All the evidences of what was to be Nietzsche's final and complete philosophical1 work in four volumes, are contained in two volumes of desultory2 and often highly condensed notes which were recently issued under the single caption3 of "The Will to Power" ("Die Wille zur Macht"). On this culminating work Nietzsche had laboured from 1883 until his final breakdown4. He made two plans for "The Will to Power"—one in 1886 and the other in 1887. As the 1887 plan was the one ultimately adhered to, there seems no reason to hesitate about accepting it as the right one. The titles of the four books which comprised this final work as it stands to-day are "European Nihilism," "A Criticism of the Highest Values that Have Prevailed Hitherto," "The Principles of a New Valuation" and "Discipline and Breeding." These headings are according to the last plan made at Nice in 1887, and although, as I stated in the preceding chapter, there was some hesitation5 between the general title of "The Will to Power" and "The Transvaluation of All Values," "The Antichrist," which fell under the latter heading, must not be considered as forming a part of "The Will to Power." However, "The Antichrist" and also "Beyond Good and Evil," "The Genealogy6 of Morals" and "The Twilight7[Pg 276] of the Idols," are closely related in thought to "The Will to Power." This fact is borne out not only by internal evidence, by the manner in which the books overlap8, and by the constant redistribution of titles which sometimes prove the unity9 of the last phase of his thought, but also by the testimony10 of those who had Nietzsche's confidence and could watch him at close quarters.
Nietzsche intended to embody11 in the four books of "The Will to Power" the entire sweep of his philosophical teachings. This work was to be a summary, not only in statement but also in analysis, of his ethical12 system. His preceding books had been replete13 in repetitions, and lacked both organisation14 and sequence. His health was such that he could work only sporadically15 and in short shifts, with the result that he was constantly trying to crowd an enormous amount of material into a short space. He was able to deal with but one point at a time, and, as his working period was frequently too short to develop that point as fully16 as he desired, we find him constantly going back over old ground, altering his syllogisms, making addenda17, interpolating analogies, and in numerous other ways changing and clarifying what he had previously18 written. "The Will to Power" was to be, then, a colossal19 organisation of all his writings, with every step intact, and every conclusion in its place. And throughout the four volumes emphasis was to be put on his motivating doctrine20, the will to power, an oppositional21 theory to Darwin's theory of struggle for mere22 existence. But although we have two large volumes of notes, these jottings lack in a large degree the co-ordination which would have characterised them had Nietzsche been able to carry out his plan.
The notes of these two books are the work of many[Pg 277] years, and the putting together of them for publication has been done without any attempt to alter their original text. They are just as Nietzsche left them—in some cases completed and closely argued paragraphs, in others mere notations23 and memoranda24, elliptic and unelaborated. It is possible, however, to gain a very adequate idea of what was to be the contents of this final work, due to the copiousness25 of the material at hand. From the time of finishing "Thus Spake Zarathustra" to 1889, Nietzsche was constantly making notes for his great work, and there is no phase of his thought which is not touched upon in these two remaining volumes. By following their pages closely, in the light of his foregoing works, one gets a very definite impression of the synthesis of his thoughts. Especially true is this of the second volume of "The Will to Power," for it is here that his cardinal27 doctrine is most strongly and consistently emphasised and its relationship to all human relationships most concisely28 drawn29. Because of this fact I have chosen to consider the two volumes separately. The first volume is full of material more or less familiar to those who have followed Nietzsche in his earlier works. The notes are, in the majority of cases, elaborations and explanations of doctrines30 contained in those books which followed "Thus Spake Zarathustra." As such they are important.
The first volume is divided into two sections—"European Nihilism" and "A Criticism of the Highest Values that Have Prevailed Hitherto." Two subdivisions are found under section one—"Nihilism" and "Concerning the History of European Nihilism." In this first subdivision Nietzsche defines Nihilism and attempts to trace its origin. He states that it is an outcome of the valuations[Pg 278] and interpretations31 of existence which have formerly33 prevailed, namely: the result of the doctrines of Christianity. For our adherence35 to Christian34 morality, Nietzsche says, we must pay dearly: by this adherence we are losing our equilibrium36 and are on the verge37 of adopting opposite valuations—those consisting of Nihilistic elements. He defines the Nihilistic movement as an expression of decadence38, and declares that this decadence is spreading throughout all our modern institutions. Under his second subdivision, he explains that modern gloominess is a result of the "slow advance and rise of the middle and lower classes," and asserts that this gloominess is accompanied by moral hypocrisy39 and the decadent40 virtues41 of sympathy and pity. In this connection he denies that the nineteenth century shows an improvement over the sixteenth. No better analysis of the effects of Christian morality on modern man is to be found in any of Nietzsche's writings than in this treatise43 of Nihilism; and a close study of this analysis will greatly help one in grasping the full significance of the doctrine of the will to power. Although the notes in this book are the least satisfactory of all the portions of "The Will to Power," being both tentative and incomplete, I have been able to select enough definite statements from them to give an adequate idea of both Nietzsche's theories and conclusions in regard to Nihilism.
