This, of course, is a position which saves the need of argument. If the average American wants to be a Chinaman, if China represents his ideal, then he should by all means follow the advice of pacificists like the writer in question and be a supporter of Mr. Bryan. If any man seriously believes that China has played a nobler and more129 useful part in the world than Athens and Rome and Germany, then he is quite right to try to Chinafy the United States. In such event he must of course believe that all the culture, all the literature, all the art, all the political and cultural liberty and social well-being3, which modern Europe and the two Americas have inherited from Rome and Greece, and that all that has been done by Germany from the days of Charlemagne to the present time, represent mere4 error and confusion. He must believe that the average German or Frenchman or Englishman or inhabitant of North or South America occupies a lower moral, intellectual, and physical status than the average coolie who with his fellows composes the overwhelming majority of the Chinese population. To my mind such a proposition is unfit for debate outside of certain types of asylum5. But those who sincerely take the view that this gentleman takes are unquestionably right in copying China in every detail, and nothing that I can say will appeal to them.
The “golden words” of Mr. Bryan were as follows:
I believe that this nation could stand before the world to-day and tell the world that it did not believe in war, that it did not believe that it was the right way to settle disputes, that it had no disputes which it was not willing to submit to the judgment6 of the world. If this nation130 did that, it not only would not be attacked by any other nation on the earth, but it would become the supreme7 power in the world.
Of course, it is to be assumed that Mr. Bryan means what he says. If he does, then he is willing to submit to arbitration8 the question whether the Japanese have or have not the right to send unlimited9 numbers of immigrants to this shore. If Mr. Bryan does not mean this, among other specific things, then the “golden words” in question represent merely the emotionalism of the professional orator10. Of course if Mr. Bryan means what he says, he also believes that we should not have interfered11 in Cuba and that Cuba ought now to be the property of Spain. He also believes that we ought to have permitted Colombia to reconquer and deprive of their independence the people of Panama, and that we should not have built the Panama Canal. He also believes that California and Texas ought now to be parts of Mexico, enjoying whatever blessings12 complete abstinence from foreign war has secured that country during the last three years. He also believes that the Declaration of Independence was an arbitrable matter and that the United States ought now to be a dependency of Great Britain. Unless Mr. Bryan does believe all of these things then his “golden words” represent only a rhetorical131 flourish. He is Secretary of State and the right-hand man of President Wilson, and President Wilson is completely responsible for whatever he says and for the things he does—or rather which he leaves undone13.
Now, it is quite useless for me to write with any view to convincing gentlemen like Mr. Bryan and the writer in question. If they really do represent our fellow countrymen, then they are right in holding up China as our ideal; not the modern China, not the China that is changing and moving forward, but old China. In such event Americans ought frankly14 to class themselves with the Chinese. That is where, on this theory, they belong. If this is so, then let us fervently15 pray that the Japanese or Germans or some other virile16 people that does not deify moral, mental, and physical impotence, may speedily come to rule over us.
I am, however, writing on the assumption that Americans are still on the whole like their forefathers17 who followed Washington, and like their fathers who fought in the armies of Grant and Lee. I am writing on the assumption that, even though temporarily misled, they will not permanently18 and tamely submit to oppression, and that they will ultimately think intelligently as to what they should do to safeguard themselves against aggression19. I abhor20 unjust war, and I deplore132 that the need even for just war should ever occur. I believe we should set our faces like flint against any policy of aggression by this country on the rights of any other country. But I believe that we should look facts in the face. I believe that it is unworthy weakness to fear to face the truth. Moreover, I believe that we should have in us that fibre of manhood which will make us follow duty whithersoever it may lead. Unquestionably, we should render all the service it is in our power to render to righteousness. To do this we must be able to back righteousness with force, to put might back of right. It may well be that by following out this theory we can in the end do our part in conjunction with other nations of the world to bring about, if not—as I hope—a world peace, yet at least an important minimizing of the chances for war and of the areas of possible war. But meanwhile it is absolutely our duty to prepare for our own defense22.
