While England and Spain were preparing for war at home and calling on their allies for support, their diplomatic representatives were endeavoring to reach an understanding. As stated above, the British Court had concluded to make no further effort to get satisfaction through the Spanish ambassador at London, but had sent its own ambassador, Fitzherbert, to treat directly with the Spanish Court. This step was decided2 upon during the exciting days immediately following the 1st of May. It was nearly the middle of June before Fitzherbert reached Madrid. In the meantime the British chargé, Merry, had been instructed to open the renewed negotiation3 by presenting to the Spanish Court a memorial setting forth4 at length the English contention5. Leeds sent instructions for this on May 4.[291]
Having received this communication from Leeds, Merry obtained an interview with Floridablanca May 16. The Spanish minister was milder than usual, but still suspected that England meant to use the matter as a ground for quarreling. In an endeavor to remove this suspicion, Merry, read to the Count his own secret and confidential6 instructions. Floridablanca observed that if England was really not attempting to force a quarrel the business might be amicably7 settled. In the evening, after the interview, Merry sent to the Spanish minister a copy of the memorial.[292] In a brief note accompanying it, he expressed great anxiety to quiet the alarm, and suggested dispatching to London at once a courier with pacific assurances from Floridablanca, if the Count felt like giving such.[293]
[396]
The British memorial declared that the last Spanish communication[294] was unsatisfactory even as the transaction had been stated in the former Spanish note.[295] No satisfaction had been offered for the insult to the British flag, and the ground stated for releasing the vessels8 was not justice, from the English standpoint, but ignorance on the part of the English commanders and general regard for England on the part of the Spanish officials. Neither could Great Britain admit the Spanish claim to exclusive rights of sovereignty, commerce, and navigation. Besides these reasons, additional information had arrived[296] telling of more than one captured vessel9. It also appeared that the soil at Nootka had been purchased by a British subject and the British flag hoisted10 thereon. Merry was—
to represent in the strongest manner to the Court of Spain that His Majesty11 has every reason to expect from the justice and wisdom of His Catholic Majesty not only the full and entire restitution12 of all the said vessels, with their property and crews (or of as many of them as shall, on fair examination of what can he alleged13 on both sides, be found to have been British vessels, entitled as such to His Majesty’s protection), but also an indemnification to the individuals concerned in the said vessels for the losses which they have sustained by their unjust detention14 and capture, and, above all, an adequate reparation to His Majesty for an injury done by an officer commanding His Catholic Majesty’s vessels of war to British subjects trading under the protection of the British flag in those parts of the world where the subjects of His Majesty have an unquestionable right to a free and undisturbed enjoyment15 of the benefits of commerce, navigation, and fishery, and also to the possession of such establishments as they may form, with the consent of the natives, in places unoccupied by other European nations.
Assurances were given of pacific wishes on the part of England, but a speedy and explicit16 answer was demanded.[297]
[397]
In this memorial England renewed her demand for satisfaction for the insult to her flag, and added a demand that Spain indemnify the owners of the captured vessels. She also rejected absolutely the Spanish claim to exclusive sovereignty by asserting England’s unquestionable right to unoccupied portions of the coast in question. Incidentally it is valuable as a declaration of Great Britain’s position on the question of the rights of colonization17.
