Attention was called above to the repeated conferences between Pitt and the South American agitator2, Miranda. The fact was pointed3 out that these conferences occurred at the critical periods of the English-Spanish negotiations4.[350] To repeat briefly6: The first was on February 14, just after the receipt of the first Spanish communication on the Nootka affair, and before the British Court had formulated7 its reply. Miranda had previously8 proposed his “grand plan” for the advantage of England united with South America. At this conference the plan was admitted to be beneficial. It was decided9 that it should be put into execution in case of a war with Spain. In consequence of Pitt’s request, Miranda presented, some three weeks later, a written statement of the commercial and military resources of South America. Again, on May 6, when the war excitement in London was at its highest, the great minister and the South American had a conference on the same subject. Pitt was on his way to a cabinet council and was taking with him for consideration at the council the papers which Miranda had presented. Grenville was present at the interview. The conversation was on the prospect10 of war with Spain, and on the disposition11 of the people of South America toward joining England in order to gain independence. Various interviews took place at Pitt’s house while the Spanish negotiations were in progress.[351]
[413]
At some time during the year Miranda’s plan was presented in the form of a draft of a constitution for the Spanish-American colonies after they should have gained their independence. The proposed new empire was to include all of South America, except Brazil and Guiana, and the portion of North America west of the Mississippi River and south of the forty-fifth parallel. Cuba was to be included as the key to the Gulf12 of Mexico. The government was to be modeled in a general way on that of Great Britain. The executive power was to be lodged13 in an inca, under the title of “emperor,” with hereditary14 succession. The upper chamber15 was to be composed of members nominated for life by the inca. Further details of the government were worked out.[352] Miranda reminded Pitt that the latter had seemed pleased with his ideas and had asked him to leave the draft for further perusal16. Plans for carrying on the war were discussed, and the most favorable point for attack in South America was considered. Means were devised for enlisting17 the interest of Jesuits in Italy who were natives of South America and had been exiled by the King of Spain. Accounts of recent insurrections in Spanish America were given to show how ready the people were for emancipation18. Later, a detailed19 plan of attack was presented, with maps to illustrate20 it. At Pitt’s request a plan of the defenses of Havana was left with him.
This shows what extended plans the British Cabinet was considering. It was to be expected that England would persist in her demands, for if Spain would not yield there was much to expect from a war. Secret agents at various places in America were collecting information looking toward military operations to carry out these schemes. Besides the overtures21 to the United States through Canada, to be discussed presently, there were secret emissaries at Charleston and New York, and information was being collected concerning New Orleans, the Floridas, and the Mississippi country. The feasibility of marching troops from New Orleans to Mexico was considered, and reports were made by men who were familiar with the country. Some of the secret employees were enthusiastic over the possibility of making a great English colony out of the Floridas and the Mississippi Valley.[414] Agents of the Creek22 and Cherokee Indians were negotiating for a friendly connection with England. The plan, as far as it had taken shape, seems to have been for England to seize the heart of North America for herself and erect23 the remainder of Spanish America into a client state.[353]
As mentioned above, the British Cabinet sent instructions on May 6 to Lord Dorchester, the governor of Canada.[354] He had intended to visit England during the summer, but was requested to remain and prepare for the impending24 struggle. Besides strengthening his own dominions26 he was to make friendly overtures to the United States.[355] In consequence of these orders Lord Dorchester gave instructions on June 27 to Major Beckwith, whom he had selected as the medium through which these overtures should be made. Beckwith was given double instructions. The one set was to guide his conversations in discussing public questions in a general way. The other was secret and for his private guidance. In the first he was instructed to say that the appearance of war with Spain rendered it improbable that Dorchester would obtain his expected leave of absence that season. He was to return hearty27 thanks for the friendly approbation28 of Dorchester’s proposed trip through the United States on his way to England. He was to express the hope that the appearance of a war with Spain, or even its actual occurrence, would not alter the friendly disposition of the United States toward Great Britain. He was to mention the pretensions29 of Spain to absolute control over navigation, commerce, and fisheries in the Pacific Ocean, and discuss the evil effect on the United States if such control should be conceded. These things he might say freely and publicly. But his secret instructions were to guide him in conversing31 with those whom he might select as proper persons in whom to confide32. From them he was to learn the disposition of the Government and the people toward England if the affair with Spain were not considered. Then he was to discover what difference a war with that country might make. He was to ascertain33 whether in case war should occur they would be likely to join Spain, and also to find what might[415] induce them to join Great Britain in such an event. In discussing the Mississippi question he was to be cautious, but might suggest that England would probably assist in obtaining its navigation. Naval34 and military movements should be watched.[356]
Dorchester reported to the home office, on July 7, that Beckwith had been hastily sent back to New York.[357] The latter did not have to wait long to find the right man to converse35 with on the matter contained in his secret instructions. On July 8, Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury36, made a memorandum37 giving the substance of a communication from him. The major had spoken of the expected rupture39 and had observed that all commercial nations must favor the views of England.
