Nietzsche was then stricken with his fatal illness, and this was the last book of his to appear during his lifetime. "The Antichrist" was already finished, having been written in the fall of 1888 immediately after the completion of "The Twilight of the Idols." "Ecce Homo" his autobiography12, was written in October, 1888; and during December Nietzsche again gave his[Pg 232] attention to Wagner, drafting "Nietzsche contra Wagner," a pamphlet made up entirely13 of excerpts14 from his earlier writings. This work, intended to supplement "The Case of Wagner," was not published until 1895, although it had been printed and corrected before the author's final breakdown15. "The Antichrist" appeared at the same time as this second Wagner document, while "Ecce Homo" was withheld16 from publication until 1908. "The Twilight of the Idols" sold 9,000 copies, but Nietzsche's mind was too clouded to know or care that at last he was coming into his own, that the public which had denied him so long had finally begun to open its eyes to his greatness.
In many ways "The Twilight of the Idols" is one of Nietzsche's most brilliant books. Being more compact, it consequently possesses a greater degree of precision and clarity than is found in his more analytical17 writings. It is not, however, a treatise18 to which one may go without considerable preparation. With the exception of "Thus Spake Zarathustra," it demands more on the part of the reader than any of Nietzsche's other books. It is, for the most part, composed of conclusions and comments which grow directly out of the laborious20 ethical22 research of his preceding volumes, and presupposes in the student an enormous amount of reading, not only of Nietzsche's own writings but of philosophical23 works in general. But once equipped with this preparation, one will find more of contemporary interest in it than in the closely organised books such as "Beyond Good and Evil" and "The Genealogy of Morals." There are few points in Nietzsche's philosophy not found here. For a compact expression of his entire teaching I know of no better book to which one might turn. Nietzsche[Pg 233] himself, to judge from a passage in his "Ecce Homo" intended this book as a statement of his whole ethical system. He probably meant that it should present in toto the principal data of his foregoing studies, in order that the reader might be familiar with all the steps in his philosophy before setting forth24 upon the formidable doctrines25 of "The Will to Power." Obviously, therefore, it is not a book for beginners. Being expositional rather than argumentative, it is open to misunderstanding and misinterpretation. It contains apparent contradictions which might confuse the student who has not followed Nietzsche in the successive points which led to his conclusions, and who is unfamiliar28 with the exact definitions attached to certain words relating to human conduct.
Other qualities of a misleading nature are to be encountered in this book. Many of the paragraphs have about them an air of mere29 cleverness, although in reality they embody30 profound concepts. The reader ignorant of the inner seriousness of Nietzsche will accept these passages only at their surface value. Of the forty-four short epigrams which comprise the opening chapter, I have appended but three, for fear they would be judged solely31 by their superficial characteristics. Many of the other aphorisms throughout the book lend themselves all too easily to the same narrow judgment32.
Again, "The Problem of Socrates," the second division of the book, because of its profundity33, presents many difficulties to the unprepared student. Here is a criticism of the Socratic ideals which requires, in order that it be intelligently grasped, not only a wide general knowledge, but also a specific training in the uprooting34 of prejudices and of traditional ethical conceptions—such a training as can be acquired only by a close study of[Pg 234] Nietzsche's own destructive works. The explanation of Socrates's power, the condemnation35 of that ancient philosopher's subtle glorification36 of the canaille, the reasons for his secret fascination37, and the interpretation27 of his whole mental progress culminating in his death—all this is profound and categorical criticism which has its roots in the very fundamentals of Nietzsche's philosophy. But because it is so deep-rooted, it therefore presents a wide and all-inclusive vista38 of that philosophy from which it stems. Furthermore, this criticism of Socrates poses a specific problem which can be answered only by resorting to the doctrines which underlie39 Nietzsche's entire thought. In like manner the chapter, "Reason in Philosophy," is understandable only in the light of those investigations40 set forth in "Beyond Good and Evil."
Under the caption, "The Four Great Errors," Nietzsche uproots41 a series of correlated beliefs which have the accumulated impetus42 of centuries of acceptance behind them. These "errors," as stated, are (1) the error of the confusion of cause and effect, (2) the error of false causality, (3) the error of imaginary causes, and (4) the error of free will. The eradication43 of these errors is necessary for a complete acceptance of Nietzsche's philosophy. But unless one is familiar with the vast amount of criticism which has led up to the present discussion of them, one will experience difficulty in following the subtly drawn44 arguments and analogies presented against them. To demonstrate briefly45 the specific application of the first error, namely: the confusion of cause and effect, I offer an analogy stated in the passage. We know that Christian46 morality teaches us that a people perish through vice47 and luxury—that is to say, that these two conditions are causes of racial degeneration.[Pg 235] Nietzsche's contention48 to the contrary is that when a nation is approaching physiological49 degeneration, vice and luxury result in the guise50 of stimuli51 adopted by exhausted52 natures. By this it can be seen how the Christian conscience is developed by a misunderstanding of causes; and it can also be seen how this error may affect the very foundation on which morality is built. I am here stating merely the conclusion: for the reasons leading up to this conclusion one must go to the book direct.
