In the middle of October the “Gazette de Leide” printed a letter from Madrid, dated September 24, saying:
We are assured that the negotiation3 with England is in a good way and is about to terminate in a friendly manner.[409]
This was written a few days after the Spanish Court had decided4 to abandon the family compact and form an intimate alliance with England as studied in the last chapter. The next issue of the same paper printed a letter from London, dated October 12, which had a very different tone:
The warlike appearances have greatly increased in the last eight days. The next dispatches from Fitzherbert, replying to the last English demand, will probably decide for peace or war. On our side all preparations for a rupture5 have already been made.[410]
This was written a fortnight after news had reached London of Spain’s proposed change. Instead of receiving the friendly advances of the Spanish Court in the spirit in which Floridablanca hoped, and apparently6 expected, the Court of St. James accepted them as an announcement that the French alliance had failed, and an acknowledgment that Spain was at the mercy of England. This is really what they meant. Instead of following Spain’s example and giving up some of her pretensions8, England took advantage of Spanish helplessness and gave Spain ten days to decide whether she would accept war in the face of almost insurmountable difficulties, or peace with humiliating concessions9. Much discontent had arisen in England at the length to which the negotiation was being drawn11 out. It was considered inconsistent with the decisive tone at the beginning. The object to be gained was thought to be hardly worth such an expensive armament continued for so many months.[440] The ministry12 was being severely13 criticised, and felt the necessity of forcing a decision.[411]
Although feeling keenly the criticism of the armament, yet the Government was unwilling14 to disarm15 until Spain should have yielded. On September 10, in consequence of the repeated requests from Spain for a mutual16 disarmament, Leeds directed Fitzherbert to represent to Floridablanca that, with every wish for an amicable17 adjustment, it did not appear to the British Government expedient18 to disarm until such adjustment should be secured.[412] For the same reason the ministry was unwilling to accept any temporary arrangement, such as Floridablanca had suggested, which would postpone19 the final settlement to a later date. Consequently, on October 2 two drafts of a treaty were sent to Fitzherbert. They contained substantially the same terms except that one provided for the definite demarkation of the limits of Spanish exclusive sovereignty, and the other did not. These embodied21 Great Britain’s ultimatum. Fitzherbert was to give the Spanish Court ten days in which to decide on an answer. If at the end of that time an answer had not been received the ambassador was to quit Madrid.
After sending the ultimatum the British Court redoubled its energies in preparing for war. One is almost led to believe, from the vigor22 displayed, that war was desired and that the ultimatum was prepared with the deliberate intention of forcing a breach23. In a letter of October 22 Leeds asked Auckland, the British ambassador at The Hague, to communicate to the Government of the Republic the probability of a rupture. He expected in a few days to send copies of all the correspondence relating to the discussion that Auckland might lay them before the Dutch Government. Although it might happen, he said, that England would be obliged to commence the hostilities24, yet he had no doubt that every circumstance would convince mankind that “Great Britain was not the aggressor in the war which may, in a few days, disturb the general tranquillity25.” After speaking of the cordiality of the Dutch Government, he continued:
It will also, I trust, be understood in Holland how material it is to enable us to act with vigor in the outset. I therefore hope that there[441] will be no difficulty in furnishing some naval26 succors27 before the expiration28 of the two months stipulated29. It would be to be wished, if possible, that a detachment be sent immediately on the news of hostilities, and that it should amount to 8 ships of the line and 8 frigates31. If, however, so much can not be obtained, even a less number will be a material object.[413]
A notion of the popular view of the impending32 war may be gleaned33 from a letter written by Storer to Auckland on the same day that the secretary for foreign affairs wrote the one just studied. Storer said that all of the officers were in high spirits at the prospect34 of a voyage to Mexico. He thought that the Nootka affair was merely a pretext35 for a war that had been previously36 determined37 upon. He said:
Pitt is tired of peace. He bullied38 France so effectually three years ago[414] that he is determined to try the same thing with Spain.
