The second volume of "The Will to Power," even in its present fragmentary form, is the most important of Nietzsche's works. It draws together under one cover many of the leading doctrines2 voiced in his principal constructive3 books, and in addition states them in terms of his fundamental postulate—the will to power. In Volume I of this work we had the application of this doctrine1 to morality, religion and philosophy. In the present book it is applied4 to science, nature, society, breeding and art. The notes are more analytical5 than in the former volume; and the subject-matter is in itself of greater importance, being more directly concerned with the exposition of Nietzsche's main theory. Volume II is also fuller and more homogeneous, and contains much new material. So compact is its organisation6 that one is able to gain a very adequate idea of the purpose which animated7 Nietzsche at the time of making these notes.
The will to power, the principle which Nietzsche held to be the elementary expression of life, must be understood in order for one to comprehend the Nietzschean system of ethics8. Throughout all the books which followed "The Joyful9 Wisdom" we have indirect references to it and conclusions based on its assumption as a[Pg 302] hypothesis. And, although it was never definitely and finally defined until the publication of the notes comprising "The Will to Power," it nevertheless was the actuating motive10 in all Nietzsche's constructive writings. Simply stated, the will to power is the biological instinct to maintenance, persistence12 and development. Nietzsche holds that Darwin's universal law of the instinct to mere13 survival is a misinterpretation of the forces at work in life. He points out that existence is a condition—a medium of action—and by no means an end. It is true that only the fittest survive in nature as a result of the tendency to exist; but this theory does not account for the activities which take place after existence has been assured. In order to explain these activities Nietzsche advances the theory of the will to power and tests all actions by it. It will be seen that by this theory the universal law of Darwin is by no means abrogated15, but rather is it explained and developed.
In the operation of Darwin's biological law there are many forces at work. That is to say, once the fact of existence is established, numerous forces can be found at work within the limits of existence. We know that the forces of nature—acting within the medium of existence which is an a priori condition—are rarely unified16 and directed toward the same result. In short, they are not reciprocal. To the contrary, they work more often against each other—they are antagonistic17. Immediately a war of forces takes place; and it is this war that constitutes all action in nature. A force in nature directed at another force calls forth19 a resistance and counter-force; and this instinct to act and to resist is in itself a will to act. Otherwise, inertia20 would be the condition of life, once mere existence was assured by the fittest.[Pg 303] But life is not inert21. Even when certain organisms have accomplished22 the victory for existence, and are no longer moved by a necessity to struggle for mere being, the will to action persists; and this will to action, according to Nietzsche, is the will for power, for in every clash of forces, there is an attempt on the part of each force to overcome and resist the antagonistic one. The greater the action, the greater the antagonism24. Hence, this tendency in all forces to persist is at bottom a tendency of self-assertion, of overcoming counter-forces, of augmenting25 individual power. Wherever this will to persist is found, Nietzsche argues that the will to act is present; and there can be no will to act without a will to power, because the very desire for existence and development is a desire for power.
This, in brief, is Nietzsche's doctrine applied to the organic and inorganic26 world. In its application to the ideological27 world, the reasoning is not changed. In ideas Nietzsche finds this same will to power. But in them it is the reflection of the principle inherent in the material world. There is no will inherent in ideas. This assumption of a reflected will to power in the ideological world is one of Nietzsche's most important concepts, for it makes all ideas the outgrowth of ourselves, and therefore dependent on natural laws. It does away with the conception of supernatural power and with the old philosophical28 belief that ideas are superior forces to those of the organic and inorganic world. Nietzsche once and for all disposes of the theory that there is anything more powerful than force, and by thus doing away with this belief, he rationalises all ideas and puts thought on a tangible29 and stable basis. In the opening section of the present book where he applies the will to power to[Pg 304] scientific research, the whole of this new theory is made clear, and I advise the student to read well this section, for I have been unable to present as clear and complete an expositional statement of it in Nietzsche's own words as I would have liked to do, owing to the close and interrelated manner in which these notes were written.
Volume II of "The Will to Power" is in two books. The first is called "The Principles of a New Valuation"; the second, "Discipline and Breeding." The first book is divided into four sections—"The Will to Power in Science," "The Will to Power in Nature," "The Will to Power as Exemplified in Society and in the Individual" and "The Will to Power in Art." The second book has three divisions—"The Order of Rank," "Dionysus" and "Eternal Recurrence30." Of the first section of Book One, "The Will to Power in Science," I have already spoken. In this section Nietzsche shows how arbitrary a thing science is, and how closely related are its conclusions to the instinct of the scientists, namely: the instinct of the will to power. Scientists, he holds, are confronted by the necessity of translating all phenomena31 into terms compatible with the struggle for persistence and maintenance. A fact in nature unaccounted for is a danger, an obstacle to the complete mastery of natural conditions. Consequently the scientist, directed and influenced by his will to power, invents explanations which will bring all facts under his jurisdiction32 and control, and will thereby33 increase his feeling of power. As a result, the great facts of life are looked upon as of secondary importance to their explanations, and science becomes, not an intelligent search for knowledge, but a system of interpretations35 tending to increase the feeling of mastery in the men directly connected with it. Thus the law of the will to[Pg 305] power, as manifest in the organic and inorganic world, becomes the dominating instinct in the ideological world as well.
It is well to speak here of truth as Nietzsche conceived it. We have seen how he denied its absolutism and declared it to be relative. But in his present work he goes further and contends that the feeling of the increase of power is the determining factor in truth. If, as we have seen, the "truths" of science are merely those interpretations which grow out of the scientists' will to power, then truth itself must be the outgrowth of this instinct. That which makes for the growth and development of the individual—or in other words, that which increases the feeling of strength—is necessarily the truth. From this it is easy to deduce the conclusion that in many instances truth is a reversal of facts, for preservation36 very often consists in an adherence37 to actual falsity. Thus, the false causality of certain phenomena—the outcome of logic11 engendered38 by a will to power—has not infrequently masqueraded as truth. Nietzsche holds that this doctrine contains the only possible definition of truth; and in this doctrine we find an explanation for many of the apparent paradoxes39 in his teachings when the matter of truth and falsity are under discussion.
The second part of the first book relates to the will to power in nature, and contains the most complete and lucid40 explanation of Nietzsche's basic theory to be found anywhere in his writings. This section opens with an argument against a purely41 mechanical interpretation14 of the world, and a refutation of the physicists42' concept of "energy." The chemical and physical laws, the atomic theory and the mechanical concept of movement, he characterises as "inventions" on the part of scientists and[Pg 306] researchers for the purpose of understanding natural phenomena and therefore of increasing their feeling of power. The apparent sequence of phenomena which constitutes "law" is, according to Nietzsche, only a "relation of power between two or more forces"—a matter of interdependence, a process wherein the "procession of moments do not determine each other after the manner of cause and effect." In these observations we see the process of reasoning with which Nietzsche refutes the current methods of ascertaining43 facts and the manner in which he introduces the principle of will to power into the phenomena of nature.