Nietzsche denies the embodiment of the motive53 of an action in the "inner facts of consciousness" where, so we have been taught by psychologists and physicists54, the responsibilities of conduct are contained. The will itself, he argues, is not a motivating force; rather is it an effect of other deeper causes. This is what he discusses in his paragraphs dealing55 with the second error of false causality. In his criticism of the third error relating to imaginary causes, he points to the comfort we obtain by attributing a certain unexplained fact to a familiar cause—by tracing it to a commonplace source—thereby doing away with its seeming mystery. Thus ordinary maladies or afflictions, or, to carry the case into moral regions, misfortunes and unaccountable strokes of fate, are explained by finding trite56 and plausible57 reasons for their existence. As a consequence the habit of postulating58 causes becomes a fixed59 mental habit. In the great majority of cases, and especially in the domain60 of morality and religion, the causes are false, inasmuch as the operation of finding them depends on the mental characteristics of the searcher. The error of free will Nietzsche attributes to the theologians' attempt to make mankind responsible for its acts and therefore amenable61 to punishment. I have been able to present his own words in explanation[Pg 236] of this error, and they will be found at the end of this chapter—41-42 and 43.
In "Skirmishes in a War with the Age," the longest section in the book, Nietzsche gives us much brilliant and incisive62 criticism of men, art and human attributes. He is here at his best, both in clarity of mind and in his manner of expression. This passage, one of the last things to come from his pen, contains the full ripeness of his nature, and is a portion of his work which no student can afford to overlook. It contains the whole of the Nietzschean philosophy applied63 to the conditions of his age. Because it is not a direct voicing of his doctrines it does not lend itself to mutilation except where it touches on principles of conduct and abstract aspects of morality. Many of the most widely read passages of all of Nietzsche's work are contained in it. But here again, as in the case of "Thus Spake Zarathustra," one regrets that the surface brilliance64 of its style attracted readers in England and America before these nations were acquainted with the books which came before. The casual reader, unfamiliar with the principles underlying65 Nietzsche's ethic21, will see only a bold and satanic flippancy66 in his definition of Zola—"the love of stinking67," or in his characterisation of George Sand as "the cow with plenty of beautiful milk," or in his bracketing of "tea-grocers, Christians68, cows, women, Englishmen and other democrats69." Yet it is significant that Nietzsche did not venture upon these remarks until he had the great bulk of his life's work behind him.
In this chapter are discussions of Renan, Sainte-Beuve, George Eliot, George Sand, Emerson, Carlyle, Darwin, Schopenhauer, Goethe and other famous men and women. In the short essays devoted71 to these writers[Pg 237] we have, however, more than mere detached valuations. Beneath all the criticisms is a rationale of judgment based on definite philosophical doctrines. This same basis of appreciation72 is present in the discussion of art and artists, to which subjects many pages are devoted. In fact, "The Twilight of the Idols" contains most of the art theories and ?sthetic doctrines which Nietzsche advanced. He defines the psychology73 of the artist, and draws the line between the two concepts, Apollonian and Dionysian, as applied to art. He analyses the meaning of beauty and ugliness, and endeavours to show in what manner the conceptions of these qualities are related to the racial instincts. He also inquires into the doctrine26 of "l'art pour l'art" and points out wherein it fails in its purpose. A valuable explanation of "genius" is put forth in the theory that the accumulative power of generations breaks forth in the great men of a nation, and that these great men mark the end of an age, as in the case of the Renaissance74.
