Of course it would be an ignoble20 action on our part after having conspicuously21 failed to protest against the violation of Belgian neutrality to show ourselves overeager to protest against comparatively insignificant22 violations23 of our own neutral rights. But we should never have put ourselves in such a position as to make insistence24 on our own rights seem disregard for the rights of others. The proper course for us to pursue was, on the one hand, scrupulously25 to see that we did not so act as to injure any contending nation, unless required to do so in the name of morality and of our solemn treaty obligations, and also fearlessly to act on behalf of other nations which were wronged, as required by these treaty obligations; and, on the other hand, with courteous26 firmness to warn any nation which, for instance, seized or searched our ships against the accepted rules of international conduct that this we could159 not permit and that such a course should not be persevered27 in by any nation which desired our good-will. I believe I speak for at least a considerable portion of our people when I say that we wish to make it evident that we feel sincere good-will toward all nations; that any action we take against any nation is taken with the greatest reluctance28 and only because the wrong-doing of that nation imposes a distinct, although painful, duty upon us; and yet that we do not intend ourselves to submit to wrong-doing from any nation.
Until an efficient world league for peace is in more than mere29 process of formation the United States must depend upon itself for protection where its vital interests are concerned. All the youth of the nation should be trained in warlike exercises and in the use of arms—as well as in the indispensable virtues30 of courage, self-restraint, and endurance—so as to be fit for national defense31. But the right arm of the nation must be its navy. Our navy is our most efficient peacemaker. In order to use the navy effectively we should clearly define to ourselves the policy we intend to follow and the limits over which we expect our power to extend. Our own coasts, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Panama Canal and its approaches should represent the sphere in which we should expect to be able, single-handed, to meet and master any opponent from overseas.
160 I exclude the Philippines. This is because I feel that the present administration has definitely committed us to a course of action which will make the early and complete severance32 of the Philippines from us not merely desirable but necessary. I have never felt that the Philippines were of any special use to us. But I have felt that we had a great task to perform there and that a great nation is benefited by doing a great task. It was our bounden duty to work primarily for the interests of the Filipinos; but it was also our bounden duty, inasmuch as the entire responsibility lay upon us, to consult our own judgment33 and not theirs in finally deciding what was to be done. It was our duty to govern the islands or to get out of the islands. It was most certainly not our duty to take the responsibility of staying in the islands without governing them. Still less was it—or is it—our duty to enter into joint34 arrangements with other powers about the islands; arrangements of confused responsibility and divided power of the kind sure to cause mischief35. I had hoped that we would continue to govern the islands until we were certain that they were able to govern themselves in such fashion as to do justice to other nations and to repel36 injustice37 committed on them by other nations. To substitute for such government by ourselves either a government by the161 Filipinos with us guaranteeing them against outsiders, or a joint guarantee between us and outsiders, would be folly38. It is eminently39 desirable to guarantee the neutrality of small civilized40 nations which have a high social and cultural status and which are so advanced that they do not fall into disorder41 or commit wrong-doing on others. But it is eminently undesirable42 to guarantee the neutrality or sovereignty of an inherently weak nation which is impotent to preserve order at home, to repel assaults from abroad, or to refrain from doing wrong to outsiders. It is even more undesirable to give such a guarantee with no intention of making it really effective. That this is precisely43 what the present administration would be delighted to do has been shown by its refusal to live up to its Hague promises at the very time that it was making similar new international promises by the batch44. To enter into a joint guarantee of neutrality which in emergencies can only be rendered effective by force of arms is to incur45 a serious responsibility which ought to be undertaken in a serious spirit. To enter into it with no intention of using force, or of preparing force, in order at need to make it effective, represents the kind of silliness which is worse than wickedness.
