The Spanish name of greatest importance in the diplomatic contest with England in 1790 is that of Count Floridablanca. He was of humble1 origin. His ability as a diplomatist was established while ambassador to the Papal Court, especially in the suppression of the Jesuit order. “This result [says Tratchevsky] was due in great measure to the skill and energy of the Spanish ambassador at Rome, Don José Mo?ino. As a recompense, Charles III conferred on him the title Count Floridablanca, and soon made him prime minister (1777).”[199] He retained this position fifteen years. “His integrity and love of labor2 won for him the entire confidence of Charles III, who found in him the industrious3 and respectful servant whom he sought.[200] He was a great worker, of clean morals, beneficent, but very proud.”[201] He was a devoted4 servant of monarchy5 and an enthusiastic adherent6 to the principle of aristocracy. But on account of his recent elevation7 to the rank of a noble he did not enjoy the favor of the upper classes. Zinovief, the Russian ambassador, wrote: “The nobles and the soldiery despise him, and he, in turn, takes no pains to hide his aversion to them. No one of the great nobles enjoys any considerable importance at Court or in the confidence of the King. Floridablanca seems intentionally8 to push everyone else aside that he alone may enjoy the Sovereign’s favor. Even the King’s confessor, who, it seems, should have nothing to fear, has to yield to him. … Everybody trembles before him.”[202]
[363]
This enviable position was enjoyed by the great minister until the death of Charles III (1788). He was retained by Charles IV, but it was not long before his position began to be undermined by court intrigues10. Baumgarten says:
The Queen sought occasions to cast reproaches upon him over a multitude of trifles, and, according to the testimony11 of Sandoz, this mighty12 man was more busily engaged in these bagatelles than in the weighty affairs of state.[203] … The Queen found willing accomplices13 among the Count’s associates in the cabinet. By 1790 his power was greatly diminished, so that he entered the contest with England considerably14 handicapped.[204]
The controversy15 between England and Spain did not seem so one-sided at that time as it does when viewed in the light of the subsequent history of the two countries. The thirty years’ reign9 of Charles III, which had just closed, is the most glorious period of Spanish history, with the single exception of her period of preeminence16 in the sixteenth century. Desdevises du Dezert says: “In Charles III Spain had a real King, the only one she had had since Philip II.”[205] Speaking of his position in Europe, the same author says:
His foreign policy was wise. He rightly considered England as the true enemy of Spain. He feared for the Indies; he beheld17 them invaded by English merchants and adventurers, by English merchandise and ideas. To protect the colonies he hurled18 upon them a new current of Spanish emigration, and decreed liberty of commerce between the Peninsula and America. He allied19 himself with France in order to combat England; and, notwithstanding some reverses, the war was closed to the advantage of Spain, which country in 1783 again took her place as a great European power.[206]
When the conflict came, in 1790, although nearly two years of the reign of Charles IV had passed, little was known of the weakness of the King, the corrupting20 influence of the Queen, and the intrigues in the ministry21. Europe of the time saw in Spain a country rapidly forging to the front,[364] with a rejuvenated22 kingship, and a minister second only to Pitt.[207] Led by this minister, Spain had less than a decade before been largely instrumental in humiliating England; and since then she had persistently23 refused to make any commercial concessions24 to her vanquished25 antagonist26. The same minister now dared to intervene between the Czar and the Porte. He was also negotiating for an alliance between Spain, France, Austria, and Russia.[208] If this quadruple alliance should prove successful the outlook for England would be dark, notwithstanding her triple alliance with Prussia and Holland.
Such, briefly27, was the political condition of Spain, internally and externally, when news arrived of the occurrences at Nootka Sound which have been discussed in the foregoing chapters.
As stated above, it was at the very beginning of the year that the intelligence was received which was soon to throw all Europe into a war fever. On January 2, 1790, Valdez[209] sent to Floridablanca the second installment28 of letters and documents concerning the occurrences at Nootka. Three days earlier he had sent the first bundle.[210] These two packages contained a complete account of the affair, with copies of all the documents. Valdez asked for His Majesty29’s pleasure concerning the matter.