It was therefore presumed, should a war take place, that the United States would find it to their interest to take part with Great Britain rather than with Spain.[358]
It seems that Hamilton communicated the matter to the President at once, for in a letter reporting a later conversation with Beckwith he says:
I have made the proper use of what you said to me at our last Interview [July 8].[359]
Under date of July 12, Jefferson, the Secretary of State, prepared a paper entitled, “Heads of a consideration on the conduct we are to observe in the war between Spain and Great Britain, and particularly should the latter attempt the conquest of Louisiana and the Floridas.” As one would expect, Jefferson inclined toward Spain rather than England. He brought out the danger to the United States if England should get control of New Orleans and the neighboring territory. He suggested the idea of joining Spain in guaranteeing the independence of these countries instead of allowing Great Britain to take them. The paper seems to have been prepared to serve as a guide in an approaching interview[416] with the Canadian agent, for he says, “As to England, say to Beckwith,” etc.,[360] then gives the substance of what Hamilton reported as having been said to that gentleman in an interview of July 22, at which Jefferson was present.
In this interview the fact was brought to light that Beckwith was not an authorized40 British agent, but that he had been sent by Dorchester with the knowledge of the British Cabinet. Owing to his unofficial character nothing of importance passed, but he was told that the United States was ready to answer when it should be presented in an official form. Hamilton had said that, at the time, he—
would not mean either to raise or repress expectations. … Something was said respecting the probable course of military operations in case of a war between Britain and Spain, which Mr. Beckwith supposed would be directed toward South America, alleging41, however, that this was mere42 conjecture43 on his part. I hinted cautiously our dislike of any attempt on New Orleans.
Hamilton added in a note:
The views of the Government were to discard suspicion that any engagements with Spain or intentions hostile to Great Britain existed; to leave the ground in other respects vague and open, so as that in case of a rupture between Great Britain and Spain the United States ought to be in the best situation to turn it to account in reference to the disputes between them and Great Britain on the one hand and Spain on the other.[361]
Beckwith reported to Dorchester that Hamilton had said:
We are perfectly44 unconnected with Spain, have even some points unadjusted with that Court, and are prepared to go into a consideration of the subject.[362]
Scott, a member of the House of Representatives from western Pennsylvania, told Beckwith that the prospect for a rupture made most forcible impressions on all classes in the States. There was a deep interest, he said, in the prospect of England’s possessing New Orleans. The possible dismemberment of South America and the opening of commerce[417] with that continent was of interest, as well as the question of navigation, commerce, and fisheries in the Pacific. He thought that the moment was very favorable for England; and he saw no reason why the United States should not assist her.[363] After news of the declaration and counter declaration, signed at Madrid July 24, reached America, Beckwith reported general dissatisfaction in the United States at the prospect of pacification45. Agricultural interests had expected that the war would bring them high prices, and the shipping46 interests were expecting a share in the English carrying trade and hoped for free commerce with the Spanish West Indies. Friends of England thought that she ought to take the opportunity for ruining the Spanish marine47, which they imagined to be an easy matter. British possession of New Orleans was expected and desired, except by the Government which hoped to gain from a neutral position when the settlement should come. At the same time he reported another conversation with Hamilton. The Secretary had said:
We consider ourselves at perfect liberty to act with respect to Spain in any way most conducive48 to our interests, even to the going to war with that power, if we shall think it advisable to join you.[364]
These reports were doubtless colored by the desire of the Canadian agent to send as favorable news as possible; but after allowing for the exaggerations and the distortion of facts that would naturally be expected, enough remains49 to show that the prospect of war was common talk and that it was not altogether undesired. They also point to the well-known fact that England had many friends in the United States and some even in the highest official circles.