Above all, we should keep our promises. The present administration was elected on the outright162 pledge of giving the Filipinos independence. Apparently46 its course in the Philippines has proceeded upon the theory that the Filipinos are now fit to govern themselves. Whatever may be our personal and individual beliefs in this matter, we ought not as a nation to break faith or even to seem to break faith. I hope therefore that the Filipinos will be given their independence at an early date and without any guarantee from us which might in any way hamper47 our future action or commit us to staying on the Asiatic coast. I do not believe we should keep any foothold whatever in the Philippines. Any kind of position by us in the Philippines merely results in making them our heel of Achilles if we are attacked by a foreign power. They can be of no compensating48 benefit to us. If we were to retain complete control over them and to continue the course of action which in the past sixteen years has resulted in such immeasurable benefit for them, then I should feel that it was our duty to stay and work for them in spite of the expense incurred49 by us and the risk we thereby50 ran. But inasmuch as we have now promised to leave them and as we are now abandoning our power to work efficiently51 for and in them, I do not feel that we are warranted in staying in the islands in an equivocal position, thereby incurring52 great risk to ourselves without conferring any real compensating advantage,163 of a kind which we are bound to take into account, on the Filipinos themselves. If the Filipinos are entitled to independence then we are entitled to be freed from all the responsibility and risk which our presence in the islands entails53 upon us.
The great nations of southernmost South America, Brazil, the Argentine, and Chile are now so far advanced in stability and power that there is no longer any need of applying the Monroe Doctrine54 as far as they are concerned; and this also relieves us as regards Uruguay and Paraguay the former of which is well advanced and neither of which has any interests with which we need particularly concern ourselves. As regards all these powers, therefore, we now have no duty save that doubtless if they got into difficulties and desired our aid we would gladly extend it, just as, for instance, we would to Australia and Canada. But we can now proceed on the assumption that they are able to help themselves and that any help we should be required to give would be given by us as an auxiliary55 rather than as a principal.
Our naval56 problem, therefore, is primarily to provide for the protection of our own coasts and for the protection and policing of Hawaii, Alaska, and the Panama Canal and its approaches. This offers a definite problem which should be solved by our naval men. It is for them, having in view164 the lessons taught by this war, to say what is the exact type of fleet we require, the number and kind of submarines, of destroyers, of mines, and of air-ships to be used against hostile fleets, in addition to the cruisers and great fighting craft which must remain the backbone57 of the navy. Civilians58 may be competent to pass on the merits of the plans suggested by the naval men, but it is the naval men themselves who must make and submit the plans in detail. Lay opinion, however, should keep certain elementary facts steadily59 in mind.
The navy must primarily be used for offensive purposes. Forts, not the navy, are to be used for defense. The only permanently60 efficient type of defensive61 is the offensive. A portion, and a very important portion, of our naval strength must be used with our own coast ordinarily as a base, its striking radius62 being only a few score miles, or a couple of hundred at the outside. The events of this war have shown that submarines can play a tremendous part. We should develop our force of submarines and train the officers and crews who have charge of them to the highest pitch of efficiency—for they will be useless in time of war unless those aboard them have been trained in time of peace. These submarines, when used in connection with destroyers and with air-ships, can undoubtedly63 serve to165 minimize the danger of successful attack on our own shores. But the prime lesson of the war, as regards the navy, is that the nation with a powerful seagoing navy, although it may suffer much annoyance64 and loss, yet is able on the whole to take the offensive and do great damage to a nation with a less powerful navy. Great Britain’s naval superiority over Germany has enabled her completely to paralyze all Germany’s sea commerce and to prevent goods from entering her ports. What is far more important, it has enabled the British to land two or three hundred thousand men to aid the French, and has enabled Canada and Australia to send a hundred thousand men from the opposite ends of the earth to Great Britain. If Germany had had the more powerful navy England would now have suffered the fate of Belgium.
The capital work done by the German cruisers in the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Oceans shows how much can be accomplished65 in the way of hurting and damaging an enemy by even the weaker power if it possesses fine ships, well handled, able to operate thousands of miles from their own base. We must not fail to recognize this. Neither must we fail heartily66 and fully67 to recognize the capital importance of submarines as well as air-ships, torpedo68-boat destroyers, and mines, as proved by the events of the last three166 months. But nothing that has yet occurred warrants us in feeling that we can afford to ease up in our programme of building battle-ships and cruisers, especially the former. The German submarines have done wonderfully in this war; their cruisers have done gallantly69. But so far as Great Britain is concerned the vital and essential feature has been the fact that her great battle fleet has kept the German fleet immured70 in its own home ports, has protected Britain from invasion, and has enabled her land strength to be used to its utmost capacity beside the armies of France and Belgium. If the men who for years have clamored against Britain’s being prepared had had their way, if Britain during the last quarter of a century had failed to continue the upbuilding of her navy, if the English statesmen corresponding to President Wilson and Mr. Bryan had seen their ideas triumph, England would now be off the map as a great power and the British Empire would have dissolved, while London, Liverpool, and Birmingham would be in the condition of Antwerp and Brussels.
