The decree of the National Assembly, in May, ordering the armament of 14 vessels2 of the line has been studied in a former chapter. Attention was there called to the fact that this step was taken before Spain had made a formal demand for assistance under the family compact. It was also noted3 that the formal demand was made in the middle of June, but that the King, fearing the consequences, had delayed laying the matter before the Assembly.[382] On August 2, more than six weeks later, a letter from Montmorin informed the Assembly that Spain had demanded in the most positive manner the execution of treaties in case the negotiation with England did not turn out as desired. The King, hoping, for a speedy settlement, had thought it wise to defer4 provoking a discussion of the matter in the National Assembly; but in view of the continued preparations of England he could delay no longer. Therefore he had charged the writer to warn the Assembly and thought that it would be prudent5 to increase the French armament. He laid before the Assembly the letter of the Spanish ambassador of June 16, with copies of the letters and documents accompanying it, recounting the history of the dispute and the negotiations6 to the time when it was written. The minister asked the Assembly to deliberate on the demand of the Court of Madrid. All of the documents were referred to the diplomatic committee.[383]
On the next day, August 3, another letter from Montmorin notified the Assembly that a courier from Madrid had brought news of the signature of a declaration and counter declaration that gave hope of an amicable7 settlement. Great applause greeted the announcement. The letter and declarations[425] were referred to the diplomatic committee. Dupont de Nemours then announced that he had some observations to present on the treaty with Spain known as the “family compact;” but to save the valuable time of the Assembly he would bring them to the attention of the Deputies by having them printed. Another Deputy announced that he also would present some remarks on the Spanish demand in the same manner.
Dupont, in his observations on the treaty, first announced the principles on which he proposed to examine it. It had been made, he said, thirty years before, when political philosophy had made scarcely any progress. It was antiquated8 and inconsistent in some respects, but these defects did not prevent its being just and salutary in principle. Some, he said, wished to break the treaty and abandon our allies, but reason, common sense, and honor point to the contrary—that we should confirm it. He declared that defensive9 and commercial arrangements ought to be kept, but anything involving offensive warfare10 ought to be struck out. He thought that it ought to be so modified that instead of a family it would be a national compact. Wherever the word “crown” occurred he would substitute the word “nation,” and instead of “the Kings agree,” etc., he would have it read “the nations (through their Kings).” He examined the treaty article by article and measured each by these standards. Most of the stipulations he would preserve, with slight modifications13; a few he would strike out entirely14. The stipulation11 which provided that the mere15 requisition should be sufficient to establish the obligation of the nation called upon to furnish the aid was wholly untenable, he declared. The need should be first established, and the nation called upon should have the right of judging. Instead of limiting the alliance to the House of Bourbon, he thought that all nations having similar sentiments ought to be admitted.