In the second section of Volume I, "A Criticism of the Highest Values That Have Prevailed Hitherto," the notes are fuller and more closely organised. This is due to the fact that the ground covered by them is in the main the same ground covered by "The Antichrist," "The Genealogy of Morals" and "Beyond Good and Evil." In fact, there is in these notes much repetition[Pg 279] of passages to be found in the three previous volumes. The first subdivision of this second section is called "Criticism of Religion," and there is little material in it which does not appear in "The Antichrist." Even in the manner of expression there exists so strong a similarity that I am inclined to think Nietzsche used these notes in composing his famous philippic against Christianity. Consequently I have made but few quotations44 from this division, choosing in each instance only such passages as do not possess a direct parallel in his earlier work. We find here the same inquiry46 into the origin of religions, the same analysis of Christian ideals, the same history of Christian doctrines, and the same argument against the dissemination47 of Christian faiths as are contained in "The Antichrist." However, these present notes are sufficiently48 different from this previous book to interest the thorough student, and there are occasional speculations49 advanced which are not to be encountered elsewhere in Nietzsche's writings. For the casual reader, however, there is little of new interest in this subdivision.
The same criticism holds true to a large extent when we come to the second subdivision of the second section "A Criticism of Morality." In "The Genealogy of Morals" we have a discussion of practically all the subjects considered in the present notes, such as the origin of moral valuations, the basis of conscience, the influence of the herd50, the dominance of virtue42, the slander51 of the so-called evil man, and the significance of such words as "improving" and "elevating." However, there is sufficient new material in these notes to warrant a reading, for although, despite a few exceptions, there are no new issues posed, certain points which were put forth[Pg 280] only in a speculative52 and abridged53 manner in earlier books, are here enlarged upon. This is especially true in regard to the doctrine of rank. Nietzsche has been accused of advocating only an individualistic morality. But the truth is that he advanced two codes. He preached a morality for the herd, a definite system which suited the needs of the serving classes. For the superior individuals, on the other hand, he taught another code, one which fitted and met the needs of the rulers. The herd morality has always sought to create and maintain a single type of mediocre54 man. Nietzsche preached the necessity of the superior, as well as the inferior, type of man; and in his present notes he goes into this doctrine more fully than heretofore. Furthermore, he makes clear his stand in regard to the weak. On page 291 he states, "I have declared war against the an?mic Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to it), not because I want to annihilate55 it, but only to put an end to its tyranny and clear the way for other ideals, for more robust56 ideals." It has been stated, even in quarters where we have a right to look for more intelligent criticism, that Nietzsche favoured the complete elimination57 of the weak and incompetent58. No such advocacy is to be found in his teachings. To the contrary, as will be seen from the above quotation45, he preached only against the dominance of the weak. He resented their supremacy59 over the intelligent man. Their existence, he maintained, was a most necessary thing. This belief is insisted upon in many places, and one should bear the point in mind when reading the criticisms of socialism to be found throughout the present volume.
Another new point to be found in these notes relates to the immoral60 methods used by the disseminators of[Pg 281] morals. From the passages in which these new points are raised I have taken the quotations which follow at the end of this chapter.
In the third and last subdivision of this second section, "Criticism of Philosophy," we have an extension of Chapter I in "Beyond Good and Evil," "Prejudices of Philosophers," and of the two chapters in "The Twilight of the Idols"—"The Problem of Socrates" and "Reason' in Philosophy." The notes (excepting a few pages of general remarks) occupy themselves with a criticism of Greek philosophy and with an analysis of philosophical truths and errors. These notes touch only indirectly61 on Nietzsche's doctrines, and may be looked upon as explanations of his intellectual methods.
Despite their fragmentariness, the notes in this volume, as I have said, permit one to gain an adequate idea of Nietzsche's purpose. In making my excerpts62 from this book, I have chosen those passages which will throw new light upon his philosophy rather than those statements of conclusions which have been previously encountered.
EXCERPTS FROM "THE WILL TO POWER" volume I
What does Nihilism mean?—That the highest values are losing their value. 8
Thorough Nihilism is the conviction that life is absurd, in the light of the highest values already discovered; it also includes the view that we have not the smallest right to assume the existence of transcendental objects or things in themselves, which would be either divine or morality incarnate63.
This view is the result of fully developed "truthfulness": therefore a consequence of the belief in morality. 8
[Pg 282]
Moral valuations are condemnations, negations; morality is the abdication65 of the will to live. 12
All values with which we have tried, hitherto, to lend the world some worth, from our point of view, and with which we have therefore deprived it of all worth (once these values have been shown to be inapplicable)—all these values, are, psychologically, the results of certain views of utility, established for the purpose of maintaining and increasing the dominion67 of certain communities: but falsely projected into the nature of things. It is always man's exaggerated ingenuousness68 to regard himself as the sense and measure of all things. 15
Every purely69 moral valuation (as, for instance, the Buddhistic) terminates in Nihilism: Europe must expect the same thing! It is supposed that one can get along with a morality bereft70 of a religious background; but in this direction the road to Nihilism is opened. 19
Nihilism is not only a meditating71 over the "in vain"—not only the belief that everything deserves to perish; but one actually puts one's shoulder to the plough; one destroys. 22
The time is coming when we shall have to pay for having been Christians72 for two thousand years: we are losing the equilibrium which enables us to live—for a long while we shall not know in what direction we are travelling. We are hurling73 ourselves headlong into the opposite valuations, with that degree of energy which could only have been engendered74 in man by an overvaluation of himself.
Now, everything is false from the root, words and nothing but words, confused, feeble, or overstrained. 25
Modern Pessimism75 is an expression of the uselessness[Pg 283] only of the modern world, not of the world and existence as such. 29
The "preponderance of pain over pleasure" or the reverse (Hedonism); both of these doctrines are already signposts to Nihilism....
For here, in both cases, no other final purpose is sought than the phenomenon pleasure or pain. 29
"Life is not worth living"; "Resignation"; "what is the good of tears?"—this is a feeble and sentimental76 attitude of mind. 29-30
People have not yet seen what is so terribly obvious—namely, that Pessimism is not a problem but a symptom,—that the term ought to be replaced by "Nihilism,"—that the question, "to be or not to be," is itself an illness, a sign of degeneracy, an idiosyncrasy.