Two days after receiving this memorial Floridablanca answered Merry’s note which accompanied it. He gave the pacific assurances that the British agent had asked, but in general terms. In keeping with his peaceful professions he proposed a mutual18 and proportionate disarmament. He asserted that His Catholic Majesty knew of the capture of only one vessel; and it had been trading illicitly20, at the time, in a place occupied by the Spanish.[298]
On the following day Merry replied, expressing his satisfaction with the pacific intentions of the Spanish Court. He said that he would gladly dispatch one of the English messengers with the Count’s peaceful assurances.[299] Fearing lest Floridablanca meant this informal note as a reply to the British memorial of May 16, he gave the Spanish minister to understand that he still expected a formal reply.[300] The British messenger bearing the peaceful assurances left Madrid May 21[301] and arrived in London June 1. Since the reply contained nothing indicating that Spain would grant the English demands, the armaments were continued.[302] Another[398] messenger from Merry arrived in London ten days later with less pacific news. Floridablanca’s language to the foreign ministers at Aranjuez showed that he still thought that England was determined21 to break with Spain. He looked on the English King’s message to Parliament as almost equivalent to a declaration of war. England’s advices to all settlements abroad increased his conviction. Her tone toward Spain he thought insufferable. He still desired peace, but feared that Spain would be driven to the necessity of defending herself. Not only had Floridablanca expressed himself thus to the foreign ministers, but he had made an appeal for money, and the bankers of Madrid had agreed to furnish some ￡4,000,000.[303]
Floridablanca’s formal reply to the British memorial reached London June 15. Merry had received it from the Spanish Court on the 4th of the same month.[304] It declared that His Catholic Majesty would claim nothing but what he could base on treaty rights, on the consent of nations, and on immemorial possession. The discussions with the new ambassador would turn on these points. If Spanish subjects had gone beyond these rights they would be punished, and the injured parties would be indemnified. Spain did not mean to carry her claim to all of the South Sea, but only to “the Indian continent, islands, and seas, which by discovery, treaties, or immemorial possession have belonged and do belong to her by the acknowledgment of all nations.” The Spanish King denied that Spain’s not having settled any particular spot was a proof that it did not belong to her. Were this admitted, the Count argued, any nation might establish herself on the dominions22 of any other nation wherever there was not an actual establishment. This, he said, would be absurd to think of. Satisfaction and indemnification should rest on the question of right, which was to be settled by the negotiation.[305]
[399]
This review of the essential points of the two memorials shows that the Courts were as far apart as ever. The conflicting colonial principles were clearly stated, and each nation stubbornly persisted in its own view. In his remarks on this communication Merry conceived that there was little or no room left to expect that any change would occur in the sentiments of the Spanish Court. He thought that the Spanish delay had probably been occasioned by the fluctuating advices from France. He could attribute the conduct of Spain to no other motive23 than a hope that her being attacked by England might put France under the necessity of engaging in the war.[306]
Fitzherbert conducted the English negotiations24 from this point. His record as a diplomat1 was already established. He had negotiated the treaty of peace with France and Spain in 1783. The next four years he had been envoy25 extraordinary to Russia. After that he had been for some time chief secretary to the lord-lieutenant of Ireland. He had also been made a member of the privy26 council. He left London May 9[307] and went to Paris, where he tarried for some time. His delay at this place was due partly to sickness, partly to his being engaged in making some representations to the French Court in connection with Fitzgerald,[308] and partly to his awaiting written instructions from London to govern him in his negotiations with Spain.[309] He reached Madrid June 9.[310] The next day he wrote a note to Floridablanca,[400] who, with the whole Spanish Court, had gone to Aranjuez. This note announced his presence and his intention of reaching Aranjuez the same evening. It also inclosed his credentials27 signed by the English King.[311]
The following day he had an interview with Floridablanca. Two days later, June 13, he received his formal introduction to the King and Queen.[312]
In their interview of June 11 Fitzherbert and Floridablanca exchanged views on the question in dispute. The former, conceiving that the memorial given to Merry on June 4 must fall short of His Britannic Majesty’s just expectations, urged the latter to give him a more favorable communication. The latter insisted that the paper in question contained the utmost that Spain ought to grant. He declared that compliance28 with the British demand for satisfaction would invalidate the Spanish claims to sovereignty, rendering29 further discussion useless. Therefore the British demand and the Spanish claim, he maintained, ought to be discussed at the same time. He asked that Fitzherbert’s statements should be presented in writing. Consequently, two days later the British ambassador sent a brief memorial presenting the British demand in language which makes it seem plausible30. Stripped of its verbiage31 it declares that England desires a peaceable settlement, but that there can be no further negotiation until Spain shall have fulfilled three conditions: First, restored the vessels; secondly33, indemnified the injured parties; thirdly, given satisfaction to the British sovereign for the insult offered to his flag. A declaration that the Spanish King would grant these demands would be accepted as ground for the negotiation.[313]