While Beckwith was holding these unofficial conferences with American statesmen President Washington and his advisers50 were considering what measures the Government should take in the event of hostilities51 breaking out. Between the time of Beckwith’s first interview with Hamilton and that of the more formal conference a fortnight later in Jefferson’s presence the latter had written to Monroe concerning[418] the matter. He said that a war between England and Spain was probable. Symptoms indicated a general design on Louisiana and the Floridas. He spoke38 of the unpleasant position of the United States if England should obtain them. Both England and Spain, he said, ought to know that this country was in a condition for war.[365] Late in August President Washington wrote concerning the matter to his chief advisers. He thought that if Great Britain and Spain should come to arms New Orleans and the Spanish posts on the Mississippi would be the first objective point of the former. He asked what the answer to Lord Dorchester should be in case he should request permission to march troops from Detroit across the territory of the United States against the Spanish posts, or in case it should be attempted without leave, which was most probable.[366]
On the day after that on which the President’s letter was written Jefferson answered it. He thought that the United States should keep out of the war as long as possible. If Lord Dorchester should make the expected demand, it should either be silently ignored, or, if granted, the same privilege ought to be offered to Spain. If the march should be attempted without permission, the United States should allow it, but protest against it, holding off from actual hostilities as long as possible.[367]
On the same day Chief Justice Jay answered the President’s question. He considered, first, what the United States had a right to do from the standpoint of international law, and, secondly52, what was expedient53 under the circumstances. Under the first head he concluded that, except in cases of absolute necessity, or those in which it could be shown that passage would be entirely54 innocent, the right of dominion25 involved the right of excluding foreigners. Under the second head he said that the probability of their being restrained by a refusal ought to be considered. If they would probably proceed anyway, it would be most prudent55, he concluded, to consent. However, he added, these remarks retain little force when applied56 to leading troops from posts in the[419] actual possession of England through territory under English jurisdiction57, though both the posts and the territory, of right, belong to the United States. He admitted that it would militate against the interests of the United States to have England occupy the Spanish territories in question. The extent to which the principles of the balance of power were applicable to the case in hand would merit serious inquiry58, he remarked, if the United States had only to consider what might be right and just. But since the condition of the country strongly recommended peace, and since it would be more prudent to allow Great Britain to conquer and hold the Floridas than to engage in war to prevent it, such inquiries59 would be premature60.[368]
On the second day after the President wrote, Vice-President Adams gave his opinion. He said that the interests of the United States pointed to neutrality as long as practicable. To preserve neutrality every wrong must be avoided. Granting to England the privilege in question would be an offense61 against Spain. Therefore, if asked, the answer should be a refusal. If the measure should be undertaken without leave there were two methods of procedure—the one was war; the other, negotiation5. Nations, he said, are not obliged to declare war for every injury or even hostility62; but tacit acquiescence63 would be misinterpreted. Negotiation, then, was the only alternative. The fact that there had been no exchange of ministers with England made this difficult. A remonstrance64 might be made in either of two ways. It might be handed by the American representative at Paris, Madrid, or The Hague to the British ambassador at the same place, or a special messenger might be sent to London to demand an audience, make remonstrance, and then take his leave shortly if a minister were not sent to the United States.[369]
Knox, the Secretary of War, sent his advice on the same day as the Vice-President. He mentioned the danger to the United States if England should get the Mississippi Valley. The true interests of the country dictated65 neutrality. Spain, he said, would not enter the war unless supported[420] by France, and such support was not unexpected. If it should be given, France would attempt to associate the United States with her in the war. One of the parties might offer sufficient inducement to the United States to enter the war, or they might be obliged to enter the war on their own account to avert66 a greater evil.[370]
More than two weeks later Hamilton sent a long discussion of the question from the standpoint of national right and from the standpoint of expediency67. He concluded that if Great Britain should ask the privilege, it would be best for the United States to agree to it and then explain the matter to Spain. If troops should be marched across without consent having been asked, it would be a cause of war and would have to be resented or a great national humiliation68 borne. Hostilities, he thought, should be delayed as long as possible.[371]
While these precautionary measures were being considered by the Government at New York, instructions were being sent to the American diplomatic agents in Europe to guide them in case of a breach69 between England and Spain. On August 11 Jefferson wrote instructions for Col. David Humphreys, whom he was sending to Europe as a secret agent of the United States. Humphreys was to go first to London, where he should deliver instructions to Morris, the American informal agent at that place. After delivering these he was to proceed by way of Lisbon to Madrid, where he should deliver instructions to Carmichael, the American chargé at the Spanish Court.[372]