The Nihilistic movement is only an expression of physiological77 decadence. 32
Decay, decline, and waste, are, per se, in no way open to objection; they are the natural consequences of life and vital growth. The phenomenon of decadence is just as necessary to life as advance or progress is: we are not in a position which enables us to suppress it. On the contrary, reason would have it retain its rights.
It is disgraceful on the part of socialist78-theorists to argue that circumstances and social combinations could be devised which would put an end to all vice79, illness, crime, prostitution, and poverty.... But that is tantamount to condemning80 Life. 33
Decadence itself is not a thing that can be withstood: it is absolutely necessary and is proper to all ages and all peoples. That which must be withstood, and by all means in our power, is the spreading of the contagion81 among the sound parts of the organism. 33-34
[Pg 284]
All those things which heretofore have been regarded as the causes of degeneration, are really its effects. 34
If Nature have no pity on the degenerate82, it is not therefore immoral: the growth of physiological and moral evils in the human race, is rather the result of morbid83 and unnatural84 morality. 44
The whole of our sociology knows no other instinct than that of the herd, i.e., of a multitude of mere ciphers—of which every cipher85 has "equal rights," and where it is a virtue to be—naught. 45
Nihilism is a sign that the botched and bungled86 have no longer any consolation87, that they destroy in order to be destroyed, that, having been deprived of morality, they no longer have any reason to "resign themselves," that they take up their stand on the territory of the opposite principle, and will also exercise power themselves, by compelling the powerful to become their hangmen. 52
Our age, with its indiscriminate endeavours to mitigate88 distress89, to honour it, and to wage war in advance with unpleasant possibilities, is an age of the poor. 57
Overwork, curiosity and sympathy—our modern vices90. 64
Christianity, revolution, the abolition91 of slavery, equal rights, philanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all these big words are only valuable in a struggle, as banners: not as realities, but as showwords, for something quite different (yea, even quite opposed to what they mean!). 68
The nineteenth century shows no advance whatever on the sixteenth: and the German spirit of 1888 is an example of a backward movement when compared with that of 1788.... Mankind does not advance, it does not even exist. The aspect of the whole is much more[Pg 285] like that of a huge experimenting workshop where some things in all ages succeed, while an incalculable number of things fail; where all order, logic66, co-ordination, and responsibility is lacking. How dare we blink the fact that the rise of Christianity is a decadent movement?—that the German Reformation was a recrudescence of Christian barbarism?—that the Revolution destroyed the instinct for an organisation of society on a large scale?... Man is not an example of progress as compared with animals: the tender son of culture is an abortion93 compared with the Arab or the Corsican; the Chinaman is a more successful type—that is to say, richer in sustaining power than the European. 72-73
I know best why man is the only animal that laughs: he alone suffers so excruciatingly that he was compelled to invent laughter. The unhappiest and most melancholy94 animal is, as might have been expected, the most cheerful. 74
Socialism—or the tyranny of the meanest and the most brainless,—that is to say, the superficial, the envious95, and the mummers, brought to its zenith,—is, as a matter of fact, the logical conclusion of "modern ideas" and their latent anarchy96: but in the genial97 atmosphere of democratic well-being98 the capacity for forming resolutions or even for coming to an end at all, is paralysed. Men will follow—but no longer their reason. That is why socialism is on the whole a hopelessly bitter affair: and there is nothing more amusing than to observe the discord99 between the poisonous and desperate faces of present-day socialists100—and what wretched and nonsensical feelings does not their style reveal to us!—and the childish lamblike happiness of their hopes and desires. 102
This is the teaching which life itself preaches to all[Pg 286] living things: the morality of Development. To have and to wish to have more, in a word, Growth—that is life itself. In the teaching of socialism "a will to the denial of life" is but poorly concealed101: botched men and races they must be who have devised a teaching of this sort. 102
Spiritual enlightenment is an unfailing means of making men uncertain, weak of will, and needful of succour and support; in short, of developing the herding102 instincts in them. 105
When the feeling of power suddenly seizes and overwhelms a man,—and this takes place in the case of all the great passions,—a doubt arises in him concerning his own person: he dare not think himself the cause of this astonishing sensation—and thus he posits103 a stronger person, a Godhead as its cause, 114-115
Religion has lowered the concept "man"; its ultimate conclusion is that all goodness, greatness, and truth are superhuman, and are only obtainable by the grace of God. 116
In short: what is the price paid for the improvement supposed to be due to morality?—The unhinging of reason, the reduction of all motives104 to fear and hope (punishment and reward); dependence105 upon the tutelage of priests, and upon a formulary exactitude which is supposed to express a divine will; the implantation of a "conscience" which establishes a false science in the place of experience and experiment: as though all one had to do or had not to do were predetermined—a kind of contraction107 of the seeking and striving spirit;—in short: the worst mutilation of man that can be imagined, and it is pretended that "the good man" is the result. 122-123
Paganism is that which says yea to all that is natural,[Pg 287] it is innocence108 in being natural, "naturalness." Christianity is that which says no to all that is natural, it is a certain lack of dignity in being natural; hostility109 to Nature. 127
Christianity is a degenerative movement, consisting of all kinds of decaying and excremental110 elements: it is not the expression of the downfall of a race, it is, from the root, an agglomeration111 of all the morbid elements which are mutually attractive and which gravitate to one another.