On January 4, Anthony Merry, the English chargé d’affaires[365] at Madrid wrote to the Duke of Leeds, British secretary for foreign affairs, giving a very confused account based on rumors30. Word had just arrived from Mexico, he said, that a small Spanish ship of war had captured an English vessel31 in the port of Nootka. There were conflicting accounts of the event. Some said “that the Viceroy of Mexico, having had notice that the English were forming an establishment at the above-mentioned place, ordered a ship there to take possession of it.” Others said that the Spanish ship was there simply to reconnoiter the coast. There were also conflicting accounts of what was done with Russian, Portuguese32, and American ships found in the same port, some stating that all were allowed to go free except the English; others, that all were seized and only the American released, Merry had not yet been able to learn the name of the English vessel or her master. All accounts agreed that she had come for the purpose of forming a settlement, that other vessels33 were to follow, and that the captured ship had been manned with Spanish seamen34 and sent to Mexico.[211]
This was the first account to reach London.[212] It is not strange that mistaken notions were formed. Fired by hatred35 for the Spaniards, it was natural that the English should consider the act much more atrocious than it was. The indefiniteness and inconsistency of the accounts gave room for[366] full play of the imagination. The Spanish Court, which had complete accounts, either did not study them carefully enough to get at the whole truth, or intentionally kept the British Court in the dark. No English account arrived for nearly four months. Such a period of uncertainty36 and suspense37 prepared a fertile field in which the exaggerated accounts then arriving produced a fruitful crop of error.
Three days after sending the above confused account Merry inclosed an extract from a letter written in Mexico, which he had seen. This letter seems to have been unofficial. Respecting the genesis and purpose of the Spanish expedition it is true to the facts. It tells briefly of the expedition of 1788 to investigate the Russian settlements, of the discovery that the Russians intended to occupy Nootka, and of the Viceroy’s prompt action to anticipate them. But respecting the events at Nootka little is told except the seizure38 of an English vessel and its arrival in Mexico as a prize.[213] On January 15 the British chargé wrote of a conference with Floridablanca on the subject. “The Count avoided explaining to him the particulars of the transaction, or avowing39 clearly the seizure of the vessels; neither did he enter upon the question of our right to trade or to form an establishment in that part of the continent of America.” He said that he would direct the Marquis del Campo, the Spanish ambassador at London, to impart the circumstances to the Duke of Leeds.[214]
In virtue40 of this promise Floridablanca instructed Campo, January 20, regarding the communication which he was to make to Leeds. This communication will be studied presently.[215] A week after sending his harsh instructions the[367] Count attempted to smooth matters over in another conference with Merry. He wished to see the present harmony between the two courts preserved and improved, and “hoped that no event might happen which might cause Great Britain to deviate41 from her present pacific system.”[216]
The first three letters from Merry had reached London before February 2. On that day the Duke of Leeds wrote cautioning him to be extremely guarded in what he should say, until definite instructions could be sent after Campo’s communication should have been received. He declared that England undoubtedly42 had a complete “right to visit for the purposes of trade, or to make a settlement in, the district in question.”[217] When this positive declaration by the British Cabinet at the very first is compared with the demand of the Spanish Court, received a few days later, it is seen that a conflict was inevitable43 unless one side should yield.
The expected communication from Campo was received by Leeds February 11. Since it was this note that started the diplomatic controversy, and since it has not before been made public, it is worth while to quote it in full. It is dated “Manchester Square, February 10, 1790,” and is as follows:
My Lord: Continuing the frequent expeditions which the King, my master, has ordered to be made to the northern coasts of California, the Viceroy of Mexico sent two ships, under the orders of Don Estevan José Martinez, ensign of the navy, to make a permanent settlement in the port of San Lorenzo, situated44 about the fiftieth degree of latitude45, and named by foreigners “Nootka,” or “Nioka,” of which possession had formerly46 been taken. He arrived there the 24th of last June. In giving his account to the Viceroy, M. Martinez said that he found there an American frigate47 and sloop48, which had sailed from Boston to make a tour of the world. He also found a packet boat and another vessel belonging to a Portuguese established at Macao, whence they had sailed with a passport from the governor of that port. He announced also that on the 2d of July there arrived another packet boat from Macao. This was English, and came to take possession of Nootka in the name of the British King. She carried a sloop in pieces on board.