The other Deputy, who presented the observations on the Spanish demand, declared that Spain had been a faithful ally. She had taken up a failing cause in 1761 and shared in the unhappy sacrifices of two years later. She had aided in the American Revolution and had prepared to assist in[426] the trouble with the Netherlands in 1787. Gratitude16 would command France to reciprocate17; but he wished to appeal to reason and not to sentiment. Spain and France were natural allies because of common interests. The treaty of 1761, no longer a family but a national compact, offered many advantages. Spain was still the most important outlet18 for French commerce. France had profited more from the alliance than Spain, hence was indebted to her. The financial embarrassment19 at the time was serious, and a war would be dangerous, but even this ought not to cause France to sacrifice honor. He thought that the armaments ought to be continued and all the forces of France ought to be offered to Spain. If this should be done, England would probably give way. The war, if it should come, ought to have the support of all France and be waged on new and noble principles.[384]
It was more than three weeks before the diplomatic committee was ready to report. The principal member of the committee was Mirabeau. He was spokesman when the report was presented to the Assembly on August 25. He began by saying that the peace was not likely to be disturbed; that the territory in dispute between Spain and England belonged to neither, but to the natives; that it was not worth the loss of blood and treasure; that France, because of internal conditions, ought to avoid war; and that there would soon be universal peace and no need of allies. After giving these pacific assurances, he admitted that France ought to change her political principles, but declared that this ought not to be done suddenly. She could not remain isolated20 from the world. The suspension of treaties would be perilous21. All treaties made by the King ought to be observed by the nation until they were annulled23 or changed. He recited the history of Spain’s faithful observance of the family compact; then asked whether it would be right for France to annul22 such a solemn engagement at a time when Spain was threatened by the same danger that she had three times warded24 off from France. In view of the great English armament,[427] self-interest obliged France to strengthen her alliance with Spain. That would require a faithful observance of the treaty. If England did not really desire war, but was arming simply to conduct the negotiation more favorably, increasing the French armament would doubtless delay the result. But if the abandonment of French engagements should force Spain to make peace with England more promptly25, a great wrong would be done to French credit and French commerce. If England desired war, then France ought to support Spain with all her resources. For if England should force Spain to succumb26, France would be the next object of her ambition and vengeance27. It was not proposed, he said, to ratify28 the compact as a whole, but only the defensive and commercial stipulations. He proposed to notify the King of Spain that the alliance would be preserved, and at the same time to refer the treaty to a committee for revision, after which it should be renewed.
The King of France was to open negotiations with the King of Spain at once for this purpose. He also proposed that the fleet be raised to 30 ships of the line, with a proportionate number of smaller vessels. After a few short favorable addresses on the report the discussion was postponed29 to the next day.[385]
When the discussion was resumed on August 26 the report met with very little opposition31. There was a futile32 attempt, led by Pétion, to postpone30 the decision until further information might be obtained. L’Abbé Maury favored confirming the treaty as it stood, declaring, rightly as events proved, that it would give England a great advantage to leave the alliance so indefinite. Ricard considered 30 vessels too small an armament and proposed increasing it to 45. Others favored his idea and Mirabeau embodied33 it in his report. With this modification12, the decrees proposed were unanimously adopted by the Assembly. The essential points were: First, defensive and commercial arrangements with Spain were to be observed; secondly34, negotiations were to be opened with Spain for the purpose of renewing and perpetuating35 the alliance; thirdly, the armament should be raised to 45[428] ships of the line, with a proportionate number of smaller vessels.[386]
On August 30 Montmorin informed the Assembly that the King had sanctioned the decrees and would proceed at once to carry them out. The minister for marine36, he said, had already received orders for the armament. Only 16 vessels would be fitted out at once, which, added to the 14 already armed, would make 30. Preparations would be made to complete the armament to 45 if that should become necessary.[387] On September 1 Montmorin replied to Fernan Nu?ez’s letter of June 16. He told of the action of the Assembly and inclosed a copy of the decrees. The King, he said, was taking steps to carry them out. The reason that only 30 ships instead of 45 would be armed immediately was to avoid the appearance of hostility38 to England. The French King hoped for a peaceful settlement and reciprocal disarmament.[388]
To one who did not scrutinize40 the decrees closely the action of the Assembly seemed to be all that Spain could desire. If the support had been tardy41, yet it was enthusiastic. It seems that at heart most of the Assembly really desired to support Spain and thought that they were doing all that could be expected; but their irrepressible tendency to theorize blinded them to the practical. Apparently42 they did not realize that their proposal to modify the treaty at such a critical time nullified it as far as any immediate37 assistance under it was concerned. It seems possible that if Mirabeau had stood firmly for ratifying43 the treaty as it was he might still have carried the Assembly with him.[389]
[429]