It is therefore not a national religion, not determined106 by race: it appeals to the disinherited everywhere; it consists of a foundation of resentment113 against all that is successful and dominant114: it is in need of a symbol which represents the damnation of everything successful and dominant. It is opposed to every form of intellectual movement, to all philosophy: it takes up the cudgels for idiots, and utters a curse upon all intellect. Resentment against those who are gifted, learned, intellectually independent: in all these it suspects the element of success and domination. 130
All Christian "truth," is idle falsehood and deception115, and is precisely116 the reverse of that which was at the bottom of the first Christian movement. 133
To be really Christian would mean to be absolutely indifferent to dogmas, cults117, priests, church, and theology. 133
A God who died for our sins, salvation118 through faith, resurrection after death—all these things are the counterfeit119 coins of real-Christianity, for which that pernicious blockhead Paul must be held responsible. 138
Christianity has, from the first, always transformed the symbolical120 into crude realities:
[Pg 288]
(1) The antitheses121 "true life" and "false life" were misunderstood and changed into "life here" and "life beyond."
(2) The notion "eternal life," as opposed to the personal life which is ephemeral, is translated into "personal immortality";
(3) The process of fraternising by means of sharing the same food and drink, after the Hebrew-Arabian manner, is interpreted as the "miracle of transubstantiation."
(4) "Resurrection" which was intended to mean the entrance to the "true life," in the sense of being intellectually "born again," becomes an historical contingency122, supposed to take place at some moment after death;
(5) The teaching of the Son of man as the "Son of God,"—that is to say, the life-relationship between man and God,—becomes the "second person of the Trinity," and thus the filial relationship of every man—even the lowest—to God, is done away with;
(6) Salvation through faith (that is to say, that there is no other way to this filial relationship to God save through the practice of life taught by Christ) becomes transformed into the belief that there is a miraculous123 way of atoning124 for all sin; though not through our own endeavours, but by means of Christ:
For all these purposes, "Christ on the Cross" had to be interpreted afresh. The death itself would certainly not be the principal feature of the event ... it was only another sign pointing to the way in which one should behave towards the authorities and the laws of the world —that one was not to defend oneself—this was the exemplary life. 139-140
The Gospel is the announcement that the road to happiness lies open for the lowly and the poor—that all one[Pg 289] has to do is to emancipate125 one's self from all institutions, traditions, and the tutelage of the higher classes. Thus Christianity is no more than the typical teaching of Socialists.
Property, acquisitions, mother-country, status and rank, tribunals, the police, the State, the Church, Education, Art, militarism: all these are so many obstacles in the way of happiness, so many mistakes, snares126, and devil's artifices127, on which the Gospel passes sentence—all this is typical of socialistic doctrines.
Behind all this there is the outburst, the explosion of a concentrated loathing128 of the "masters"—the instinct which discerns the happiness of freedom after such long oppression. 173-174
Christianity is a denaturalisation of gregarious129 morality: under the power of the most complete misapprehensions and self-deceptions. Democracy is a more natural form of it, and less sown with falsehood. It is a fact that the oppressed, the low, and whole mob of slaves and half-castes, will prevail.
First step: they make themselves free—they detach themselves, at first in fancy only; they recognise each other; they make themselves paramount130.
Second step: they enter the lists, they demand acknowledgment, equal rights, "Justice."
Third step: they demand privileges (they draw the representatives of power over to their side).
Fourth step: they alone want all power, and they have it. 177
When and where has any man, of any note at all, resembled the Christian ideal?—at least in the eyes of those who are psychologists and triers of the heart and reins131. Look at all Plutarch's heroes! 180
[Pg 290]
The higher man distinguishes himself from the lower by his fearlessness and his readiness to challenge misfortune: it is a sign of degeneration when eudemonistic values begin to prevail (physiological fatigue132 and enfeeblement of will-power). Christianity, with its prospect133 of "blessedness," is the typical attitude of mind of a suffering and impoverished134 species of man. Abundant strength will be active, will suffer, and will go under. 182
All ideals are dangerous; because they lower and brand realities; they are all poisons. 183
These "conditions of salvation" of which the Christian is conscious are merely variations of the same diseased state—the interpretation32 of an attack of epilepsy by means of a particular formula which is provided, not by science, but by religious mania135. 190
A pang136 of conscience in a man is a sign that his character is not yet equal to his deed. There is such a thing as a pang of conscience after good deeds: in this case it is their unfamiliarity137, their incompatibility138 with an old environment. 192
We immoralists prefer to disbelieve in "faults." We believe that all deeds, of what kind soever, are identically the same at root; just as deeds which turn against us may be useful from an economical point of view, and even generally desirable. In certain individual cases, we admit that we might well have been spared a given action; the circumstances alone predisposed us in its favour. Which of us, if favoured by circumstances, would not already have committed every possible crime?... That is why, one should never say: "Thou shouldst never have done such and such a thing," but only: "How strange it is that I have not done such and such[Pg 291] a thing hundreds of times already!"—As a matter of fact, only a very small number of acts are typical acts and real epitomes140 of a personality, and seeing what a small number of people really are personalities141, a single act very rarely characterises a man. Acts are mostly dictated142 by circumstances; they are superficial or merely reflex movements performed in response to a stimulus143, long before the depths of our beings are affected144 or consulted in the matter. 192-193.
