Argentina has 14 Provinces and 11 National Territories, including the district of the Federal Capital, the city of Buenos Aires. Each of the Provinces has a Governor and a Parliament of its own, chosen by the local electorate2, and possesses, as has been said, a very large measure of autonomy in the management of its own fiscal3 and other internal affairs. Other large areas which are not yet judged by Congress to have attained5 sufficient development to be able to support the financial burdens and status of autonomous6 Provinces have remained National Territories under the direct control of the National Government. The Municipal Council of the Federal Capital has wide administrative7 powers, always subject, however, to the sanction of the National Executive, and the “Lord Mayor” (Intendente Municipal) of Buenos Aires is appointed by the National Government.
The National Territory likely to be the first promoted to the rank of a Province is that of the Pampa Central; now one of the chief cereal areas of the Republic.
[63]
The Argentine Provinces and National Territories are the following:
PROVINCES
1. Buenos Aires.
2. Santa Fé.
3. Entre Rios.
4. Corrientes.
5. Córdoba.
6. San Luis.
7. Santiago del Estero.
8. Mendoza.
9. San Juan.
10. La Rioja.
11. Catamarca.
12. Tucumán.
13. Salta.
14. Jujuy.
TERRITORIES
1. Federal Capital.
2. Misiones.
3. Formosa.
4. Chaco.
5. Pampa Central.
6. Neuquen.
7. Rio Negro.
8. Chubut.
9. Santa Cruz.
10. Tierra del Fuego.
11. Los Andes.
It should be added that all Public Acts and Judicial8 Decisions of one Province have legal effect in all the others. Sometimes, however, conflicts of jurisdiction9 afford matter for the decision of the Federal High Court.
Uruguay is divided into 19 Departments, each of which has a Governor appointed by the National Executive and an administrative Council chosen by local popular vote. The Departments of Uruguay are:
Tucuarembo.
Cerro Largo10.
Durazno.
Paysandú.
Salto.
Minas.
Florida.
Artígas.
Rocha.
Rivera.
Treinta y tres.
Soriano.
Rio Negro.
San José.
Colonia.
Flores.
Maldonado.
Canelones.
Montevideo.
[64]
It is perhaps not convenient here to discuss the comparative advantages of the two systems; but it must be said that evidence of the defects inherent to the qualities of both is not lacking. In Argentina the Provinces and in Uruguay the National Governments have frequently shown and still show a disposition11 to make ells out of the inches given them by their respective constitutions.
In Argentina this disposition was considerably12 scotched13 though not killed by the Centralizing policy of Dr. Figueroa Alcorta, the immediate14 predecessor15 in the Presidential chair of the recently deceased Dr. Roque Saenz Pe?a. Dr. Alcorta’s policy was fundamentally good and was carried out by him with, doubtless, the best of motives16, if the manner of its execution was rather Gilbertian.
The evils he attacked arose from the fact that each of the more distant Provinces was practically under the almost autocratic domination of a great land-owning family; the descendants, usually, of the lords of the soil in the patriarchal days of the River Plate countries.
In those Provinces these families and their nearer ramifications17 formed powerful oligarchies18; ruling over people who in their turn were the descendants of those who in bygone days had been little else than the vassals19 of the Great House. The head of the leading family was the Governor of his Province by an almost acknowledged right of inheritance; while his sons, nephews, and sons-in-law occupied the chief posts in the Provincial20 Government.
It is not too much to say that these people had, in measure as the National Government became more and more perfected in its conduct and outlook, become an insufferable obstacle to uniformity of ordered conduct of public affairs. Especially was this so in financial matters.