This country needs something like the Swiss system of war training for its young men. Switzerland is one of the most democratic governments in the world, and it has given its young men such an efficient training as to insure entire preparedness for war, without suffering from the least touch of militarism. Switzerland is at peace now primarily because all the great military nations that surround it know that its people have no133 intention of making aggression on anybody and yet that they are thoroughly23 prepared to hold their own and are resolute24 to fight to the last against any invader25 who attempts either to subjugate26 their territory or by violating its neutrality to make it a battle-ground.
A bishop27 of the Episcopal Church recently wrote me as follows:
How lamentable28 that we should stand idle, making no preparations to enforce peace, and crying “peace” when there is none! I have scant29 sympathy for the short-sightedness of those who decry30 preparation for war as a means of preventing it.
The manager of a land company in Alabama writes me urging that some one speak for reasonable preparedness on the part of the nation. He states that it is always possible that we shall be engaged in hostilities31 with some first-class power, that he hopes and believes that war will never come, but adds:
I may not believe that my home will burn down or that I am going to die within the period of my expectancy32, but nevertheless I carry fire and life insurance to the full insurable value on my property and on my life to the extent of my ability. The only insurance of our liberties as a people is full preparation for a defense adequate against any attack and made in time to fully33 meet any attack. We do not know the attack is coming; but134 to wait until it does come will be too late. Our present weakness lies in the wide-spread opinion among our people that this country is invincible34 because of its large population and vast resources. This I believe is true if, and only if, we use these resources or a small part of them to protect the major part, and if we train at least a part of our people how to defend the nation. Under existing conditions we can hardly hope to have an effective army in the field in less time than eight or ten months. To-day not one per cent of our people know anything about rifle shooting.
I quote these two out of many letters, because they sum up the general feeling of men of vision. Both of my correspondents are most sincerely for peace. No man can possibly be more anxious for peace than I am. I ask those individuals who think of me as a firebrand to remember that during the seven and a half years I was President not a shot was fired at any soldier of a hostile nation by any American soldier or sailor, and there was not so much as a threat of war. Even when the state of Panama threw off the alien yoke35 of Colombia and when this nation, acting36 as was its manifest duty, by recognizing Panama as an independent state stood for the right of the governed to govern themselves on the Isthmus37, as well as for justice and humanity, there was not a shot fired by any of our people at any Colombian. The blood recently shed at Vera Cruz, like the unpunished wrongs recently committed on our people135 in Mexico, had no parallel during my administration. When I left the presidency38 there was not a cloud on the horizon—and one of the reasons why there was not a cloud on the horizon was that the American battle fleet had just returned from its sixteen months’ trip around the world, a trip such as no other battle fleet of any power had ever taken, which it had not been supposed could be taken, and which exercised a greater influence for peace than all the peace congresses of the last fifty years. With Lowell I most emphatically believe that peace is not a gift that tarries long in the hands of cowards; and the fool and the weakling are no improvement on the coward.
Nineteen centuries ago in the greatest of all books we were warned that whoso loses his life for righteousness shall save it and that he who seeks to save it shall lose it. The ignoble39 and abject40 gospel of those who would teach us that it is preferable to endure disgrace and discredit41 than to run any risk to life or limb would defeat its own purpose; for that kind of submission43 to wrong-doing merely invites further wrong-doing, as has been shown a thousand times in history and as is shown by the case of China in our own days. Moreover, our people, however ill-prepared, would never consent to such abject submission; and indeed as a matter of fact our publicists and public men and our newspapers, instead of being136 too humble44 and submissive, are only too apt to indulge in very offensive talk about foreign nations. Of all the nations of the world we are the one that combines the greatest amount of wealth with the smallest ability to defend that wealth. Surely one does not have to read history very much or ponder over philosophy a great deal in order to realize the truth that the one certain way to invite disaster is to be opulent, offensive, and unarmed. There is utter inconsistency between the ideal of making this nation the foremost commercial power in the world and of disarmament in the face of an armed world. There is utter inconsistency between the ideal of making this nation a power for international righteousness and at the same time refusing to make us a power efficient in anything save empty treaties and emptier promises.