Experience teaches us that, in every case in which a man has elevated himself to any great extent above the average of his fellows, every high degree of power always involves a corresponding degree of freedom from Good and Evil as also from "true" and "false," and cannot take into account what goodness dictates145. 200
What is Christian "virtue" and "love of men," if not precisely this mutual112 assistance with a view to survival, this solidarity146 of the weak, this thwarting147 of selection? What is Christian altruism148, if it is not the mob-egotism of the weak which divines that, if everybody looks after everybody else, every individual will be preserved for a longer period of time?... He who does not consider this attitude of mind as immoral, as a crime against life, himself belongs to the sickly crowd, and also shares their instincts.... Genuine love of mankind exacts sacrifice for the good of the species—it is hard, full of self-control, because it needs human sacrifices. 203
What deserves the most rigorous condemnation64, is the ambiguous and cowardly infirmity of purpose of a religion like Christianity,—or rather like the Church,—which, instead of recommending death and self-destruction, actually protects all the botched and bungled, and encourages them to propagate their kind. 204
[Pg 292]
Let us see what the "genuine Christian" does of all the things which his instincts forbid him to do:—he covers beauty, pride, riches, self-reliance, brilliancy, knowledge, and power with suspicion and mud—in short, all culture: his object is to deprive the latter of its clean conscience. 200
What is it we combat in Christianity? That it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their spirit, at exploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at converting their proud assurance into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it knows how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect them with disease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards, against themselves—until the strong perish through their excessive self-contempt and self-immolation. 209
All virtues should be looked upon as physiological conditions. 213
Formerly it was said of every form of morality, "Ye shall know them by their fruits." I say of every form of morality: "It is a fruit, and from it I learn the Soil out of which it grew." 214
My leading doctrine is this: there are no moral phenomena149, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena. The origin of this interpretation itself lies beyond the pale of morality. 214
The whole of morality of Europe is based upon the values which are useful to the herd. 228
The herd regards the exception, whether it be above or beneath its general level, as something which is antagonistic150 and dangerous to itself. Their trick in dealing151 with the exceptions above them, the strong, the mighty152, the wise, and the fruitful, is to persuade them to become guardians153, herdsmen, and watchmen—in fact, to become[Pg 293] their head-servants: thus they convert a danger into a thing which is useful. 231
My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides—that is to say, against those which are decadents154 from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and against those who rise superior to its dead level. 236
My philosophy aims at a new order of rank: not at an individualistic morality. The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd—but not beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation for their actions. 237
Conscience condemns155 an action because that action has been condemned156 for a long period of time: all conscience does is to imitate: it does not create values. That which first led to the condemnation of certain actions, was not conscience: but the knowledge of (or the prejudice against) its consequences.... The approbation157 of conscience, the feeling of well-being, of "inner peace," is of the same order of emotions as the artist's joy over his work—it proves nothing. 242
By what means does a virtue attain158 to power?—With precisely the same means as a political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining of opposing virtues that happen to be already in power, the changing of their names, systematic159 persecution160 and scorn; in short, by means of acts of general "immorality161." 252
Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic162 pity, so that we no longer recognise it as such. The same has happened to the love of the sexes which has become amour-passion; the slavish attitude of mind appears as Christian obedience163; wretchedness becomes humility164; the disease of the nervus sympathicus, for[Pg 294] instance, is eulogised as Pessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc. 253
The qualities which constitute the strength of an opposing race or class are declared to be the most evil and pernicious things it has: for by means of them it may be harmful to us. 255
I recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being recognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue everywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it does not suffer from the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of perspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim itself; (4) it makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as judge because it is always a personal virtue; (6) it does precisely what is generally forbidden: virtue as I understand it is the actual vetitum within all gregarious legislation; (7) in short, I recognise virtue in that it is in the Renaissance165 style—virtu—free from all moralic acid. 258
Lust166 of property, lust of power, laziness, simplicity167, fear; all these things are interested in virtue; that is why it stands so securely. 261
Vice is a somewhat arbitrary epitome139 of certain effects resulting from physiological degeneracy. A general proposition such as that which Christianity teaches, namely, "Man is evil," would be justified168 provided one were justified in regarding a given type of degenerate man as normal. But this may be an exaggeration. Of course, wherever Christianity prospers169 and prevails, the proposition holds good: for then the existence of an unhealthy soil—of a degenerate territory—is demonstrated. 269
It is difficult to have sufficient respect for man, when one sees how he understands the art of fighting his way,[Pg 295] of enduring, of turning circumstances to his own advantage, and of overthrowing170 opponents; but when he is seen in the light of his desires, he is the most absurd of all animals. 269
As to the whole socialistic ideal: it is nothing but a blockheaded misunderstanding of the Christian moral ideal. 275
An ideal which is striving to prevail or to assert itself endeavours to further its purpose (a) by laying claim to a spurious origin; (b) by assuming a relationship between itself and the powerful ideals already existing; (c) by means of the thrill produced by mystery, as though an unquestionable power were manifesting itself; (d) by the slander of its opponents' ideals; (e) by a lying teaching of the advantages which follow in its wake, for instance: happiness, spiritual peace, general peace, or even the assistance of a mighty God. 278