The French Government was anxious regarding the effect that the action of the Assembly might have on England. The French view of England’s conduct was well expressed in a letter from Montmorin to Luzerne, the ambassador from France to the English Court. After remarking that the British Court would probably be astonished at the decrees, he explained that the step was necessary to sustain the honor of France. It had not been taken precipitately44, he said, but had been delayed as long as possible, even provoking complaints from Spain. When it was learned that Spain had given satisfaction to England, and still the latter refused to disarm39, the French Government was compelled to suppose that the British Cabinet had some ulterior purpose and was not certain that it did not concern France. Either England did not wish to terminate the Nootka affair justly or she had other objects, for which this was to furnish a stepping-stone. If it was a question of Spain, France was interested in saving her ally; if the French themselves were concerned, argument was unnecessary. Luzerne was to use these arguments with Leeds and Pitt. He was also to use confidentially45 the fact that the Assembly had decreed a larger armament than the Government had asked. This, Montmorin remarked, ought to make an impression. Luzerne might again suggest French intervention46, but with much circumspection47, since it had been refused before.[390] On the day after writing the above private instructions for the ambassador, Montmorin asked him to assure the English King that the armaments were purely48 precautionary and had no object except those designated by the Assembly. The French King hoped for a peaceable settlement. He had been pleased with the declaration and counter-declaration, but would have been more pleased if a proportionate disarmament had followed, or at least an agreement not to increase the armaments.[391]
Gower, the British ambassador at Paris, had promptly expressed to Montmorin his surprise at the action of the Assembly. He reported on August 27 to his Government that Montmorin was surprised also, and had told him that orders would be given to commission more ships, “but that[430] it would be done (this he said in the utmost confidence) avec le plus grande lenteur.”[392] A dispatch of the next day hinted that Spanish money might have influenced the Assembly.[393] On September 1 instructions were sent from London telling Gower to renew the English assurances of friendliness49 for France, but to observe that it would be impossible for the harmony to continue if France should support Spain. He was to represent that any aid or encouragement to Spain would be a cause of umbrage50 to England, since it would make a just settlement more difficult.[394] On September 4 Gower presented a memorial demanding an explanation of the armament.[395] Montmorin’s letter to Luzerne of August 28, referred to above, was presented to the English Court on September 7.[396] On September 10, in reply to Gower’s of the 4th, Montmorin referred the English Court to a letter written September 9 to Luzerne, which the latter would present. For some reason Luzerne delayed handing this to the British Court, and on September 21 Gower was instructed to demand a formal reply to his memorial. When this demand reached Paris, Montmorin was out of the city. Having returned, he answered, October 4, that he did not understand Luzerne’s delay. He declared that France had no wish to influence the negotiations, but in case the matter could not be amicably51 settled she might be compelled to support Spain. Before this reached London Gower had been instructed to demand that the French fleet make no move to join the Spanish. On October 14 Montmorin agreed that no movement should be made until England should have received a reply from Spain to the ultimatum52 which the British Court had sent a few days before.[397] Hugh Elliot was sent secretly as a special English agent to argue with the French Court against supporting Spain. He met members of the diplomatic committee and thought, at least, that he had converted them to the English view. W. A. Miles co?perated with Elliot in this undertaking53. Only obscure and[431] mysterious references to their mission are extant, and many curious speculations54 have been made concerning it.[398]
Before news reached Madrid of the action of the National Assembly negotiations had begun for a final settlement of the Nootka question.
The declaration and counter declaration signed late in July had been accepted by England as affording the satisfaction demanded. This had opened the way for a pacific discussion of the respective rights to Nootka and the neighboring coast.[399] On September 8 Fitzherbert presented to Floridablanca the first projet of a treaty. It had been formulated55 in London three weeks earlier and had been sent with instructions to the British ambassador. These instructions declared it to be the purpose of the British Government to avoid requiring Spain to make any mortifying56 renunciation of rights, but at the same time the stipulations were to be so worded that they would not imply an admission of the Spanish claims by the British Government. It was impossible for His Majesty57 to recognize them, either directly or indirectly58. They were merely a matter of pride with Spain, it was said, and were really a source of weakness rather than of strength.[400]
When Fitzherbert submitted the projet he inclosed with it extended observations on each article. The preamble59, as it had been worded by the British ambassador, declared a[432] desire to form a convention which would settle the present differences and avoid such disputes for the future. On this he observed that the Court of London thought that would be the best means of settlement which, without formally pronouncing on the opposing pretensions60, should regulate the respective positions of the two Crowns for the future. If British subjects could be assured of the free exercise of their rights in the Pacific, the English King would not be reluctant to establish all possible rules to prevent illicit62 commerce with Spanish possessions. The Court of London was persuaded that a Cabinet so wise as that of Spain could not seriously have advanced such vast pretensions.
