greater event than that fight, the putting of that question, that deadly antagonism169. Rome found in the Jew the incarnation of the unnatural182, as though it were its diametrically opposed monstrosity, and in Rome the Jew was held to be convicted of hatred of the whole human race: and rightly so, in so far as it is right to link the well-being and the future of the human race to the unconditional183 mastery of the aristocratic values, of the Roman values. What, conversely, did the Jews feel against Rome? One can surmise it from a thousand symptoms, but it is sufficient to carry one's mind back to the Johannian Apocalypse, that most obscene of all the written outbursts, which has revenge on its conscience. 53-54
Beyond Good and Evil—at any rate that is not the same as "Beyond Good and Bad." 57
The proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this rare freedom, of this power over himself and over fate, has sunk right down to his innermost depths, and has become an instinct, a dominating instinct—what name will he give to it, to[Pg 220] this dominating instinct if he needs to have a word for it? But there is no doubt about it—the sovereign man calls it his conscience. 65
Have these current genealogists of morals ever allowed themselves to have even the vaguest notion, for instance, that the cardinal184 moral idea of "ought" originates from the very material idea of "owe"? Or that punishment developed as a retaliation185 absolutely independently of any preliminary hypothesis of the freedom or determination of the will?—And this to such an extent, that a high degree of civilisation was always first necessary for the animal man to begin to make those much more primitive distinctions of "intentional," "negligent," "accidental," "responsible," and their contraries, and apply them in the assessing of punishment. That idea—"the wrong-doer deserves punishment because he might have acted otherwise," in spite of the fact that it is nowadays so cheap, obvious, natural, and inevitable186, and that it has had to serve as an illustration of the way in which the sentiment of justice appeared on earth is in point of fact an exceedingly late, and even refined form of human judgment43 and inference; the placing of this idea back at the beginning of the world is simply a clumsy violation187 of the principles of primitive psychology. 69
The sight of suffering does one good, the infliction of suffering does one more good—this is a hard maxim188, but none the less a fundamental maxim, old, powerful, and "human, all-too-human"; one, moreover, to which perhaps even the apes as well would subscribe189: for it is said that in inventing bizarre cruelties they are giving abundant proof of their future humanity, to which, as it were, they are playing the prelude190. Without cruelty, no feast:[Pg 221] so teaches the oldest and longest history of man—and in punishment too is there so much of the festive191. 75
The darkening of the heavens over man has always increased in proportion to the growth of man's shame before man. The tired pessimistic outlook, the mistrust of the riddle192 of life, the icy negation116 of disgusted ennui193, all those are not the signs of the most evil age of the human race: much rather do they come first to the light of day, as the swamp-flowers, which they are, when the swamp to which they belong comes into existence—I mean the diseased refinement194 and moralisation, thanks to which the "animal man" has at last learnt to be ashamed of all his instincts. 75
The curve of human sensibilities to pain seems indeed to sink in an extraordinary and almost sudden fashion, as soon as one has passed the upper ten thousand or ten millions of over-civilised humanity, and I personally have no doubt that, by comparison with one painful night passed by one single hysterical195 chit of a cultured woman, the suffering of all the animals taken together who have been put to the question of the knife, so as to give scientific answers, are simply negligible. 76-77
Man ... arrived at the great generalisation "everything has its price, all can be paid for," the oldest and most na?ve moral canon of justice the beginning of all "kindness," of all "equity," of all "goodwill," of all "objectivity" in the world. 80
The self-destruction of Justice! we know the pretty name it calls itself—Grace! it remains196, as is obvious, the privilege of the strongest, better still, their super-law. 83-84
The aggressive man has at all times enjoyed the stronger, bolder, more aristocratic, and also freer outlook,[Pg 222] the better conscience. On the other hand, we already surmise who it really is that has on his conscience the invention of the "bad conscience,"—the resentful man! 86
To talk of intrinsic right and intrinsic wrong is absolutely nonsensical; intrinsically, an injury, an oppression, an exploitation, an annihilation can be nothing wrong, inasmuch as life is essentially197 (that is, in its cardinal functions) something which functions by injuring, oppressing, exploiting, and annihilating198, and is absolutely inconceivable without such a character. 88