The outlying and, mostly, poorer Provinces were always needing, or at any rate wanting, money; and at the same time not over-nice about their lack of unpledged security when they found a European financier, as untrammelled by[65] scruple22 as they themselves, willing to engineer a further Provincial loan under the independent borrowing powers given by the Constitution to each Province. Some of them also wished to continue and even increase the issue of notes the value of which was shockingly depreciated23, and which were only legal tender within the boundaries of the particular Province. Almost in vain, the National Government issued diplomatic and consular24 circulars to the effect that Provincial loans were not Argentine National loans, and that it, the National Government, would only hold itself responsible for the latter. The financiers who floated new Provincial loans were well aware that the majority of those persons whom they could induce to take up such bonds knew little or nothing of the distinction between National and Provincial. The loan was an Argentine one; puffed25 with perfectly26 true statistics of the progress and prosperity of the Argentine Republic—without too much insistence27 on that of the particular Province concerned. Besides, these financiers and, possibly, some of their clients calculated on the extreme probability of the National Government, if an awkward situation really did arise, not allowing its Provinces to be declared defaulters in Europe, because of the consequent slur28 which must inevitably29, though unjustly, fall on the name of “Argentina”; a name the credit of which the untiring and scrupulous30 efforts of the National Government have built up since the crisis of 1891.
The Provincial Oligarchies had also other ways of jockeying National Government. They would ask for all sorts of things, and if refused would proceed to rant31 shamelessly in the Senate. This was blackmail32, nothing more nor less; but frequently effective, since Provincial Governors are practically always members of the National Senate; in which the President must, obviously, have a majority if he is to carry on the Government.
Such situations Dr. Figueroa Alcorta determined33 to take[66] in hand; and the only way of doing this was to break up the offending Oligarchies.
Much of the humour of his doing so lay in the fact that he owed his high post to an original miscalculation of his character as that of a pleasant enough figure-head certain to be docile34 in the hands of the wire-pullers. Therefore he was appointed Vice-President to be a negligible quantity under the Presidency35 of Dr. Manuel Quintana. On whose death he, ipso facto, under the Constitution, became acting36 President for the remainder of Dr. Quintana’s term of office. The developments of Dr. Figueroa Alcorta were as much a surprise to Argentine politicians as were those of Bret Harte’s “Heathen Chinee” to his associates in “the game he did not understand.” And realization37 came as late in the day in the one case as in the other.
A veritable epidemic38 of local Revolutions sprang up in one after the other of the oligarchically39 ruled Provinces. On each occasion an “Interventor” was, as is provided by the Constitution for such cases, sent down by the National Government to enquire40 into the causes of the disturbance41, and particularly to ascertain42 if the Province concerned were being ruled “in accordance with the Constitution and democratic principles.” If the answer to this last question were found to be in the affirmative, National troops could be sent down to support the existing Provincial Government; if in the negative, the ruling party, including, of course, the Governor, could be deposed44 and a successor appointed by the National Government in his stead.
As a result it gradually (but not till it was very nearly all over) dawned on the general intelligence of the country that the Governors who had been found to have ruled their Provinces “in accordance with the constitution, etc.,” were faithful supporters of the Presidential policy; whilst those who had been deposed for misrule happened, strangely enough, to be those who had kicked over, or shown an overt45 disposition to kick over, the Presidential traces.
[67]
This appealed to the public sense of humour and “Revolución de arriba” (Revolution from above, i.e. instigated46 in high quarters[13]) became a catch phrase. Thus were the Oligarchies brought to naught47 and the central power greatly strengthened thereby48.
Dr. Figueroa Alcorta’s crowning coup49 d’état was, however, his shutting Congress out of its own Palace in consequence of its conspired50 refusal to pass one of his budgets. One fine day, the National Senators and Deputies on reaching the Congress building found it in possession of troops who refused them admission. Remonstrance51 was unavailing, and they perforce returned home. Meanwhile, the President passed the Budget himself, as the Constitution gives him power to do “when Congress is not sitting.”
In the result Dr. Figueroa Alcorta’s Budget (which was a perfectly wise and necessary one) remained operative and the officer who had commanded the troops was heavily fined for disrespect shown to the sacred offices of Senator and Deputy. The gallant52 officer’s plea in defence that the President whose orders he had obeyed on that occasion was, as constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, his Military Superior, availed him nothing. Nobody else was one penny the worse. Possibly, the payment of Colonel Calazza’s fine came “de arriba” like the Revolutions.