After this first exchange of views with the Spanish minister,[401] Fitzherbert reported his observations to the British Cabinet. He thought that Spain was bent34 on war, and was refusing satisfaction in hope of inducing England to make reprisals35 which would serve as a pretext36 for demanding French aid. As to her motive, he thought that she certainly could not hope to regain37 Gibraltar or her West Indian possessions; and it could not be to counteract38 French revolutionary infection, for everything was quiet in Spain. He believed the real cause to be Floridablanca’s suspicion that England had designs on the Spanish colonies. The Spanish minister seemed to count little on French aid, but to expect substantial help from the United States. Some advances had been made to that power, and Carmichael, the American chargé, was much caressed39 at Court. The American agent thought that his Government would not be favorable.[314] A few days later, Fitzherbert expressed his confidence that no encouraging communication had been received from America. On the contrary, there had recently been marked symptoms of coldness.[315]
In answer to the British ambassador’s communication of June 13, Floridablanca replied five days later that he could not consent to the principles which it laid down. However, for the sake of peace, he offered to make the declaration proposed, provided one of three explanations be added: First, the question of insult and satisfaction should be decided by the arbitration40 of a king of Europe, to be chosen by England; or, second, no facts should be admitted in the subsequent negotiation unless fully41 established by Great Britain; or, third, the satisfaction should not prejudice the rights of Spain nor prevent her from exacting42 equivalent satisfaction from Great Britain if it should be found that she had a right to do so.[316] In spite of the evident fairness of these proposals, they were not accepted. In reporting them to the British Court, Fitzherbert suggested that he considered them inadmissible. The English Cabinet seems to have agreed with him. This makes it appear that England was afraid to submit her case to the judgment43 of a third party, even[402] though she had the privilege of selecting the judge. Further, she seemed unwilling44 to confine the negotiation to established facts, or to suffer the consequences in case the negotiation should show her to have been in the wrong. It appears that the English Court had decided to force from Spain once and for all an acknowledgment of the British principle of colonization. Nothing less would be accepted. It was this, and not simply justice, that she demanded.
For some time after this the British ambassador received no communication from the Spanish minister. This was partially45 accounted for by accident. On the same day that Floridablanca had written the document last studied an attempt was made to assassinate46 him. He was stabbed by a fanatical Frenchman. The wound was not serious. In letters of June 24 and 28 Fitzherbert reported that the Count still refused to see him on the pretense47 of indisposition, though he was transacting48 other business. The Spanish Court had assumed a more pacific attitude and seemed sincerely desirous of an accommodation. The delay was continued in hope that a reply would soon be received from London to the Spanish memorial presented to Merry June 4.[317]
The pacific intentions of the Spanish Court were further shown by the fact that orders had been given to the commanders of various ports to treat British war ships, which were hovering49 in the neighborhood, as they would be treated in a period of profound peace. Furthermore, in an informal interview of July 1, Floridablanca said that he had been busying himself on a plan for an ulterior arrangement which he thought would entirely50 fulfill32 the views and objects of both parties.[318] At a conference on July 10 the Count presented his plan. The essential points were: First, Spain should retain exclusive possession of the Northwest Coast up to and including Nootka; second, from Nootka to the sixty-first degree the two Crowns should have common rights, except that south of the fifty-sixth degree British influence should not extend beyond a certain distance inland; third, Great Britain should have the right of fishing in the[403] South Sea and of landing and erecting51 temporary buildings in unoccupied places, though no English vessels should approach a Spanish settlement; and fourth, the mutual rights should not be discussed and the mutual demands for satisfaction should be waived52, in which case Spain would pay the losses on ships taken at Nootka. Fitzherbert declared the plan inadmissible, but said that it might possibly be modified to make it acceptable.[319] This is interesting as foreshadowing in some respects the final settlement.
About the middle of July Fitzherbert received the English reply to the Spanish memorials of June 4 and June 18. Extended instructions were given to guide him in his communication to the Spanish Court. These had been sent from London July 5[320]. In obedience53 to his instructions, the British ambassador presented to the Spanish minister on July 17 a new memorial defining the British views on the point of satisfaction.
