Until the first week in May the negotiations2 regarding the Nootka Sound dispute were conducted with the greatest secrecy3 in both countries. The public, especially in England, did not so much as know that there was any serious question pending4 between the two Crowns. There were general rejoicings over the prospect5 of a long period of untroubled peace. The consternation6 that ensued may be imagined when, on the morning of May 5, England awoke to the fact that in the darkness of the preceding night sailors had been seized in every port and were being pressed into the navy for immediate7 service. The excitement in London is reflected by the following extracts from a diary. The writer was an ex-governor of Canada, and was living in retirement8 at London. According to his entry for May 5, a note just received informed him that “during last night all the sailors on the Thames had been pressed, and that war was on the point of being declared against Spain, which had seized five of our ships near Cooks River; and the funds had fallen 3 per cent.” This indicates that the financial pulse was decidedly unsteady. The depression seems to have continued for at least ten days. At the end of that time the same writer entered in his diary: “Opinions are still divided as to whether there will be a war or not. The funds begin to rise.” On this day he had invested $3,000 in bonds.[246]
On the day following the press a message from the King was read in both Houses of Parliament. This explained why the Government had taken such an extraordinary step. The King declared that two vessels10 whose nationality had[381] not been fully11 ascertained13 and two others known to be British had been captured at Nootka Sound by an officer commanding two Spanish ships of war. He told how the cargoes14 had been seized and the officers sent as prisoners to a Spanish port. He related briefly15 the correspondence with the Spanish Court, then told how that Court had refused the satisfaction demanded and had asserted a claim “to the exclusive rights of sovereignty, navigation, and commerce in the territories, coasts, and seas in that part of the world.” His minister at Madrid was to renew the demand for satisfaction. Having learned of considerable armaments in Spain, he had judged it necessary to arm in turn “in support of the honor of his Crown and the interests of his people.” He appealed to the Commons for the necessary support. He hoped that the affair might be terminated peaceably, and in such a manner as to remove grounds for misunderstandings in the future.[247]
The next day, May 6, the matter was discussed in Parliament. Pitt opened the debate in the lower House by moving an address of thanks for the King’s message. He recited the facts briefly, asserted England’s right to fisheries and commerce in the districts in question, and showed that Spain’s extravagant16 claims would entirely17 exclude England from that ocean, if they were allowed. The settlement of this dispute would establish a precedent18 for all the future. The insult to the British flag lay in two facts—first, the seizure19 had been made in time of profound peace; secondly20, goods had been confiscated21 without condemnation22.[248] Government hoped yet to settle the dispute peaceably, but it was necessary to increase the armaments in order to treat with Spain on an equal footing. The opposition23 led by Fox agreed that the address should be voted and the armaments approved; but they criticised the ministry24 for having so recently held out hopes for continued peace when a matter[382] of such importance was pending. This reference was to statements made by Pitt in his budget speech of April 19. The minister answered that the facts were not all known at that time; and besides, he had made no promise of the continuance of peace, but had said that the existing prosperity was due to the happy interval25 of peace and that if peace should continue prosperity would increase.
From the facts presented in the preceding chapter it is known that the criticism was unjust. Until April 21 the ministry had had no communication from Spain except the note of February 10. Only one ship was known to have been captured, and that only through the information furnished by the Spanish Court in that note. Merry had reported rumors26 of Spanish naval27 preparations, but had at the same time given quieting assurances. Shortly after the budget speech came the Spanish memorial of April 20, distinctly avowing28 the seizures29 and asserting the Spanish pretensions30; then came exact information from Merry of extensive Spanish armaments; and last and most important came Meares with his exaggerated stories of Spanish cruelty and injustice31, revealing the true number of seizures and overrating the losses. It was urged more properly that the English Government was unjust in demanding the restoration of the ships and satisfaction for the insult before discussing the respective rights. This, it was said, was begging the question.