It is in this section that Nietzsche discusses at length the points of divergence44 between his life principle and that of Darwin. And it is here also that he treats of the psychology45 of pleasure and pain in their relation to the will to power. This latter statement is of great importance in an understanding of the instincts of life as he taught them, for it denies both pleasure and pain a place in the determining of acts. They are both, according to him, but accompanying factors, never causes, and are but second-rate valuations derived47 from a dominating value. He denies that man struggles for happiness. To the contrary, he holds that all expansion and growth and resistance—in short, all movement—is related to states of pain, and that, although the modern man is master of the forces of nature and of himself, he is no happier than the primeval man. Why, then, does man struggle for knowledge and growth, knowing that it does not bring happiness? Not for existence, because existence is already assured him. But for power, for the feeling of increased mastery. Thus Nietzsche answers the two common explanations of man's will to action—the[Pg 307] need for being and the desire for happiness—by his doctrine of the will to power.
The entire teaching of Nietzsche in regard to classes and to the necessity of divergent moral codes to meet the needs of higher and lower castes, is contained in the third part of the first book. Here again he emphasises the need of two codes and makes clear his stand in relation to the superior individual. As I have pointed48 out in preceding chapters, Nietzsche did not attempt to do away with the morality of the inferior classes. He saw that some such religious belief as Christianity was imperative50 for them. His fight was against its application to all classes, against its dominance. I mention this point again because it is the basis of the greatest misunderstanding of Nietzsche's philosophy. Part III is written for the higher man, and if this viewpoint is assumed on the part of the reader, there will be no confusion as to doctrines encountered. The statements in this section are in effect similar to those to be found in Nietzsche's previous works, but in every instance in the present case they are directly related to the will to power. Because of this they possess a significance which does not attach to them in antecedent volumes.
The whole of Nietzsche's art theories are to be found in Part IV, "The Will to Power in Art." It is not merely a system of ?sthetics that occupies the pages under this section, for Nietzsche never divorces art from life itself; and the artist, according to him, is the superior type, the creator of values. The concepts of beauty and ugliness are the outgrowths of an overflow51 of Dionysian power; and it is to the great artists of the past, the instinctive52 higher men, that we owe our current concepts. The principle here is the dominant53 one in Nietzsche's[Pg 308] philosophy in relation to valuing:—to the few individuals of the race are we indebted for the world of values. To the student who wishes to go deeply into Nietzsche's ideas of art and his conception of the artist, and to know in just what manner the Dionysian and Apollonian figure in his theories, I unhesitatingly recommend Anthony M. Ludovici's book, "Nietzsche and Art."
The first section of the second book in this volume contains some of Nietzsche's finest writing. Its title, "The Order of Rank," explains in a large measure what material comprises it. It is a description of the various degrees of man, and a statement of the attributes which belong to each. No better definition of the different classes of men is to be found anywhere in this philosopher's writings. One part is devoted54 to a consideration of the strong and the weak, and the way in which they react on one another; another part deals with "the noble man" and contains (in Aphorism55 943) a list of the characteristics of the noble man, unfortunately too long a list to be quoted in the present chapter; another part defines "the lords of the earth"; another part delineates "the great man," and enumerates56 his specific qualities; and still another part treats of "the highest man as law-giver of the future." This section, however, is not a mere series of detached and isolated57 definitions, but an important summary of the ethical58 code which Nietzsche advanced as a result of his application of the doctrine of the will to power to the order of individual rank.
The two remaining sections—"Dionysus" and "Eternal Recurrence"—are short, and fail to touch on new ground. There are a few robust59 and heroic passages in the former section which summarise60 Nietzsche's definitions of Apollonian and Dionysian; but in the latter[Pg 309] section there is nothing not found in the pamphlet called "The Eternal Recurrence" and in "Thus Spake Zarathustra." I do not doubt that Nietzsche had every intention of elaborating this last section, for he considered the principle of recurrence a most important one in his philosophy. But, as it stands, it is but a few pages in length and in no way touches upon his other philosophical doctrines. If importance it had in the philosophy of the superman, that importance was never shown either by Nietzsche or by his critics.
However, let us not overlook the importance of the doctrine of the will to power either in its relation to Nietzsche's writings or in its application to ourselves. By this doctrine the philosopher wished to make mankind realise its great dormant61 power. The insistence62 on the human basis of all things was no more than a call to arms—an attempt to instil63 courage in men who had attributed all great phenomena to supernatural forces and had therefore acquiesced64 before them instead of having endeavoured to conquer them. Nietzsche's object was to make man surer of himself, to infuse him with pride, to imbue65 him with more daring, to awaken66 him to a full realisation of his possibilities. This, in brief, is the teaching of the will to power reduced to its immediate18 influences. In this doctrine is preached a new virility67. Not the sedentary virility of compromise, but the virility which is born of struggle and suffering, which is a sign of one's great love of living. Nietzsche offered a new set of vital ideals to supplant68 the decadent69 ones which now govern us. Resolute70 faith, the power of affirmation, initiative, pride, courage and fearlessness—these are the rewards in the exercise of the will to power. The strength of great love and the vitality71 of great deeds, as[Pg 310] well as the possibility of rare and vigorous growth, lie within this doctrine of will. Its object is to give back to us the life we have lost—the life of beauty and plenitude, of strength and exuberance72.
EXCERPTS73 FROM "THE WILL TO POWER" volume II
For hundreds of years, pleasure and pain have been represented as the motives74 for every action. Upon reflection, however, we are bound to concede that everything would have proceeded in exactly the same way, according to precisely75 the same sequence of cause and effect, if the states "pleasure" and "pain" had been entirely76 absent. 8-9
The measure of the desire for knowledge depends upon the extent to which the Will to Power grows in a certain species: a species gets a grasp of a given amount of reality, in order to master it, in order to enlist77 that amount in its service. 12
It is our needs that interpret the world; our instincts and their impulses for and against. Every instinct is a sort of thirst for power.... 13
That a belief, however useful it may be for the preservation of a species, has nothing to do with the truth, may be seen from the fact that we must believe in time, space, and motion, without feeling ourselves compelled to regard them as absolute realities. 16
Truth is that hind79 of error without which a certain species of living being cannot exist. 20
In the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was a need in us that was the determining power: not the need "to know," but to classify, to schematise, for the purpose of intelligibility80 and calculation. 29
Logic is the attempt on our part to understand the[Pg 311] actual world according to a scheme of Being devised by ourselves; or, more exactly, it is our attempt at making the actual world more calculable and more susceptible81 to formulation, for our own purposes.... 33
"Truth" is the will to be master over the manifold sensations that reach consciousness; it is the will to classify phenomena according to definite categories. In this way we start out with a belief in the "true nature" of things (we regard phenomena as real).