With the memorial he inclosed drafts of a proposed Spanish declaration and a British counter declaration which would be acceptable to His Britannic Majesty as affording the satisfaction demanded. The memorial declared that the Spanish communications did not contain the satisfaction demanded, nor was a plausible ground established for refusing the demands. To justify54 these demands it was urged that there had been no established possession of nor proved sovereignty over the Nootka region which could have justified55 the seizure56 of British vessels. For such justification57 there must have been actual possession and exercise of jurisdiction58 which had been recognized by other nations. From the representations of the Spanish Court itself, it appeared that the Spaniards had undertaken the occupation only a few days before the seizure of the vessels in question. English subjects had for many years previously59 frequented the place and had traded with the natives without interruption. Hence it was impossible for Spain to maintain her claim to exclusive jurisdiction. The simple restoration of the vessels was not sufficient. No reparation had been made for the insult[404] to the British flag. “In consequence, His majesty finds it necessary to demand anew in terms most direct and least equivocal the satisfaction already demanded, and which can not longer be deferred60 without consequences which His Majesty desires ardently61 to avoid.” As soon as this demand should be met England would be ready to treat with reference to rights of territorial62 possessions, commerce, navigation, and fisheries in that part of the world.[321]
In his private instructions referred to above, Fitzherbert was told that the giving of satisfaction must amount to an admission that Spain was not in possession of an actual and known sovereignty at Nootka. No discussion could take place on this point, it was declared, after the satisfaction should be given. If Spain could prove her claim to sovereignty, it must be done before the point of satisfaction should be reached. If proved, it would remove the ground on which satisfaction was demanded; but, it was added, no such proof could be adduced. Hence satisfaction was insisted upon.[322] This was tantamount to saying that the British Court would not be convinced, no matter what arguments the Spanish Court might produce. Spain was just as confident that she did possess sovereignty over Nootka as England was that Spain did not. The Spanish Court had taken great care to collect evidence on this point. A commission was sent to examine the archives of the Indies at Seville for this purpose. Their report covered some 200 pages of manuscript. It was a compilation63 of accounts of exploring expeditions, of royal orders and decisions, of acts of the council of the Indies, and of laws promulgated64, all affecting that part of the world. Its purpose was to show that Spain had always claimed and exercised the rights of sovereignty over those regions and the right of excluding other nations from her possessions in the South Sea.[323] The treaty of Utrecht was repeatedly cited in the various memorials and letters as guaranteeing Spain’s rights in the Indies as they had been in the time of Charles II. The willingness of Spain to submit[405] the matter to arbitration shows that she had confidence in the justice of her cause. England’s refusal to arbitrate indicates a lack of confidence.
On July 22 Floridablanca replied to Fitzherbert’s communication of five days before. He added little to what he had said in documents already studied. He repeated the grounds on which Spain rested her claim—grounds that were absolutely good from the Spanish standpoint. He showed again the unreasonableness65 and absurdity66, from the same standpoint, of the English demands, and their contravention of treaties. He assumed, not without cause, a tone of injured innocence67, and concluded that it was not worth while to extend further his reflections on points so clear nor in demonstration68 of the rights of Spain, since enough had been said already. The Spanish King had no intention, he declared, of being dragged into a war over an academic dispute. He agreed to give, first, such satisfaction as one of the Kings of Europe, chosen by England as arbitrator, should think proper; or, secondly, to give whatever satisfaction should be reciprocally agreed upon, it being understood that such satisfaction should not prejudice the rights of Spain to Nootka. He appealed to the honor and justice of all nations to recognize the generosity69 of His Catholic Majesty’s heart, since to avoid dragging Europe into war he would sacrifice his own well-founded opinion, even though prepared to enforce it by his superior armament.[324] Having led, or rather forced, the Spanish minister to yield this much, Fitzherbert continued to press him until he agreed to the declaration and counter-declaration, almost word for word, as they had been dictated70 by the British Cabinet. They were signed July 24, and are as follows:[325]
DECLARATION.