Notwithstanding these criticisms the address was carried unanimously. The measures taken by the Government were confirmed, the armament was approved, and the support of the Commons was assured. After a similar debate in the Lords on the same day the ministry was supported with the same enthusiasm.[249] The entry in the diary of Gouverneur Morris, who was then in London as the semiofficial agent of the United States Government, tells of the animated32 debate in the Commons, of the enthusiastic support accorded to the ministry, and of the avowed33 determination to obtain from the Spanish Court an acknowledgment that Spain is entitled to no part of America except such as she occupies.[250] The assurance of the Commons was followed up on June 10 by a[383] vote of credit for ￡1,000,000 “to enable His Majesty34 to act as the exigency35 of affairs might require.”[251] Orders were at once given for the equipment of a fleet to consist of 14 ships of the line, besides smaller vessels. This was soon increased. The press was prosecuted36 vigorously and with success in all ports.[252] Vancouver’s work speaks of “the uncommon37 celerity and the unparalleled dispatch which attended the equipment of one of the noblest fleets that Great Britain ever saw.”[253] Public excitement was wrought38 to the highest pitch. Pamphlets were issued in the form of addresses to the King, setting forth39 the extravagance of the Spanish claim to exercise control over the whole Pacific Ocean, and enlarging on the magnitude and promise of the frustrated40 English enterprise. All the forces of national pride, prejudice, and patriotism41 were united to arouse hatred42 for the Spaniard. Indignant orators43 dwelt on memories of Papal anathemas44, the Holy Inquisition, and the Invincible45 Armada.[254]
At this juncture46 it is interesting to note again the relations between Pitt and the South American agitator47, Miranda. Attention was called above to conferences between them shortly after the Spanish note of February 10 was delivered to the British Court. Nothing seems to have passed between them after that time until the second Spanish note arrived. At 9 o’clock on the evening of May 6, the day of the debate in Parliament just studied, Miranda again met Pitt on the latter’s invitation. Grenville was present also. They had a long conference “upon the subject of a war with Spain, in consequence of the occurrences at Nootka Sound, the disposition48 of the people in South America toward joining the English for their independency against the Spaniards,” etc. Pitt thanked Miranda for the papers which he had sent, and showed them to him. The minister was taking them to a meeting of the Cabinet. New assurances were given of the execution of Miranda’s plans in case of war. Various interviews took place between them [384]during the time that the great armament and the Spanish negotiations were in progress.[255] The fact that Pitt was taking Miranda’s papers to a cabinet meeting just at this time is unmistakable evidence that his plans were being seriously considered.
There were attempts on the part of the opposition to censure49 the ministry for their conduct of the Spanish business. On May 10, in debating the motion for the vote of credit, Fox called for the date of the first communication from Spain on the affair. This was not revealed.[256] On the next day there was an attempt to learn whether the proposed settlement at Nootka was “undertaken under the sanction and authority of Government, or merely as an enterprise of private persons.” The motion was defeated, but Pitt declared that licenses50 to trade at Nootka Sound had been granted; and whether this particular undertaking51 was or was not a public enterprise it was incumbent52 on the honor of the country to demand satisfaction. He said that the “Memorial” of Captain Meares would put the House in possession of all that Government knew on the subject.[257] On May 12 there was a spirited debate on a motion calling for the papers relative to the dispute, but the demand was successfully resisted.[258] On the following day a motion by the opposition, calling for information regarding the appointment of ambassadors to Spain since the peace of 1783, was not resisted by the ministry.[259] A week later the information obtained was discussed. During the seven years there had been a resident ambassador at Madrid only thirteen months, though there had been four appointments and upward of ￡35,000 had been appropriated for their support. It was explained that these conditions were mostly due to Spanish delays and etiquette53; that although an ambassador[385] had not been present yet a chargé had been there all the time, and British interests had not suffered. The motion was for an address asking the King to provide for the performance in the future of the duties of ambassadors to foreign courts. It was defeated.[260] There was no further Parliamentary activity of importance on the matter before the session closed on June 10.[261]
While England was making these vigorous preparations at home she was calling for support in every place from which she had a right to expect aid. At the same time she was taking steps to put every portion of her wide dominions54 in a state of defense55. Ireland was called upon to restrain shipments of provisions to Spain, and also to recruit forces for the West Indies. The lord lieutenant56 agreed, with some qualifications, to carry out both measures.[262] The commander at Gibraltar was warned of his danger. The governor of that port, who was visiting in England, was ordered to return to his post. A regiment57 of foot was to embark58 immediately to re?nforce the garrison59.[263] Notices were sent to the governors of Barbados, St. Vincent, the Leeward60 and Bahama Islands, Dominica, Cape61 Breton, and Nova Scotia. They were ordered to expedite works of defense, to report on their forces, and to keep a watch on Spanish and French movements. Four regiments62 of foot and two ships of war were ordered to the West Indies.[264] Three ships of war, with re?nforcements and provisions, were sent to India, with instructions to prepare an expedition to seize Manila or the west coast of America should orders come to that effect.[265] The governor of Canada, about to return to England, was ordered to remain and prepare the forces of Canada for any exigency that might arise. He was to cultivate the friendship of the United States and to adopt every means in his power for influencing the Americans in favor of Great [386]Britain and preventing their union with Spain.[266] These interesting Canadian overtures63 will be fully discussed later. It was suggested to the King that he use his Hanoverian troops to augment64 the garrison at Gibraltar. He favored the measure, and took steps for carrying it out.[267]