This simple recital49 will have convinced your excellency of the necessity in which the Court of Madrid finds itself of asking His Britannic Majesty to punish such undertakings50 in a manner to restrain his subjects from continuing them on these lands which have been occupied and frequented by the Spaniards for so many years. I say[368] this to your excellency as an established fact, and as a further argument against those who attribute to Captain Cook the discovery of the said port of San Lorenzo, I add that the same Martinez in charge of the last expedition was there under commission in August of 1774. This was almost four years before the appearance of Cook. This same Martinez left in the hands of the Indians two silver spoons, some shells, and some other articles which Cook found. The Indians still keep them, and these facts, with the testimony of the Indians, served M. Martinez to convince the English captain.
The English prisoners have been liberated52 through the consideration which the King has for His Britannic Majesty, and which he has carefully enjoined53 upon his viceroys to govern their actions in unforeseen events. His Majesty flatters himself that the Court of St. James will certainly not fail to give the strictest orders to prevent such attempts in the future, and, in general, everything that could trouble the good harmony happily existing between the two Crowns. Spain on her side engages to do the same with respect to her subjects.
I have the honor to be, etc.,
The Marquis del Campo.
His Excellency M. the Duke of Leeds.[218]
One who has read the foregoing chapters will recognize many misleading statements in this letter. The first sentence falsely gives the impression, though it does not make the positive statement, that the King of Spain had ordered the occupation of Nootka. Hence there was some ground for suspecting that the Spanish Government had ordered Martinez’s violent proceedings55. Martinez arrived at Nootka almost two months earlier than the date given in the note. June 21 was the date of the formal act of possession. This error seems to have been due to carelessness, since no motive56 is apparent, and the correct date is given in the documents which Floridablanca had at hand. The note does not mention the fact, clearly stated in the same documents, that the first packet boat and the other vessel accompanying it from Macao were really English, though nominally57 Portuguese; and the impression is given that they were allowed to go absolutely free as were the American vessels. No mention whatever is made of the Princess Royal which was also sent as a prize to Mexico, though this is plainly stated in the documents. Instead of telling that four English ships were[369] captured, the impression is given that there was only one. The gravest misstatement is that the English prisoners had been liberated. As pointed58 out above, this was probably inferred from the statement in the second letter of Florez that he thought that they ought to be liberated, but would leave his successor to do it—a very insufficient59 ground for such a positive assertion. As a matter of fact, they were not liberated for more than three months after Floridablanca wrote the instructions which this note embodied60.[219]
But the gravity of the note did not lie in its errors or prevarications. The serious part of it was the demand that the English King should punish his subjects for doing what Leeds had declared to Merry only a few days before they had a perfect right to do, namely, to trade and make settlements on the Northwest Coast. The further request that the English Government should give strict orders to prevent such enterprises in the future was virtually demanding that England should forever refrain from exercising this right. Such demands could only be acquiesced61 in when made upon a weak government by a strong one. English pride could not brook62 them.
The narrative63 which was prepared in the foreign office and published by the Government[220] says:
His Majesty’s ministers conceiving the circumstance of seizing a British ship in time of peace to be an offense64 against the law of nations and an insult to His Majesty, lost no time in taking the only step in their powers.[221]
A fortnight after receiving the Spanish note Leeds replied in a tone equally imperious. After reviewing the facts as given by Campo and referring to the demands of the Spanish Court, he said:
As yet no precise information has been received relative to the events mentioned in your excellency’s letter, but while awaiting such I have His Majesty’s orders to inform your excellency that the act of violence spoken of in your letter as having been committed by M. Martinez, in seizing a British vessel under the circumstances reported, makes it necessary henceforth to suspend all discussion of the pretensions66 set forth65 in that letter until a just and adequate satisfaction shall have been made for a proceeding54 so injurious to Great Britain.