Evildoers have throughout thousands of years felt when overtaken by punishment exactly like Spinoza, on the subject of their "offence": "here is something which went wrong contrary to my anticipation199, not I ought not to have done this."—They submitted themselves to punishment, just as one submits one's self to a disease, to a misfortune, or to death, with that stubborn and resigned fatalism which gives the Russians, for instance, even nowadays, the advantage over us Westerners, in the handling of life. If at that period there was a critique of action, the criterion was prudence200: the real effect of punishment is unquestionably chiefly to be found in a sharpening of the sense of prudence, in a lengthening201 of the memory, in a will to adopt more of a policy of caution, suspicion, and secrecy; in the recognition that there are many things which are unquestionably beyond one's capacity; in a kind of improvement in self-criticism. The broad effects which can be obtained by punishment in man and beast, are the increase of fear, the sharpening of the sense of cunning, the mastery of the desires: so it is that punishment tames man, but does not make him "better"—it would be more correct even to go so far as to assert the contrary. 99
[Pg 223]
All instincts which do not find a vent42 without, turn inwards—this is what I mean by the growing "internalisation" of man: consequently we have the first growth in man, of what subsequently was called his soul. The whole inner world, originally as thin as if it had been stretched between two layers of skin, burst apart and expanded proportionately, and obtained depth, breadth, and height, when man's external outlet became obstructed202. These terrible bulwarks203, with which the social organisation204 protected itself against the old instincts of freedom (punishments belong pre-eminently to these bulwarks), brought it about that all those instincts of wild, free, prowling man became turned backwards against man himself. Enmity, cruelty, the delight in persecution205, in surprises, change, destruction—the turning all these instincts against their own possessors: this is the origin of the "bad conscience." It was man, who, lacking external enemies and obstacles, and imprisoned206 as he was in the oppressive narrowness and monotony of custom, in his own impatience207 lacerated, persecuted208, gnawed209, frightened, and ill-treated himself; it was this animal in the hands of the tamer, which beat itself against the bars of its cage; it was this being who, pining and yearning210 for that desert home of which it had been deprived, was compelled to create out of its own self, an adventure, a torture-chamber, a hazardous211 and perilous212 desert—it was this fool, this homesick and desperate prisoner—who invented the "bad conscience." 100-101
A herd of blonde beasts of prey, a race of conquerors and masters, which with all its warlike organisation and all its organising power pounces213 with its terrible claws on a population, in numbers possibly tremendously superior, but as yet formless, as yet nomad214. Such is the origin of[Pg 224] the "State." That fantastic theory that makes it begin with a contract is, I think, disposed of. He who can command, he who is a master by "nature," he who comes on the scene forceful in deed and gesture—what has he to do with contracts? Such beings defy calculation, they come like fate, without cause, reason, notice, excuse, they are there like the lightning is there, too terrible, too sudden, too convincing, too "different," to be personally even hated. Their work is an instinctive215 creating and impressing of forms, they are the most involuntary, unconscious artists that there are.... 103
It is only the bad conscience, only the will for self-abuse, that provides the necessary conditions for the existence of altruism as a value. 105
The feeling of owing a debt to the deity216 has grown continuously for several centuries, always in the same proportion in which the idea of God and the consciousness of God have grown and become exalted217 among mankind. (The whole history of ethnic218 fights, victories, reconciliations219, amalgamations, everything, in fact, which precedes the eventual220 classing of all the social elements in each great race synthesis, are mirrored in the hotch-potch genealogy of their gods, in the legends of their fights, victories, and reconciliations, Progress towards universal empires invariably means progress towards universal deities; despotism, with its subjugation221 of the independent nobility, always paves the way for some system or other of monotheism.) The appearance of the Christian god, as the record god up to this time, has for that very reason brought equally into the world the record amount of guilt consciousness. 109
This is a kind of madness of the will in the sphere of psychological cruelty which is absolutely unparalleled:—[Pg 225]man's will to find himself guilty and blameworthy to the point of inexpiability, his will to think of himself as punished, without the punishment ever being able to balance the guilt, his will to infect and to poison the fundamental basis of the universe with the problem of punishment and guilt, in order to cut off once and for all any escape out of this labyrinth222 of "fixed ideas," his will for rearing an ideal—that of the "holy God"—face to face with which he can have tangible223 proof of his own unworthiness. Alas224 for this mad melancholy225 beast man! 112-113