Besides this aid from her dependencies, England also claimed the support of her allies under the triple alliance of 1788. Since the war promised to be almost wholly naval, the friendship of the Netherlands with her fleet would be of great value. On May 4, the day before the English preparations were made public, Leeds wrote to Lord Auckland, the British ambassador at The Hague, asking him to communicate the matter to the Dutch Government. His Britannic Majesty relied on the justice of his cause, and had no doubt that the Dutch Republic would approve, and, if it should become necessary, furnish him support under the treaty.[268] In a private letter of the same date Leeds asked that before demanding aid under the treaty Auckland ascertain12 whether the Dutch Government would fit out a number of vessels and furnish them to England at English expense.[269] In less than ten days an answer had arrived, saying that Holland was ready to support England and that any or all of the Dutch ships of the line might be put at the disposal of Great Britain at British expense.[270] On May 15 Auckland sent a statement of the terms on which these vessels would be furnished.[271] Three days later Leeds replied that the terms were so favorable that Auckland was authorized65 to accept them at once and promote with the utmost expedition the equipment of 10 sail of the line.[272] Still further assurances of Dutch friendship and generosity66 were given. On May 31 the States General passed resolutions refusing to accept the English subsidies67, and taking upon themselves the entire expense.[273] Everything being in readiness[387] and the English Government having requested the movement, the Dutch fleet, under Admiral Kinsbergen, left the Texel on June 17 and joined the English fleet at Portsmouth three weeks later.[274]
The third member of the triple alliance, Prussia, was at the same time called upon for support. On May 20 Hertzberg, the Prussian minister, handed an answer to Ewart, the British ambassador at Berlin. The Prussian King approved the measures of England and pledged himself to fulfill68 his engagements in case the contest with Spain should render it necessary. Hertzberg suggested that it was impossible to suppose that Spain would think of embarking69 on a war with such disadvantage without having a motive70 other than that alleged71. He said that there were positive indications that an alliance was being negotiated between Spain, Russia, and Austria to which Denmark was to be asked to accede72. These indications made it necessary for the three allies to be in perfect accord. He referred to Prussia’s very grave discussions with the Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg and claimed English support in case it should be needed in that business.[275] Thus the Nootka Sound dispute was drawn73 into the general current of European politics and was destined74 to have an indirect influence on the Polish and Turkish questions. More will be said later regarding these matters.
While England was meeting with such decided9 success in her demands on her allies, Spain was also looking for support outside her own borders. Her chief reliance was on France. For nearly thirty years the two countries had been intimately united under the family compact. This was concluded in 1761, during the Seven Years’ war, when France was fighting a losing battle. The farsighted Charles III, who had then recently ascended75 the Spanish Throne, saw in a close union between the Bourbon Monarchies76 a prospect for ultimate gain to his Kingdom in spite of the fact that he could hope for little at the time. He hastened nobly to the rescue and generously shared the defeats and losses of France. When Louis XVI entered the contest in behalf of the American colonies in their struggle against the mother[388] country, Charles III, true to the family compact, followed his ally into the war which ended in the glorious peace of 1783. When in 1790 Spain was threatened by war with England, she naturally turned to France, whom she had twice assisted against this same foe77. But the advances were made with serious misgivings78 on account of the turbulence79 in France, which was threatening to overturn the monarchy80.
For a year the utmost confusion had prevailed in Paris and throughout the country. The oppressions of the feudal81 régime, wasteful82 methods of taxation83, and financial mismanagement had combined to reduce the Government to a state of bankruptcy84. Finally, Louis XVI had yielded to the universal clamor and called the States-General. In May, 1789, after a recess85 of a hundred and seventy-five years, they had assembled at Versailles. After a deadlock86 of nearly two months the privileged orders had been compelled to yield to the demand of the third estate and meet in a common body—the National Assembly. In the middle of July, the Parisian mob had razed87 the Bastille, which they looked upon as the symbol of arbitrary government. A little more than a fortnight later the nobles in the National Assembly had bowed before the coming storm and voluntarily laid down their feudal privileges. Rightly interpreting these events as an acknowledgment of impotence on the part of the old régime; the proletariat in the cities and the peasants in the country had arisen everywhere, murdered the governmental officials, and burned and pillaged88 the castles of the nobles. As a result of the frightful89 events of the early days of October, the mob had carried the royal family in triumph to Paris, and the National Assembly had followed shortly after. Both were thenceforward virtually the prisoners of the Parisian populace. The power of the Monarchy had ended. Under the spell of Jacobin orators the Assembly was wasting its time in the fruitless discussion of constitutional principles, and leaving the country to ruin and anarchy90. This was the condition of France in the summer of 1790.