[370]
In the first place it is indispensable that the vessel in question shall be restored. To determine the details of the ultimate satisfaction which may be found necessary more ample information must be awaited concerning all the circumstances of the affair.[222]
This haughty67 tone surprised the Spanish ambassador. In his note to Floridablanca inclosing Leeds’s answer, he said:
The reply which this ministry has finally given to my letter will surprise your excellency as it has surprised me. I refrain from comments on it. At first I thought of going to the Duke of Leeds to express my astonishment68, but after considering the matter carefully I have concluded that I ought to refrain, fearing lest in the heat of conversation something might be said which might exasperate69. Since it is a formal reply and in writing I could not have obtained its withdrawal70. Besides, anything which I may say in reply will be better if it comes from there (Madrid), which is the source.[223]
This quotation71 is a postscript72 to a letter which had been written after delivering the Spanish note to Leeds, but evidently before receiving the answer. In the letter he had said that Leeds listened to him calmly, but avoided any discussion of the matter. He had tarried a little time and then withdrawn73 to write his account and urge anew that orders be sent disavowing the seizure. He was not convinced that, as might be suspected, the English expedition had been ordered by the Court. He believed it to have been an enterprise of some remote officials.[224]
It should be noticed in connection with this reply to the Spanish Court that Pitt was at this very time listening to the schemes of Colonel Miranda, the famous South American agitator74. It is quite possible that this had much to do with the imperious tone assumed by the British Cabinet. As previously75 stated, the Spanish note was received February 11. On February 14 Miranda met Pitt, on the latter’s invitation. He had previously proposed his “grand plan” for the advantage of England in connection with South America, and that plan was considered at this meeting. Miranda[371] explained the new form of government to be introduced and discussed the existing situation. The plan was admitted to be beneficial, but was to be put into execution only in case of a war with Spain. Pitt asked him to write down the substance of what he had said, adding a statement of all the products of South America, the exports and imports, and the population, and the military and naval76 forces of both South America and Spain. Miranda did so with as much accuracy and detail as possible, and submitted his statement to Pitt on March 5.[225] In the meantime, on February 25, Leeds’s reply had been delivered to Campo. It will be interesting to watch the progress of these conferences between Pitt and Miranda and note the coincidence of some of them with the critical periods of the Spanish negotiation77.
While awaiting the reply from London, nothing out of the ordinary seems to have occurred at the Spanish capital. When Leeds cautioned Merry to be guarded in what he might say, he also asked the chargé for all the information he could obtain concerning recent Spanish naval movements. Merry’s replies indicated a pacific attitude, externally at least, on the part of the Spanish Court. March 1 he wrote:
Count Floridablanca gave me no hint of his having any intention of arming; and, notwithstanding the reports which have continued to prevail here with regard to the naval preparations in the Spanish ports, I can not, on the most diligent78 inquiry79, find that any are yet commenced, except for the equipping of 3 ships of the line, 6 frigates80, and 3 sloops81 of war for the purpose of forming a fleet of exercise. [On March 15 he wrote:] The King of Spain has given orders to grant free license82 to Prince Edward to pass and repass from Gibraltar to Spain, and to pay him the same honors as to an Infante de Castilla.[226]
After the English reply reached Madrid, Merry’s reports were very different. March 22 he wrote that Floridablanca was much dissatisfied with the English reply, but still seemed anxious that peace should be preserved. Merry thought that the Count’s ill humor was caused by the fear lest Great Britain should use the matter as a ground for a quarrel.[227]
[372]
On the same day that Merry wrote the last-mentioned letter an important session of the supreme83 junta84 of state was being held. The question considered was as to the reply that should be made to England. The matter had been discussed in the preceding junta. At this meeting of March 22 Valdez, the minister for marine85, presented in writing his version of the proper reply. Though it is not given, its import may be divined from the report which accompanied it. He told of abundant military preparations at the principal places in the Indies, of what was needed to complete their equipment, and the orders that could be given to insure their security. He also reported on the state of the Spanish navy, telling of the ships at the three naval stations Cadiz, Ferrol, and Carthagena. There were 45 ships of the line and 32 frigates ready to be armed at once; and in addition 24 of the former and 7 of the latter could be prepared in a short time. The chief of the council for the Indies, Porlier, also presented his opinion in writing. Others gave oral advice, and it was left to Floridablanca to formulate86 the reply to the English Court. Valdez received royal orders to collect a squadron at Cadiz to be ready for emergencies, and to take the steps necessary to put Honduras, Trinidad, and Porto Rico in a state of defense87.[228]
On March 24 an order was sent to the Viceroy of New Spain to liberate51 the English ship in case this had not already been done.[229] As stated in the preceding chapter, the vessels had not been released at this time, but were liberated before this order reached the Viceroy.