Morris had been watching the progress of the dispute between England and Spain and had been in close touch and sympathy with French representatives.[373] The letter which Humphreys carried instructed Morris to intimate to the British Court in case of war that the United States could not be indifferent to the prospect of England’s acquiring territory in the adjoining Spanish possessions. The American Government would contemplate70 a change of neighbors with extreme uneasiness. Due balance on their borders was not[421] less desirable to Americans than the balance of power in Europe was to Englishmen. Jefferson wrote: “We wish to be neutral, and we will be so if they will execute the treaty fairly and attempt no conquests adjoining us.” Other dominions of Spain, he declared, left them room for conquests. “If war takes place, we would really wish to be quieted on these two points, offering in return an honorable neutrality. More than this they are not to expect.”
This was to be communicated only in the event of war having actually taken place.[374] Without waiting for America to broach71 the subject, the Duke of Leeds had sounded Morris on the American attitude toward the extravagant72 claims of Spain. The latter answered carelessly without giving any real information. He said that Spain was apprehensive73 of the Americans and would sacrifice for their friendship. He intimated that the navigation of the Mississippi might be offered.[375] A report was current in London that Spain had actually made this concession74 to the United States.[376]
Jefferson was planning to use French mediation75 to secure from Spain the opening of the Mississippi. He instructed Short, the American chargé at Paris, to make advances for this purpose through Lafayette if war had begun or whenever it should begin. France, he said, would be drawn76 into the war only as an ally, hence she might reasonably insist that Spain should do all in her power to keep the United States from the ranks of the enemy.[377]
In his instructions to Carmichael Jefferson suggested that, in case of war, the people of Louisiana and Florida would favor England. He also suggested that it would be best for both countries if Spain would cede30 the Floridas and New Orleans to the United States in return for a guaranty of the Spanish possessions on the west bank of the Mississippi. These matters were being pressed warmly and firmly, the Secretary said, under the idea that the war between[422] Spain and Great Britain would be begun before Carmichael could receive these instructions, and such an opportunity must not be lost.[378] As stated in the previous chapter, Fitzherbert believed that Spain had made friendly overtures to the United States, but thought also that they would not be cordially received. The Spanish representative at New York presented a letter to President Washington on August 3 which doubtless contained the overtures to which Fitzherbert referred.[379] Very late in the negotiations Short thought that the Spanish ambassador at Paris was about to offer through him a concession of territory to the United States, but the conversation was interrupted before it reached the vital point.[380]
Humphreys delivered Jefferson’s instructions to Carmichael late in the year. Carmichael thought that America might have obtained all of her wishes if the Secretary’s letters had arrived early in the summer. At that time—
The critical state of affairs induced the Comte de Floridablanca to throw out those general assertions that we should have no reason to complain of the conduct of this Court with respect to the Mississippi, which gave rise to the report its navigation was opened. That minister had intimations from del Campo of the conferences between Mr. Morris and the Duke of Leeds, which occasioned him to say with warmth to Mr. Carmichael, “Now is the time to make a treaty with England.” Fitzherbert availed himself of these conferences to create apprehensions77 that the Americans would aid his nation in case of war.[381]
The circumstances studied in this chapter show that plans were being formed which, if they had been carried out, would[423] have profoundly altered the subsequent development of the United States. They show also that the attitude of the United States was looked upon as of considerable importance, and influenced to a certain extent the counsels of both of the contending parties. Incidentally it is seen that the controversy afforded an opportunity for expressions of the attitude of the American Government toward encroachment78 of European nations on American soil. In the above quotations79 from Jefferson’s letters may be found a very good statement of the principles that later became known as The Monroe Doctrine80.
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1
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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agitator
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| n.鼓动者；搅拌器 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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6
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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formulated
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| v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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gulf
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| n.海湾；深渊，鸿沟；分歧，隔阂 | |
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lodged
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| v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 )；暂住；埋入；（权利、权威等）归属 | |
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hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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perusal
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| n.细读，熟读；目测 | |
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enlisting
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| v.（使）入伍， （使）参军( enlist的现在分词 )；获得（帮助或支持） | |