The character of the world in the process of Becoming is not susceptible of formulation; it is "false" and "contradicts itself." Knowledge and the process of evolution exclude each other. Consequently, knowledge must be something else; it must be preceded by a will to make things knowable, a kind of Becoming in itself must create the impression of Being. 33-34
The chief error of psychologists: they regard the indistinct idea as of a lower kind than the distinct; but that which keeps at a distance from our consciousness and which is therefore obscure, may on that very account be quite clear in itself. The fact that a thing becomes obscure is a question of the perspective of consciousness. 42
The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power. 49
Logic was intended to be a method of facilitating thought: a means of expression,—not truth.... Later on it got to act like truth.... 50
In a world which was essentially82 false, truthfulness83 would be an anti-natural tendency: its only purpose would be to provide a means of attaining85 to a higher degree of falsity. 51
We have absolutely no experience concerning cause; viewed psychologically we derive46 the whole concept[Pg 312] from the subjective86 conviction, that we ourselves are causes. 55
"Truth" is not something which is present and which has to be found and discovered; it is something which has to be created and which gives its name to a process, or, better still, to the Will to overpower, which in itself has no purpose.... 60
The absolute is even an absurd concept: an "absolute mode of existence" is nonsense, the concept "being," "thing," is always relative to us.
The trouble is that, owing to the old antithesis87 "apparent" and "real," the correlative valuations "little value" and "absolute value" have been spread abroad. 83
Man seeks "the truth": a world that does not contradict itself, that does not deceive, that does not change, a real world—a world in which there is no suffering: contradiction, deception88, variability—the causes of suffering. He does not doubt that there is such a thing as a world as it ought to be; he would fain find a road to it.... Obviously, the will to truth is merely the longing89 for a stable world.
The senses deceive; reason corrects the errors: therefore, it was concluded, reason is the road to a static state; the most spiritual ideas must be nearest to the "real world." 88
The degree of a man's will-power may be measured from the extent to which he can dispense90 with the meaning in things, from the extent to which he is able to endure a world without meaning: because he himself arranges a small portion of it. 90
There is no such thing as an established fact, everything fluctuates, everything is intangible, yielding; after all, the most lasting91 of all things are our opinions. 103
[Pg 313]
That the worth of the world lies in our interpretations (that perhaps yet other interpretations are possible somewhere, besides mankind's); that the interpretations made hitherto were perspective valuations, by means of which we were able to survive in life, i. e. in the Will to Power and in the growth of power; that every elevation92 of man involves the overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every higher degree of strength or power attained93, brings new views in its train, and teaches a belief in new horizons—these doctrines lie scattered94 through all my works. 107
The triumphant95 concept "energy" with which our physicists created God and the world, needs yet to be completer: it must be given an inner will which I characterise as the "Will to Power"—that is to say, as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or the application and exercise of power as a creative instinct, etc.... 110
The unalterable sequence of certain phenomena does not prove any "law," but a relation of power between two or more forces. 115
A quantum of power is characterised by the effect it produces and the influence it resists. The adiaphoric state which would be thinkable in itself, is entirely lacking. It is essentially a will to violence and a will to defend one's self against violence. It is not self-preservation: every atom exercises its influence over the whole of existence—it is thought out of existence if one thinks this radiation of will-power away. That is why I call it a quantum of "Will to Power." ... 117-118
My idea is that every specific body strives to become master of all space, and to extend its power (its will to power), and to thrust back everything that resists it. But inasmuch as it is continually meeting the same[Pg 314] endeavours on the part of other bodies, it concludes by coming to terms with those (by "combining" with those) which are sufficiently96 related to it—and thus they conspire97 together for power. And the process continues. 121
The influence of "environment" is nonsensically over-rated in Darwin: the essential factor in the process of life is precisely the tremendous inner power to shape and to create forms, which merely uses, exploits "environment." 127
The feeling of being surcharged, the feeling accompanying an increase in strength, quite apart from the utility of the struggle, is the actual progress: from these feelings the will to war is first derived. 128
A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength: "self-preservation" is only one of the results thereof.... 128
The most fundamental and most primeval activity of a protoplasm cannot be ascribed to a will to self-preservation, for it absorbs an amount of material which is absurdly out of proportion with the needs of its preservation: and what is more, it does not "preserve itself" in the process, but actually falls to pieces .... The instinct which rules here, must account for this total absence in the organism of a desire to preserve itself.