As early as January 20, the day on which Floridablanca wrote his instructions to Campo in London—which instructions the latter embodied91 in his drastic note of February 10 to the British Court—the Spanish minister had also written to Montmorin, the French minister for foreign affairs. In[389] this letter he made no mention of the Nootka Sound episode nor of the haughty92 demands which he was making on England the same day. But he expressed pity for France and her King, and complained that in the existing circumstances that country was not in a condition to unite with Spain as she should. He feared that their enemies would take advantage of the embarrassing position.[276] Though he said nothing about it, Floridablanca was evidently thinking of the possible consequences of his harsh demand. After the warlike sessions of the junta93 of state, mentioned in the previous chapter, and after the second note to the British Court had been sent, Floridablanca made indirect overtures to France for assurances of support. This was in a letter of April 6 to Fernan Nu?ez, the Spanish ambassador in Paris. He suggested that in the absence of French support it would be necessary for Spain to look to other powers. Russia he thought most likely to furnish aid.[277] No formal demand was made in this communication, but it seems that the Spanish ambassador made some advances to the French Court. On May 11 Fernan Nu?ez wrote of a conference which he had had with Montmorin. The latter had promised to propose an armament. Luzerne, the French minister for marine94, had told of the number of vessels available. Montmorin had suggested that in case of war the allies should disembark 50,000 men in England and should revolutionize Holland. The French minister had asked for information concerning the origin and progress of the dispute with England.[278]
In the conversation just referred to Montmorin had told the Spanish ambassador that the Constitutional party in France suspected Vauguyon, the French ambassador at Madrid. They thought that he had induced the Spanish Government to stir up the quarrel with England in order to involve France as the ally of Spain. They suspected that this was being done in the hope of strengthening the French[390] royal power, and so bringing about a counter revolution. This suspicion grew so strong that Montmorin, as a concession95 to the radical96 element, recalled Vauguyon. The Spanish King refused to grant him a letter of dismissal or to recognize anyone as his successor.[279]
As Montmorin had promised the Spanish ambassador in the above-mentioned conversation, the French Government immediately took steps toward an armament. On May 14 a letter from Montmorin to the president of the National Assembly informed that body that the King had given orders for the armament of 14 ships of the line. Assurance was given that it was only a precautionary measure in view of the English armament. The King would do all that he could to promote a friendly adjustment between the Courts of London and Madrid. He hoped that France would not be involved in war. The English Court had made friendly declarations and had stated that the only cause for armament was the dispute with Spain.[280] It was not wise, however, to remain disarmed97 under such circumstances. France ought to show to Europe that her constitution was not an obstacle to the development of her forces.[281]
Montmorin’s message precipitated98 the famous discussion as to whether the right to make peace and war should rest with the King or the people. This discussion is probably better known than the Nootka Sound dispute which occasioned it. The consideration of the message was made the order of the day for May 15, the day following its presentation. Biron, the first speaker, declared that the prosperity of France was closely bound up with that of Spain. Spain had been a generous ally of France in the past. The representatives[391] of the people ought to respect the obligations of the nation. “Let it not be said,” he declared, “that the efforts of a free people are less than those of a despotism.” After a brief enthusiastic speech he moved a decree approving the measures taken by the King. Alexander Lameth declared, amid great applause, that the first question to be considered was whether the sovereign nation ought to concede to the King the right to make peace and war. There was an attempt to postpone99 this question, but Barnave declared that when it should be demonstrated that effects ought to precede their causes then it would be proved that the question proposed by Lameth should be considered last. Robespierre said that the time to judge of a right was when they were deliberating on the exercise of it. Baron100 Menou said that the right of making peace and war should be determined101 first, then they ought to learn which nation was in the wrong. If Spain, she ought to be persuaded to yield; if England, then France should arm not merely 14 vessels, but all of the forces on land and sea, and compel submission102.