The efficiency of the German personnel at sea has been no less remarkable71 than the efficiency of the German personnel on land. This is due partly to the spirit of the nation and partly to what is itself a consequence of that spirit, the careful training of the navy during peace under167 the conditions of actual service. When, early in 1909, our battle fleet returned from its sixteen months’ voyage around the world there was no navy in the world which, size for size, ship for ship, and squadron for squadron, stood at a higher pitch of efficiency. We blind ourselves to the truth if we believe that the same is true now. During the last twenty months, ever since Secretary Meyer left the Navy Department, there has been in our navy a great falling off relatively72 to other nations. It was quite impossible to avoid this while our national affairs were handled as they have recently been handled. The President who intrusts the Departments of State and the Navy to gentlemen like Messrs. Bryan and Daniels deliberately73 invites disaster, in the event of serious complications with a formidable foreign opponent. On the whole, there is no class of our citizens, big or small, who so emphatically deserve well of the country as the officers and the enlisted74 men of the army and navy. No navy in the world has such fine stuff out of which to make man-of-war’s men. But they must be heartily backed up, heartily supported, and sedulously75 trained. They must be treated well, and, above all, they must be treated so as to encourage the best among them by sharply discriminating76 against the worst. The utmost possible efficiency should be demanded of them. They are emphatically168 and in every sense of the word men; and real men resent with impatient contempt a policy under which less than their best is demanded. The finest material is utterly77 worthless without the best personnel. In such a highly specialized78 service as the navy constant training of a purely79 military type is an absolute necessity. At present our navy is lamentably80 short in many different material directions. There is actually but one torpedo for each torpedo tube. It seems incredible that such can be the case; yet it is the case. We are many thousands of men short in our enlistments. We are lamentably short in certain types of vessel81. There is grave doubt as to the efficiency of many of our submarines and destroyers. But the shortcomings in our training are even more lamentable82. To keep the navy cruising near Vera Cruz and in Mexican waters, without man?uvring, invites rapid deterioration83. For nearly two years there has been no fleet man?uvring; and this fact by itself probably means a twenty-five per cent loss of efficiency. During the same periods most of the ships have not even had division gun practice. Not only should our navy be as large as our position and interest demand but it should be kept continually at the highest point of efficiency and should never be used save for its own appropriate military purposes. Of this elementary fact the present169 administration seems to be completely ignorant.
President Wilson and Secretary Daniels assert that our navy is in efficient shape. Admiral Fiske’s testimony84 is conclusive85 to the contrary, although it was very cautiously given, as is but natural when a naval officer, if he tells the whole truth, must state what is unpleasant for his superiors to hear. Other naval officers have pointed out our deficiencies, and the newspapers state that some of them have been reprimanded for so doing. But there is no need for their testimony. There is one admitted fact which is absolutely conclusive in the matter. There has been no fleet man?uvring during the past twenty-two months. In spite of fleet man?uvring the navy may be unprepared. But it is an absolute certainty that without fleet man?uvring it cannot possibly be prepared. In the unimportant domain86 of sport there is not a man who goes to see the annual football game between Harvard and Yale who would not promptly87 cancel his ticket if either university should propose to put into the field a team which, no matter how good the players were individually, had not been practised as a team during the preceding sixty days. If in such event the president of either university or the coach of the team should announce that in spite of never having had any team practice the team170 was nevertheless in first-class condition, there is literally88 no intelligent follower89 of the game who would regard the utterance90 as serious. Why should President Wilson and Secretary Daniels expect the American public to show less intelligence as regards the vital matter of our navy than they do as regards a mere sport, a mere play? For twenty-two months there has been no fleet man?uvring. Since in the daily press, early in November, I, with emphasis, called attention to this fact Mr. Daniels has announced that shortly man?uvring will take place; and of course the failure to man?uvre for nearly two years has been due less to Mr. Daniels than to President Wilson’s futile91 and mischievous92 Mexican policy and his entire ignorance of the needs of the navy. I am glad that the administration has tardily93 waked up to the necessity of taking some steps to make the navy efficient, and if the President and the Secretary of the Navy bring forth94 fruits meet for repentance95, I will most heartily acknowledge the fact—just as it has given me the utmost pleasure to praise and support President Wilson’s Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison96. But misstatements as to actual conditions make but a poor preparation for the work of remedying these conditions, and President Wilson and Secretary Daniels try to conceal97 from the people our ominous98 naval shortcomings. The171 shortcomings are far-reaching, alike in material, organization, and practical training. The navy is absolutely unprepared; its efficiency has been terribly reduced under and because of the action of President Wilson and Secretary Daniels. Let them realize this fact and do all they can to remedy the wrong they have committed. Let Congress realize its own shortcomings. Far-reaching and thoroughgoing treatment, continued for a period of at least two and in all probability three years, is needed if the navy is to be placed on an equality, unit for unit, no less than in the mass, with the navies of England, Germany, and Japan. In the present war the deeds of the Emden, of the German submarines, of Von Spee’s squadron, have shown not merely efficiency but heroism99; and the navies of Great Britain and Japan have been handled in masterly manner. Have the countrymen of Farragut, of Cushing, Buchanan, Winslow, and Semmes, of Decatur, Hull100, Perry, and MacDonough, lost their address and courage, and are they willing to sink below the standard set by their forefathers101?