The will to power can manifest itself only against obstacles: it therefore goes in search of what resists it—this is the primitive98 tendency of the protoplasm when it extends its pseudopodia and feels about it. The act of appropriation99 and assimilation is, above all, the result of an additional building and rebuilding, until at last the subjected creature has become completely a part of the[Pg 315] superior creature's sphere of power, and has increased the latter.... 130
Why is all activity, even that of a sense, associated with pleasure? Because, before the activity was possible, an obstacle or a burden was done away with. Or, rather, because all action is a process of overcoming, of becoming master of, and of increasing the feeling of power? 135
Man is not only an individual, but the continuation of collective organic life in one definite line. The fact that man survives, proves that a certain species of interpretations (even though it still be added to) has also survived; that, as a system, this method of interpreting has not changed. 152
The fundamental phenomena: innumerable individuals are sacrificed for the sake of a few, in order to make the few possible.—One must not allow one's self to be deceived; the case is the same with peoples and races: they produce the "body" for the generation of isolated and valuable individuals, who continue the great process. 153
Life is not the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations, but will to power, which, proceeding100 from inside, subjugates101 and incorporates an ever-increasing quantity of "external" phenomena. 153-154
Man as a species is not progressing. Higher specimens102 are indeed attained; but they do not survive. The general level of the species is not raised.... Man as a species does not represent any sort of progress compared with any other animal. 157
The domestication103 (culture) of man does not sink very deep. When it does sink far below the skin it immediately becomes degeneration (type: the Christian49). The[Pg 316] "wild" man (or, in moral terminology105, the evil man) is a reversion to Nature—and, in a certain sense, he represents a recovery, a cure from the effects of "culture."... 158
The strong always have to be upheld against the weak; and the well-constituted against the ill-constituted, the healthy against the sick and physiologically106 botched. If we drew our morals from reality, they would read thus: the mediocre107 are more valuable than the exceptional creatures, and the decadent than the mediocre; the will to nonentity108 prevails over the will to life.... 159
That species show an ascending109 tendency, is the most nonsensical assertion that has ever been made: until now they have only manifested a dead level. There is nothing whatever to prove that the higher organisms have developed from the lower. 160
Man as he has appeared up to the present is the embryo110 of the man of the future; all the formative powers which are to produce the latter, already lie in the former: and owing to the fact that they are enormous, the more promising111 for the future the modern individual happens to be, the more suffering falls to his lot. 161
The will to power is the primitive motive force out of which all other motives have been derived. 162
From a psychological point of view the idea of "cause" is our feeling of power in the act which is called willing—our concept "effect" is the superstition112 that this feeling of power is itself the force which moves things.... 163
Life as an individual case (a hypothesis which may be applied to existence in general) strives after the maximum feeling of power; life is essentially a striving after more power; striving itself is only a straining after more[Pg 317] power; the most fundamental and innermost thing of all is this will. 165
Man does not seek happiness and does not avoid unhappiness. Everybody knows the famous prejudices I here contradict. Pleasure and pain are mere results, mere accompanying phenomena—that which every man, which every tiny particle of a living organism will have, is an increase of power. In striving after this, pleasure and pain are encountered; it is owing to that will that the organism seeks opposition113 and requires that which stands in its way.... Pain as the hindrance114 of its will to power is therefore a normal feature, a natural ingredient of every organic phenomenon; man does not avoid it; on the contrary, he is constantly in need of it; every triumph, every feeling of pleasure, every event presupposes an obstacle overcome. 172
Man is now master of the forces of nature, and master too of his own wild and unbridled feelings (the passions have followed suit, and have learned to become useful)—in comparison with primeval man, the man of to-day represents an enormous quantum of power, but not an increase in happiness. How can one maintain, then, that he has striven after happiness? 174
"God" is the culminating moment: life is an eternal process of deifying and undeifying. But withal there is no zenith of values, but only a zenith of power. 181
Man has one terrible and fundamental wish; he desires power, and this impulse, which is called freedom, must be the longest restrained. Hence ethics has instinctively116 aimed at such an education as shall restrain the desire for power; thus our morality slanders118 the would-be tyrant119, and glorifies120 charity, patriotism121, and the ambition of the herd122. 186
[Pg 318]
When the instincts of a society ultimately make it give up war and renounce123 conquest, it is decadent: it is ripe for democracy and the rule of shopkeepers. 189
The maintenance of the military State is the last means of adhering to the great tradition of the past; or, where it has been lost, to revive it. By means of it the superior or strong type of man is preserved, and all institutions and ideas which perpetuate124 enmity and order of rank in States such as national feeling, protective tariffs125, etc., may on that account seem justified126. 190
Concerning the future of marriage.—A supertax on inherited property, a longer term of military service for bachelors of a certain minimum age within the community.
Privileges of all sorts for fathers who lavish128 boys upon the world, and perhaps plural129 votes as well.
A medical certificate as a condition of any marriage, endorsed130 by the parochial authorities, in which a series of questions addressed to the parties and the medical officers must be answered ("family histories").
As a counter-agent to prostitution, or as its ennoblement, I would recommend leasehold131 marriages (to last for a term of years or months), with adequate provision for the children.
Every marriage to be warranted and sanctioned by a certain number of good men and true, of the parish, as a parochial obligation. 193
Society ... should in many cases actually prevent the act of procreation, and may, without any regard for rank, descent, or intellect, hold in readiness the most rigorous forms of compulsion and restriction132, and, under certain circumstances, have recourse to castration. 194
The idea of punishment ought to be reduced to the[Pg 319] concept of the suppression of revolt, a weapon against the vanquished133 (by means of long or short terms of imprisonment). But punishment should not be associated in any way with contempt. A criminal is at all events a man who has set his life, his honour, his freedom at stake; he is therefore a man of courage. Neither should punishment be regarded as penance134 or retribution, as though there were some recognised rate of exchange between crime and punishment. Punishment does not purify, simply because crime does not sully. 198
Should not the punishment fit the crime? 200
"The will to power" is so loathed135 in democratic ages that the whole of the psychology of these ages seems directed towards its belittlement136 and slander117. 205
I am opposed to Socialism because it dreams ingenuously137 of "goodness, truth, beauty, and equal rights" (anarchy pursues the same ideal, but in a more brutal138 fashion).
I am opposed to parliamentary government and the power of the press, because they are the means whereby cattle become masters. 206
The idea of a higher order of man is hated much more profoundly than monarchs139 themselves. Hatred140 of aristocracy always uses hatred of monarchy141 as a mask. 207
Utility and pleasure are slave theories of life. "The blessing142 of work" is an ennobling phrase for slaves. Incapacity for leisure. 208
There is no such thing as a right to live, a right to work, or a right to be happy: in this respect man is no different from the meanest worm. 208
Fundamental errors: to regard the herd as an aim instead of the individual! The herd is only a means and nothing more! But nowadays people are trying to[Pg 320] understand the herd as they would an individual, and to confer higher rights upon it than upon isolated personalities143. In addition to this, all that makes for gregariousness145, e.g., sympathy, is regarded as the more valuable side of our natures. 214-215
The will to power appears:—
(a) Among the oppressed and slaves of all kinds, in the form of will to "freedom": the mere fact of breaking loose from something seems to be an end in itself (in a religio-moral sense: "One is only answerable to one's own conscience"; "evangelical freedom," etc., etc.).
(b) In the case of a stronger species, ascending to power, in the form of the will to overpower. If this fails, then it shrinks to the "will to justice"—that is to say, to the will to the same measure of rights as the ruling caste possesses.
(c) In the case of the strongest, richest, most independent, and most courageous146, in the form of "love of humanity," of "love of the people," of the "gospel," of "truth," of "God," of "pity," of "self-sacrifice," etc., etc.; in the form of overpowering, of deeds of capture, of imposing147 service on some one, of an instinctive reckoning of one's self as part of a great mass of power to which one attempts to give a direction: the hero, the prophet, the C?sar, the Saviour148, the bell-wether. 220-221
Individualism is a modest and still unconscious form of will to power; with it a single human unit seems to think it sufficient to free himself from the preponderating149 power of society (or of the State or Church). He does not set himself up in opposition as a personality, but merely as a unit; he represents the rights of all other individuals as against the whole. That is to say, he[Pg 321] instinctively places himself on a level with every other unit: what he combats he does not combat as a person, but as a representative of units against a mass. 227
There are no such things as moral actions: they are purely imaginary. Not only is it impossible to demonstrate their existence (a fact which Kant and Christianity, for instance, both acknowledge)—but they are not even possible. Owing to psychological misunderstanding, man invented an opposite to the instinctive impulses of life, and believed that a new species of instinct was thereby discovered: a primum mobile was postulated150 which does not exist at all. According to the valuation which gave rise to the antithesis "moral" and "immoral151," one should say: There is nothing else on earth but immoral intentions and actions.