Soon afterwards Dr. Figueroa Alcorta was the courteous53 and diplomatic host of Personages (including the Infanta Isabella) at the 1910 Centenary Festivities; and, shortly after that again, vacated the Presidential chair in favour of Dr. Saenz Pe?a, his successor “by consent.” The usual and graceful54, though officially unacknowledged, custom in Argentina being that the Presidential Election shall follow a prearranged course.[14]
[68]
With the matter of elections Dr. Saenz Pe?a’s name is, as has been said, intimately and honourably55 associated, and it may be repeated that by his death the Republic lost one of its most broad-minded and straightforward56 statesmen.
Up to the passing of his Electoral Reform Law, no self-respecting private citizen ever dreamed of voting: simply because if he favoured the Government policy his doing so would be a mere57 work of supererogation, while if he held opposition58 views it would be sheer waste of time and trouble on his part; and if he were a provincial voter he would certainly find himself the object of unpleasant attention by the police, whose really chief duty was to “conduct” elections to the satisfaction of the ruling party. Anyhow, his voting could not influence the preordained result of the election one way or the other. Voting was done by the mere deposit of a “Libreta” or certificate of citizenship59, and libretas deposited in favour of the ruling party were subject to little scrutiny60 as to whether the persons named in them were alive or dead. They were thrown in at the polling stations in bundles. Some were bought; though at a low figure, because there were thousands of blank libretas at Government House ready to be filled in by quick-writing clerks in the very remote event of any booth being reported to have received a disconcerting number of votes adverse61 to the Government.
In the Provinces the proceedings63 were rougher and readier; the comparative smallness of the communities enabling the Police Commissary to know the political views of all persons in his district. Did a would-be opponent of the ruling powers heave in sight, he was hustled64 as if to make room for others who had arrived before him, and if he were still foolish enough to persist in trying to vote he was arrested for making a disturbance, and locked up till the election was over. The Provincial Police Authorities could hardly be blamed for their share in this scandal, because the successful conduct of elections was really a sine qua non condition of[69] their tenure66 of office. Failure meant for them being almost immediately superseded67.
In Uruguay, no matter whether Reds or Whites (the two great political parties) were in power, the rural population, the true backbone68 of the agricultural country, were perennially69 in opposition: because they found that the atmosphere of the capital somehow or another always infected their rulers with ideas of government which, however splendid they might be in theory, were more often than not quite out of harmony with, and often contradictory70 to, practical agricultural needs and conditions.
Thus, to cite an instance often referred to in this regard, it is not long since a German agricultural expert, specially21 imported with the best of intentions by the Government, showed them that wheat allowed to mature for a while in stacks had a greater commercial value in Europe than that thrashed simultaneously71 with reaping and shipped immediately. This is, in itself, undeniable fact; from which, however, the Uruguayan Government drew the conclusion that it would be well to pass a law making it obligatory72, under penalty for not doing so, on every farmer in the country to stack all his wheat for a certain period before sending it for export. This proposal naturally raised an outcry throughout the country. Because a practice which presents little practical inconvenience and much advantage in an European country, where small wheat fields and a more or less damp climate are the rule, would be monstrously73 ridiculous in a land where grain is grown by the square league, and where, accidents of weather apart, the standing74 crops are well dried by the sun. Just imagine the enormous expense involved in stacking wheat over such vast areas as are covered by cereals in the River Plate countries. In which countries, moreover, the greatest of all difficulties in the way of production is the scarcity75 of labour! The stacking method would cost vastly more than the difference in the value between stacked and unstacked grain.
[70]
Needless to say, this brilliantly conceived law was never passed; but the idea of it stands as an example of the doctrinaire76 tendencies of Montevidean statesmen of which the rural industries complain.