The first article declared that British subjects should be replaced in possession of the ships and lands of which they had been deprived at Nootka by a Spanish officer toward the month of April, 1789.[401] The observations on this gave the English arguments against the claim of Spain to exclusive dominion63 over the coasts in question. The English Court could not admit the justice of an exclusive sovereignty over so vast a coast, which since its discovery had without interruption been frequented by British subjects and by those of other nations as well. Spain claimed only as far as the sixty-first degree, conceding to Russia the portion beyond. Fitzherbert insisted, with a good deal of sagacity, that the very principle of this division demonstrated the inadmissibility of the Spanish pretension61. If Russia had acquired rights to the coast beyond the sixty-first degree in virtue64 of the establishments which her subjects had formed there, how, he asked, could other nations be denied the opportunity of making establishments in like manner on the parts of the coast situated65 below this degree and not already occupied? As to the Spanish claim to priority of discovery, he implied that it could be disproved, though he did not disprove it. However, he insisted that discovery alone, without being followed up by actual occupation, could not be admitted as furnishing a right to possession which could operate to the exclusion66 of other[433] nations. England did not claim exclusive jurisdiction67, he said. What she wished was a reciprocal assurance of free access for both nations to the new establishments formed or to be formed by the one or the other.
The second article, in keeping with the statement just made, declared that between certain limits, to be named later, the subjects of both Crowns should exercise their commerce without hindrance68 in the establishments of either.
The third article declared that England would employ efficient means to prevent such access being made a pretext69 for illicit commerce with Spanish colonies. With this in view it was stipulated70 that between certain limits, to be named later, British subjects should make no establishments, and that they should not approach within a certain distance of the coast between these limits. Fitzherbert observed that the purpose of this was to assure to Spain the rights of domain71 over all places in actual possession of her subjects. It was desired to make this as favorable to the Spanish pretensions as possible. He proposed as the northern limit of Spanish exclusive dominion the thirty-first degree. This would have left to Spain not quite all of Lower California. He suggested that the boundary should run east on this degree to the Colorado River, follow that river to its source, and then run northeast to the nearest point on the Missouri. Spain should have exclusive dominion of the coast from the above-mentioned parallel southward to within about 10° of Cape72 Horn. In his private instructions Fitzherbert was authorized73 to yield a little if necessary. He might accept as the northern limit the fortieth parallel from the Pacific to the Missouri. He thought that the distance within which British ships should not approach ought to be 5 leagues. On this point his private instructions allowed him to yield to 8 or even 10 leagues.
The fourth article provided that everywhere else in the Pacific the subjects of both Crowns should enjoy freedom of navigation and fishery, with the privilege of landing on the coasts to trade with the natives or form establishments in unoccupied places. It was thought, he said, that this would be the best way to prevent injurious competition in making settlements. This principle was to be applied74 to[434] the Nootka settlement also, when that should have been returned to Great Britain. On this, he said, no further observations were necessary. It was a natural consequence of the foregoing stipulations. This would have meant, had it been conceded, that England and Spain would have had equal rights to all of the coast north of Lower California. The fifth article referred to making establishments in South America, and was not considered essential by the British Cabinet. The sixth referred to the exchange of ratifications75.[402]
Soon after the presentation of this projet the action of the French Assembly became known at Madrid, and its influence must next be considered.