The whole differentiation152, "moral" and "immoral," arises from the assumption that both moral and immoral actions are the result of a spontaneous will—in short, that such a will exists; or in other words, that moral judgments153 can only hold good with regard to intuitions and actions that are free. But this whole order of actions and intentions is purely imaginary: the only world to which the moral standard could be applied does not exist at all: there is no such thing as a moral or an immoral action. 230-231
There are two conditions in which art manifests itself in man even as a force of nature, and disposes of him whether he consent or not: it may be as a constraint154 to visionary states, or it may be an orgiastic impulse. 240
Sexuality, intoxication155, cruelty; all these belong to the oldest festal joys of mankind, they also preponderate156 in budding artists. 243
The desire for art and beauty is an indirect longing[Pg 322] for the ecstasy157 of sexual desire, which gets communicated to the brain. 248
All art works as a tonic158; it increases strength, it kindles159 desire (i.e., the feeling of strength), it excites all the more subtle recollections of intoxication.... 252
The inartistic states are: objectivity, reflection, suspension of the will.... The inartistic states are: those which impoverish160, which subtract, which bleach161, under which life suffers—the Christian. 257
Would any link be missing in the whole chain of science and art, if woman, if woman's work, were excluded from it? Let us acknowledge the exception—it proves the rule—that woman is capable of perfection in everything which does not constitute a work: in letters, in memoirs162, in the most intricate handiwork—in short, in everything which is not a craft.... 260-261
A man is an artist to the extent to which he regards everything that inartistic people call "form" as the actual substance, as the "principal" thing. 261
The essential feature in art is its power of perfecting existence, its production of perfection and plenitude; art is essentially the affirmation, the blessing, and the deification of existence.... 263
The greatness of an artist is not to be measured by the beautiful feelings which he evokes163: let this belief be left to the girls. It should be measured according to the extent to which he approaches the grand style, according to the extent to which he is capable of the grand style. This style and great passion have this in common—that they scorn to please; that they forget to persuade: that they command; that they will.... To become master of the chaos164 which is in one; to compel one's inner chaos to assume form; to become consistent, simple, unequivocal,[Pg 323] mathematical, law—this is the great ambition here. 277
A preference for questionable165 and terrible things is a symptom of strength; whereas the taste for pretty and charming trifles is characteristic of the weak and the delicate. 287
Art is the great means of making life possible, the great seducer166 to life, the great stimulus167 of life.
Art is the only superior counter-agent to all will to the denial of life; it is par23 excellence168 the anti-Christian, the anti-Buddhistic, the anti-Nihilistic force. 290
Quanta of power alone determine rank and distinguish rank: nothing else does. 295
It is necessary for higher men to declare war upon the masses! In all directions mediocre people are joining hands in order to make themselves masters. Everything that pampers169, that softens170, and that brings the "people" or "woman" to the front, operates in favour of universal suffrage—that is to say, the dominion171 of inferior men. 297
Woman has always conspired172 with decadent types,—the priests, for instance,—against the "mighty173," against the "strong," against men. Women avail themselves of children for the cult104 of piety174, pity, and love:—the mother stands as the symbol of convincing altruism175. 300
It is necessary to show that a counter-movement is inevitably176 associated with any increasingly economical consumption of men and mankind, and with an ever more closely involved "machinery177" of interests and services. I call this counter-movement the separation of the luxurious178 surplus of mankind: by means of it a stronger kind, a higher type, must come to light, which has other conditions for its origin and for its maintenance than the[Pg 324] average man. My concept, my metaphor179 for this type is, as you know, the word "Superman." 305
Readers are beginning to see what I am combating—namely, economic optimism: as if the general welfare of everybody must necessarily increase with the growing self-sacrifice of everybody. The very reverse seems to me to be the case, the self-sacrifice of everybody amounts to a collective loss; man becomes inferior—so that nobody knows what end this monstrous180 purpose has served. 306-307
The root of all evil: that the slave morality of modesty181, chastity, selfishness, and absolute obedience182 should have triumphed. Dominating natures were thus condemned183 (1) to hypocrisy184, (2) to qualms185 of conscience,—creative natures regarded themselves as rebels against God, uncertain and hemmed186 in by eternal values. 309
That which men of power and will are able to demand of themselves gives them the standard for what they may also allow themselves. Such natures are the very opposite of the vicious and the unbridled: although under certain circumstances they may perpetrate deeds for which an inferior man would be convicted of vice78 and intemperance187.
In this respect the concept, "all men are equal before God" does an extraordinary amount of harm; actions and attitudes of mind were forbidden which belonged to the prerogative188 of the strong alone, just as if they were in themselves unworthy of man. All the tendencies of strong men were brought into disrepute by the fact that the defensive189 weapons of the most weak (even of those who were weakest towards themselves) were established as a standard of valuation. 311
The degeneration of the ruler and of the ruling classes[Pg 325] has been the cause of all the great disorders190 in history! 312
The solitary191 type should not be valued from the standpoint of the gregarious144 type, or vice versa. 320
Who would dare to disgust the mediocre of their mediocrity! As you observe, I do precisely the reverse: every step away from mediocrity—thus do I teach—leads to immorality192. 324
What I combat: that an exceptional form should make war upon the rule—instead of understanding that the continued existence of the rule is the first condition of the value of the exception. 325
One should not suppose the mission of a higher species to be the leading of inferior men (as Comte does, for instance); but the inferior should be regarded as the foundation upon which a higher species may live their higher life—upon which alone they can stand. 329
My consolation193 is, that the nature of man is evil, and this guarantees his strength! 332
There is no true scholar who has not the instincts of a true soldier in his veins194. To be able to command and to be able to obey in a proud fashion; to keep one's place in rank and file, and yet to be ready at any moment to lead; to prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh what is permitted and what is forbidden in a tradesman's balance; to be more hostile to pettiness, slyness, and parasitism195 than to wickedness. What is it that one learns in a hard school?—to obey and to command. 335
The means by which a strong species maintains itself:—
It grants itself the right of exceptional actions, as a test of the power of self-control and of freedom.
It abandons itself to states in which a man is not allowed to be anything else than a barbarian196.
[Pg 326]
It tries to acquire strength of will by every kind of asceticism197.
It is not expansive; it practises silence; it is cautious in regard to all charms.
It learns to obey in such a way that obedience provides a test of self-maintenance. Casuistry is carried to its highest pitch in regard to points of honour.
It never argues, "What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander"—but conversely! it regards reward, and the ability to repay, as a privilege, as a distinction.