What is the meaning of ascetic ideals? In artists, nothing, or too much; in philosophers and scholars, a kind of "flair226" and instinct for the conditions most favourable227 to advanced intellectualism; in women, at best an additional seductive fascination228, a little morbidezza on a fine piece of flesh, the angelhood of a fat, pretty animal; in physiological failures and whiners (in the majority of mortals), an attempt to pose as "too good" for this world, a holy form of debauchery, their chief weapon, in the battle with lingering pain and ennui; in priests, the actual priestly faith, their best engine of power, and also the supreme229 authority for power; in saints, finally a pretext230 for hibernation231, their novissima gloria cupido, their peace in nothingness ("God"), their form of madness. 121
All good things were once bad things; from every original sin has grown an original virtue. Marriage, for example, seemed for a long time a sin against the rights of the community; a man formerly232 paid a fine for the insolence233 of claiming one woman to himself. 144-145
The soft, benevolent234 yielding, sympathetic feelings—eventually valued so highly that they almost become[Pg 226] "intrinsic values," were for a very long time actually despised by their possessors; gentleness was then a subject for shame, just as hardness is now. 145
The ascetic ideal springs from the prophylactic235 and self-preservative instincts which mark a decadent236 life, which seeks by every means in its power to maintain its position and fight for its existence; it points to a partial physiological depression and exhaustion237, against which the most profound and intact life-instincts fight ceaselessly with new weapons and discoveries. The ascetic ideal is such a weapon: its position is consequently exactly the reverse of that which the worshippers of the ideal imagine—life struggles in it and through it with death and against death; the ascetic ideal is a dodge238 for the preservation239 of life. 154
The ascetic priest is the incarnate240 wish for an existence of another kind, an existence on another plane,—he is, in fact, the highest point of this wish, its official ecstasy241 and passion: but it is the very power of this wish which is the fetter242 that binds244 him here; it is just that which makes him into a tool that must labour to create more favourable conditions for earthly existence, for existence on the human plane—it is with this very power that he keeps the whole herd of failures, distortions, abortions245, unfortunates, sufferers from themselves of every kind, fast to existence, while he as the herdsman goes instinctively246 on in front. 154-155
The sick are the great danger of man, not the evil, not the "beasts of prey." They who are from the outset botched, oppressed, broken, those are they, the weakest are they, who most undermine the life beneath the feet of man, who instil124 the most dangerous venom247 and scepticism into our trust in life, in man, in ourselves. 157
[Pg 227]
Preventing the sick making the healthy sick ... this ought to be our supreme object in the world—but for this it is above all essential that the healthy should remain separated from the sick, that they should even guard themselves from the look of the sick, that they should not even associate with the sick. Or may it, perchance, be their mission to be nurses or doctors? But they could not mistake or disown their mission more grossly—the higher must not degrade itself to be the tool of the lower, the pathos of distance must to all eternity248 keep their missions also separate. The right of the happy to existence, the right of bells with a full tone over the discordant249 cracked bells, is verily a thousand times greater: they alone are the sureties of the future, they alone are bound to man's future. 160-161
The ascetic priest must be accepted by us as the predestined saviour250, herdsman, and champion of the sick herd: thereby do we first understand his awful historic mission. 162
"I suffer: it must be somebody's fault"—so thinks every sick sheep. But his herdsman, the ascetic priest, says to him, "Quite so, my sheep, it must be the fault of some one; but thou thyself art that some one, it is all the fault of thyself alone—it is the fault of thyself alone against thyself": that is bold enough, false enough, but one thing is at least attained251; thereby, as I have said, the course of resentment is—diverted. 165
All sick and diseased people strive instinctively after a herd-organisation, out of a desire to shake off their sense of oppressive discomfort252 and weakness; the ascetic priest divines this instinct and promotes it; wherever a herd exists it is the instinct of weakness which has wished for the herd, and the cleverness of the priests which has[Pg 228] organised it, for, mark this: by an equally natural necessity the strong strive as much for isolation as the weak for union: when the former bind243 themselves it is only with a view to an aggressive joint253 action and joint satisfaction of their Will for Power, much against the wishes of their individual consciences; the latter, on the contrary, range themselves together with positive delight in such a muster—their instincts are as much gratified thereby as the instincts of the "born master" (that is the solitary254 beast-of-prey species of man) are disturbed and wounded to the quick by organisation. 176-177
The keynote by which the ascetic priest was enabled to get every kind of agonising and ecstatic music to play on the fibres of the human soul—was, as every one knows, the exploitation of the feeling of "guilt." 182