The most significant brief essay in this section is an answer made to certain critics who, in reviewing "Beyond Good and Evil," claimed a superiority for the present age over the older civilisations. Nietzsche calls this essay "Have We Become Moral?" and proceeds to make comparisons of contemporaneous virtues76 with those of the ancients. He denies that to-day, without our decrepit77 humanitarianism78 and our doctrines of weakness, we would be able to withstand, either nervously79 or muscularly, the conditions that prevailed during the Renaissance. He points out that our morals are those of senility, and that we have deteriorated80, physically81 as well as mentally, as a result of an adherence82 to a code of morality invented to meet the needs of a weak and impoverished[Pg 238] people. Our virtues, he says, are determined83 and stimulated84 by our weakness, so that we have come to admire the moralities of the slave, the most prominent among which is the doctrine of equality. In the decline of all the positive forces of life Nietzsche sees only racial decadence85. In this regard it is important to take note of one of the passages relative to the discussion of this decadence, namely: the one wherein he characterises the anarchist86 as "the mouthpiece of the decaying strata87 of society." The appellation88 of "anarchist" has not infrequently been applied to Nietzsche himself by those who have read him superficially or whose acquaintance with him has been the result of distorted hearsay89. I know of no better analysis of anarchistic90 motives91 or of no keener dissection92 of anarchistic weakness than is set forth here. Nor do I know of any better answer to those critics who have accused Nietzsche of anarchy93, than the criticism contained in this passage.
In a final chapter, under the caption of "Things I Owe to the Ancients," Nietzsche outlines the inspirational source of many of his doctrines and literary habits. This chapter is important only to the student who wishes to go to the remoter influences in Nietzsche's writings, and for that reason I have omitted from the following excerpts any quotation94 from it.
EXCERPTS FROM "THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS"
Man thinks woman profound—why? Because he can never fathom95 her depths. Woman is not even shallow. 5
The trodden worm curls up. This testifies to its caution. It thus reduces its chances of being trodden upon again. In the language of morality: Humility96. 5-6
The Church combats passion by means of excision97 of[Pg 239] all kinds: its practise, its "remedy," is castration. It never inquires "how can a desire be spiritualised, beautified, deified?"—In all ages it has laid the weight of discipline in the process of extirpation98 (the extirpation of sensuality, pride, lust99 of dominion100, lust of property, and revenge).—But to attack the passions at their roots, means attacking life itself at its source: the method of the Church is hostile to life. 27
Only degenerates102 find radical103 methods indispensable: weakness of will, or more strictly104 speaking, the inability not to react to a stimulus105, is in itself simply another form of degeneracy. Radical and mortal hostility106 to sensuality, remains107 a suspicious symptom: it justifies108 one in being suspicious of the general state of one who goes to such extremes. 27
A man is productive only in so far as he is rich in contrasted instincts; he can remain young only on condition that his soul does not begin to take things easy and to yearn109 for peace. 28-29
All naturalism is morality—that is to say, every sound morality is ruled by a life instinct—any one of the laws of life is fulfilled by the definite canon "thou shalt," "thou shalt not," and any sort of obstacle or hostile element in the road of life is thus cleared away. Conversely, the morality which is antagonistic110 to nature—that is to say, almost every morality that has been taught, honoured and preached hitherto, is directed precisely111 against the life-instincts.... 30
Morality, as it has been understood hitherto, is the instinct of degeneration itself, which converts itself into an imperative112: it says: "Perish!" It is the death sentence of men who are already doomed113. 31
Morality, in so far it condemns114 per se, and not out of[Pg 240] any aim, consideration or motive of life, is a specific error, for which no one should feel any mercy, a degenerate101 idiosyncrasy, that has done an unutterable amount of harm. 32
Every mistake is in every sense the sequel to degeneration of the instincts to disintegration115 of the will. This is almost the definition of evil. 35
Morality and religion are completely and utterly116 parts of the psychology of error: in every particular case cause and effect are confounded. 41
At present we no longer have any mercy upon the concept "free-will": we know only too well what it is—the most egregious117 theological trick that has ever existed for the purpose of making mankind "responsible" in a theological manner—that is to say, to make mankind dependent upon theologians. 41
The doctrine of the will was invented principally for the purpose of punishment,—that is to say, with the intention of tracing guilt118. The whole of ancient psychology, or the psychology of the will, is the outcome of the fact that its originators, who were the priests at the head of ancient communities, wanted to create for themselves a right to administer punishments—or the right for God to do so. Men were thought of as "free" in order that they might be held guilty.... 42
The fact that no one shall any longer be made responsible, that the nature of existence may not be traced to a causa prima, that the world is an entity119 neither as a sensorium nor as a spirit—this alone is the great deliverance,—thus alone is the innocence120 of Becoming restored.... The concept "God" has been the greatest objection to existence hitherto.... We deny God, we deny responsibility in God: thus alone do we save the world. 43
[Pg 241]
Moral judgment has this in common with the religious one, that it believes in realities which are not real. Morality is only an interpretation of certain phenomena121: or more strictly speaking, a misinterpretation of them. Moral judgment, like the religious one, belongs to a stage of ignorance in which even the concept of reality, the distinction between real and imagined things, is still lacking.... 44
In the early years of the Middle Ages, during which the Church was most distinctly and above all a menagerie, the most beautiful examples of the "blond beast" were hunted down in all directions,—the noble Germans, for instance, were "improved." But what did this "improved" German, who had been lured122 to the monastery123 look like after the process? He looked like a caricature of man, like an abortion124: he had become a "sinner," he was caged up, he had been imprisoned125 behind a host of appalling126 notions. He now lay there, sick, wretched, malevolent127 even toward himself: full of hate for the instincts of life, full of suspicion in regard to all that is still strong and happy. In short a "Christian." In physiological terms: in a fight with an animal, the only way of making it weak may be to make it sick. The Church understood this: it ruined man, it made him weak,—but it laid claim to having "improved" him. 45-46
All means which have been used heretofore with the object of making man moral, were through and through immoral128. 49
My impossible people—Seneca, or the toreador of virtue75.—Rousseau, or the return to nature, in impuris naturalibus.—Schiller, or the Moral Trumpeter of S?ckingen.—Dante, or the hy?na that writes poetry in tombs.—Kant, or cant70 as an intelligible129 character.—Victor Hugo,[Pg 242] or the lighthouse on the sea of nonsense.—Liszt, or the school of racing—after women.—George Sand, or lactea ubertas, in plain English: the cow with plenty beautiful milk.—Michelet, or enthusiasm in its shirt sleeves.—Carlyle, or Pessimism130 after undigested meals.—John Stuart Mill, or offensive lucidity131.—The brothers Goncourt, or the two Ajaxes fighting with Homer. Music by Offenbach.—Zola, or the love of stinking. 60