It does not covet198 other people's virtues199. 341
The blind yielding to a passion, whether it be generosity201, pity, or hostility202, is the cause of the greatest evil. Greatness of character does not consist in not possessing these passions—on the contrary, a man should possess them to a terrible degree: but he should lead them by the bridle115.... 346
Education: essentially a means of ruining exceptions in favour of the rule. Culture: essentially the means of directing taste against the exceptions in favour of the mediocre. 349
What is noble?—The fact that one is constantly forced to be playing a part. That one is constantly searching for situations in which one is forced to put on airs. That one leaves happiness to the greatest number: the happiness which consists of inner peacefulness, of virtue200, of comfort, and of Anglo-angelic-back-parlour-smugness, à la Spencer. That one instinctively seeks for heavy responsibilities. That one knows how to create enemies everywhere, at a pinch even in one's self. That one contradicts the greatest number, not in words at all, but by continually behaving differently from them. 357
The first thing that must be done is to rear a new kind[Pg 327] of man in whom the duration of the necessary will and the necessary instincts is guaranteed for many generations. This must be a new kind of ruling species and caste—this ought to be quite as clear as the somewhat lengthy203 and not easily expressed consequences of this thought. The aim should be to prepare a transvaluation of values for a particularly strong kind of man, most highly gifted in intellect and will, and, to his end, slowly and cautiously to liberate204 in him a whole host of slandered205 instincts hitherto held in check.... 363-364
The revolution, confusion, and distress206 of whole peoples is in my opinion of less importance than the misfortunes which attend great individuals in their development. We must not allow ourselves to be deceived: the many misfortunes of all these small folk do not together constitute a sum-total, except in the feelings of mighty men. 369
The greatest men may also perhaps have great virtues, but then they also have the opposites of these virtues. I believe that it is precisely out of the presence of these opposites and of the feelings they suscitate, that the great man arises,—for the great man is the broad arch which spans two banks lying far apart. 370
In great men we find the specific qualities of life in their highest manifestation207: injustice208, falsehood, exploitation. But inasmuch as their effect has always been overwhelming, their essential nature has been most thoroughly209 misunderstood, and interpreted as goodness. 370-371
We must not make men "better," we must not talk to them about morality in any form as if "morality in itself," or an ideal kind of man in general, could be taken for granted; but we must create circumstances in which stronger men are necessary, such as for their part will[Pg 328] require a morality (or, better still: a bodily and spiritual discipline) which makes men strong, and upon which they will consequently insist! 379
We must not separate greatness of soul from intellectual greatness. For the former involves independence; but without intellectual greatness independence should not be allowed; all it does is to create disasters even in its lust210 of well-doing and of practising "justice." Inferior spirits must obey, consequently they cannot be possessed211 of greatness. 380
I teach that there are higher and lower men, and that a single individual may under certain circumstances justify212 whole millenniums of existence—that is to say, a wealthier, more gifted, greater, and more complete man, as compared with innumerable imperfect and fragmentary men. 386
He who determines values and leads the will of millenniums, and does this by leading the highest natures—he is the highest man. 386
We should attain84 to such a height, to such a lofty eagle's ledge34, in our observation, as to be able to understand that everything happens, just as it ought to happen: and that all "imperfection," and the pain it brings, belong to all that which is most eminently213 desirable. 389
Pleasure appears with the feeling of power.
Happiness means that power and triumph have entered into our consciousness.
Progress is the strengthening of the type, the ability to exercise great will-power: everything else is a misunderstanding and a danger. 403
Man is a combination of the beast and the superbeast: higher man a combination of the monster and the superman: these opposites belong to each other. With every[Pg 329] degree of a man's growth towards greatness and loftiness, he also grows downwards214 into the depths and into the terrible:... 405
The word "Dionysian" expresses: a constraint to unity127, a soaring above personality, the commonplace, society, reality, and above the abyss of the ephemeral; the passionately215 painful sensation of superabundance, in darker, fuller, and more fluctuating conditions; an ecstatic saying of yea to the collective character of existence, as that which remains216 the same, and equally mighty and blissful throughout all change; the great pantheistic sympathy with pleasure and pain, which declares even the most terrible and most questionable qualities of existence good, and sanctifies them; the eternal will to procreation, to fruitfulness, and to recurrence; the feeling of unity in regard to the necessity of creating and annihilating217. 415-416
At this point I set up the Dionysus of the Greeks: the religious affirmation of Life, of the whole of Life, not of denied and partial Life.... 420
God on the Cross is a curse upon Life, a signpost directing people to deliver themselves from it;—Dionysus cut into pieces is a promise of Life: it will be for ever born anew, and rise afresh from destruction. 421
点击收听单词发音
1 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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2 doctrines | |
n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 );教义;学说;(政府政策的)正式声明 | |
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3 constructive | |
adj.建设的,建设性的 | |
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4 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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5 analytical | |
adj.分析的;用分析法的 | |
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6 organisation | |
n.组织,安排,团体,有机休 | |
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7 animated | |
adj.生气勃勃的,活跃的,愉快的 | |
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8 ethics | |
n.伦理学;伦理观,道德标准 | |
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9 joyful | |
adj.欢乐的,令人欢欣的 | |
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10 motive | |
n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
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11 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
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12 persistence | |
n.坚持,持续,存留 | |
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13 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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14 interpretation | |
n.解释,说明,描述;艺术处理 | |
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15 abrogated | |
废除(法律等)( abrogate的过去式和过去分词 ); 取消; 去掉; 抛开 | |
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16 unified | |
(unify 的过去式和过去分词); 统一的; 统一标准的; 一元化的 | |
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17 antagonistic | |
adj.敌对的 | |
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18 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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19 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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20 inertia | |
adj.惰性,惯性,懒惰,迟钝 | |
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21 inert | |
adj.无活动能力的,惰性的;迟钝的 | |
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22 accomplished | |
adj.有才艺的;有造诣的;达到了的 | |
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23 par | |
n.标准,票面价值,平均数量;adj.票面的,平常的,标准的 | |
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24 antagonism | |
n.对抗,敌对,对立 | |
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25 augmenting | |
使扩张 | |
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26 inorganic | |
adj.无生物的;无机的 | |
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27 ideological | |
a.意识形态的 | |
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28 philosophical | |
adj.哲学家的,哲学上的,达观的 | |
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29 tangible | |
adj.有形的,可触摸的,确凿的,实际的 | |
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30 recurrence | |
n.复发,反复,重现 | |
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31 phenomena | |
n.现象 | |
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32 jurisdiction | |
n.司法权,审判权,管辖权,控制权 | |
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33 thereby | |
adv.因此,从而 | |
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34 ledge | |