I do not believe in a large standing45 army. Most emphatically I do not believe in militarism. Most emphatically I do not believe in any policy of aggression by us. But I do believe that no man is really fit to be the free citizen of a free republic unless he is able to bear arms and at need to serve with efficiency in the efficient army of the republic. This is no new thing with me. For years I have believed that the young men of the country should know how to use a rifle and should have a short period of military training137 which, while not taking them for any length of time from civil pursuits, would make them quickly capable of helping46 defend the country in case of need. When I was governor of New York, acting in conjunction with the administration at Washington under President McKinley, I secured the sending abroad of one of the best officers in the New York National Guard, Colonel William Cary Sanger, to study the Swiss system. As President I had to devote my attention chiefly to getting the navy built up. But surely the sight of what has happened abroad ought to awaken47 our people to the need of action, not only as regards our navy but as regards our land forces also.
Australia has done well in this respect. But Switzerland has worked out a comprehensive scheme with practical intelligence. She has not only solved the question of having men ready to fight, but she has solved the question of having arms to give these men. At present England is in more difficulty about arms than about men, and some of her people when sent to the front were armed with hunting rifles. Our own shortcomings are far greater. Indeed, they are so lamentable that it is hard to believe that our citizens as a whole know them. To equip half the number of men whom even the British now have in the field would tax our factories to the limit. In Switzerland, during the last two or three years138 of what corresponds to our high-school work the boy is thoroughly grounded in the rudiments48 of military training, discipline, and marksmanship. When he graduates he is put for some four to six months in the army to receive exactly the training he would get in time of war. After that he serves eight days a year and in addition often joins with his fellows in practising at a mark. He keeps his rifle and accoutrements in his home and is responsible for their condition. Efficiency is the watchword of Switzerland, and not least in its army. At the outbreak of this terrible war Switzerland was able to mobilize her forces in the corner of her territory between France and Germany as quickly as either of the great combatants could theirs; and no one trespassed49 upon her soil.
The Swiss training does not to any appreciable50 extent take the man away from his work. But it does make him markedly more efficient for his work. The training he gets and his short service with the colors render him appreciably51 better able to do whatever his job in life is, and, in addition, benefit his health and spirits. The service is a holiday, and a holiday of the best because of the most useful type.
There is no reason whatever why Americans should be unwilling52 or unable to do what Switzerland has done. We are a far wealthier country139 than Switzerland and could afford without the slightest strain the very trifling53 expense and the trifling consumption of time rendered necessary by such a system. It has really nothing in common with the universal service in the great conscript armies of the military powers. No man would be really taken out of industry. On the contrary, the average man would probably be actually benefited so far as doing his life-work is concerned. The system would be thoroughly democratic in its workings. No man would be exempted54 from the work and all would have to perform the work alike. It would be entirely55 possible to arrange that there should be a certain latitude56 as to the exact year when the four or six months’ service was given.
Officers, of course, would need a longer training than the men. This could readily be furnished either by allowing numbers of extra students to take partial or short-term courses at West Point or by specifying57 optional courses in the high schools, the graduates of these special courses being tested carefully in their field-work and being required to give extra periods of service and being under the rigid58 supervision59 of the regular army. There could also be opportunities for promotion60 from the ranks for any one who chose to take the time and the trouble to fit himself.
The four or six months’ service with the colors140 would be for the most part in the open field. The drill hall and the parade-ground do not teach more than five per cent of what a soldier must actually know. Any man who has had any experience with ordinary organizations of the National Guard when taken into camp knows that at first only a very limited number of the men have any idea of taking care of themselves and that the great majority suffer much from dyspepsia, just because they do not know how to take care of themselves. The soldier needs to spend some months in actual campaign practice under canvas with competent instructors61 before he gets to know his duty. If, however, he has had previous training in the schools of such a type as that given in Switzerland and then has this actual practice, he remains62 for some years efficient with no more training than eight or ten days a year.
The training must be given in large bodies. It is essential that men shall get accustomed to the policing and sanitary63 care of camps in which there are masses of soldiers. Moreover, officers and especially the higher officers are wholly useless in war time unless they are accustomed to handle masses of men in co-operation with one another.
There are small sections of our population out of which it is possible to improvise64 soldiers in a short time. Men who are accustomed to ride141 and to shoot and to live in the open and who are hardy65 and enduring and by nature possess the fighting edge already know most of what it is necessary that an infantryman or cavalryman68 should know, and they can be taught the remainder in a very short time by good officers. Morgan’s Virginia Riflemen, Andrew Jackson’s Tennesseans, Forrest’s Southwestern Cavalry67 were all men of this kind; but even such men are of real use only after considerable training or else if their leaders are born fighters and masters of men. Such leaders are rare. The ordinary dweller69 in civilization has to be taught to shoot, to walk (or ride if he is in the cavalry), to cook for himself, to make himself comfortable in the open, and to take care of his feet and his health generally. Artillerymen and engineers need long special training.