For art to be possible at all—that is to say, in order that an ?sthetic mode of action and of observation may exist, a certain preliminary physiological state is indispensable: ecstasy132. This state of ecstasy must first have intensified133 the susceptibility of the whole machine: otherwise, no art is possible. All kinds of ecstasy, however differently produced, have this power to create art, and above all the state dependent upon sexual excitement—this most venerable and primitive134 form of ecstasy. The same applies to that ecstasy which is the outcome of all great desires, all strong passions; the ecstasy of the feast, of the arena135, of the act of bravery, of victory, of all extreme action; the ecstasy of cruelty; the ecstasy of destruction; the ecstasy following upon certain meteorological influences, as for instance that of springtime, or upon the use of narcotics136; and finally the ecstasy of will, that ecstasy which results from accumulated and surging will-power. 68-68
What is the meaning of the antithetical concepts Apollonian and Dionysian which I have introduced into the vocabulary of ?sthetic, as representing two distinct modes of ecstasy?—Apollonian ecstasy acts above all as a force stimulating137 the eye, so that it acquires the power of vision. The painter, the sculptor138, the epic139 poet are essentially140 visionaries. In the Dionysian state, on the other[Pg 243] hand, the whole system of passions is stimulated and intensified, so that it discharges itself by all the means of expression at once, and vents141 all its power of representation, of imitation, of transfiguration, of transformation142, together with every kind of mimicry143 and histrionic display at the same time. 67-68
As to the famous "struggle for existence," it seems to me, for the present, to be more of an assumption than a fact. It does occur, but as an exception. The general condition of life is not one of want or famine, but rather of riches, of lavish144 luxuriance, and even of absurd prodigality,—where there is a struggle, it is a struggle for power. 71
The most intellectual men, provided they are also the most courageous146, experience the most excruciating tragedies: but on that very account they honour life, because it confronts them with its more formidable antagonism147. 73
When the anarchist, as the mouthpiece of the decaying strata of society, raises his voice in splendid indignation for "right," "justice," "equal rights," he is only groaning148 under the burden of his ignorance, which cannot understand why he actually suffers,—what his poverty consists of—the poverty of life. 86
To bewail one's lot is always despicable: it is always the outcome of weakness. Whether one ascribes one's afflictions to others or to one's self, it is all the same. The socialist149 does the former, the Christian, for instance, does the latter. That which is common to both attitudes, or rather that which is equally ignoble150 in them both, is the fact that somebody must be to blame if one suffers—in short that the sufferer drugs himself with the honey of revenge to allay151 his anguish152. 86
[Pg 244]
Why a Beyond, if it be not a means of splashing mud over a "Here," over this world? 87
An "altruistic153" morality, a morality under which selfishness withers154, is in all circumstances a bad sign. This is true of individuals and above all of nations. The best are lacking when selfishness begins to be lacking. Instinctively155 to select that which is harmful to one, to be lured by "disinterested156" motives,—these things almost provide the formula for decadence. "Not to have one's own interests at heart"—this is simply a moral fig-leaf concealing157 a very different fact, a physiological one, to wit:—"I no longer know how to find what is to my interest.".... Disintegration of the instincts!—All is up with man when he becomes altruistic. 87
One should die proudly when it is no longer possible to live proudly. Death should be chosen freely,—death at the right time, faced clearly and joyfully158 and embraced while one is surrounded by one's children and other witnesses. It should be affected159 in such a way that a proper farewell is still possible, that he who is about to take leave of us is still himself, and really capable not only of valuing what he has achieved and willed in life, but also of summing-up the value of life itself. Everything precisely the opposite of the ghastly comedy which Christianity has made of the hour of death. We should never forgive Christianity for having so abused the weakness of the dying man as to do violence to his conscience, or for having used his manner of dying as a means of valuing both man and his past!—In spite of all cowardly prejudices, it is our duty, in this respect, above all to reinstate the proper—that is to say, the physiological, aspect of so-called natural death, which after all is perfectly160 "unnatural161" and nothing else than suicide. One never[Pg 245] perishes through anybody's fault but one's own. The only thing is that the death which takes place in the most contemptible162 circumstances, the death that is not free, the death which occurs at the wrong time, is the death of a coward. Out of the very love one bears to life, one should wish death to be different from this—that is to say, free, deliberate, and neither a matter of chance nor of surprise. Finally let me whisper a word of advice to our friends the pessimists163 and all other decadents164. We have not the power to prevent ourselves from being born: but this error—for sometimes it is an error—can be rectified165 if we choose. The man who does away with himself performs the most estimable of deeds: he almost deserves to live for having done so. 88-89
The decline of the instincts of hostility and of those instincts that arouse suspicion,—for this if anything is what constitutes our progress—is only one of the results manifested by the general decline in vitality166: it requires a hundred times more trouble and caution to live such a dependent and senile existence. In such circumstances everybody gives everybody else a helping167 hand, and, to a certain extent, everybody is either an invalid168 or an invalid's attendant. This is then called "virtue": among those men who knew a different life—that is to say, a fuller, more prodigal145, more superabundant sort of life, it might have been called by another name,—possibly "cowardice," or "vileness," or "old woman's morality." 91-92
Ages should be measured according to their positive forces;—valued by this standard that prodigal and fateful age of the Renaissance, appears as the last great age, while we moderns with our anxious care of ourselves and love of our neighbours, with all our unassuming virtues[Pg 246] of industry, equity169, and scientific method—with our lust of collection, of economy and of mechanism—represent a weak age. 93
Liberalism, or, in plain English, the transformation of mankind into cattle. 94
Freedom is the will to be responsible for ourselves. It is to preserve the distance which separates us from other men. To grow more indifferent to hardship, to severity, to privation, and even to life itself. To be ready to sacrifice men for one's cause, one's self included. Freedom denotes that the virile170 instincts which rejoice in war and in victory, prevail over other instincts; for instance, over the instincts of "happiness." The man who has won his freedom, and how much more so, therefore, the spirit that has won his freedom, tramples171 ruthlessly upon that contemptible kind of comfort which tea-grocers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen and other democrats worship in their dreams. The free man is a warrior172. 94-95