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emancipation
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| n.（从束缚、支配下）解放 | |
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detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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overtures
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| n.主动的表示，提议；（向某人做出的）友好表示、姿态或提议( overture的名词复数 )；（歌剧、芭蕾舞、音乐剧等的）序曲，前奏曲 | |
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creek
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| n.小溪，小河，小湾 | |
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erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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impending
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| a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
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dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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hearty
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| adj.热情友好的；衷心的；尽情的，纵情的 | |
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approbation
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| n.称赞；认可 | |
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pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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cede
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| v.割让，放弃 | |
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conversing
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| v.交谈，谈话( converse的现在分词 ) | |
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confide
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| v.向某人吐露秘密 | |
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ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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converse
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| vi.谈话，谈天，闲聊；adv.相反的，相反 | |
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treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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memorandum
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| n.备忘录，便笺 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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rupture
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| n.破裂；(关系的)决裂；v.(使)破裂 | |
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authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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alleging
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| 断言，宣称，辩解( allege的现在分词 ) | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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conjecture
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| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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pacification
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| n. 讲和，绥靖，平定 | |
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shipping
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| n.船运（发货，运输，乘船） | |
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marine
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| adj.海的；海生的；航海的；海事的；n.水兵 | |
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conducive
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| adj.有益的，有助的 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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advisers
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| 顾问，劝告者( adviser的名词复数 )； （指导大学新生学科问题等的）指导教授 | |
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hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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54
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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offense
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| n.犯规，违法行为；冒犯，得罪 | |
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hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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acquiescence
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| n.默许；顺从 | |
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remonstrance
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| n抗议，抱怨 | |
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dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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expediency
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| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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humiliation
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| n.羞辱 | |
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breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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broach
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| v.开瓶，提出(题目) | |
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extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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apprehensive
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| adj.担心的，恐惧的，善于领会的 | |
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concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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mediation
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| n.调解 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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apprehensions
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| 疑惧 | |
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encroachment
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| n.侵入，蚕食 | |
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quotations
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| n.引用( quotation的名词复数 )；[商业]行情（报告）；（货物或股票的）市价；时价 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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