It may well be that the Swiss on an average can be made into good troops quicker than our own men; but most assuredly there would be numbers of Americans who would not be behind the Swiss in such a matter. A body of volunteers of the kind I am describing would of course not be as good as a body of regulars of the same size, but they would be immeasurably better than the average soldiers produced by any system we now have or ever have had in connection with our militia70. Our regular army would be strengthened by them at the very beginning and would be142 set free in its entirety for immediate71 aggressive action; and in addition a levy72 in mass of the young men of the right age would mean that two or three million troops were put into the field, who, although not as good as regulars, would at once be available in numbers sufficient to overwhelm any expeditionary force which it would be possible for any military power to send to our shores. The existence of such a force would render the immediate taking of cities like San Francisco, New York, or Boston an impossibility and would free us from all danger from sudden raids and make it impossible even for an army-corps to land with any prospect73 of success.
Our people are so entirely unused to things military that it is probably difficult for the average man to get any clear idea of our shortcomings. Unlike what is true in the military nations of the Old World, here the ordinary citizen takes no interest in the working of our War Department in time of peace. No President gains the slightest credit for himself by paying attention to it. Then when a crisis comes and the War Department breaks down, instead of the people accepting what has happened with humility74 as due to their own fault during the previous two or three decades, there is a roar of wrath75 against the unfortunate man who happens to be in office at the time. There was such a roar of wrath against143 Secretary Alger in the Spanish War. Now, as a matter of fact, ninety per cent of our shortcomings when the war broke out with Spain could not have been remedied by any action on the part of the Secretary of War. They were due to what had been done ever since the close of the Civil War.
We were utterly76 unprepared. There had been no real man?uvring of so much as a brigade and very rarely had any of our generals commanded even a good-sized regiment77 in the field. The enlisted78 men and the junior officers of the regular army were good. Most of the officers above the rank of captain were nearly worthless. There were striking exceptions of course, but, taking the average, I really believe that it would have been on the whole to the advantage of our army in 1898 if all the regular officers above the rank of captain had been retired79 and if all the captains who were unfit to be placed in the higher positions had also been retired. The lieutenants80 were good. The lack of administrative81 skill was even more marked than the lack of military skill. No one who saw the congestion82 of trains, supplies, animals, and men at Tampa will ever forget the impression of helpless confusion that it gave him. The volunteer forces included some organizations and multitudes of individuals offering first-class material. But, as a whole, the144 volunteer army would have been utterly helpless against any efficient regular force at the outset of the 1898 war, probably almost as inefficient83 as were the two armies which fought one another at Bull Run in 1861. Even the efficiency of the regular army itself was such merely by comparison with the volunteers. I do not believe that any army in the world offered finer material than was offered by the junior officers and enlisted men of the regular army which disembarked on Cuban soil in June, 1898; and by the end of the next two weeks probably the average individual infantry66 or cavalry organization therein was at least as good as the average organization of the same size in an Old-World army. But taking the army as a whole and considering its management from the time it began to assemble at Tampa until the surrender of Santiago, I seriously doubt if it was as efficient as a really good European or Japanese army of half the size. Since then we have made considerable progress. Our little army of occupation that went to Cuba at the time of the revolution in Cuba ten years ago was thoroughly well handled and did at least as well as any foreign force of the same size could have done. But it did not include ten thousand men, that is, it did not include as many men as the smallest military power in Europe would assemble any day for man?uvres.