He thought that the negotiators themselves did not know what would happen.[415] If the British ministers were not actually trying to force a war, it is, at least, evident that they were willing to accept it should it come; and that they were not willing to make any considerable concessions to preserve peace.
The ultimatum, with instructions for his private guidance, reached Fitzherbert October 12. He was told that Floridablanca’s proposal for a temporary agreement was not admissible since it would leave the matter open to a subsequent discussion. It was important that it should be settled at once. If Floridablanca’s proposal had not been accompanied by assurances that indicated a sincere desire for accommodation with England, it would have been doubtful, he was told, whether anything could have been hoped from a further continuance of the negotiation. The prospect for a speedy settlement and the chance for dissolving the family compact compensated39 largely for the inconvenience of further delay, but that delay could be only for a few days. The Count’s committing himself on points of so much delicacy40 indicated that the Spanish Court had determined to go a considerable length. His language respecting France was[442] consistent with his character. The temporary arrangement proposed by him admitted the British claims in general terms, but the indefiniteness of its terms would leave ground for disputes. Fitzherbert was to remind the Count that he had, in principle, admitted the justice of the British claims. The present articles, he was told, did no more than to secure definitely those rights. Their rejection41 would be considered as a proof either that Spain was not sincerely desirous of an accommodation or that she was unwilling to grant distinctly the security which the Spanish minister had argued to be in fact contained in the articles which he had suggested. The question as to security of navigation, commerce, and fisheries in that part of the world depended on whether Spain did or did not insist on her exclusive claim to the continent in question and the seas adjacent. This could be decided as well at one time as another. The question of restitution42 should depend on whether Spain rested her case on her pretended exclusive sovereignty or prior discovery, or whether she could prove that she had actual occupation of Nootka prior to the time when lands were purchased and buildings erected43 there by British subjects.[416] The only matter that could afford an excuse for delay was the determination of limits. Such an article would seem to be desirable to both sides, but His Britannic Majesty44 would not object seriously to the omission45 of such demarkation. The great expense of maintaining the armament ready for service and the just expectations of the public could not admit of further delay in coming to a decision on the question of peace or war. Fitzherbert was to communicate this fact to Floridablanca in the least offensive but the most explicit46 manner possible. Ten days was considered a sufficient time for the Spanish answer.
On the question of disarming47 in the event of an amicable settlement, Leeds suggested that mutual confidence would be a stronger security than any formal stipulations. England did not wish to reduce to a peace establishment at once, on account of the French armament and because of the fact that[443] Russia seemed unwilling to adopt a moderate policy toward Turkey. It was incumbent49 on the allies to prevent the dismemberment of Turkey.[417]
On October 13, the next day after receiving the above instructions and the projets of a convention accompanying them, Fitzherbert had a conference with the Spanish minister, at which the latter’s language led the former to doubt the possibility of an amicable settlement. At an interview on the following day the British minister presented parts of the drafts of the ultimatum. The Count’s reception of these was so unfavorable that Fitzherbert thought best to warn all of the British consuls50 in Spain of the prospect of an immediate30 rupture. He wrote to his home Government that it seemed impossible to obtain a convention with a demarcation of limits. That no means of effecting a pacification51 might be left untried, Fitzherbert delivered to Floridablanca on October 15 a translation of the entire projet without the demarcation of limits. The Count’s reply of the next day was still in terms extremely wide of the English proposals, but it revived Fitzherbert’s hopes of engaging the Spanish minister by degrees to accede52 to His Britannic Majesty’s demands.[418]
In this reply of October 16 Floridablanca said that there were considerable difficulties in the way of agreeing to the English projet. He submitted some observations justifying53 some small but substantial changes which he had suggested. He remarked that the British projet, in demanding that the buildings and lands should be restored to the British subjects, assumed that they had once possessed54 them. He declared that this assumption was untrue; that the British subjects had only been attempting to make an establishment, from which the Spanish commander had prevented them. If they had ever bought land, as pretended, they had failed to take possession of it.