The ascetic ideal and its sublime255 moral cult, this most ingenious, reckless, and perilous systématisation of all methods of emotional excess, is writ1 large in a dreadful and unforgettable fashion on the whole history of man, and unfortunately not only on history. I was scarcely able to put forward any other element which attacked the health and race efficiency of Europeans with more destructive power than did this ideal; it can be dubbed256, without exaggeration, the real fatality257 in the history of the health of the European man. 186-187
The ascetic ideal has corrupted258 not only health and taste, there are also third, fourth, fifth, and sixth things which it has corrupted—I shall take care not to go through the catalogue (when should I get to the end?). 190
The periods in a nation in which the learned man comes into prominence; they are the periods of exhaustion, often of sunset, of decay—the effervescing strength, the confidence of life, the confidence in the future are no[Pg 229] more. The preponderance of the mandarins never signifies any good, any more than does the advent144 of democracy, or arbitration259 instead of war, equal rights for women, the religion of pity, and all the other symptoms of declining life. 200
The ascetic ideal simply means this: that something was lacking, that a tremendous void encircled man—he did not know how to justify260 himself, to explain himself, to affirm himself, he suffered from the problem of his own meaning. He suffered also in other ways, he was in the main a diseased animal; but his problem was not suffering itself, but the lack of an answer to that crying question, "To what purpose do we suffer?" Man, the bravest animal and the one most inured261 to suffering, does not repudiate262 suffering in itself: he wills it, he even seeks it out, provided that he is shown a meaning for it, a purpose of suffering was the curse which till then lay spread over humanity—and the ascetic ideal gave it a meaning! It was up till then the only meaning; but any meaning is better than no meaning; the ascetic ideal was in that connection the "faute de mieux" par excellence that existed at that time. In that ideal suffering found an explanation; the tremendous gap seemed filled; the door to all suicidal Nihilism was closed. The explanation—there is no doubt about it—brought in its train new suffering, deeper, more penetrating263, more venomous, gnawing264 more brutally265 into life: it brought all suffering under the perspective of guilt; but in spite of all that—man was saved thereby, he had a meaning, and from henceforth was no more like a leaf in the wind, a shuttlecock, of chance, of nonsense, he could now "will" something—absolutely immaterial to what end, to what purpose, with that means he wished: the will itself was saved.[Pg 230] It is absolutely impossible to disguise what in point of fact is made clear by every complete will that has taken its direction from the ascetic ideal: this hate of the human, and even more of the animal, and more still of the material, this horror of the senses, of reason itself, this fear of happiness and beauty, this desire to get right away from all illusion, change, growth, death, wishing and even desiring—all this means—let us have the courage to grasp it—a will for Nothingness, a will opposed to life, a repudiation266 of the most fundamental conditions of life, but it is and remains a will!—and to say at the end that which I said at the beginning—man will wish Nothingness rather than not wish at all. 210-211
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1 writ | |
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4 sketched | |
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5 doctrine | |
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7 converse | |
vi.谈话,谈天,闲聊;adv.相反的,相反 | |
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10 polemic | |
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24 cult | |
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29 ethical | |
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30 syllogism | |
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31 ascertains | |
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33 deterioration | |
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34 Christian | |
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35 entirely | |
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36 precepts | |
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37 genealogies | |
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38 applied | |
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39 innate | |
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40 faculty | |
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42 vent | |
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43 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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判断( judgment的名词复数 ); 鉴定; 评价; 审判 | |
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45 well-being | |
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47 impoverishment | |
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48 civilisation | |
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49 isolation | |
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51 persistently | |
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52 altruism | |
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53 possessed | |
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54 utilitarian | |
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55 contention | |
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56 etymology | |