By showing ever more and more favour to love-marriages, the very foundation of matrimony, that which alone makes it an institution, has been undermined. No institution ever has been nor ever will be built upon an idiosyncrasy; as I say, marriage cannot be based upon "love." 97-98
The mere fact that there is such a thing as the question of the working-man is due to stupidity, or at bottom to degenerate instincts which are the cause of all the stupidity of modern times. Concerning certain things no questions ought to be put: the first imperative principle of instinct. For the life of me I cannot see what people want to do with the working-man of Europe; now that they have made a question of him. He is far too[Pg 247] comfortable to cease from questioning, ever more and more, and with ever less modesty173. After all, he has the majority on his side. There is now not the slightest hope that an unassuming and contented174 sort of man, after the style of the Chinaman, will come into being in this quarter: and this would have been the reasonable course, it was even a dire19 necessity. What has been done? Everything has been done with the view of nipping the very pre-requisite of this accomplishment175 in the bud,—with the most frivolous176 thoughtlessness those self-same instincts by means of which a working-class becomes possible, and tolerable even to its members themselves, have been destroyed root and branch. The working-man has been declared fit for military service; he has been granted the right of combination, and of franchise177: can it be wondered at that he already regards his condition as one of distress178 (expressed morally, as an injustice)? But, again I ask, what do people want? If they desire a certain end, then they should desire the means thereto. If they will have slaves, then it is madness to educate them to be masters. 98-99
Great men, like great ages, are explosive material, in which a stupendous amount of power is accumulated; the first conditions of their existence are always historical and physiological; they are the outcome of the fact that for long ages energy has been collected, hoarded179 up, saved up and preserved for their use, and that no explosion has taken place. When the tension in the bulk has become sufficiently180 excessive, the most fortuitous stimulus suffices in order to call "genius," "great deeds," and momentous181 fate into the world. 101-102
The criminal type is the type of the strong man and unfavourable conditions, a strong man made sick. He[Pg 248] lacks the wild and savage182 state, a form of nature and existence which is freer and more dangerous, in which everything that constitutes the shield and the sword in the instinct of the strong man, takes a place by right. Society puts a ban upon his virtues; the most spirited instincts inherent in him immediately become involved with the depressing passions, with suspicion, fear and dishonour183. But this is almost the recipe for physiological degeneration. When a man has to do that which he is best suited to do, which he is most fond of doing, not only clandestinely184, but also with long suspense185, caution and ruse186, he becomes an?mic; and inasmuch as he is always having to pay for his instincts in the form of danger, persecution187 and fatalities188, even his feelings begin to turn against these instincts—he begins to regard them as fatal. It is society, our tame, mediocre189, castrated society, in which an untutored son of nature who comes to us from his mountains or from his adventures at sea, must necessarily degenerate into a criminal. Or almost necessarily: for there are cases in which such a man shows himself to be stronger than society: the Corsican Napoleon is the most celebrated190 case of this. 103-104
As long as the priest represented the highest type of man, every valuable kind of man was depreciated191.... The time is coming—this I guarantee—when he will pass as the lowest type, as our Chandala, as the falsest and most disreputable kind of man. 105
Everything good is an inheritance: that which is not inherited is imperfect, it is simply a beginning. 107
Christianity with its contempt of the body is the greatest mishap192 that has ever befallen mankind. 108
I also speak of a "return to nature," although it is not a process of going back but of going up—up into lofty, free[Pg 249] and even terrible nature and naturalness; such a nature as can play with great tasks and may play with them. 108
The doctrine of equality!... But there is no more deadly poison than this for it seems to proceed from the very lips of justice, whereas in reality it draws the curtain down on all justice.... "To equals equality, to unequals inequality"—that would be the real speech of justice and that which follows from it. "Never make unequal things equal." The fact that so much horror and blood are associated with this doctrine of equality, has lent this "modern idea" par3 excellence193 such a halo of fire and glory, that the Revolution as a drama has misled even the most noble minds. 108-109
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genealogy
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| n.家系，宗谱 | |
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excoriated
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| v.擦伤( excoriate的过去式和过去分词 )；擦破（皮肤）；剥（皮）；严厉指责 | |
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par
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caption
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twilight
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| n.暮光，黄昏；暮年，晚期，衰落时期 | |
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idols
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| 偶像( idol的名词复数 )； 受崇拜的人或物； 受到热爱和崇拜的人或物； 神像 | |
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titular
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parody
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| n.打油诗文，诙谐的改编诗文，拙劣的模仿；v.拙劣模仿，作模仿诗文 | |
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subtitle
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accomplished
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aphorisms
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autobiography
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entirely
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excerpts
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breakdown
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| n.垮，衰竭；损坏，故障，倒塌 | |
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withheld
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analytical
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treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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19
dire
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| adj.可怕的，悲惨的，阴惨的，极端的 | |
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20
laborious
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| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
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21
ethic
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| n.道德标准，行为准则 | |
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22
ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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23
philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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24
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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25
doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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26