His Britannic Majesty having complained of the capture of certain vessels belonging to his subjects in the port of Nootka, situated71 on the Northwest Coast of America, by an officer in the service of His Catholic[406] Majesty, the undersigned counselor72 and principal secretary of state to His Majesty, being thereto duly authorized73, declares in the name and by the order of His Majesty, that he is willing to give satisfaction to His Britannic Majesty for the injury of which he has complained, fully persuaded that His said Britannic Majesty would act in the same manner toward His Catholic Majesty under similar circumstances; and His Majesty further engages to make full restitution of all the British vessels which were captured at Nootka, and to indemnify the parties interested in those vessels for the losses which they may have sustained, as soon as the amount thereof shall have been ascertained74. It being understood that this declaration is not to prejudice the ulterior discussion of any right which His Catholic Majesty claims to form an exclusive establishment at Nootka.
In witness whereof I have signed this declaration and sealed it with the seal of my arms at Madrid the 24th of July, 1790.
Count Floridablanca.
COUNTER DECLARATION.
His Catholic Majesty having declared that he was willing to give satisfaction for the injury done to the King by the capture of certain vessels belonging to his subjects in the Bay of Nootka; and Count Floridablanca having signed, in the name and by the order of His Catholic Majesty, a declaration to this effect, and by which His said Majesty likewise engages to make full restitution of the vessels so captured and to indemnify the parties interested in those vessels for the losses which they shall have sustained, the undersigned ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of His Majesty to the Catholic King, being thereto duly and expressly authorized, accepts the said declaration in the name of the King; and declares that His Majesty will consider this declaration, with the performance of the engagements contained therein, as a full and entire satisfaction for the injury of which His Majesty has complained.
The undersigned declares at the same time that it is to be understood that neither the said declaration signed by Count Floridablanca nor the acceptance thereof by the undersigned, in the name of the King, is to preclude75 or prejudice, in any respect, the rights which His Majesty may claim to any establishment which his subjects may have formed, or may desire to form in the future, at the said Bay of Nootka.
In witness whereof I have signed this counter declaration and sealed it with the seal of my arms at Madrid the 24th of July, 1790.
Alleyne Fitzherbert.
The only difference of any importance between the drafts prepared by the British Cabinet and the documents as finally signed is the insertion in the Spanish declaration of the clause “fully persuaded that His said Britannic Majesty[407] would act in the same manner toward His Catholic Majesty under similar circumstances.”[326]
Fitzherbert wrote that on the first occasion of his paying his respects to His Catholic Majesty after the declarations had been signed that Monarch76 had deigned77 to converse78 freely concerning them, saying that they had given him the sincerest pleasure, and that he considered them “a happy earnest of the revival79 of that perfect harmony and good understanding which it was his constant wish to maintain with the Crown of Great Britain.” The ambassador reminded Leeds “that it is extremely unusual for His Catholic Majesty to converse with foreign ministers on any political topic, from which circumstance, joined to the known sincerity80 of his character and the marked cordiality of air and manner with which he accompanied this declaration, I can safely convey it to your grace as the genuine expression of his feelings.”[327]
These declarations settled merely the question of satisfaction which England had demanded as the indispensable preliminary to a discussion of the respective rights of the two Crowns on the Northwest Coast, and particularly at Nootka. This simply repaired the insult which England felt that she had suffered at the hands of Spain. They were now ready to begin negotiations on a friendly basis for the settlement of the present difficulty and the arrangement of a modus vivendi for the future. News of the declarations reached London August 5, and Grenville immediately notified the King, congratulating him on the event, “which, as far as it goes, appears highly satisfactory and seems to offer the most favorable prospect81 for such an ultimate termination of the business as may correspond with Your Majesty’s wishes.”[328] In a letter of the next day, Leeds praised Fitzherbert for the latter’s success.[329]
[408]