My view: all the forces and instincts which are the source of life are lying beneath the ban of morality: morality is the life-denying instinct. Morality must be annihilated171 if life is to be emancipated172. 278
Every one's desire is that there should be no other teaching and valuation of things than those by means of which he himself succeeds. Thus the fundamental tendency of the weak and mediocre of all times, has been to enfeeble the strong and to reduce them to the level of the weak: their chief weapon in this process was the moral principle. The attitude of the strong towards the weak is branded as evil; the highest states of the strong become bad bywords. 279
Every small community (or individual), finding itself involved in a struggle, strives to convince itself of this: "Good taste, good judgment173, and virtue are[Pg 296] ours." War urges people to this exaggerated self-esteem. 281
Whatever kind of eccentric ideal one may have (whether as a "Christian," a "free-spirit," an "immoralist," or a German Imperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its being the ideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged nature. One should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate it, and thus level one's self down to the rest of mankind. 281
Real heroism174 consists, not in fighting under the banner of self-sacrifice, submission175 and disinterestedness176, but in not fighting at all.... "I am thus: I will be thus—and you can go to the devil!" 282
Modest, industrious177, benevolent178, and temperate179: thus you would that men were?—that good men were? But such men I can only conceive as slaves, the slaves of the future. 289
Industry, modesty180, benevolence181, temperance, are just so many obstacles in the way of sovereign sentiments, of great ingenuity182, of an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one's self. 290
I have declared war against the an?mic Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to it), not because I want to annihilate it, but only to put an end to its tyranny and clear the way for other ideals, for more robust ideals. 291
If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self and not one's neighbour that one is succouring. 294
"One is continually promoting the interests of one's 'ego26' at the cost of other people"; "Living consists in living at the cost of others"—he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step towards truth to himself. 294
[Pg 297]
A morality and a religion of "love," the curbing183 of the self-affirming spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, resignation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and deed may be of the highest value within the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: for it restrains the feelings of rivalry184, of resentment, and of envy,—feelings which are only too natural in the bungled and the botched,—and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of obedience, of slave-life, of being-ruled, of poverty, of illness, and of lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes (or races) and individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult92 of unselfishness, the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross." 296
The hatred185 of egoism, whether it be one's own (as in the case of the Socialists) appears as a valuation reached under the predominance of revenge; and also as an act of prudence186 on the part of the preservative187 instinct of the suffering, in the form of an increase in their feelings of co-operation and unity.... At bottom, the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism (one's own or that of others) is still a self-preservative measure on the part of the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly appears under certain definite physiological circumstances.
When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice," "rights," "equal rights," it only shows that he is oppressed by his inadequate188 culture, and is unable to understand why he suffers: he also finds pleasure in crying;—if he were more at ease he would take jolly good care not to cry in that way: in that case he would[Pg 298] seek his pleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of the Christian: he curses, condemns, and slanders189 the "world"—and does not even except himself. But that is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we are in the presence of invalids190 who feel better for crying, and who find relief in slander. 298
I value a man according to the quantum of power and fulness of his will; not according to the enfeeblement and moribund191 state thereof. I consider that a philosophy which teaches the denial of will is both defamatory and slanderous192.... I test the power of a will according to the amount of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn to its own advantage; I do not point to the evil and pain of existence with the finger of reproach, but rather entertain the hope that life may one day be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been. 304
My ultimate conclusion is, that the real man represents a much higher value than the "desirable" man of any ideal that has ever existed hitherto; that all "desiderata" in regard to mankind have been absurd and dangerous dissipations by means of which a particular kind of man has sought to establish his measures of preservation193 and of growth as a law for all; that every "desideratum" of this kind which has been made to dominate has reduced man's worth, his strength, and his trust in the future; that the indigence194 and mediocre intellectuality of man becomes most apparent, even to-day, when he reveals a desire; that man's ability to fix values has hitherto been developed too inadequately195 to do justice to the actual, not merely to the "desirable," worth of man; that, up to the present, ideals have really been the power which has most slandered196 man and power, the[Pg 299] poisonous fumes197 which have hung over reality, and which have seduced198 men to yearn199 for nonentity200.... 311
One must be very immoral in order to make people moral by deeds. The moralist's means are the most terrible that have ever been used; he who has not the courage to be an immoralist in deeds may be fit for anything else, but not for the duties of a moralist. 314
The priests of all ages have always pretended that they wished to "improve.. ... But we, of another persuasion201, would laugh if a lion-tamer ever wished to speak to us of his "improved" animals. As a rule, the taming of a beast is only achieved by deteriorating202 it: even the moral man is not a better man; he is rather a weaker member of his species. 319
Up to the present, morality has developed at the cost of: the ruling classes and their specific instincts, the well-constituted and beautiful natures, the independent and privileged classes in all respects.
Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement opposing Nature's endeavours to arrive at a higher type. Its effects are: mistrust of life in general (in so far as its tendencies are felt to be immoral),—hostility towards the senses (inasmuch as the highest values are felt to be opposed to the higher instincts).—Degeneration and self-destruction of "higher natures," because it is precisely in them that the conflict becomes conscious. 321
Suppose the strong were masters in all respects, even in valuing: let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness, suffering, and sacrifice. Self-contempt on the part of the weak would be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate203 their kind. And would this be desirable?—should we really like a world in which the subtlety204, the consideration, the[Pg 300] intellectuality, the plasticity—in fact, the whole influence of the weak—was lacking? ... 323
Under "Spiritual freedom" I understand something very definite: it is a state in which one is a hundred times superior to philosophers and other disciples205 of "truth" in one's severity towards one's self, in one's uprightness, in one's courage, and in one's absolute will to say nay206 even when it is dangerous to say nay. I regard the philosophers that have appeared heretofore as contemptible207 libertines208 hiding behind the petticoats of the female "Truth." 384
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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desultory
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| adj.散漫的，无方法的 | |
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caption
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| n.说明，字幕，标题；v.加上标题，加上说明 | |
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breakdown
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| n.垮，衰竭；损坏，故障，倒塌 | |
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hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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genealogy
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| n.家系，宗谱 | |
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twilight
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| n.暮光，黄昏；暮年，晚期，衰落时期 | |
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overlap
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| v.重叠，与…交叠；n.重叠 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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embody
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| vt.具体表达，使具体化；包含，收录 | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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replete
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| adj.饱满的，塞满的；n.贮蜜蚁 | |
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organisation
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| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
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sporadically
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| adv.偶发地，零星地 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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addenda
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| n.附录，附加物；附加物( addendum的名词复数 )；补遗；附录；（齿轮的）齿顶（高） | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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colossal
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| adj.异常的，庞大的 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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oppositional
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| 反对的，对抗的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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notations
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| 记号，标记法( notation的名词复数 ) | |
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memoranda
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| n. 备忘录, 便条 名词memorandum的复数形式 | |
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copiousness
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| n.丰裕，旺盛 | |
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ego
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| n.自我，自己，自尊 | |
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cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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concisely
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| adv.简明地 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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interpretations
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| n.解释( interpretation的名词复数 )；表演；演绎；理解 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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adherence
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| n.信奉，依附，坚持，固着 | |
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equilibrium
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| n.平衡，均衡，相称，均势，平静 | |
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verge
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| n.边，边缘；v.接近，濒临 | |
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decadence
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| n.衰落，颓废 | |
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hypocrisy
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| n.伪善，虚伪 | |
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decadent
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| adj.颓废的，衰落的，堕落的 | |
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virtues
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| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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quotations
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| n.引用( quotation的名词复数 )；[商业]行情（报告）；（货物或股票的）市价；时价 | |
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quotation
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| n.引文，引语，语录；报价，牌价，行情 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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dissemination
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| 传播,宣传,传染(病毒) | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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speculations
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| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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herd
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| n.兽群，牧群；vt.使集中，把…赶在一起 | |
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slander
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| n./v.诽谤，污蔑 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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abridged
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| 削减的，删节的 | |
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mediocre
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| adj.平常的，普通的 | |
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annihilate
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| v.使无效；毁灭；取消 | |
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robust
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| adj.强壮的，强健的，粗野的，需要体力的，浓的 | |
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elimination
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| n.排除，消除，消灭 | |
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incompetent
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| adj.无能力的，不能胜任的 | |
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supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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immoral
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| adj.不道德的，淫荡的，荒淫的，有伤风化的 | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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excerpts
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| n.摘录，摘要( excerpt的名词复数 )；节选（音乐，电影）片段 | |
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63
incarnate
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| adj.化身的，人体化的，肉色的 | |
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condemnation
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| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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abdication
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| n.辞职；退位 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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ingenuousness
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| n.率直；正直；老实 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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70
bereft
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| adj.被剥夺的 | |
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meditating
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| a.沉思的，冥想的 | |
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72
Christians
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| n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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73
hurling
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| n.爱尔兰式曲棍球v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的现在分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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74
engendered
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| v.产生（某形势或状况），造成，引起( engender的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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pessimism
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| n.悲观者，悲观主义者，厌世者 | |
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sentimental
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| adj.多愁善感的，感伤的 | |
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physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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socialist
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| n.社会主义者；adj.社会主义的 | |
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vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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condemning
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| v.（通常因道义上的原因而）谴责( condemn的现在分词 )；宣判；宣布…不能使用；迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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contagion
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| n.(通过接触的疾病)传染；蔓延 | |
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degenerate
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| v.退步，堕落；adj.退步的，堕落的；n.堕落者 | |
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morbid
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| adj.病的；致病的；病态的；可怕的 | |
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unnatural
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| adj.不自然的；反常的 | |
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cipher
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| n.零；无影响力的人；密码 | |
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bungled
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| v.搞糟，完不成( bungle的过去式和过去分词 )；笨手笨脚地做；失败；完不成 | |
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consolation
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| n.安慰，慰问 | |
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mitigate
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| vt.（使）减轻，（使）缓和 | |
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distress
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| n.苦恼，痛苦，不舒适；不幸；vt.使悲痛 | |
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vices
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| 缺陷( vice的名词复数 )； 恶习； 不道德行为； 台钳 | |
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abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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cult
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| n.异教，邪教；时尚，狂热的崇拜 | |
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abortion
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| n.流产，堕胎 | |
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melancholy
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| n.忧郁，愁思；adj.令人感伤（沮丧）的，忧郁的 | |
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envious
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| adj.嫉妒的，羡慕的 | |
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anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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genial
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| adj.亲切的，和蔼的，愉快的，脾气好的 | |
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well-being
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| n.安康，安乐，幸福 | |
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discord
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| n.不和，意见不合，争论，（音乐）不和谐 | |
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socialists
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| 社会主义者( socialist的名词复数 ) | |
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concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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herding
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| 中畜群 | |
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posits
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| v.假定，设想，假设( posit的第三人称单数 ) | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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107
contraction
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| n.缩略词，缩写式，害病 | |
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108
innocence
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| n.无罪；天真；无害 | |
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109