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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27
interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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28
unfamiliar
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| adj.陌生的，不熟悉的 | |
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29
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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30
embody
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| vt.具体表达，使具体化；包含，收录 | |
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31
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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32
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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33
profundity
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| n.渊博；深奥，深刻 | |
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34
uprooting
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|
| n.倒根，挖除伐根v.把（某物）连根拔起( uproot的现在分词 )；根除；赶走；把…赶出家园 | |
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35
condemnation
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| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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36
glorification
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| n.赞颂 | |
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37
fascination
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| n.令人着迷的事物，魅力，迷恋 | |
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38
vista
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| n.远景，深景，展望，回想 | |
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39
underlie
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| v.位于...之下，成为...的基础 | |
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40
investigations
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| （正式的）调查( investigation的名词复数 )； 侦查； 科学研究； 学术研究 | |
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41
uproots
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| v.把（某物）连根拔起( uproot的第三人称单数 )；根除；赶走；把…赶出家园 | |
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42
impetus
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| n.推动，促进，刺激；推动力 | |
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43
eradication
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| n.根除 | |
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44
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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45
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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46
Christian
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|
| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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47
vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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48
contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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49
physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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50
guise
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| n.外表，伪装的姿态 | |
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51
stimuli
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| n.刺激（物） | |
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52
exhausted
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|
| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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53
motive
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|
| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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54
physicists
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| 物理学家( physicist的名词复数 ) | |
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55
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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56
trite
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| adj.陈腐的 | |
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57
plausible
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|
| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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58
postulating
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| v.假定，假设( postulate的现在分词 ) | |
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59
fixed
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|
| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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60
domain
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| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
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61
amenable
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| adj.经得起检验的；顺从的；对负有义务的 | |
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62
incisive
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|
| adj.敏锐的，机敏的，锋利的，切入的 | |
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63
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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64
brilliance
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|
| n.光辉，辉煌，壮丽，（卓越的）才华，才智 | |
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65
underlying
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|
| adj.在下面的，含蓄的，潜在的 | |
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66
flippancy
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| n.轻率；浮躁；无礼的行动 | |
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67
stinking
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|
| adj.臭的，烂醉的，讨厌的v.散发出恶臭( stink的现在分词 )；发臭味；名声臭；糟透 | |
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68
Christians
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| n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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69
democrats
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| n.民主主义者，民主人士( democrat的名词复数 ) | |
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70
cant
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| n.斜穿，黑话，猛扔 | |
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71
devoted
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|
| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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72
appreciation
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|
| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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73
psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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74
renaissance
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| n.复活，复兴，文艺复兴 | |
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75
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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76
virtues
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| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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77
decrepit
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|
| adj.衰老的，破旧的 | |
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78
humanitarianism
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| n.博爱主义；人道主义；基督凡人论 | |
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79
nervously
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|
| adv.神情激动地，不安地 | |
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80
deteriorated
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|
| 恶化，变坏( deteriorate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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81