During the months of May, June, and July, while the negotiations that have been studied in this chapter were in progress, both countries continued their warlike preparations. Shortly after reaching Madrid Fitzherbert reported a Spanish fleet of 30 sail of the line, though poorly manned.[330] Baumgarten tells of the difficulty which the Spanish Government experienced in getting sailors. He says that they took refuge in the mountains to escape being pressed into the navy.[331] On July 5 the British ambassador reported that the Spanish fleet at Cadiz had been ordered to sea immediately, but he thought it simply a show of vigor83 to inspire confidence.[332] Four days later he received a note from Floridablanca explaining the movement. The King of Spain, having learned that the English fleet had put to sea, gave orders to his to move also, but to refrain from hostilities84 unless attacked.[333] Two Spanish ships of war, with 1,000 soldiers, had been sent to Porto Rico, since an attack was apprehended85 at that point.[334] By the 20th of the same month Spain had 34 ships of the line and 16 smaller craft at sea.[335] At the end of June an English fleet of 25 vessels of the line had put to sea,[336] and had been joined early in July by the Dutch fleet under Admiral Kinsbergen.[337]
During all this time the armaments had been carried on in spite of repeated offers and requests from Spain to disarm19 mutually. As early as May 18, on receipt of the British memorial presented two days before, Floridablanca had proposed to Merry mutual and proportionate disarmament.[338] This was repeated in the Spanish memorial of June 4.[339] The British Cabinet rejected the proposition. In his instructions[409] of July 5 Leeds cautioned Fitzherbert to be particularly careful not to give the smallest encouragement to this idea. His Majesty could not consent to discontinue preparations until he should have secured freedom of commerce, navigation, and fisheries in the districts in question.[340] After the declaration and counter declaration had been signed, Floridablanca proposed limiting the operations of the fleets to prevent the possibility of an encounter.[341] On August 10 Campo, the Spanish ambassador in London, repeated the proposals for disarming86.[342] In reply, four days later, Leeds gave assurance of England’s desire for peace, but declared that Great Britain refused to disarm until the matter in question should be settled for the future.[343] On the same day that Leeds gave this decided answer to Campo in London, Floridablanca, in Madrid, had again proposed to Fitzherbert a mutual disarmament. On September 10, Leeds sent a formal reply, repeating what he had said to Campo on August 14.[344]
Far from yielding to the Spanish proposals, Great Britain was continuing her preparations and calling on her allies to do the same. On the day that Leeds rejected Campo’s proposition to disarm, he instructed Auckland, the British ambassador at The Hague, to ask that Dutch preparations should not be relaxed. The national honor had been satisfied, but the question of peace or war had not been settled. It was requested that the Dutch fleet be ordered home for supplies and re?nforcements.[345] August 19 this request was granted, and England was reassured87 of the support of Holland.[346] Baumgarten says that early in September the English and Spanish fleets were both hovering off Cape82 Finisterre, and were dangerously near to each other.[347]
In his instructions to Auckland of August 14, referred to above, Leeds had suggested that with a slight additional expense the Dutch and English fleets could be used to give[410] weight to the representations already made by England for bringing about a pacification88 in the north and east of Europe. The Dutch Government assented89 that the general state of Europe, as well as the Spanish negotiations, warranted a continuance of their armament.
The relation between the Nootka Sound negotiations and the questions uppermost in eastern and northern Europe is more than incidental. In a dispatch of June 14 Theremin, the Prussian chargé at Madrid, wrote his Government that in case of a breach90 between England and Spain the latter would certainly join Russia and Austria.[348] The situation of the powers was such that this would have been perfectly91 natural. Russia and Austria were waging a common war against the Porte. The former was also engaged in war with Sweden, and the latter had just been deprived of her control in the Netherlands by the Belgian revolution. England and the Netherlands were trying to quiet the storm and induce all parties to make peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellum. Prussia, the third member of the triple alliance, was not in harmony with the other two in this matter. On the contrary, she was attempting to increase the confusion in the hope of gaining something in the turmoil92. She was attempting to force Galicia from Austria that she might restore it to Poland and receive as compensation Dantzig and Thorn. She was fostering the Belgian revolution so that in the end she might be able to return the Flemish provinces to Austria to compensate93 that power for the loss of Galicia. She had actually made a treaty with the Porte looking to this end, and had won the partial support of Poland. If Prussia had succeeded in dragging the other two members of the triple alliance with her into war and Spain had at the same time broken with England on the Nootka question, it would inevitably94 have thrown Spain into the arms of the imperial courts. The opponents, then, would have been Prussia, England, the Netherlands, and Turkey, with probably Poland and Sweden, against Russia, Austria, and Spain, with possibly Denmark. France had for a time been thought of as a fourth member of the proposed[411] alliance between Spain and the imperial courts, but the disturbances95 in that country had, for the present, made her almost a negligible quantity.