n.壁架,架状突出物;岩架,岩礁 | |
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35 interpretations | |
n.解释( interpretation的名词复数 );表演;演绎;理解 | |
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36 preservation | |
n.保护,维护,保存,保留,保持 | |
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37 adherence | |
n.信奉,依附,坚持,固着 | |
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38 engendered | |
v.产生(某形势或状况),造成,引起( engender的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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39 paradoxes | |
n.似非而是的隽语,看似矛盾而实际却可能正确的说法( paradox的名词复数 );用于语言文学中的上述隽语;有矛盾特点的人[事物,情况] | |
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40 lucid | |
adj.明白易懂的,清晰的,头脑清楚的 | |
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41 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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42 physicists | |
物理学家( physicist的名词复数 ) | |
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43 ascertaining | |
v.弄清,确定,查明( ascertain的现在分词 ) | |
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44 divergence | |
n.分歧,岔开 | |
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45 psychology | |
n.心理,心理学,心理状态 | |
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46 derive | |
v.取得;导出;引申;来自;源自;出自 | |
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47 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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48 pointed | |
adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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49 Christian | |
adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
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50 imperative | |
n.命令,需要;规则;祈使语气;adj.强制的;紧急的 | |
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51 overflow | |
v.(使)外溢,(使)溢出;溢出,流出,漫出 | |
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52 instinctive | |
adj.(出于)本能的;直觉的;(出于)天性的 | |
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53 dominant | |
adj.支配的,统治的;占优势的;显性的;n.主因,要素,主要的人(或物);显性基因 | |
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54 devoted | |
adj.忠诚的,忠实的,热心的,献身于...的 | |
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55 aphorism | |
n.格言,警语 | |
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56 enumerates | |
v.列举,枚举,数( enumerate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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57 isolated | |
adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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58 ethical | |
adj.伦理的,道德的,合乎道德的 | |
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59 robust | |
adj.强壮的,强健的,粗野的,需要体力的,浓的 | |
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60 summarise | |
vt.概括,总结 | |
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61 dormant | |
adj.暂停活动的;休眠的;潜伏的 | |
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62 insistence | |
n.坚持;强调;坚决主张 | |
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63 instil | |
v.逐渐灌输 | |
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64 acquiesced | |
v.默认,默许( acquiesce的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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65 imbue | |
v.灌输(某种强烈的情感或意见),感染 | |
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66 awaken | |
vi.醒,觉醒;vt.唤醒,使觉醒,唤起,激起 | |
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67 virility | |
n.雄劲,丈夫气 | |
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68 supplant | |
vt.排挤;取代 | |
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69 decadent | |
adj.颓废的,衰落的,堕落的 | |
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70 resolute | |
adj.坚决的,果敢的 | |
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71 vitality | |
n.活力,生命力,效力 | |
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72 exuberance | |
n.丰富;繁荣 | |
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73 excerpts | |
n.摘录,摘要( excerpt的名词复数 );节选(音乐,电影)片段 | |
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74 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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75 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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76 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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77 enlist | |
vt.谋取(支持等),赢得;征募;vi.入伍 | |
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78 vice | |
n.坏事;恶习;[pl.]台钳,老虎钳;adj.副的 | |
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79 hind | |
adj.后面的,后部的 | |
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80 intelligibility | |
n.可理解性,可理解的事物 | |
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81 susceptible | |
adj.过敏的,敏感的;易动感情的,易受感动的 | |
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82 essentially | |
adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
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83 truthfulness | |
n. 符合实际 | |
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84 attain | |
vt.达到,获得,完成 | |
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85 attaining | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的现在分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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86 subjective | |
a.主观(上)的,个人的 | |
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87 antithesis | |
n.对立;相对 | |
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88 deception | |
n.欺骗,欺诈;骗局,诡计 | |
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89 longing | |
n.(for)渴望 | |
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90 dispense | |
vt.分配,分发;配(药),发(药);实施 | |
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91 lasting | |
adj.永久的,永恒的;vbl.持续,维持 | |
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92 elevation | |
n.高度;海拔;高地;上升;提高 | |
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93 attained | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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94 scattered | |
adj.分散的,稀疏的;散步的;疏疏落落的 | |
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95 triumphant | |
adj.胜利的,成功的;狂欢的,喜悦的 | |
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96 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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97 conspire | |
v.密谋,(事件等)巧合,共同导致 | |
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98 primitive | |
adj.原始的;简单的;n.原(始)人,原始事物 | |
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99 appropriation | |
n.拨款,批准支出 | |
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100 proceeding | |
n.行动,进行,(pl.)会议录,学报 | |
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101 subjugates | |
v.征服,降伏( subjugate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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102 specimens | |
n.样品( specimen的名词复数 );范例;(化验的)抽样;某种类型的人 | |
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103 domestication | |
n.驯养,驯化 | |
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104 cult | |
n.异教,邪教;时尚,狂热的崇拜 | |
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105 terminology | |
n.术语;专有名词 | |
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106 physiologically | |
ad.生理上,在生理学上 | |
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107 mediocre | |
adj.平常的,普通的 | |
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108 nonentity | |
n.无足轻重的人 | |
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109 ascending | |
adj.上升的,向上的 | |
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110 embryo | |
n.胚胎,萌芽的事物 | |
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111 promising | |
adj.有希望的,有前途的 | |
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112 superstition | |
n.迷信,迷信行为 | |
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113 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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114 hindrance | |
n.妨碍,障碍 | |
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115 bridle | |
n.笼头,束缚;vt.抑制,约束;动怒 | |
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116 instinctively | |
adv.本能地 | |
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117 slander | |
n./v.诽谤,污蔑 | |
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118 slanders | |
诽谤,诋毁( slander的名词复数 ) | |
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119 tyrant | |
n.暴君,专制的君主,残暴的人 | |
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120 glorifies | |
赞美( glorify的第三人称单数 ); 颂扬; 美化; 使光荣 | |
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121 patriotism | |
n.爱国精神,爱国心,爱国主义 | |
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122 herd | |
n.兽群,牧群;vt.使集中,把…赶在一起 | |
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123 renounce | |
v.放弃;拒绝承认,宣布与…断绝关系 | |
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124 perpetuate | |
v.使永存,使永记不忘 | |
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125 tariffs | |
关税制度; 关税( tariff的名词复数 ); 关税表; (旅馆或饭店等的)收费表; 量刑标准 | |