Merry had another conference with Floridablanca on March 27. He reported to his Government that the Count had concluded from Leeds’s reply that the British Court intended to use the matter as a ground for quarreling. The Spanish minister lamented88 the fact and hoped that the necessity for Spain’s coming to an understanding with other courts might be avoided. He said that he would endeavor to soften89 his reply to the British Court. Merry thought that in view of the condition of Spain Floridablanca would not suffer the matter to come to extremities90.[230]
[373]
At the next junta, which was March 29, the minister for marine presented another report. This was dated March 28 and was embodied in the minutes of the session of the following day. In it Valdez says that in consequence of the reply which the junta of one week before had agreed should be sent to the Court of London by Floridablanca, and in compliance91 with the precautionary measures which the department of marine was ordered to take in the Indies and in Spain, he had proceeded promptly92, with His Majesty’s approval, to execute the orders which follow in the report. Vessels were to be armed at once in Ferrol, Carthagena, and Cadiz, and, the real purpose being kept as secret as possible, a sufficient number were to be collected at the last-named port to form a respectable squadron for use in case later occurrences should make it necessary. The vessels that needed it were to be cleaned and repaired as rapidly as possible. Those out of port were to be detained under arms at Cadiz when they returned. Provisions were being collected. The officials of Havana, Santo Domingo, Porto Rico, and Trinidad were ordered to strengthen their positions. At the same session Floridablanca read the reply which Campo, the ambassador at London, was to present to the English Ministry.[231] The contents of this reply will be examined presently.
This glimpse into the inner workings of the Spanish Cabinet reveals a warlike activity. But externally every possible effort was made to maintain a peaceable demeanor93. Floridablanca made especial efforts to keep the British chargé in the dark and quiet any alarm which the warlike rumors might arouse. According to the dispatches of the Prussian ambassador, Sandoz, to his Government at Berlin, the Count—
confided94 to Merry in the greatest secrecy95 the intelligence that French emissaries had scattered96 seditious pamphlets in Mexico and Havana, and thereby97 had stirred up the greatest possible ferment98, which threatened an outbreak every moment. The King had concluded that the most efficacious measures must be taken with the greatest haste in order that these first dangerous agitations99 might be nipped in the[374] bud, and consequently he had decided100 to employ his whole force against it if necessary. To make this seem more probable, he indulged in a tirade101 against the French Revolution.[232]
In dispatches of April 5 and 6 Merry told of the alarm in Spain and of the naval activity, but he still thought Floridablanca desirous of avoiding war if possible. The fleet of exercise which he had mentioned before was assembling at Carthagena.[233] April 12 he reported that the fleet of exercise had been ordered to Cadiz. Other ships were being armed in that port and the other two naval stations.[234] Three days later he reported as being fitted for immediate102 service at Cadiz 14 ships of the line, 10 frigates, and 2 sloops. He told of three treasure ships that had recently arrived from Spanish America with some 5,000,000 Spanish dollars on board.[235] On April 22 he wrote of still larger armaments. Twenty ships of the line were reported ready for service.[236]
Such was the tenor103 of the dispatches from Madrid arriving at London when, on April 20, Campo presented the second formal note from the Spanish Court on the Nootka Sound controversy. This embodied the reply agreed upon in the sessions of the Spanish junta of March 22 and 29. It is as follows:[237]
My Lord: Having given an account to my Court of the reply which your excellency was pleased to make on the 26th of last February to my memoir104 on the detention105 in the port of Nootka of an English packet boat named the Prince of Wales,[238] in consequence I have received an order to inform the Ministry of His Britannic Majesty as follows: In spite of the incontestable rights of Spain to exclusive sovereignty, navigation, and commerce, founded on the most solemn treaties, on the discovery of the Indies and the islands and the continent of the South Sea, on ancient laws, and on immemorial possession,[375] which rights this Crown has continually exercised over the territories, coasts, and seas above mentioned, including the right always exercised of capturing transgressors—[in spite of all this] the Viceroy of Mexico, as appears from the latest information, has already liberated the above-mentioned English vessel and crew. He did this because he was convinced that nothing but ignorance of the rights of Spain could have encouraged the individuals of any nation to resort to those places with the idea of establishing themselves or of carrying on commerce there. The Viceroy also had at hand positive orders which had been given to him instructing him to have all possible regard for the British nation and to avoid even the least act that could disturb the good harmony and friendship which happily subsists106 between the two Courts. For these reasons, and in order to give a further proof of the King’s desire to preserve and strengthen this friendship, His Majesty understands and considers this affair as closed, without entering into disputes or discussions over the indubitable rights of his Crown. His Catholic Majesty flatters himself that the British King will order all of his subjects to respect these rights, as I had the honor of setting forth and recommending to your excellency formerly.