[444]
Before examining Floridablanca’s observations further it may be well to remark that this was the point of fact on which it was impossible for the two Courts to agree. Each relied on the statements made by its own subjects and these statements were conflicting. Meares told of his purchase of land and his erection of a building thereon in 1788 in such a manner as to lead the British Cabinet to believe that he had formed a substantial English settlement, and that the establishment was still there in the spring of 1789 when Martinez arrived. On the other hand, Martinez’s account showed that when he arrived at Nootka there were no evidences of any British establishment, but that the expedition under Colnett, which arrived two months later, came to form an establishment. Neither was wholly right nor wholly wrong.[419]
Floridablanca said that it was very difficult and almost impossible for Spain to consent that British subjects should land in unoccupied places to trade with the natives and form establishments. Places without a substantial Spanish occupation, he said, might be found almost anywhere along the coast of America. This clause, he said, ought to be omitted from the projet. Fitzherbert had proposed that British vessels55 should not approach within 10 leagues of places occupied by Spain. The Count insisted that the distance was too short. Instead of the expression, “occupied by Spain,” he would substitute the expression, “belonging to Spain.” With his observations the Spanish minister submitted a counter projet which embodied them. In his letter accompanying these documents, Floridablanca said that he had proposed a special junta56 to consider the English propositions. However, if Fitzherbert would agree to the Spanish counter projet, he would venture to propose it to the King and see if the matter could not be settled before the meeting of the junta.[420]
The Spanish minister had decided that Spain would have to yield to the English demands. He was directing his efforts toward an attempt to induce the British ambassador to modify those demands so that they would give as little[445] offense57 as possible to Spanish pride. But other Spanish officials were not so ready to yield as the prime minister was.
Fitzherbert did not accept the count’s terms. He insisted on the British projet as it stood. The special junta was summoned. It was composed of eight of the principal ministers, not including Floridablanca. The order naming the members was dated October 19. The next day a note requested them to hasten, for the ambassador was very urgent. Sessions were held on the 21st, 22d, 24th, and 25th. The English projet was examined article by article.
The findings of the junta furnish an excellent notion of the feeling of Spaniards respecting the dispute. It was declared that Martinez’s conduct at Nootka had not been contrary to international law nor an insult to the English flag. What he had done was to prevent the forming of an establishment in a place belonging to the Spanish dominions58, in which, by virtue59 of treaties made before all Europe and guaranteed by England herself, no foreign disembarkation was permitted without a just motive60, and much less the forming of military or commercial establishments. Even granting that the proceedings61 of Martinez had been culpable62, and, by a distortion of ideas, that the resistance to a usurpation63 could be considered an insult, Spain had already given England such satisfaction as was compatible with her dignity. The increasing of the British pretensions while the Spanish were being moderated showed that the Nootka affair was only a mask to cover England’s hostile designs of taking advantage of the revolution in France to attack the divided House of Bourbon.
Referring to a clause in the British projet providing for the return of any vessels that might have been seized since April, 1789, the conclusions of the junta declared that this showed England’s design of sending new expeditions. They would not limit themselves to fisheries nor to trading with the natives. They intended to form fortified64 establishments and construct vessels there to carry on trade with all of New Spain. Their first aggressions would lead to others. The weak and extended Spanish dominions afforded opportunities for their activity. There were many places that[446] Spain had not been able and probably never would be able to people. The English pretension7 was the more irritating since it extended also to all the coasts of South America. If Spain should grant their demands she might expect in the end to surrender to them all of the commerce of Peru and New Spain.
The English offer of not allowing their subjects to approach within 10 leagues of any place occupied by Spain was useless, the junta declared, since they demanded the privilege of disembarking in all unoccupied places. By this means they could approach insensibly to those that were occupied. If the Spanish governors should attempt to prevent them, it would lead to disputes and to new negotiations65 which would afford new opportunities for aggressions. They would finally take all of these countries from Spain.