Mirabeau declared that it was unreasonable103 and irrelevant104 thus to elude105 the question. The message, he continued, had nothing in common with a declaration of war. Jurisdiction106 in times of danger ought always to be in the King’s hands. The vessels were to be armed only because England was arming. The armament was not dangerous, and to deny it would cause commercial discontent. The only question, he said, was whether the funds asked were necessary. He declared that they were, and called for the immediate consideration of the message. He proposed to approve the measures of the King and to order by the same decree that to-morrow they take up the discussion of the constitutional question, Shall the nation delegate to the King the exercise of the right of peace and war? His proposition was adopted almost unanimously.[282]
Thus after some hesitation107 over the theoretical consequences the armament was approved as enthusiastically as Spain could expect or desire. The debate in the Assembly has no further importance for the Nootka question. It[392] would be of little interest and less value to follow the metaphysical discussions of the constitutional question. The final decision is of some interest. The debate occupied nearly the whole of each morning session for six days. In the end Mirabeau prevailed again. He had taken a middle ground. It was decreed that the right of peace and war belonged to the nation; that war could be declared only by a decree of the legislative108 body, but that this step could be taken only on a formal proposal by the King, and must be sanctioned by the King subsequently.[283]
A few days after the Assembly had approved the armament Montmorin wrote to Floridablanca. He hoped that the armament would recall England to a proper tone and that the difficulty might be settled amicably109. Referring to Floridablanca’s letter of January 20, in which the latter had complained of the inability of France to support Spain as she should, the French minister said that its statements were as forceful as they were true. The Spanish Government could count on the most sincere desire on the part of the French King to fulfill his engagements with Spain, but the will of the Assembly could not be depended on. If war should be decided upon, the difficulties would be incalculable. Peace, then, he concluded, ought to be the end of all their efforts.[284]
Subsequently, Luzerne, the minister for marine, made two reports on the extent of the armament and the increased cost. On June 13 the Assembly appropriated 3,000,000 livres to support it.[285] Up to the present point the attitude of France appeared to be all that Spain could wish, as far as could be judged from external appearances. But this armament was distinctly French. There was no assurance that the fleet or any part of it would be turned over to Spain if she should call for it under the treaty. But this seems not yet to have been asked.
[393]
On June 4 Spain attempted to set herself right in the eyes of all Europe by issuing a circular letter and sending it to all the Courts. This recounted briefly the origin of the dispute and the course of the negotiations, and attempted to show the unreasonableness110 of the English demands and their inconsistency with her treaty obligations. It set forth the Spanish claim in the most favorable light possible, basing it on treaties and the consent of nations.[286]
The formal demand from Spain for French assistance was made June 16. On that date the Spanish ambassador at Paris handed to Montmorin extracts from all the correspondence between Spain and England up to date. He inclosed with them an extended argument in support of the Spanish case. After elaborating the arguments he demanded French assistance under the family compact, and added that if it were not offered Spain would have to seek alliances elsewhere in Europe.[287] Ten days later Montmorin replied that the matter had been laid before the King, but in view of the decree of the Assembly relative to peace and war the Spanish demand would have to be submitted to that body. As soon as it had been acted upon a positive response would be given.[288] This reply had been delayed so long that the Spanish ambassador had become impatient. On the preceding day he had written again to the French minister demanding an early reply. Fitzherbert, the British ambassador, had already arrived at Madrid, he said, and it was necessary for the negotiation1 that Spain be assured of French supported.[289] To this Montmorin answered that the King had not for a moment lost sight of the importance of the matter. Louis XVI had written to Charles IV regarding it.[290]
Notwithstanding the urgency of the Spanish ambassador and the willingness of the French King and his foreign minister, the Spanish demand was not laid before the[394] Assembly for more than six weeks after it was presented. During all this time Spain was kept in uncertainty111 as to whether she would receive from France the aid which she had a right to expect. Before the expiration112 of this time the diplomacy113 of Floridablanca and Fitzherbert had taken an important turn, though the dispute was still far from settled. The next chapter will follow the course of the main negotiation through this preliminary settlement.