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57 deriving | |
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58 subservient | |
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61 guilt | |
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62 imperative | |
n.命令,需要;规则;祈使语气;adj.强制的;紧急的 | |
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63 promising | |
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64 debtor | |
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65 creditor | |
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66 inflicting | |
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67 repayment | |
n.偿还,偿还款;报酬 | |
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68 primitive | |
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69 thoroughly | |
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73 guise | |
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74 defrauded | |
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75 divested | |
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76 martial | |
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77 debtors | |
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78 leniency | |
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88 interpretations | |
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90 remorse | |
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91 psychology | |
n.心理,心理学,心理状态 | |
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92 numbs | |
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93 secrecy | |
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102 ascetic | |
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103 deities | |
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104 expiation | |
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105 asceticism | |
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106 previously | |
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108 reverence | |
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109 mitigating | |
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110 consolation | |
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113 intervals | |
n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 );间隔时间;[数学]区间;(戏剧、电影或音乐会的)幕间休息 | |
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114 miscegenation | |
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115 phenomena | |
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116 negation | |
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117 equanimity | |
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118 disorders | |
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119 insanity | |
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120 ecstasies | |
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121 depressed | |
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127 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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128 prescriptions | |
药( prescription的名词复数 ); 处方; 开处方; 计划 | |
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129 embodied | |
v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 );象征;包括;包含 | |
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130 protracted | |
adj.拖延的;延长的v.拖延“protract”的过去式和过去分词 | |
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131 query | |
n.疑问,问号,质问;vt.询问,表示怀疑 | |
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132 lust | |
n.性(淫)欲;渴(欲)望;vi.对…有强烈的欲望 | |
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133 iniquitous | |
adj.不公正的;邪恶的;高得出奇的 | |
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134 decadence | |
n.衰落,颓废 | |
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135 levy | |
n.征收税或其他款项,征收额 | |
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136 resentment | |
n.怨愤,忿恨 | |
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137 pathos | |
n.哀婉,悲怆 | |
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138 chronic | |
adj.(疾病)长期未愈的,慢性的;极坏的 | |
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139 corps | |
n.(通信等兵种的)部队;(同类作的)一组 | |
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140 dominant | |
adj.支配的,统治的;占优势的;显性的;n.主因,要素,主要的人(或物);显性基因 | |
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141 antitheses | |
n.对照,对立的,对比法;对立( antithesis的名词复数 );对立面;对照;对偶 | |
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142 effervescing | |
v.冒气泡,起泡沫( effervesce的现在分词 ) | |
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143 considerably | |
adv.极大地;相当大地;在很大程度上 | |
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144 advent | |
n.(重要事件等的)到来,来临 | |
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145 joyous | |
adj.充满快乐的;令人高兴的 | |
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146 terminology | |
n.术语;专有名词 | |
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147 stimuli | |
n.刺激(物) | |
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148 antithesis | |
n.对立;相对 | |
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149 exultant | |
adj.欢腾的,狂欢的,大喜的 | |
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150 hatred | |
n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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151 nuance | |
n.(意义、意见、颜色)细微差别 | |
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152 prey | |
n.被掠食者,牺牲者,掠食;v.捕食,掠夺,折磨 | |
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153 brute | |