It is with the most respectful sentiments and the most constant attachments107 that I have the honor, etc.,
The Marquis del Campo.
His Excellency M. the Duke of Leeds.[239]
The tone of this letter explains the feverish108 preparations for war which the Spanish Court began as soon as the reply was decided upon. It ignored the demand for satisfaction, the granting of which the English reply of February 26 had made the indispensable condition of further negotiation. It assumed that Spain was right and England wrong. It distinctly avowed109 the seizure and made the release an act of pure generosity110. As justification111, it asserted the most extensive claims to exclusive dominion112. It renewed the former demand that England prevent her subjects from infringing113 upon that dominion. To support the positive position taken, Spain was making extensive preparations for war. If granting the first Spanish demand would have been incompatible114 with British pride, yielding to the second would have been inconsistent with British honor. Only one answer could have been expected from the British Court.
[376]
Shortly after the presentation of the above Spanish memorial an event occurred which greatly influenced the British Cabinet and made them urge their demands more vigorously. This was the arrival of Meares. He came just at the opportune115 moment. The blood of the English ministers was already up. In the absence of any authentic116 account to the contrary, they accepted the exaggerated statements of Meares. The foreign office “Narrative” says:
From him a more full and probably a more authentic account of this transaction was obtained than had already been in possession of Government.[240]
His Majesty’s ministers, who till now had proceeded with that caution which the uncertain nature of the intelligence they had received rendered essentially117 necessary, no longer having room to doubt of the insult offered to the British flag, and the injury sustained by British subjects from the unwarrantable and unprovoked hostility118 of the Spanish commander, lost no time in taking those measures which were best calculated to vindicate119 the honor of His Majesty and the British nation.[241]
This event with the arrival of the reports from Merry, mentioned above, caused the British Government to turn its most serious attention to the Nootka business.
At a cabinet meeting held in the night of April 30 the following recommendations to the King were agreed upon, and submitted by Grenville to George III the next day:
Upon consideration of the information which has been received from Mr. Meares of the detention and capture of several British vessels at Nootka Sound, on the coast of America, and of the circumstances of that transaction, as also of the papers which here have been delivered by Monsieur del Campo relative thereto, Your Majesty’s servants have agreed humbly120 to submit to Your Majesty their opinion that Your Majesty’s minister at the Court of Madrid should be instructed to present a memorial demanding an immediate and adequate satisfaction for the outrages121 committed by Monsieur de Martinez; and that it would be proper, in order to support that demand and to be prepared for such events as may arise, that Your Majesty should give orders for fitting out a squadron of ships of the line.[242]
In a note of May 1 the King asked whether a press would be necessary for equipping the proposed squadron. The[377] next day Grenville replied that the Cabinet thought a press necessary and that it should take place Tuesday night, May 4, between 12 and 3 o’clock, as that time would create least observation. The same day that Grenville’s note was written the King answered it requesting a privy122 council for the next day, May 3, to consider the arrangements for the press. The council was to be composed of the cabinet ministers, as the more secret the business could be kept the more possibility there would be of collecting some seamen in the first attempt.[243]
After these days of martial123 activity in the British Cabinet Leeds replied to Campo’s letter of April 20. He informed the Marquis, May 5, that the unsatisfactory answer which the latter had been instructed to make to the English demand for satisfaction made it necessary for His Majesty to direct his minister at Madrid to renew the representations. Owing to this change in the seat of negotiations124, Leeds said it was impossible for him to enter into the particulars of Campo’s letter. He concluded:
I can therefore at present only observe in general to your excellency that although on cases properly stated it will be His Majesty’s desire—which he has manifested in repeated instances—to take any measures necessary for preventing his subjects’ interfering125 with the just and acknowledged rights of Spain, he can never in any shape accede126 to those claims of exclusive sovereignty, commerce, and navigation to which your excellency’s representations appear principally to refer; and particularly that His Majesty will consider it his indispensable duty to protect his subjects in the enjoyment127 of the right of carrying on their fisheries in the Pacific Ocean.[244]
Each nation stood firmly on the ground originally taken. Each had made its first demand apparently128 expecting immediate compliance. When such was stubbornly refused each suspected that the other had some ulterior end in view and was using the matter in hand only as a pretext129. The misunderstanding arose over the fact that neither the Briton nor the Spaniard could understand the mental attitude of the other regarding the matter in dispute. The Spanish mind had for centuries been accustomed to think of the[378] American continent as the exclusive possession of Spain. The accident that had given a portion to Portugal, when the Pope drew his arbitrary line between the dominions130 of the two maritime131 nations, was accepted without question by the abnormally religious mind of the Spaniard. That Spain had yielded the bleak132 northern shore of the Atlantic was of little consequence, since she retained the sunny southern portion, where, alone, the Spaniard could feel at home. With the exception of Portugal’s comparatively insignificant133 holding, Spain still possessed134 practically the whole of both Americas south of the northern line of Florida and west of the Mississippi River. That Russia had recently settled on the icebound coast of the far-away northwest was hardly known and less to be regretted. Being accustomed to think of America thus, the Spaniard could not conceive that anyone else would dare to infringe135 on his right. Little was known in Spain of the colonial development of England and the new principles on which it was based, namely, that unoccupied land anywhere on the globe was the legitimate136 possession of any nation that would occupy and develop it, and that no other nation could resist such occupation by the mere137 assertion of an ancient shadowy claim that had never been made good by actual settlement. The Briton was too accustomed to this view to believe that anyone would still advance in good faith the antiquated138 notion that any real right could be conferred by the gift of a Pope, who, he believed, had no more authority to make such gifts than any other individual, or that a claim not made good by occupying and developing would be seriously urged. It was impossible to reach a harmonious139 agreement. One party would have to yield.
From this time onward140 negotiations were conducted at Madrid instead of at London as hitherto. The British minister to the Court of Spain, Alleyne Fitzherbert, had not yet gone to take charge of his post. Affairs were in the hands of the chargé, Merry. Fitzherbert was now dispatched to Madrid.[245] No communication of importance passed between the two Courts until his arrival. In the meantime each Government was putting forth its utmost efforts to raise its naval force to the highest possible efficiency. During the same[379] time the diplomacy141 of each country was directed toward strengthening its European position by calling on its allies for assurances of support. The outcome of these efforts influenced, considerably, the course of the main negotiation. Besides this influence much of the interest and importance of the controversy lies in the effect of these by-negotiations on France, the country chiefly involved in them. They will be studied in the next chapter.
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humble
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labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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industrious
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devoted
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monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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adherent