physically
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|
| adj.物质上，体格上，身体上，按自然规律 | |
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82
adherence
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| n.信奉，依附，坚持，固着 | |
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83
determined
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|
| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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84
stimulated
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| a.刺激的 | |
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85
decadence
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|
| n.衰落，颓废 | |
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86
anarchist
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|
| n.无政府主义者 | |
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87
strata
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| n.地层（复数）；社会阶层 | |
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88
appellation
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| n.名称，称呼 | |
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89
hearsay
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| n.谣传，风闻 | |
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90
anarchistic
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| 无政府主义的 | |
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91
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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92
dissection
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|
| n.分析；解剖 | |
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93
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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94
quotation
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| n.引文，引语，语录；报价，牌价，行情 | |
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95
fathom
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| v.领悟，彻底了解 | |
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96
humility
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| n.谦逊，谦恭 | |
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97
excision
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| n.删掉；除去 | |
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98
extirpation
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|
| n.消灭，根除，毁灭；摘除 | |
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99
lust
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| n.性(淫)欲；渴(欲)望；vi.对…有强烈的欲望 | |
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100
dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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101
degenerate
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| v.退步，堕落；adj.退步的，堕落的；n.堕落者 | |
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102
degenerates
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| 衰退，堕落，退化( degenerate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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103
radical
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|
| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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104
strictly
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|
| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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105
stimulus
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| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
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106
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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107
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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108
justifies
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|
| 证明…有理( justify的第三人称单数 )； 为…辩护； 对…作出解释； 为…辩解（或辩护） | |
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109
yearn
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| v.想念；怀念；渴望 | |
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110
antagonistic
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| adj.敌对的 | |
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111
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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112
imperative
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|
| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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113
doomed
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| 命定的 | |
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114
condemns
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|
| v.（通常因道义上的原因而）谴责( condemn的第三人称单数 )；宣判；宣布…不能使用；迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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115
disintegration
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| n.分散，解体 | |
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116
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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117
egregious
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| adj.非常的，过分的 | |
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118
guilt
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| n.犯罪；内疚；过失，罪责 | |
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119
entity
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| n.实体，独立存在体，实际存在物 | |
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120
innocence
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| n.无罪；天真；无害 | |
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121
phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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122
lured
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| 吸引，引诱（lure的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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123
monastery
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| n.修道院，僧院，寺院 | |
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124
abortion
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| n.流产，堕胎 | |
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125
imprisoned
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| 下狱，监禁( imprison的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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126
appalling
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| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
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127
malevolent
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| adj.有恶意的，恶毒的 | |
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128
immoral
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| adj.不道德的，淫荡的，荒淫的，有伤风化的 | |
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129
intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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130
pessimism
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| n.悲观者，悲观主义者，厌世者 | |
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131
lucidity
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| n.明朗，清晰，透明 | |
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132
ecstasy
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| n.狂喜，心醉神怡，入迷 | |
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133
intensified
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| v.（使）增强， （使）加剧( intensify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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134
primitive
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|
| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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135
arena