n.野兽,兽性 | |
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154 avidly | |
adv.渴望地,热心地 | |
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155 rampant | |
adj.(植物)蔓生的;狂暴的,无约束的 | |
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156 outlet | |
n.出口/路;销路;批发商店;通风口;发泄 | |
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157 barbarian | |
n.野蛮人;adj.野蛮(人)的;未开化的 | |
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158 nay | |
adv.不;n.反对票,投反对票者 | |
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159 mediocre | |
adj.平常的,普通的 | |
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160 pinnacle | |
n.尖塔,尖顶,山峰;(喻)顶峰 | |
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161 dwarfing | |
n.矮化病 | |
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162 lurks | |
n.潜在,潜伏;(lurk的复数形式)vi.潜伏,埋伏(lurk的第三人称单数形式) | |
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163 peril | |
n.(严重的)危险;危险的事物 | |
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164 surmise | |
v./n.猜想,推测 | |
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165 backwards | |
adv.往回地,向原处,倒,相反,前后倒置地 | |
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166 attenuated | |
v.(使)变细( attenuate的过去式和过去分词 );(使)变薄;(使)变小;减弱 | |
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167 overthrow | |
v.推翻,打倒,颠覆;n.推翻,瓦解,颠覆 | |
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168 antagonisms | |
对抗,敌对( antagonism的名词复数 ) | |
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169 antagonism | |
n.对抗,敌对,对立 | |
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170 requites | |
vt.报答(requite的第三人称单数形式) | |
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171 meekness | |
n.温顺,柔和 | |
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172 submission | |
n.服从,投降;温顺,谦虚;提出 | |
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173 cowardice | |
n.胆小,怯懦 | |
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174 avenge | |
v.为...复仇,为...报仇 | |
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175 miserable | |
adj.悲惨的,痛苦的;可怜的,糟糕的 | |
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176 crouching | |
v.屈膝,蹲伏( crouch的现在分词 ) | |
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177 misery | |
n.痛苦,苦恼,苦难;悲惨的境遇,贫苦 | |
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178 probation | |
n.缓刑(期),(以观后效的)察看;试用(期) | |
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179 compensated | |
补偿,报酬( compensate的过去式和过去分词 ); 给(某人)赔偿(或赔款) | |
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180 worthy | |
adj.(of)值得的,配得上的;有价值的 | |
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181 perusal | |
n.细读,熟读;目测 | |
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182 unnatural | |
adj.不自然的;反常的 | |
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183 unconditional | |
adj.无条件的,无限制的,绝对的 | |
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184 cardinal | |
n.(天主教的)红衣主教;adj.首要的,基本的 | |
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185 retaliation | |
n.报复,反击 | |
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186 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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187 violation | |
n.违反(行为),违背(行为),侵犯 | |
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188 maxim | |
n.格言,箴言 | |
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189 subscribe | |
vi.(to)订阅,订购;同意;vt.捐助,赞助 | |
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190 prelude | |
n.序言,前兆,序曲 | |
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191 festive | |
adj.欢宴的,节日的 | |
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192 riddle | |
n.谜,谜语,粗筛;vt.解谜,给…出谜,筛,检查,鉴定,非难,充满于;vi.出谜 | |
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193 ennui | |
n.怠倦,无聊 | |
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194 refinement | |
n.文雅;高尚;精美;精制;精炼 | |
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195 hysterical | |
adj.情绪异常激动的,歇斯底里般的 | |
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196 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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197 essentially | |
adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
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198 annihilating | |
v.(彻底)消灭( annihilate的现在分词 );使无效;废止;彻底击溃 | |
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199 anticipation | |
n.预期,预料,期望 | |
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200 prudence | |
n.谨慎,精明,节俭 | |
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201 lengthening | |
(时间或空间)延长,伸长( lengthen的现在分词 ); 加长 | |
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202 obstructed | |
阻塞( obstruct的过去式和过去分词 ); 堵塞; 阻碍; 阻止 | |
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203 bulwarks | |
n.堡垒( bulwark的名词复数 );保障;支柱;舷墙 | |
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204 organisation | |
n.组织,安排,团体,有机休 | |
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205 persecution | |
n. 迫害,烦扰 | |
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206 imprisoned | |
下狱,监禁( imprison的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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207 impatience | |
n.不耐烦,急躁 | |
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208 persecuted | |
(尤指宗教或政治信仰的)迫害(~sb. for sth.)( persecute的过去式和过去分词 ); 烦扰,困扰或骚扰某人 | |
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209 gnawed | |
咬( gnaw的过去式和过去分词 ); (长时间) 折磨某人; (使)苦恼; (长时间)危害某事物 | |