It has been said that the United States never learns by experience but only by disaster. Such method of education may at times prove costly102. The slothful or short-sighted citizens who are now misled by the cries of the ultrapacificists would do well to remember events connected with172 the outbreak of the war with Spain. I was then Assistant Secretary of the Navy. At one bound our people passed from a condition of smug confidence that war never could occur (a smug confidence just as great as any we feel at present) to a condition of utterly unreasoning panic over what might be done to us by a very weak antagonist103. One governor of a seaboard State announced that none of the National Guard regiments104 would be allowed to respond to the call of the President because they would be needed to prevent a Spanish invasion of that State—the Spaniards being about as likely to make such an invasion as we were to invade Timbuctoo or Turkestan. One congressman105 besought106 me to send a battle-ship to protect Jekyll Island, off the coast of Georgia. Another congressman asked me to send a battle-ship to protect a summer colony which centred around a large Atlantic-coast hotel in Connecticut. In my own neighborhood on Long Island clauses were gravely inserted into the leases of property to the effect that if the Spaniards destroyed the property the leases should terminate. Chambers107 of commerce, boards of trade, municipal authorities, leading business men, from one end of the country to the other, hysterically108 demanded, each of them, that a ship should be stationed to defend some particular locality; the theory being that our navy173 should be strung along both seacoasts, each ship by itself, in a purely defensive attitude—thereby making certain that even the Spanish navy could pick them all up in detail. One railway president came to protest to me against the choice of Tampa as a point of embarkation109 for our troops, on the ground that his railway was entitled to its share of the profit of transporting troops and munitions110 of war and that his railway went to New Orleans. The very senators and congressmen who had done everything in their power to prevent the building up and the efficient training of the navy screamed and shrieked111 loudest to have the navy diverted from its proper purpose and used to protect unimportant seaports112. Surely our congressmen and, above all, our people need to learn that in time of crisis peace treaties are worthless, and the ultrapacificists of both sexes merely a burden on and a detriment113 to the country as a whole; that the only permanently useful defensive is the offensive, and that the navy is properly the offensive weapon of the nation.
The navy of the United States is the right arm of the United States and is emphatically the peacemaker. Woe114 to our country if we permit that right arm to become palsied or even to become flabby and inefficient115!