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negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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secrecy
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| n.秘密，保密，隐蔽 | |
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pending
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| prep.直到，等待…期间；adj.待定的；迫近的 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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consternation
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| n.大为吃惊，惊骇 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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cargoes
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| n.（船或飞机装载的）货物( cargo的名词复数 )；大量，重负 | |
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briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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seizure
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| n.没收；占有；抵押 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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confiscated
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| 没收，充公( confiscate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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condemnation
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| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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rumors
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| n.传闻( rumor的名词复数 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷v.传闻( rumor的第三人称单数 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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avowing
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| v.公开声明，承认( avow的现在分词 ) | |
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seizures
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| n.起获( seizure的名词复数 )；没收；充公；起获的赃物 | |
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pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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animated
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| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
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avowed
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| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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exigency
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| n.紧急；迫切需要 | |
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prosecuted
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| a.被起诉的 | |
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uncommon
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| adj.罕见的，非凡的，不平常的 | |
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wrought
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| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
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39
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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40
frustrated
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| adj.挫败的，失意的，泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧 | |
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41
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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42
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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43
orators
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| n.演说者，演讲家( orator的名词复数 ) | |
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44
anathemas
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| n.（天主教的）革出教门( anathema的名词复数 )；诅咒；令人极其讨厌的事；被基督教诅咒的人或事 | |
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45
invincible
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| adj.不可征服的，难以制服的 | |
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46
juncture
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| n.时刻，关键时刻，紧要关头 | |
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47
agitator
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| n.鼓动者；搅拌器 | |
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48
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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49
censure
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| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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50
licenses
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| n.执照( license的名词复数 )v.批准，许可，颁发执照( license的第三人称单数 ) | |
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51
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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52
incumbent
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| adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的 | |
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53
etiquette
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| n.礼仪，礼节；规矩 | |
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54
dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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55
defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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56
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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57
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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58
embark
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| vi.乘船，着手，从事，上飞机 | |
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59
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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60
leeward
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| adj.背风的；下风的 | |
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61
cape
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| n.海角，岬；披肩，短披风 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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63
overtures
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| n.主动的表示，提议；（向某人做出的）友好表示、姿态或提议( overture的名词复数 )；（歌剧、芭蕾舞、音乐剧等的）序曲，前奏曲 | |
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64
augment
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| vt.(使)增大，增加，增长，扩张 | |
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65
authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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66
generosity
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| n.大度，慷慨，慷慨的行为 | |
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67
subsidies
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| n.补贴，津贴，补助金( subsidy的名词复数 ) | |
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68
fulfill
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| vt.履行，实现，完成；满足，使满意 | |
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69
embarking
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| 乘船( embark的现在分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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72
accede
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| v.应允，同意 | |
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73
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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ascended
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| v.上升，攀登( ascend的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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76
monarchies
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| n. 君主政体, 君主国, 君主政治 | |
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foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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78
misgivings
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| n.疑虑，担忧，害怕；疑虑，担心，恐惧( misgiving的名词复数 )；疑惧 | |
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79
turbulence
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| n.喧嚣，狂暴，骚乱，湍流 | |
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80
monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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81
feudal
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| adj.封建的，封地的，领地的 | |
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82
wasteful
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| adj.（造成）浪费的，挥霍的 | |
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83
taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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84
bankruptcy
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| n.破产；无偿付能力 | |
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85
recess
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| n.短期休息，壁凹（墙上装架子，柜子等凹处） | |
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deadlock
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| n.僵局，僵持 | |
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87
razed
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| v.彻底摧毁，将…夷为平地( raze的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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pillaged
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| v.抢劫，掠夺( pillage的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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89
frightful
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| adj.可怕的；讨厌的 | |
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90
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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91
embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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92
haughty
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| adj.傲慢的，高傲的 | |
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93
junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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94
marine
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| adj.海的；海生的；航海的；海事的；n.水兵 | |
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95
concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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96
radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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97
disarmed
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| v.裁军( disarm的过去式和过去分词 )；使息怒 | |
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98
precipitated
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| v.（突如其来地）使发生( precipitate的过去式和过去分词 )；促成；猛然摔下；使沉淀 | |
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99
postpone
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| v.延期，推迟 | |
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100
baron
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| n.男爵；(商业界等)巨头，大王 | |
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101
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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102
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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103
unreasonable
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| adj.不讲道理的，不合情理的，过度的 | |
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104
irrelevant
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| adj.不恰当的，无关系的，不相干的 | |
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105
elude
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| v.躲避，困惑 | |
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106
jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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107
hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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108
legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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109
amicably
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| adv.友善地 | |
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110
unreasonableness
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| 无理性； 横逆 | |
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111
uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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112
expiration
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| n.终结，期满，呼气，呼出物 | |
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113
diplomacy
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| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
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