The conference at Reichenbach, which closed in August, affected96 materially the state of Europe. The pacific efforts of England and the Dutch Republic had already succeeded in curbing97 somewhat the warlike passions of Prussia, and at this conference won a further triumph for the peace principle by inducing Leopold of Austria to make peace with Turkey. But Russia still persisted for a time in her war with the Porte, and the English-Spanish dispute over Nootka Sound was almost as far from settlement as ever.
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diplomat
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| n.外交官，外交家；能交际的人，圆滑的人 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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confidential
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| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
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amicably
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| adv.友善地 | |
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vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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hoisted
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| 把…吊起，升起( hoist的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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restitution
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| n.赔偿；恢复原状 | |
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alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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detention
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| n.滞留，停留；拘留，扣留；(教育)留下 | |
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enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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colonization
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| 殖民地的开拓，殖民，殖民地化； 移殖 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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disarm
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| v.解除武装，回复平常的编制，缓和 | |
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illicitly
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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envoy
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| n.使节，使者，代表，公使 | |
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privy
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| adj.私用的；隐密的 | |
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credentials
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| n.证明，资格，证明书，证件 | |
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compliance
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| n.顺从；服从；附和；屈从 | |
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rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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verbiage
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| n.冗词；冗长 | |
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fulfill
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| vt.履行，实现，完成；满足，使满意 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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reprisals
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| n.报复（行为）( reprisal的名词复数 ) | |
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pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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regain
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| vt.重新获得，收复，恢复 | |
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counteract
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| vt.对…起反作用，对抗，抵消 | |
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caressed
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| 爱抚或抚摸…( caress的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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arbitration
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| n.调停，仲裁 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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exacting
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| adj.苛求的，要求严格的 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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assassinate
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| vt.暗杀，行刺，中伤 | |
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pretense
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| n.矫饰，做作，借口 | |
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transacting
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| v.办理（业务等）( transact的现在分词 )；交易，谈判 | |
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hovering
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| 鸟( hover的现在分词 )； 靠近（某事物）； （人）徘徊； 犹豫 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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erecting
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| v.使直立，竖起( erect的现在分词 )；建立 | |
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waived
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| v.宣布放弃( waive的过去式和过去分词 )；搁置；推迟；放弃（权利、要求等） | |
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obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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seizure
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| n.没收；占有；抵押 | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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deferred
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| adj.延期的，缓召的v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的过去式和过去分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
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ardently
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| adv.热心地，热烈地 | |
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territorial
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| adj.领土的，领地的 | |
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compilation
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| n.编译，编辑 | |
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promulgated
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| v.宣扬（某事物）( promulgate的过去式和过去分词 )；传播；公布；颁布（法令、新法律等） | |
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unreasonableness
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| 无理性； 横逆 | |
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absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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innocence
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| n.无罪；天真；无害 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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generosity
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| n.大度，慷慨，慷慨的行为 | |
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dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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counselor
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| n.顾问，法律顾问 | |
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authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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preclude
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| vt.阻止，排除，防止；妨碍 | |
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monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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deigned
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| v.屈尊，俯就( deign的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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converse
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| vi.谈话，谈天，闲聊；adv.相反的，相反 | |
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revival
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| n.复兴，复苏，（精力、活力等的）重振 | |
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sincerity
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| n.真诚，诚意；真实 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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cape
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| n.海角，岬；披肩，短披风 | |
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vigor
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| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
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84
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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disarming
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| adj.消除敌意的，使人消气的v.裁军( disarm的现在分词 )；使息怒 | |
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reassured
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| adj.使消除疑虑的；使放心的v.再保证，恢复信心( reassure的过去式和过去分词) | |
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pacification
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| n. 讲和，绥靖，平定 | |
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assented
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| 同意，赞成( assent的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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turmoil
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| n.骚乱，混乱，动乱 | |
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93
compensate
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| vt.补偿，赔偿；酬报 vi.弥补；补偿；抵消 | |
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inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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disturbances
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| n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 )；打扰；困扰；障碍 | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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curbing
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| n.边石，边石的材料v.限制，克制，抑制( curb的现在分词 ) | |
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