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126 justified | |
a.正当的,有理的 | |
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127 unity | |
n.团结,联合,统一;和睦,协调 | |
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128 lavish | |
adj.无节制的;浪费的;vt.慷慨地给予,挥霍 | |
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129 plural | |
n.复数;复数形式;adj.复数的 | |
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130 endorsed | |
vt.& vi.endorse的过去式或过去分词形式v.赞同( endorse的过去式和过去分词 );在(尤指支票的)背面签字;在(文件的)背面写评论;在广告上说本人使用并赞同某产品 | |
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131 leasehold | |
n.租赁,租约,租赁权,租赁期,adj.租(来)的 | |
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132 restriction | |
n.限制,约束 | |
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133 vanquished | |
v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 );战胜;克服;抑制 | |
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134 penance | |
n.(赎罪的)惩罪 | |
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135 loathed | |
v.憎恨,厌恶( loathe的过去式和过去分词 );极不喜欢 | |
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136 belittlement | |
轻视 | |
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137 ingenuously | |
adv.率直地,正直地 | |
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138 brutal | |
adj.残忍的,野蛮的,不讲理的 | |
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139 monarchs | |
君主,帝王( monarch的名词复数 ) | |
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140 hatred | |
n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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141 monarchy | |
n.君主,最高统治者;君主政体,君主国 | |
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142 blessing | |
n.祈神赐福;祷告;祝福,祝愿 | |
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143 personalities | |
n. 诽谤,(对某人容貌、性格等所进行的)人身攻击; 人身攻击;人格, 个性, 名人( personality的名词复数 ) | |
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144 gregarious | |
adj.群居的,喜好群居的 | |
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145 gregariousness | |
集群性;簇聚性 | |
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146 courageous | |
adj.勇敢的,有胆量的 | |
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147 imposing | |
adj.使人难忘的,壮丽的,堂皇的,雄伟的 | |
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148 saviour | |
n.拯救者,救星 | |
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149 preponderating | |
v.超过,胜过( preponderate的现在分词 ) | |
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150 postulated | |
v.假定,假设( postulate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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151 immoral | |
adj.不道德的,淫荡的,荒淫的,有伤风化的 | |
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152 differentiation | |
n.区别,区分 | |
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153 judgments | |
判断( judgment的名词复数 ); 鉴定; 评价; 审判 | |
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154 constraint | |
n.(on)约束,限制;限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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155 intoxication | |
n.wild excitement;drunkenness;poisoning | |
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156 preponderate | |
v.数目超过;占优势 | |
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157 ecstasy | |
n.狂喜,心醉神怡,入迷 | |
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158 tonic | |
n./adj.滋补品,补药,强身的,健体的 | |
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159 kindles | |
(使某物)燃烧,着火( kindle的第三人称单数 ); 激起(感情等); 发亮,放光 | |
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160 impoverish | |
vt.使穷困,使贫困 | |
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161 bleach | |
vt.使漂白;vi.变白;n.漂白剂 | |
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162 memoirs | |
n.回忆录;回忆录传( mem,自oir的名词复数) | |
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163 evokes | |
产生,引起,唤起( evoke的第三人称单数 ) | |
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164 chaos | |
n.混乱,无秩序 | |
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165 questionable | |
adj.可疑的,有问题的 | |
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166 seducer | |
n.诱惑者,骗子,玩弄女性的人 | |
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167 stimulus | |
n.刺激,刺激物,促进因素,引起兴奋的事物 | |
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168 excellence | |
n.优秀,杰出,(pl.)优点,美德 | |
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169 pampers | |
v.纵容,宠,娇养( pamper的第三人称单数 ) | |
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170 softens | |
(使)变软( soften的第三人称单数 ); 缓解打击; 缓和; 安慰 | |
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171 dominion | |
n.统治,管辖,支配权;领土,版图 | |
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172 conspired | |
密谋( conspire的过去式和过去分词 ); 搞阴谋; (事件等)巧合; 共同导致 | |
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173 mighty | |
adj.强有力的;巨大的 | |
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174 piety | |
n.虔诚,虔敬 | |
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175 altruism | |
n.利他主义,不自私 | |
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176 inevitably | |
adv.不可避免地;必然发生地 | |
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177 machinery | |
n.(总称)机械,机器;机构 | |
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178 luxurious | |
adj.精美而昂贵的;豪华的 | |
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179 metaphor | |
n.隐喻,暗喻 | |
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180 monstrous | |
adj.巨大的;恐怖的;可耻的,丢脸的 | |
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181 modesty | |
n.谦逊,虚心,端庄,稳重,羞怯,朴素 | |
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182 obedience | |
n.服从,顺从 | |
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183 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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184 hypocrisy | |
n.伪善,虚伪 | |
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185 qualms | |
n.不安;内疚 | |
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186 hemmed | |
缝…的褶边( hem的过去式和过去分词 ); 包围 | |
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187 intemperance | |
n.放纵 | |
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188 prerogative | |
n.特权 | |
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189 defensive | |
adj.防御的;防卫的;防守的 | |
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190 disorders | |
n.混乱( disorder的名词复数 );凌乱;骚乱;(身心、机能)失调 | |
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191 solitary | |
adj.孤独的,独立的,荒凉的;n.隐士 | |
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192 immorality | |
n. 不道德, 无道义 | |
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193 consolation | |
n.安慰,慰问 | |
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194 veins | |
n.纹理;矿脉( vein的名词复数 );静脉;叶脉;纹理 | |
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195 parasitism | |
n.寄生状态,寄生病;寄生性 | |
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196 barbarian | |
n.野蛮人;adj.野蛮(人)的;未开化的 | |
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197 asceticism | |
n.禁欲主义 | |
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198 covet | |
vt.垂涎;贪图(尤指属于他人的东西) | |
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199 virtues | |
美德( virtue的名词复数 ); 德行; 优点; 长处 | |
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200 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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201 generosity | |
n.大度,慷慨,慷慨的行为 | |
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202 hostility | |
n.敌对,敌意;抵制[pl.]交战,战争 | |
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203 lengthy | |
adj.漫长的,冗长的 | |
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204 liberate | |
v.解放,使获得自由,释出,放出;vt.解放,使获自由 | |
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205 slandered | |
造谣中伤( slander的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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206 distress | |
n.苦恼,痛苦,不舒适;不幸;vt.使悲痛 | |
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207 manifestation | |
n.表现形式;表明;现象 | |
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208 injustice | |
n.非正义,不公正,不公平,侵犯(别人的)权利 | |
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209 thoroughly | |
adv.完全地,彻底地,十足地 | |
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210 lust | |
n.性(淫)欲;渴(欲)望;vi.对…有强烈的欲望 | |
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211 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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212 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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213 eminently | |
adv.突出地;显著地;不寻常地 | |
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214 downwards | |
adj./adv.向下的(地),下行的(地) | |
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215 passionately | |
ad.热烈地,激烈地 | |
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216 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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217 annihilating | |
v.(彻底)消灭( annihilate的现在分词 );使无效;废止;彻底击溃 | |
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