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1
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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notably
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| adv.值得注意地，显著地，尤其地，特别地 | |
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perilously
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| adv.充满危险地，危机四伏地 | |
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outrage
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| n.暴行，侮辱，愤怒；vt.凌辱，激怒 | |
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violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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vacillation
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| n.动摇；忧柔寡断 | |
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improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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overrode
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| 越控( override的过去式 )； （以权力）否决； 优先于； 比…更重要 | |
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dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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belligerent
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| adj.好战的，挑起战争的；n.交战国，交战者 | |
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belligerents
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| n.交战的一方（指国家、集团或个人）( belligerent的名词复数 ) | |
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offender
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| n.冒犯者，违反者，犯罪者 | |
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ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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requite
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| v.报酬，报答 | |
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intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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heed
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| v.注意，留意；n.注意，留心 | |
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contraband
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| n.违禁品，走私品 | |
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ignoble
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| adj.不光彩的，卑鄙的；可耻的 | |
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conspicuously
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| ad.明显地，惹人注目地 | |
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insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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violations
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| 违反( violation的名词复数 )； 冒犯； 违反（行为、事例）； 强奸 | |
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insistence
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| n.坚持；强调；坚决主张 | |
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scrupulously
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| adv.一丝不苟地；小心翼翼地，多顾虑地 | |
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courteous
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| adj.彬彬有礼的，客气的 | |
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persevered
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| v.坚忍，坚持( persevere的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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reluctance
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| n.厌恶，讨厌，勉强，不情愿 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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virtues
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| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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severance
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| n.离职金；切断 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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repel
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| v.击退，抵制，拒绝，排斥 | |
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injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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eminently
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| adv.突出地；显著地；不寻常地 | |
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civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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undesirable
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| adj.不受欢迎的，不良的，不合意的，讨厌的；n.不受欢迎的人，不良分子 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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batch
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| n.一批(组，群)；一批生产量 | |
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incur
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| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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hamper
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| vt.妨碍，束缚，限制；n.(有盖的)大篮子 | |
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compensating
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| 补偿，补助，修正 | |
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incurred
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| [医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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efficiently
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| adv.高效率地，有能力地 | |
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incurring
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| 遭受，招致，引起( incur的现在分词 ) | |
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53
entails
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| 使…成为必要( entail的第三人称单数 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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54
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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auxiliary
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| adj.辅助的，备用的 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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backbone
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| n.脊骨，脊柱，骨干；刚毅，骨气 | |
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civilians
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| 平民，百姓( civilian的名词复数 )； 老百姓 | |
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steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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radius
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| n.半径，半径范围；有效航程，范围，界限 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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annoyance
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| n.恼怒，生气，烦恼 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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heartily
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| adv.衷心地，诚恳地，十分，很 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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68
torpedo
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| n.水雷，地雷；v.用鱼雷破坏 | |
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gallantly
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| adv. 漂亮地，勇敢地，献殷勤地 | |
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immured
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| v.禁闭，监禁( immure的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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relatively
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| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
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deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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enlisted
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| adj.应募入伍的v.（使）入伍， （使）参军( enlist的过去式和过去分词 )；获得（帮助或支持） | |
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sedulously
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| ad.孜孜不倦地 | |
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76
discriminating
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| a.有辨别能力的 | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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specialized
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| adj.专门的，专业化的 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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lamentably
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| adv.哀伤地，拙劣地 | |
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81
vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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lamentable
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| adj.令人惋惜的，悔恨的 | |
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83
deterioration
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| n.退化；恶化；变坏 | |
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testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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domain
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| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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literally
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| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
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follower
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| n.跟随者；随员；门徒；信徒 | |
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utterance
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| n.用言语表达，话语，言语 | |
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futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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mischievous
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| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
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tardily
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| adv.缓慢 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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repentance
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| n.懊悔 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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ominous
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| adj.不祥的，不吉的，预兆的，预示的 | |
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heroism
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| n.大无畏精神，英勇 | |
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100
hull
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| n.船身；(果、实等的)外壳；vt.去(谷物等)壳 | |
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101
forefathers
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| n.祖先，先人；祖先，祖宗( forefather的名词复数 )；列祖列宗；前人 | |
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costly
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| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
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103
antagonist
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| n.敌人，对抗者，对手 | |
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104
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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Congressman
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| n.（美）国会议员 | |
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106
besought
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| v.恳求，乞求（某事物）( beseech的过去式和过去分词 )；(beseech的过去式与过去分词) | |
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107
chambers
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| n.房间( chamber的名词复数 )；（议会的）议院；卧室；会议厅 | |
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108
hysterically
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| ad. 歇斯底里地 | |
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109
embarkation
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| n. 乘船, 搭机, 开船 | |
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110
munitions
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| n.军火，弹药；v.供应…军需品 | |
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111
shrieked
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| v.尖叫( shriek的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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112
seaports
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| n.海港( seaport的名词复数 ) | |
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113
detriment
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| n.损害；损害物，造成损害的根源 | |
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114
woe
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| n.悲哀，苦痛，不幸，困难；int.用来表达悲伤或惊慌 | |
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115
inefficient
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| adj.效率低的，无效的 | |
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