That there is a mysterious something in the air of Montevideo which influences men in the direction of abstract idealism, and at the same time blinds them to facts which their cherished theories will not fit, seems undeniable. But it is unlikely that Uruguay will ever again be plunged77 into the ruinous throes of Revolution.
Once the leaders of Uruguayan opinion grasped the fact that Revolution is the greatest possible impediment to the best interests of the country, the peaceful future of the Republic was assured; and they now seem to have grasped it clearly and firmly.
State insurance, State railways, State tramways, water and gas works, electrical power stations and, in fact, State everything was Se?or Batlle’s[15] plan for holding Uruguay up to the world as a splendid object-lesson in State Socialism. Here again one sees the fire of patriotism78 gleaming through a mass of practical difficulties (the obtaining of necessary capital for the purpose, and on the necessary conditions of the execution of such splendid plans, for instance) in the way of the accomplishment79 of the President’s dream.
Equally patriotic80 were those who endeavoured to keep the brakes well pressed on to the wheels of the “progressive” Presidential car; hoping for the conclusion of Se?or Batlle y Ordo?ez’s term of office before too much harm were done. But, mark this, not a sign of overt rebellion in a situation over which only a few years ago the whole country would have been engaged in a fratricidal struggle.
Se?or Batlle y Ordo?ez was an autocratic democrat43; desiring and firmly, even obstinately81, determined, to rule as[71] absolutely as any Tsar in what he conceived to be the true interests of all classes of the population.
The present writer well remembers hearing him, on the first day of the great general strike of 1911, addressing the strikers from the balcony of Government House at Montevideo.
He told them that were it not for his high office he would be among them and with them; counselled them to stand firmly for their rights; and wound up with a warning that any acts of intimidation82 or violence on their part would not only injure their just cause, but expose the guilty parties to extremely severe punishment.
By way of underlining this last wholesome83 admonition, Martial84 Law was immediately declared, and the next day saw the town filled with Horse, Foot and Artillery85. This move (which caused some doubt in the mind of the extreme Labour Party as to which way the Presidential wind was really blowing), and the fact that the flags, illuminations and firework installations were already nailed up for the celebration of the Centenary of Artígas, the National Hero, whose memory has of late years been completely whitewashed86 by the National Historians, caused the strike to fizzle out and all hands to join, a day or two later, in festivities the brilliance87 of which confirmed the reputation of the Montevideans as past masters of artistic88 illumination.
The only net result of the strike appeared to be the fining, in the strict terms of its concession89, of the Montevideo Tramways Company for neglecting to run cars according to schedule during a period when it was physically90 impossible for it to have done so. When no bread was baked and even doctors were forced by the strike leaders to abandon the use of their carriages; when, in fact, the whole city kept a sabbath during which no man might do any manner of work. A state of things enforced by patrols of strikers armed with revolvers—until the troops of their friend the President suddenly appeared upon the scene.
[72]
Of both Argentina and Uruguay it may be said that their Constitutions, Laws (National and Provincial) and Municipal by-laws and regulations are as nearly perfect models of what such things should be as can well be imagined. If they were not sometimes honoured in the breach91 of them and if isolated92 provisions were not sometimes hauled out to meet cases pretty obviously not exactly contemplated93 by their framers, all would be even better in lands where, on the whole, Laws and Regulations, as occasionally varied94 by tacit custom, generally work very well indeed. Such custom, it should be noted95 here, is not, however, altogether reliable and would be useless as a defence in the frequently recurring96 event of some Authority or other, perhaps piqued97 by an ambition to distinguish itself or to be revenged on a torpid98 liver, suddenly insisting on the observance of the strict letter of the law. In that case, several unsuspecting people get fined; journalists are inspired for paragraphs and even articles; a, say, three days’ wonder is created; and custom resumes her sway until the next temporary upheaval99.