A letter from Madrid of September 10 to the “Gazette de Leide” told that a courier had just arrived from Paris with the news that a decree had been rendered by the National Assembly for a provisional maintenance of the family compact and for increasing the armament. This had greatly decreased the inquietude over the English demands. A rumor76 had arisen that these demands would overthrow77 many of the long-established principles of Spain, for they were based on English pretensions to a right of free navigation and commerce in the South Sea and on the western coast of America. The expectation of such powerful aid had produced an agreeable sensation.[403] This was the effect on the popular mind.
Its influence on Floridablanca was very different. In submitting to a council of the principal ministers of state the English projet of a treaty studied above, he said that it was advisable to consider first the relations of Spain with the principal courts of Europe. He began with France. In referring to the portion of the decree that limited the treaty to “defensive and commercial arrangements,” he remarked that this expression was capable of many interpretations78 and equivocations. He noticed further that even the declaration for this partial maintenance of the treaty was made subordinate[435] to the expression “taking all proper precautions to preserve the peace.” If, he declared, the deciding on what were proper precautions be left to the Assembly, composed of so many members and with such extraordinary ideas, there was no hope that their decision would accord with Spain’s ideas of preserving the peace. That body might not consider the Nootka dispute a casus foederis. It might decide that Spain was to blame, or that she had motives79 of aggression80, or that she had not admitted all of the means of conciliation81 proposed by England. The desire of the Assembly to negotiate a new treaty on national lines was ominous82, he said. They, of course, wished to modify or explain the old. This new system of the sovereignty of the nation might present difficulties. The body asserting it, the National Assembly, was itself a usurper83. Referring to the provision for arming 45 ships of the line, he called attention to the fact that the reason assigned was not that of supporting Spain. The decree declared that the armament was in consideration of the armaments of various nations of Europe, and was for the security of French commerce and French colonial possessions. Finally, he declared, even if the Assembly really wished to aid Spain it was doubtful whether it could do so, on account of the lack of funds and on account of the disorders84 of the country. If aid should be sent, the insubordination of the French sailors would be in danger of contaminating the Spanish and would impede85 their own usefulness. He concluded that there was very little hope of aid. Only in case that England attacked France would there be any reasonable hope of assistance.
After discussing the unhappy relations with France, the minister took up each of the other nations in turn. Prussia and the Netherlands were allies of England, so must be counted as enemies. Of the small States, the Courts of Lisbon, Naples, and Turin could be counted on as friendly neutrals. All that could be hoped for from Turkey, Tripoli, and Algiers was that they would not injure Spain; but not so with Tunis and Morocco, which were actually threatening and were probably being reckoned on by England. The Court of Vienna was not open to new enterprises of war or new alliances. Sweden would not be a safe ally, and besides would demand a subsidy86. Denmark[436] also would have to be subsidized, and then would join only in case that Russia entered also. The latter was already engaged in war with Sweden[404] and Turkey, and was being menaced by England and Prussia. In the absence of money and support she would have to yield. If Spain had a full treasury87 to open to Russia and would enter a war against England, engaging her Baltic fleet, there was no doubt that Catherine II would form an alliance. But Spain had not the treasury and was not in a position to undertake a war for the benefit of Russia. If, however, Spain could not honorably avoid war and should be attacked, some arrangement with Russia for reciprocal aid would be useful. Steps had been taken with that in view, but nothing definite had been done. The United States would be useful allies, since they could harass88 English commerce and threaten Canada. They had been sounded and seemed not unfavorable. But they would desire the navigation of the Mississippi, which would open to them a door for contraband89 trade with Mexico. And besides this they might in the end be enabled to insist on the boundary of Florida which they had unjustly arranged with England, usurping90 a large part from Spain.