The English assumption of rights in South America was branded as an infamous66 artifice67. Although Spain had for three centuries been in exclusive and peaceful possession of all South America, the English were now pretending that they had equal rights to unoccupied places. Appealing directly to the King, they said:
Strange, astonishing, unheard-of it is, Se?or, that England should dare to pretend that Your Majesty should authorize68 and adopt a stipulation48 which prohibits mutually the forming of establishments there as long as the subjects of other powers shall not attempt to do so; adding that the respective subjects shall have the right of disembarking in those places and building huts and other temporary structures for objects connected with their fisheries. … The English pretend that all South America is open to all nations, and that its territories shall belong to the first that desires to occupy them.
England, they declared, was now exacting69 more than she had dared to ask in 1763, when she had so great an advantage. She had forgotten her guaranty in the treaty of Utrecht that Spain’s American dominions should be restored as they had been in the reign20 of King Charles II, and should remain in that condition. If Spain should grant these privileges to England, other nations would claim them under the “most-favored-nation clause” of the same treaty.
The King was asked to consider how his father had resisted England when there was much less at stake and when[447] the Spanish army and navy were in no better condition. In case of war England’s attention, they said, would be directed not against the Peninsula, but against the colonies. Havana Vera Cruz, Cartagena, Porto Rico, Santo Domingo, Trinidad, Caracas, Montevideo, and Buenos Ayres were considered likely points of attack. All of these were declared ready to defend themselves because of their superior garrisons70 and of climatic and strategic advantages.
Floridablanca had inclosed with other papers for the junta a copy of the observations on Spain’s relations to other powers, which he had prepared early in September on receipt of the news of the decree of the National Assembly.[421] Because of the frankness shown in other matters the junta said that they were encouraged to volunteer their own observations on this. Speaking of Prussia as England’s most powerful ally, they said that her King was not in a position to dictate71 terms to all of the northern powers, consequently he would have to consider his own defense72. In view of this and of the existing state of Turkish affairs they concluded that England’s position was not an especially strong one. As to possible support for Spain, they said that France could not be blind to her interests and to her obligations under the family compact. To avoid the evil effects on the Spanish fleet of insubordination in the French navy the two could operate separately. Spain could probably not get any aid from the United States. Neither were they likely to join England. Portugal could not aid except by remaining neutral. There was nothing to ask or expect from Sardinia, Naples, Venice, or Turkey, and the African states ought to give little concern. As to Russia they were more hopeful. They suggested that it would not be impossible for Spain, by offering commercial advantages, to enter an alliance with Russia, Sweden, and Denmark and secure their help against England. They respectfully submitted to the King and his prime minister the idea of a treaty with Russia defining territorial73 limits on the western coast of America and guaranteeing each other against English aggressions on that coast.
[448]
The junta then offered several observations on the harshness of the English demands. England was offering nothing, they said, in return for the sacrifices demanded of Spain. She had turned a deaf ear to Spain’s repeated requests for a reciprocal disarmament, hence there was good reason to fear that she was trying to force a breach. It was plain that she intended to form new establishments in the Spanish dominions. She proposed to deprive Spain of the power of repelling74 the intrusions which she meditated76 by allowing no recourse except a report of the matter to the home governments and a new convention in each case. This would mean subjection and a continual state of war. She was inviting77 other nations to help her despoil78 Spain. She was insisting on the establishment of a principle which would allow usurpations in every uninhabited place. The whole Spanish dominions would shortly be destroyed. Her demands were as injurious as could be made after the most disgraceful war. If this cession10 should be made through fear in a time of profound peace, it would encourage still greater claims. Authorized79 by such a document other nations would form common cause, and the vast continent of the Indies would be exposed to a general occupation. Even in an unfortunate war Spain would only have to come to an understanding with her enemies, and there would be hope for favorable alliances and better terms with less sacrifices.