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elevation
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| n.高度；海拔；高地；上升；提高 | |
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intentionally
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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11
testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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12
mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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13
accomplices
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| 从犯，帮凶，同谋( accomplice的名词复数 ) | |
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considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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15
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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16
preeminence
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| n.卓越,杰出 | |
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17
beheld
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| v.看，注视( behold的过去式和过去分词 )；瞧；看呀；（叙述中用于引出某人意外的出现）哎哟 | |
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18
hurled
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| v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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19
allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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20
corrupting
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的现在分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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21
ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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22
rejuvenated
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| 更生的 | |
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23
persistently
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| ad.坚持地；固执地 | |
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24
concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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25
vanquished
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| v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 )；战胜；克服；抑制 | |
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26
antagonist
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| n.敌人，对抗者，对手 | |
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27
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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28
installment
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| n.(instalment)分期付款；(连载的)一期 | |
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29
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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30
rumors
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| n.传闻( rumor的名词复数 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷v.传闻( rumor的第三人称单数 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷 | |
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31
vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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32
Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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33
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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34
seamen
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| n.海员 | |
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35
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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36
uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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37
suspense
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| n.（对可能发生的事）紧张感，担心，挂虑 | |
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38
seizure
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| n.没收；占有；抵押 | |
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39
avowing
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| v.公开声明，承认( avow的现在分词 ) | |
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40
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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41
deviate
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| v.(from)背离，偏离 | |
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42
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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43
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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44
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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45
latitude
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| n.纬度，行动或言论的自由(范围)，(pl.)地区 | |
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46
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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47
frigate
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| n.护航舰，大型驱逐舰 | |
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48
sloop
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| n.单桅帆船 | |
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49
recital
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| n.朗诵，独奏会，独唱会 | |
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50
undertakings
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| 企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务 | |
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51
liberate
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| v.解放，使获得自由，释出，放出；vt.解放，使获自由 | |
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52
liberated
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| a.无拘束的，放纵的 | |
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53
enjoined
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| v.命令( enjoin的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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54
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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55
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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56
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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57
nominally
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| 在名义上，表面地； 应名儿 | |
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58
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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59
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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60
embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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61
acquiesced
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| v.默认，默许( acquiesce的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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62
brook
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| n.小河，溪；v.忍受，容让 | |
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63
narrative
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| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
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64
offense
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| n.犯规，违法行为；冒犯，得罪 | |
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65
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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66
pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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67
haughty
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| adj.傲慢的，高傲的 | |
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68
astonishment
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| n.惊奇，惊异 | |
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69
exasperate
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| v.激怒，使（疾病）加剧，使恶化 | |
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70
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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71
quotation
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| n.引文，引语，语录；报价，牌价，行情 | |
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72
postscript
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| n.附言，又及；(正文后的)补充说明 | |
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73
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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74
agitator
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| n.鼓动者；搅拌器 | |
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75
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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76