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210 yearning | |
a.渴望的;向往的;怀念的 | |
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211 hazardous | |
adj.(有)危险的,冒险的;碰运气的 | |
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212 perilous | |
adj.危险的,冒险的 | |
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213 pounces | |
v.突然袭击( pounce的第三人称单数 );猛扑;一眼看出;抓住机会(进行抨击) | |
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214 nomad | |
n.游牧部落的人,流浪者,游牧民 | |
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215 instinctive | |
adj.(出于)本能的;直觉的;(出于)天性的 | |
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216 deity | |
n.神,神性;被奉若神明的人(或物) | |
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217 exalted | |
adj.(地位等)高的,崇高的;尊贵的,高尚的 | |
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218 ethnic | |
adj.人种的,种族的,异教徒的 | |
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219 reconciliations | |
和解( reconciliation的名词复数 ); 一致; 勉强接受; (争吵等的)止息 | |
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220 eventual | |
adj.最后的,结局的,最终的 | |
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221 subjugation | |
n.镇压,平息,征服 | |
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222 labyrinth | |
n.迷宫;难解的事物;迷路 | |
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223 tangible | |
adj.有形的,可触摸的,确凿的,实际的 | |
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224 alas | |
int.唉(表示悲伤、忧愁、恐惧等) | |
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225 melancholy | |
n.忧郁,愁思;adj.令人感伤(沮丧)的,忧郁的 | |
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226 flair | |
n.天赋,本领,才华;洞察力 | |
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227 favourable | |
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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228 fascination | |
n.令人着迷的事物,魅力,迷恋 | |
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229 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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230 pretext | |
n.借口,托词 | |
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231 hibernation | |
n.冬眠 | |
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232 formerly | |
adv.从前,以前 | |
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233 insolence | |
n.傲慢;无礼;厚颜;傲慢的态度 | |
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234 benevolent | |
adj.仁慈的,乐善好施的 | |
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235 prophylactic | |
adj.预防疾病的;n.预防疾病 | |
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236 decadent | |
adj.颓废的,衰落的,堕落的 | |
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237 exhaustion | |
n.耗尽枯竭,疲惫,筋疲力尽,竭尽,详尽无遗的论述 | |
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238 dodge | |
v.闪开,躲开,避开;n.妙计,诡计 | |
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239 preservation | |
n.保护,维护,保存,保留,保持 | |
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240 incarnate | |
adj.化身的,人体化的,肉色的 | |
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241 ecstasy | |
n.狂喜,心醉神怡,入迷 | |
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242 fetter | |
n./vt.脚镣,束缚 | |
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243 bind | |
vt.捆,包扎;装订;约束;使凝固;vi.变硬 | |
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244 binds | |
v.约束( bind的第三人称单数 );装订;捆绑;(用长布条)缠绕 | |
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245 abortions | |
n.小产( abortion的名词复数 );小产胎儿;(计划)等中止或夭折;败育 | |
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246 instinctively | |
adv.本能地 | |
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247 venom | |
n.毒液,恶毒,痛恨 | |
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248 eternity | |
n.不朽,来世;永恒,无穷 | |
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249 discordant | |
adj.不调和的 | |
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250 saviour | |
n.拯救者,救星 | |
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251 attained | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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252 discomfort | |
n.不舒服,不安,难过,困难,不方便 | |
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253 joint | |
adj.联合的,共同的;n.关节,接合处;v.连接,贴合 | |
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254 solitary | |
adj.孤独的,独立的,荒凉的;n.隐士 | |
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255 sublime | |
adj.崇高的,伟大的;极度的,不顾后果的 | |
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256 dubbed | |
v.给…起绰号( dub的过去式和过去分词 );把…称为;配音;复制 | |
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257 fatality | |
n.不幸,灾祸,天命 | |
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258 corrupted | |
(使)败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 ); (使)腐化; 引起(计算机文件等的)错误; 破坏 | |
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259 arbitration | |
n.调停,仲裁 | |
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260 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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261 inured | |
adj.坚强的,习惯的 | |
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262 repudiate | |
v.拒绝,拒付,拒绝履行 | |
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263 penetrating | |
adj.(声音)响亮的,尖锐的adj.(气味)刺激的adj.(思想)敏锐的,有洞察力的 | |
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264 gnawing | |
a.痛苦的,折磨人的 | |
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265 brutally | |
adv.残忍地,野蛮地,冷酷无情地 | |
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266 repudiation | |
n.拒绝;否认;断绝关系;抛弃 | |
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