Finally the junta gave their conclusions as to the answer that should be made to England’s ultimatum. The concessions now demanded, they said, would inevitably80 lead Spain into a war. She would then suffer all that the King now wished to avoid, and England would certainly accept no less afterwards. In case that this projet should be rejected and war should ensue, what treaty, it was asked, could be concluded more absolutely ruinous, even in the remote chance of complete prostration81, than the convention which was now proposed? Therefore the junta could not in any manner accept the unjust terms contained in the English ultimatum. They recognized that this would mean war. They advised preparation at once to repel75 hostile attacks and an immediate[449] search for allies even before giving a final answer to the English ambassador.[422]
On October 25, the day of the last session of the junta, its conclusions were hurried off to Floridablanca to be laid before the King. Their reception and influence on the negotiation will be studied in the next chapter.
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1
ultimatum
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| n.最后通牒 | |
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defiance
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| n.挑战，挑衅，蔑视，违抗 | |
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negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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rupture
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| n.破裂；(关系的)决裂；v.(使)破裂 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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pretension
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| n.要求；自命，自称；自负 | |
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pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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cession
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| n.割让，转让 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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disarm
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| v.解除武装，回复平常的编制，缓和 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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amicable
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| adj.和平的，友好的；友善的 | |
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expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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postpone
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| v.延期，推迟 | |
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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vigor
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| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
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breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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succors
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| n.救助，帮助（尤指需要时）( succor的名词复数 )v.给予帮助( succor的第三人称单数 ) | |
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expiration
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| n.终结，期满，呼气，呼出物 | |
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stipulated
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| vt.& vi.规定；约定adj.[法]合同规定的 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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frigates
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| n.快速军舰( frigate的名词复数 ) | |
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impending
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| a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
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gleaned
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| v.一点点地收集（资料、事实）( glean的过去式和过去分词 )；（收割后）拾穗 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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bullied
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| adj.被欺负了v.恐吓，威逼( bully的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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compensated
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| 补偿，报酬( compensate的过去式和过去分词 )； 给（某人）赔偿（或赔款） | |
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delicacy
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| n.精致，细微，微妙，精良；美味，佳肴 | |
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rejection
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| n.拒绝，被拒，抛弃，被弃 | |
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restitution
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| n.赔偿；恢复原状 | |
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ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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omission
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| n.省略，删节；遗漏或省略的事物，冗长 | |
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explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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disarming
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| adj.消除敌意的，使人消气的v.裁军( disarm的现在分词 )；使息怒 | |
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stipulation
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| n.契约，规定，条文；条款说明 | |
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incumbent
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| adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的 | |
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consuls
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| 领事( consul的名词复数 )； （古罗马共和国时期）执政官 （古罗马共和国及其军队的最高首长，同时共有两位，每年选举一次） | |
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pacification
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| n. 讲和，绥靖，平定 | |
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accede
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| v.应允，同意 | |
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justifying
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| 证明…有理( justify的现在分词 )； 为…辩护； 对…作出解释； 为…辩解（或辩护） | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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offense
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| n.犯规，违法行为；冒犯，得罪 | |
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dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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59
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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60
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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61
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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62
culpable
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| adj.有罪的，该受谴责的 | |
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63
usurpation
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| n.篡位；霸占 | |
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64
fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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65
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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66
infamous
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| adj.声名狼藉的，臭名昭著的，邪恶的 | |
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67
artifice
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| n.妙计，高明的手段；狡诈，诡计 | |
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68
authorize
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| v.授权，委任；批准，认可 | |
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69
exacting
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| adj.苛求的，要求严格的 | |
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70
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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71
dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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72
defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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73
territorial
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| adj.领土的，领地的 | |
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74
repelling
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| v.击退( repel的现在分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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75
repel
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| v.击退，抵制，拒绝，排斥 | |
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76
meditated
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| 深思，沉思，冥想( meditate的过去式和过去分词 )； 内心策划，考虑 | |
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77
inviting
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| adj.诱人的，引人注目的 | |
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78
despoil
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| v.夺取，抢夺 | |
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79
authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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80
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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81
prostration
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| n. 平伏, 跪倒, 疲劳 | |
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