After considering the foreign relations of Spain, Floridablanca reminded the ministers that they ought also to reflect on internal affairs—the army, the navy, the treasury, and economic conditions. The army was weak, he said, but could soon be increased as much as would be necessary in a maritime91 war. The navy was well equipped at the time, but provision would have to be made for re?nforcements and supplies. All of this would occasion much expense, and the treasury was scarcely sufficient for peace. It would be necessary to have recourse to credit. Bad harvests and weak administration of justice, he said, had increased the cost of provisions. New taxes could not be imposed without causing resistance, especially in view of the evil example of France.
These reflections on the conditions of Spain at home and abroad, the Count said, would have to be kept in mind in considering the plan for a convention which England had[437] proposed. On the other hand, they must not lose sight of the loss that would be caused to the rights of Spain in the two Americas. They must remember the danger to Spanish commerce and navigation and to the quietude of the colonial establishments. They must also consider the evil example that would be given to other nations by a concession92 to Great Britain, as well as “the incentive93 to England to increase her pretensions and exact other condescensions if we enter easily into the first.”[405] From these reflections it is evident that Floridablanca had decided94 to yield to England, but with at least a show of resistance.
Such a communication from the prime minister to the Council of State would lead one to infer that the Spanish Court was about to desert the French alliance, and was willing to sacrifice something for the friendship of England. But if this is only an inference the communications with the English ambassador at about the same time leave no doubt of the fact. At a conference on September 13 Floridablanca declared to Fitzherbert that His Catholic Majesty regarded the National Assembly with the utmost horror. He was extremely averse95 to adopting the kind of treaty proposed by that body. He feared for the influence on his own authority that a recognition of the French Assembly would have. If, however, England should press too hardly in the present conjuncture, the Count declared, Spain would be compelled to accept the alliance of France on any condition. But if an accommodation could be speedily arranged, His Catholic Majesty intended to reject the treaty proposed by the French Assembly and to establish an intimate concert and union with England. The Count informed the British ambassador that he had submitted the latter’s projet and observations to the Council of State. That body had decided that it would be necessary to send to America in order to locate definitely the northern and southern limits of the Spanish settlements as proposed. Since this would delay the settlement of the Nootka affair, he suggested the immediate conclusion of a preliminary agreement, which would secure to[438] Great Britain by general, but sufficient, stipulations, the objects that she had in view. This would put a stop to the armaments, give time to arrange a system of union between Spain and England, and allow His Catholic Majesty to disengage himself entirely from France.[406]
At this conference, on September 13, Floridablanca had said that he would present a plan for the temporary settlement which he had suggested. Fitzherbert had found it best in his dealings with the Spanish Court to be first on the ground. Consequently on the following day he sent to the Count a projet for the proposed temporary agreement. On the same evening Floridablanca presented his plan in the form of a counter-projet. The next day, September 15, they held another conference to consider the plans. The English ambassador labored96 in vain to induce the Spanish minister to admit some alterations97 in the latter’s plan, so that it would be acceptable to the British Court. The Count insisted that he had conceded all that his colleagues and the King would allow him to grant. He earnestly requested Fitzherbert to transmit it to the Duke of Leeds in its existing form. He felt confident that the terms would be accepted by the Court of London. As a means of shortening by some weeks the continuance of the present expensive armaments, he would send instructions authorizing98 Campo, the Spanish ambassador at London, to sign it in case His Britannic Majesty should approve it.[407] Since neither of these plans was accepted, it is not necessary to study their terms in detail.
This shows the influence that the action of the French Assembly had on the relations of the three countries. In view of it, Spain despaired of getting any assistance from France, and, further, it promised to be the occasion for a rearrangement of alliances, Spain breaking the traditional union with France and arranging an intimate alliance with England.