145 This is no new thing in our history. If only we were willing to learn from our defeats and failures instead of paying heed85 purely86 to our successes, we would realize that what I have above described is one of the common phases of our history. In the War of 1812, at the outset of the struggle, American forces were repeatedly beaten, as at Niagara and Bladensburg, by an enemy one half or one quarter the strength of the American army engaged. Yet two years later these same American troops on the northern frontier, when trained and commanded by Brown, Scott, and Ripley, proved able to do what the finest troops of Napoleon were unable to do, that is, meet the British regulars on equal terms in the open; and the Tennessee backwoodsmen and Louisiana volunteers, when mastered and controlled by the iron will and warlike genius of Andrew Jackson, performed at New Orleans a really great feat42. During the year 1812 the American soldiers on shore suffered shameful87 and discreditable defeats, and yet their own brothers at sea won equally striking victories, and this because the men on shore were utterly unprepared and because the men at sea had been thoroughly trained and drilled long in advance.
Exactly the same lessons are taught by the histories of other nations. When, during the Napoleonic wars, a small force of veteran French146 soldiers landed in Ireland they defeated without an effort five times their number of British and Irish troops at Castlebar. Yet the men whom they thus drove in wild flight were the own brothers of and often the very same men who a few years later, under Wellington, proved an overmatch for the flower of the French forces. The nation that waits until the crisis is upon it before taking measures for its own safety pays heavy toll88 in the blood of its best and its bravest and in bitter shame and humiliation89. Small is the comfort it can then take from the memory of the times when the noisy and feeble folk in its own ranks cried “Peace, peace,” without taking one practical step to secure peace.
We can never follow out a worthy21 national policy, we can never be of benefit to others or to ourselves, unless we keep steadily90 in view as our ideal that of the just man armed, the man who is fearless, self-reliant, ready, because he has prepared himself for possible contingencies91; the man who is scornful alike of those who would advise him to do wrong and of those who would advise him tamely to suffer wrong. The great war now being waged in Europe and the fact that no neutral nation has ventured to make even the smallest effort to alleviate1 or even to protest against147 the wrongs that have been done show with lamentable clearness that all the peace congresses of the past fifteen years have accomplished92 precisely93 and exactly nothing so far as any great crisis is concerned. Fundamentally this is because they have confined themselves to mere words, seemingly without realizing that mere words are utterly useless unless translated into deeds and that an ounce of promise which is accompanied by provision for a similar ounce of effective performance is worth at least a ton of promise as to which no effective method of performance is provided. Furthermore, a very serious blunder has been to treat peace as the end instead of righteousness as the end. The greatest soldier-patriots of history, Timoleon, John Hamden, Andreas Hofer, Koerner, the great patriot-statesman-soldiers like Washington, the great patriot-statesmen like Lincoln whose achievements for good depended upon the use of soldiers, have all achieved their immortal94 claim to the gratitude95 of mankind by what148 they did in just war. To condemn96 war in terms which include the wars these men waged or took part in precisely as they include the most wicked and unjust wars of history is to serve the devil and not God.
1 The much advertised sending of food and supplies to Belgium has been of most benefit to the German conquerors97 of Belgium. They have taken the money and food of the Belgians and permitted the Belgians to be supported by outsiders. Of course, it was far better to send them food, even under such conditions, than to let them starve; but the professional pacificists would do well to ponder the fact that if the neutral nations had been willing to prevent the invasion of Belgium, which could only be done by willingness and ability to use force, they would by this act of “war” have prevented more misery98 and suffering to innocent men, women, and children than the organized charity of all the “peaceful” nations of the world can now remove.
Again, these peace people have persistently99 and resolutely100 blinked facts. One of the peace congresses sat in New York at the very time that the feeling in California about the Japanese question gravely threatened the good relations between ourselves and the great empire of Japan. The only thing which at the moment could practically be done for the cause of peace was to secure some proper solution of the question at issue between ourselves and Japan. But this represented real effort, real thought. The peace congress paid not the slightest serious attention to the matter and instead devoted101 itself to listening to speeches which favored the abolition102 of the United States navy and even in one case the prohibiting the use of tin soldiers in nurseries because of the militaristic effect on the minds of the little boys and girls who played with them!