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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110
excremental
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| adj.排泄物的，粪便的 | |
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111
agglomeration
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| n.结聚，一堆 | |
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112
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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113
resentment
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| n.怨愤，忿恨 | |
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114
dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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115
deception
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| n.欺骗，欺诈；骗局，诡计 | |
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116
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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117
cults
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| n.迷信( cult的名词复数 )；狂热的崇拜；（有极端宗教信仰的）异教团体 | |
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118
salvation
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| n.（尤指基督）救世，超度，拯救，解困 | |
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119
counterfeit
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| vt.伪造，仿造；adj.伪造的，假冒的 | |
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120
symbolical
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| a.象征性的 | |
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121
antitheses
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| n.对照，对立的，对比法；对立( antithesis的名词复数 )；对立面；对照；对偶 | |
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122
contingency
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| n.意外事件，可能性 | |
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123
miraculous
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| adj.像奇迹一样的，不可思议的 | |
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124
atoning
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| v.补偿，赎（罪）( atone的现在分词 )；补偿，弥补，赎回 | |
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125
emancipate
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| v.解放，解除 | |
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126
snares
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| n.陷阱( snare的名词复数 )；圈套；诱人遭受失败（丢脸、损失等）的东西；诱惑物v.用罗网捕捉，诱陷，陷害( snare的第三人称单数 ) | |
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127
artifices
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| n.灵巧( artifice的名词复数 )；诡计；巧妙办法；虚伪行为 | |
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128
loathing
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| n.厌恶，憎恨v.憎恨，厌恶( loathe的现在分词)；极不喜欢 | |
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129
gregarious
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| adj.群居的，喜好群居的 | |
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130
paramount
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| a.最重要的，最高权力的 | |
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131
reins
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| 感情，激情； 缰( rein的名词复数 )； 控制手段； 掌管； （成人带着幼儿走路以防其走失时用的）保护带 | |
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132
fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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133
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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134
impoverished
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| adj.穷困的，无力的，用尽了的v.使（某人）贫穷( impoverish的过去式和过去分词 )；使（某物）贫瘠或恶化 | |
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135
mania
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| n.疯狂；躁狂症，狂热，癖好 | |
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136
pang
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| n.剧痛，悲痛，苦闷 | |
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137
unfamiliarity
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138
incompatibility
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| n.不兼容 | |
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139
epitome
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| n.典型，梗概 | |
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140
epitomes
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| n.缩影 | |
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141
personalities
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| n. 诽谤，（对某人容貌、性格等所进行的）人身攻击； 人身攻击；人格, 个性, 名人( personality的名词复数 ) | |
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142
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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143
stimulus
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| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
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144
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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145
dictates
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| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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146
solidarity
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| n.团结；休戚相关 | |
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147
thwarting
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| 阻挠( thwart的现在分词 )； 使受挫折； 挫败； 横过 | |
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148
altruism
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| n.利他主义，不自私 | |
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149
phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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150
antagonistic
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| adj.敌对的 | |
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151
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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152
mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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153
guardians
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| 监护人( guardian的名词复数 )； 保护者，维护者 | |
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154
decadents
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| n.颓废派艺术家（decadent的复数形式） | |
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155
condemns
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| v.（通常因道义上的原因而）谴责( condemn的第三人称单数 )；宣判；宣布…不能使用；迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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156
condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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157
approbation
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| n.称赞；认可 | |
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158
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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159
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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160
persecution
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| n. 迫害,烦扰 | |
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161
immorality
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| n. 不道德, 无道义 | |
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162
tragic
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| adj.悲剧的，悲剧性的，悲惨的 | |
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163
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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164
humility
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| n.谦逊，谦恭 | |
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165
renaissance
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| n.复活，复兴，文艺复兴 | |
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166
lust
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| n.性(淫)欲；渴(欲)望；vi.对…有强烈的欲望 | |
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167
simplicity
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| n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯 | |
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168
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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169
prospers
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| v.成功，兴旺( prosper的第三人称单数 ) | |
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170
overthrowing
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| v.打倒，推翻( overthrow的现在分词 )；使终止 | |
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171
annihilated
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| v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃 | |
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172
emancipated
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| adj.被解放的，不受约束的v.解放某人（尤指摆脱政治、法律或社会的束缚）( emancipate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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173
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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174
heroism
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| n.大无畏精神，英勇 | |
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175
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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176
disinterestedness
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177
industrious
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| adj.勤劳的，刻苦的，奋发的 | |
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178
benevolent
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| adj.仁慈的，乐善好施的 | |
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179
temperate
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| adj.温和的，温带的，自我克制的，不过分的 | |
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180
modesty
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| n.谦逊，虚心，端庄，稳重，羞怯，朴素 | |
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181
benevolence
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| n.慈悲，捐助 | |
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182
ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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183
curbing
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| n.边石，边石的材料v.限制，克制，抑制( curb的现在分词 ) | |
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184
rivalry
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| n.竞争，竞赛，对抗 | |
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185
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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186
prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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187
preservative
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| n.防腐剂；防腐料；保护料；预防药 | |
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188
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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189
slanders
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| 诽谤，诋毁( slander的名词复数 ) | |
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190
invalids
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| 病人，残疾者( invalid的名词复数 ) | |
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191
moribund
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| adj.即将结束的，垂死的 | |
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192
slanderous
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| adj.诽谤的，中伤的 | |
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193
preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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194
indigence
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| n.贫穷 | |
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195
inadequately
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| ad.不够地；不够好地 | |
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196
slandered
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| 造谣中伤( slander的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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197
fumes
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| n.(强烈而刺激的)气味，气体 | |
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198
seduced
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| 诱奸( seduce的过去式和过去分词 )； 勾引； 诱使堕落； 使入迷 | |
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199
yearn
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| v.想念；怀念；渴望 | |
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200
nonentity
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| n.无足轻重的人 | |
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201
persuasion
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| n.劝说；说服；持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
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202
deteriorating
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| 恶化，变坏( deteriorate的现在分词 ) | |
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203
extirpate
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| v.除尽，灭绝 | |
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204
subtlety
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| n.微妙，敏锐，精巧；微妙之处，细微的区别 | |
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205
disciples
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| n.信徒( disciple的名词复数 )；门徒；耶稣的信徒；（尤指）耶稣十二门徒之一 | |
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206
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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207
contemptible
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| adj.可鄙的，可轻视的，卑劣的 | |
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208
libertines
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| n.放荡不羁的人，淫荡的人( libertine的名词复数 ) | |
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