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1
negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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defer
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| vt.推迟，拖延；vi.(to)遵从，听从，服从 | |
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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amicable
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| adj.和平的，友好的；友善的 | |
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antiquated
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| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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stipulation
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| n.契约，规定，条文；条款说明 | |
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modification
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| n.修改，改进，缓和，减轻 | |
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modifications
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| n.缓和( modification的名词复数 )；限制；更改；改变 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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gratitude
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| adj.感激，感谢 | |
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reciprocate
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| v.往复运动；互换；回报，酬答 | |
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outlet
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| n.出口/路；销路；批发商店；通风口；发泄 | |
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embarrassment
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| n.尴尬；使人为难的人(事物)；障碍；窘迫 | |
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isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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annul
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| v.宣告…无效，取消，废止 | |
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annulled
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| v.宣告无效( annul的过去式和过去分词 )；取消；使消失；抹去 | |
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warded
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| 有锁孔的，有钥匙榫槽的 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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succumb
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| v.屈服，屈从；死 | |
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vengeance
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| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
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ratify
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| v.批准，认可，追认 | |
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postponed
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| vt.& vi.延期，缓办，（使）延迟vt.把…放在次要地位；[语]把…放在后面（或句尾）vi.（疟疾等）延缓发作（或复发） | |
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postpone
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| v.延期，推迟 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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perpetuating
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| perpetuate的现在进行式 | |
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marine
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| adj.海的；海生的；航海的；海事的；n.水兵 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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disarm
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| v.解除武装，回复平常的编制，缓和 | |
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scrutinize
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| n.详细检查，细读 | |
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41
tardy
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| adj.缓慢的，迟缓的 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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ratifying
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| v.批准，签认（合约等）( ratify的现在分词 ) | |
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precipitately
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| adv.猛进地 | |
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confidentially
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| ad.秘密地，悄悄地 | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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47
circumspection
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| n.细心，慎重 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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friendliness
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| n.友谊，亲切，亲密 | |
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50
umbrage
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| n.不快；树荫 | |
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51
amicably
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| adv.友善地 | |
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52
ultimatum
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| n.最后通牒 | |
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undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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speculations
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| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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formulated
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| v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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mortifying
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| adj.抑制的，苦修的v.使受辱( mortify的现在分词 )；伤害（人的感情）；克制；抑制（肉体、情感等） | |
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majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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preamble
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| n.前言；序文 | |
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pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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pretension
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| n.要求；自命，自称；自负 | |
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illicit
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| adj.非法的，禁止的，不正当的 | |
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dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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exclusion
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| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
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jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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hindrance
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| n.妨碍，障碍 | |
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pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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stipulated
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| vt.& vi.规定；约定adj.[法]合同规定的 | |
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domain
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| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
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cape
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| n.海角，岬；披肩，短披风 | |
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authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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ratifications
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| n.正式批准，认可( ratification的名词复数 ) | |
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rumor
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| n.谣言，谣传，传说 | |
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overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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interpretations
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| n.解释( interpretation的名词复数 )；表演；演绎；理解 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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conciliation
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| n.调解，调停 | |
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ominous
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| adj.不祥的，不吉的，预兆的，预示的 | |
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usurper
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| n. 篡夺者, 僭取者 | |
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disorders
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| n.混乱( disorder的名词复数 )；凌乱；骚乱；（身心、机能）失调 | |
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impede
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| v.妨碍，阻碍，阻止 | |
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subsidy
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| n.补助金，津贴 | |
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treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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harass
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| vt.使烦恼，折磨，骚扰 | |
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contraband
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| n.违禁品，走私品 | |
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usurping
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| 篡夺，霸占( usurp的现在分词 )； 盗用； 篡夺，篡权 | |
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maritime
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| adj.海的，海事的，航海的，近海的，沿海的 | |
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concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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incentive
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| n.刺激；动力；鼓励；诱因；动机 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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averse
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| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
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labored
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| adj.吃力的，谨慎的v.努力争取(for)( labor的过去式和过去分词 )；苦干；详细分析；（指引擎）缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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alterations
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| n.改动( alteration的名词复数 )；更改；变化；改变 | |
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authorizing
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| 授权，批准，委托( authorize的现在分词 ) | |
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