Ex-President Taft has recently said that it is hysterical103 to endeavor to prepare against war; and he at the same time explained that the only real possibility of war was to be found “in the wanton, reckless, wicked willingness on the part of a narrow section of the country to gratify racial149 prejudice and class hatred104 by flagrant breach105 of treaty right in the form of state law.” This characterization is, of course, aimed at the State of California for its action toward the Japanese. If—which may Heaven forfend—any trouble comes because of the action of California toward the Japanese, a prime factor in producing it will be the treaty negotiated four years ago with Japan; and no clearer illustration can be given of the mischief106 that comes to our people from the habit our public men have contracted of getting cheap applause for themselves by making treaties which they know to be shams107, which they know cannot be observed. The result of such action is that there is one set of real facts, those that actually exist and must be reckoned with, and another set of make-believe facts which do not exist except on pieces of paper or in after-dinner speeches, which are known to be false but which serve to deceive well-meaning pacificists. Four years ago there was in existence a long-standing treaty with Japan under which we reserved the right to keep out Japanese laborers108. Every man of any knowledge whatever of conditions on the Pacific Slope, and, indeed, generally throughout this country, knew, and knows now, that any immigration in mass to this country of the Japanese, whether the immigrants be industrial laborers or men whose labor109 takes the form of agricultural150 work or even the form of small shopkeeping, was and is absolutely certain to produce trouble of the most dangerous kind. The then administration entered on a course of conduct as regards Manchuria which not only deeply offended the Japanese but actually achieved the result of uniting the Russians and Japanese against us. To make amends110 for this serious blunder the administration committed the far worse blunder of endeavoring to placate111 Japanese opinion by the negotiation112 of a new treaty in which our right to exclude Japanese laborers, that is, to prevent Japanese immigration in mass, was abandoned. The extraordinary and lamentable fact in the matter was that the California senators acquiesced113 in the treaty. Apparently114 they took the view, which so many of our public men do take and which they are encouraged to take by the unwisdom of those who demand impossible treaties, that they were perfectly115 willing to please some people by passing the treaty because, if necessary, the opponents of the treaty could at any time be placated116 by its violation117. One item in securing their support was the statement by the then administration that the Japanese authorities had said that they would promise under a “gentlemen’s agreement” to keep the immigrants out if only they were by treaty given the right to let them in. Under the preceding treaty, during151 my administration, the Japanese government had made and had in good faith kept such an agreement, the agreement being that as long as the Japanese government itself kept out Japanese immigrants and thereby118 relieved us of the necessity of passing any law to exclude them, no such law would be passed. Apparently the next administration did not perceive the fathomless119 difference between retaining the power to enact120 a law which was not enacted121 as long as no necessity for enacting122 it arose, and abandoning the power, surrendering the right, and trusting that the necessity to exercise it would not arise.
I immensely admire and respect the Japanese people. I prize their good-will. I am proud of my personal relations with some of their leading men. Fifty years ago there was no possible community between the Japanese and ourselves. The events of the last fifty years have been so extraordinary that now Japanese statesmen, generals, artists, writers, scientific men, business men, can meet our corresponding men on terms of entire equality. I am fortunate enough to have a number of Japanese friends. I value their friendship. They and I meet on a footing of absolute equality, socially, politically, and in every other way. I respect and regard them precisely as in the case of my German and Russian, French and English friends. But there is no use152 blinking the truth because it is unpleasant. As yet the differences between the Japanese who work with their hands and the Americans who work with their hands are such that it is absolutely impossible for them, when brought into contact with one another in great numbers, to get on. Japan would not permit any immigration in mass of our people into her territory, and it is wholly inadvisable that there should be such immigration of her people into our territory. This is not because either side is inferior to the other but because they are different. As a matter of fact, these differences are sometimes in favor of the Japanese and sometimes in favor of the Americans. But they are so marked that at this time, whatever may be the case in the future, friction123 and trouble are certain to come if there is any immigration in mass of Japanese into this country, exactly as friction and trouble have actually come in British Columbia from this cause, and have been prevented from coming in Australia only by the most rigid exclusion124 laws. Under these conditions the way to avoid trouble is not by making believe that things which are not so are so but by courteously125 and firmly facing the situation. The two nations should be given absolutely reciprocal treatment. Students, statesmen, publicists, scientific men, all travellers, whether for business or pleasure, and all men153 engaged in international business, whether Japanese or American, should have absolute right of entry into one another’s countries and should be treated with the highest consideration while therein, but no settlement in mass should be permitted of the people of either country in the other country. All travelling and sojourning by the people of either country in the other country should be encouraged, but there should be no immigration of workers to, no settlement in, either country by the people of the other. I advocate this solution, which for years I have advocated, because I am not merely a friend but an intense admirer of Japan, because I am most anxious that America should learn from Japan the great amount that Japan can teach us and because I wish to work for the best possible feeling between the two countries. Each country has interests in the Pacific which can best be served by their cordial co-operation on a footing of frank and friendly equality; and in eastern Asiatic waters the interest and therefore the proper dominance of Japan are and will be greater than those of any other nation. If such a plan as that above advocated were once adopted by both our nations all sources of friction between the two countries would vanish at once. Ultimately I have no question that all restrictions126 of movement from one country to the other could be dispensed128 with.154 But to attempt to dispense127 with them in our day and our generation will fail; and even worse failure will attend the attempt to make believe to dispense with them while not doing so.