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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77
negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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78
diligent
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| adj.勤勉的，勤奋的 | |
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79
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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80
frigates
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| n.快速军舰( frigate的名词复数 ) | |
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81
sloops
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| n.单桅纵帆船( sloop的名词复数 ) | |
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82
license
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| n.执照，许可证，特许；v.许可，特许 | |
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83
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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84
junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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85
marine
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| adj.海的；海生的；航海的；海事的；n.水兵 | |
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86
formulate
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| v.用公式表示；规划；设计；系统地阐述 | |
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87
defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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88
lamented
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|
| adj.被哀悼的，令人遗憾的v.（为…）哀悼，痛哭，悲伤( lament的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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89
soften
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| v.(使)变柔软；(使)变柔和 | |
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90
extremities
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| n.端点( extremity的名词复数 )；尽头；手和足；极窘迫的境地 | |
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91
compliance
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| n.顺从；服从；附和；屈从 | |
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92
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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93
demeanor
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| n.行为；风度 | |
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94
confided
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| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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95
secrecy
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| n.秘密，保密，隐蔽 | |
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96
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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97
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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98
ferment
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| vt.使发酵；n./vt.（使）激动，（使）动乱 | |
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99
agitations
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| （液体等的）摇动( agitation的名词复数 )； 鼓动； 激烈争论； （情绪等的）纷乱 | |
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100
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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101
tirade
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| n.冗长的攻击性演说 | |
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102
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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103
tenor
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| n.男高音（歌手），次中音（乐器），要旨，大意 | |
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104
memoir
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| n.[pl.]回忆录，自传；记事录 | |
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105
detention
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| n.滞留，停留；拘留，扣留；(教育)留下 | |
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106
subsists
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| v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的第三人称单数 ) | |
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107
attachments
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| n.（用电子邮件发送的）附件( attachment的名词复数 )；附着；连接；附属物 | |
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108
feverish
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| adj.发烧的，狂热的，兴奋的 | |
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109
avowed
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| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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110
generosity
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| n.大度，慷慨，慷慨的行为 | |
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111
justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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112
dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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113
infringing
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| v.违反（规章等）( infringe的现在分词 )；侵犯（某人的权利）；侵害（某人的自由、权益等） | |
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114
incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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115
opportune
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| adj.合适的，适当的 | |
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116
authentic
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| a.真的，真正的；可靠的，可信的，有根据的 | |
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117
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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118
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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119
vindicate
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| v.为…辩护或辩解，辩明；证明…正确 | |
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120
humbly
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| adv. 恭顺地，谦卑地 | |
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121
outrages
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| 引起…的义愤，激怒( outrage的第三人称单数 ) | |
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122
privy
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| adj.私用的；隐密的 | |
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123
martial
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| adj.战争的，军事的，尚武的，威武的 | |
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124
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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125
interfering
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| adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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126
accede
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| v.应允，同意 | |
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127
enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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128
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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129
pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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130
dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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131
maritime
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| adj.海的，海事的，航海的，近海的，沿海的 | |
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132
bleak
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| adj.(天气)阴冷的；凄凉的；暗淡的 | |
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133
insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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134
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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135
infringe
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| v.违反，触犯，侵害 | |
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136
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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137
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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138
antiquated
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| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
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139
harmonious
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| adj.和睦的，调和的，和谐的，协调的 | |
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140
onward
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| adj.向前的，前进的；adv.向前，前进，在先 | |
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141
diplomacy
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| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
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