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| n.竞技场，运动场所；竞争场所，舞台 | |
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136
narcotics
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| n.麻醉药( narcotic的名词复数 )；毒品；毒 | |
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137
stimulating
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|
| adj.有启发性的，能激发人思考的 | |
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138
sculptor
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| n.雕刻家，雕刻家 | |
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139
epic
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| n.史诗，叙事诗；adj.史诗般的，壮丽的 | |
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140
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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141
vents
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| （气体、液体等进出的）孔、口( vent的名词复数 )； （鸟、鱼、爬行动物或小哺乳动物的）肛门； 大衣等的)衩口； 开衩 | |
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142
transformation
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| n.变化；改造；转变 | |
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143
mimicry
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| n.（生物）拟态，模仿 | |
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144
lavish
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| adj.无节制的；浪费的；vt.慷慨地给予，挥霍 | |
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145
prodigal
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|
| adj.浪费的，挥霍的，放荡的 | |
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146
courageous
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| adj.勇敢的，有胆量的 | |
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147
antagonism
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| n.对抗，敌对，对立 | |
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148
groaning
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| adj. 呜咽的, 呻吟的 动词groan的现在分词形式 | |
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149
socialist
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| n.社会主义者；adj.社会主义的 | |
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150
ignoble
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| adj.不光彩的，卑鄙的；可耻的 | |
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151
allay
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| v.消除，减轻(恐惧、怀疑等) | |
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152
anguish
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| n.(尤指心灵上的)极度痛苦，烦恼 | |
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altruistic
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| adj.无私的，为他人着想的 | |
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withers
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| 马肩隆 | |
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instinctively
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| adv.本能地 | |
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disinterested
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| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
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concealing
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，遮住( conceal的现在分词 ) | |
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joyfully
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| adv. 喜悦地, 高兴地 | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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unnatural
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| adj.不自然的；反常的 | |
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contemptible
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| adj.可鄙的，可轻视的，卑劣的 | |
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pessimists
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| n.悲观主义者( pessimist的名词复数 ) | |
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decadents
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| n.颓废派艺术家（decadent的复数形式） | |
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rectified
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| [医]矫正的，调整的 | |
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vitality
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| n.活力，生命力，效力 | |
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helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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invalid
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| n.病人，伤残人；adj.有病的，伤残的；无效的 | |
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equity
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| n.公正，公平，（无固定利息的）股票 | |
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virile
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| adj.男性的；有男性生殖力的；有男子气概的；强有力的 | |
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tramples
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| 踩( trample的第三人称单数 )； 践踏； 无视； 侵犯 | |
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warrior
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| n.勇士，武士，斗士 | |
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modesty
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| n.谦逊，虚心，端庄，稳重，羞怯，朴素 | |
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contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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accomplishment
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| n.完成，成就，（pl.）造诣，技能 | |
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frivolous
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| adj.轻薄的；轻率的 | |
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franchise
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| n.特许，特权，专营权，特许权 | |
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distress
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| n.苦恼，痛苦，不舒适；不幸；vt.使悲痛 | |
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hoarded
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| v.积蓄并储藏（某物）( hoard的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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momentous
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| adj.重要的，重大的 | |
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savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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dishonour
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| n./vt.拒付（支票、汇票、票据等）；vt.凌辱，使丢脸；n.不名誉，耻辱，不光彩 | |
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clandestinely
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| adv.秘密地，暗中地 | |
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suspense
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| n.（对可能发生的事）紧张感，担心，挂虑 | |
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ruse
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| n.诡计，计策；诡计 | |
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persecution
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| n. 迫害,烦扰 | |
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fatalities
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| n.恶性事故( fatality的名词复数 )；死亡；致命性；命运 | |
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mediocre
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| adj.平常的，普通的 | |
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celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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depreciated
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| v.贬值，跌价，减价( depreciate的过去式和过去分词 )；贬低，蔑视，轻视 | |
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mishap
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| n.不幸的事，不幸；灾祸 | |
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excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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