It is eminently129 necessary that the United States should in good faith observe its treaties, and it is therefore eminently necessary not to pass treaties which it is absolutely certain will not be obeyed, and which themselves provoke disobedience to them. The height of folly130, of course, is to pass treaties which will not be obeyed and the disregard of which may cause the gravest possible trouble, even war, and at the same time to refuse to prepare for war and to pass other foolish treaties calculated to lure84 our people into the belief that there will never be war.
I advocate that our preparedness take such shape as to fit us to resist aggression, not to encourage us in aggression. I advocate preparedness that will enable us to defend our own shores and to defend the Panama Canal and Hawaii and Alaska, and prevent the seizure131 of territory at the expense of any commonwealth132 of the western hemisphere by any military power of the Old World. I advocate this being done in the most democratic manner possible. We Americans do not realize how fundamentally democratic our army really is. When I served in Cuba it was under General Sam Young and alongside of General155 Adna Chaffee. Both had entered the American army as enlisted men in the Civil War. Later, as President, I made both of them in succession lieutenant-generals and commanders of the army. On the occasion when General Chaffee was to appear at the White House for the first time as lieutenant-general, General Young sent him his own starred shoulder-straps with a little note saying that they were from “Private Young, ’61, to Private Chaffee, ’61.” Both of the fine old fellows represented the best type of citizen-soldier. Each was simply and sincerely devoted to peace and justice. Each was incapable133 of advocating our doing wrong to others. Neither could have understood willingness on the part of any American to see the United States submit tamely to insult or injury. Both typified the attitude that we Americans should take in our dealings with foreign countries.
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orator
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| n.演说者，演讲者，雄辩家 | |
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interfered
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| v.干预( interfere的过去式和过去分词 )；调停；妨碍；干涉 | |
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blessings
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| n.（上帝的）祝福( blessing的名词复数 )；好事；福分；因祸得福 | |
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undone
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| a.未做完的，未完成的 | |
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frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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fervently
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| adv.热烈地，热情地，强烈地 | |
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virile
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| adj.男性的；有男性生殖力的；有男子气概的；强有力的 | |
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forefathers
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| n.祖先，先人；祖先，祖宗( forefather的名词复数 )；列祖列宗；前人 | |
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permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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19
aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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abhor
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| v.憎恶；痛恨 | |
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21
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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22
defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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25
invader
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| n.侵略者，侵犯者，入侵者 | |
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26
subjugate
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| v.征服；抑制 | |
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27
bishop
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| n.主教，（国际象棋）象 | |
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28
lamentable
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| adj.令人惋惜的，悔恨的 | |
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29
scant
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| adj.不充分的，不足的；v.减缩，限制，忽略 | |
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30
decry
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| v.危难，谴责 | |
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31
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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expectancy
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| n.期望，预期，（根据概率统计求得）预期数额 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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34
invincible
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| adj.不可征服的，难以制服的 | |
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35
yoke
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| n.轭；支配；v.给...上轭，连接，使成配偶 | |
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36
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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37
isthmus
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| n.地峡 | |
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38
presidency
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| n.总统(校长，总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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39
ignoble
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| adj.不光彩的，卑鄙的；可耻的 | |
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40
abject
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| adj.极可怜的，卑屈的 | |
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41
discredit
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| vt.使不可置信；n.丧失信义；不信，怀疑 | |
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feat
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| n.功绩；武艺，技艺；adj.灵巧的，漂亮的，合适的 | |
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43
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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44
humble
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| adj.谦卑的，恭顺的；地位低下的；v.降低，贬低 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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46
helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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47
awaken
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| vi.醒，觉醒；vt.唤醒，使觉醒，唤起，激起 | |
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48
rudiments
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| n.基础知识，入门 | |
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49
trespassed
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| （trespass的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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50
appreciable
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| adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的 | |
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51
appreciably
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| adv.相当大地 | |
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52
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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53
trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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54
exempted
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| 使免除[豁免]( exempt的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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55
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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56
latitude
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| n.纬度，行动或言论的自由(范围)，(pl.)地区 | |
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57
specifying
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| v.指定( specify的现在分词 )；详述；提出…的条件；使具有特性 | |
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58
rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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59
supervision
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| n.监督，管理 | |
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60
promotion
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| n.提升，晋级；促销，宣传 | |
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61
instructors
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| 指导者，教师( instructor的名词复数 ) | |
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62
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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63
sanitary
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| adj.卫生方面的，卫生的，清洁的，卫生的 | |
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64
improvise
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| v.即兴创作；临时准备，临时凑成 | |
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65
hardy
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| adj.勇敢的，果断的，吃苦的；耐寒的 | |
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66
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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67
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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68
cavalryman
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| 骑兵 | |
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69
dweller
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| n.居住者，住客 | |
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70
militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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71
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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72
levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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73
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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74
humility
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| n.谦逊，谦恭 | |
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75
wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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76
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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77
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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78
enlisted
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| adj.应募入伍的v.（使）入伍， （使）参军( enlist的过去式和过去分词 )；获得（帮助或支持） | |
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79
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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80
lieutenants
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| n.陆军中尉( lieutenant的名词复数 )；副职官员；空军；仅低于…官阶的官员 | |
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81
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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82
congestion
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| n.阻塞，消化不良 | |
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83
inefficient
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| adj.效率低的，无效的 | |
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84
lure
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| n.吸引人的东西，诱惑物；vt.引诱，吸引 | |
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85
heed
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| v.注意，留意；n.注意，留心 | |
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86
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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87
shameful
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| adj.可耻的，不道德的 | |
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88
toll
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| n.过路(桥)费；损失，伤亡人数；v.敲(钟) | |
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89
humiliation
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| n.羞辱 | |
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90
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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91
contingencies
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| n.偶然发生的事故，意外事故( contingency的名词复数 )；以备万一 | |
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92
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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93
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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94
immortal
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| adj.不朽的；永生的，不死的；神的 | |
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95
gratitude
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| adj.感激，感谢 | |
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96
condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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97
conquerors
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| 征服者，占领者( conqueror的名词复数 ) | |
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98
misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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99
persistently
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| ad.坚持地；固执地 | |
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100
resolutely
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| adj.坚决地，果断地 | |
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101
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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102
abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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103
hysterical
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| adj.情绪异常激动的，歇斯底里般的 | |
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104
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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105
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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106
mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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107
shams
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| 假象( sham的名词复数 )； 假货； 虚假的行为（或感情、言语等）； 假装…的人 | |
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108
laborers
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| n.体力劳动者，工人( laborer的名词复数 )；（熟练工人的）辅助工 | |
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109
labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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110
amends
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| n. 赔偿 | |
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111
placate
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| v.抚慰，平息(愤怒) | |
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112
negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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113
acquiesced
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| v.默认，默许( acquiesce的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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114
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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115
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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116
placated
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| v.安抚，抚慰，使平静( placate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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117
violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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118
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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119
fathomless
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| a.深不可测的 | |
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120
enact
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| vt.制定(法律)；上演，扮演 | |
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121
enacted
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| 制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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122
enacting
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| 制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的现在分词 ) | |
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123
friction
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| n.摩擦，摩擦力 | |
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124
exclusion
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| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
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125
courteously
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| adv.有礼貌地，亲切地 | |
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126
restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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127
dispense
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| vt.分配，分发；配(药)，发(药)；实施 | |
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128
dispensed
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| v.分配( dispense的过去式和过去分词 )；施与；配（药） | |
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129
eminently
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| adv.突出地；显著地；不寻常地 | |
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130
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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131
seizure
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| n.没收；占有；抵押 | |
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132
commonwealth
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| n.共和国，联邦，共同体 | |
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133
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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