The writer once lived in a district of Argentina where, as elsewhere in that country, all dairy farmers must, under penalty, use milk cans duly certified100 and marked by the Authority appointed for that purpose, as being according to standard measure. A fee is payable101 on each can so certified. One day, being in a curious mood, one not uncommon102 in journalists, he asked Authority to show him the standard measures. The latter, a good fellow, was pleased to consider the writer as another; so he laughed and said he had never seen nor asked to have such a thing. He knew that all these milk-cans were turned out accurately103 enough by the manufacturers. So what was the use of bothering further? He just marked them and took the fee.
Some day, he or his successor or a colleague of some other district, will be caught by some Higher Authority in a fit of zeal104 and made an example of. Someone will get a profitable contract to furnish Standard milk-cans throughout the[73] Republic, these will duly get lost or be appropriated by Authority’s wife for household purposes, and dairymen’s cans will be certified on sight as before.
It is only just to say that this story is rather illustrative of Argentine life than Uruguayan: the Uruguayan generally takes more strict a view of his duties and obligations than his over-river cousin.
But to return to our subject. Generally speaking, and especially in Argentina with its Provincial Autonomy, the further one journeys from the National Capital the slacker and more irregular one finds the administration of Laws and By-Laws, the greater the resemblance of the manners and methods of Authority to that of the Kadi under a palm tree. And the more one realizes the truth of the proverb that while one man may steal a horse another may not look over a gate. In country districts personal influence is wellnigh everything. If one be on good terms with the Municipal Intendente (Mayor) or the Comisario of Police (it is generally a case of being friendly, if at all, with both and the other members of the official clique105; all usually to be found together in the same bar or restaurant), the law looks very indulgently on one, and at a pinch will turn a blind eye to one’s, really only humorous, peccadillos. If not, one must walk carefully like Agag until one has gathered common sense enough to approach Authority in a properly friendly (and acceptable) spirit.
Does the Comisario’s horse go lame65, he will ask you to lend him one. You do so, saying at the same time that you have no further need of it. And the next time you have trouble with your peons, or anyone else with less influence than yourself, send for the Comisario, he will soon straighten the matter out for you. Even if your trouble be with an equal or superior in influence, smiling Authority will discover a modus vivendi and drinks all round will seal the friendly compact. It is seldom one meets anyone who is not on good terms with his Authorities. Not to be so would[74] remind one of the story of Carnot, who refused to stand in with Napoleon I. The Emperor told him frankly106 that he who was not with him was against him, and that he, Carnot, was much too powerful a person with the people to be permitted to be at large in France under the latter condition. He must be exiled, and had better see Fouché on the matter.
Carnot went; and, addressing Fouché, asked sternly, “Where must I go? Traitor107!” “Wherever you like. Imbecile!” was Fouché’s cynical108 retort.
So, in Argentine rural ethics109, if you are not friendly with Authority you have only your own folly110 to thank for the usually inconvenient111 consequences.
It is wonderful how much money Authority has to spend on amusement when it gets a day or two’s holiday in Buenos Aires; and it is great fun as well as good policy to go round with him, if you also are in funds. Argentine Authority seldom gives or expects anything for nothing; but usually is a pleasant enough fellow withal, if taken the right way.
The Uruguayan, in such regards as in all others, is a less sophisticated and, in country districts, a more primitively112 minded person; though always hospitable113, usually courteous in his manner, and particularly so to strangers.
The most exalted114 Governmental spheres, those of the National Governments in the Cities of Buenos Aires and Montevideo, respectively, are nowadays almost entirely115 free from any suggestion of the mildest form of even technical corruption116. It certainly is easier to obtain a personal interview with the President or a Minister if one personally knows one of his intimate friends or subordinate officials; but that is all that influence really amounts to as regards any question affecting overseas Commerce, Concessions117 or Foreign Affairs. In regard to home politics, doubtless a good deal of intrigue118 is constantly at work at Government House in Buenos Aires, but those are matters which the foreign settler leaves exclusively to the Argentines themselves. So long as they do[75] nothing which may affect trade or credit, even the representatives of the largest foreign interests are careful to avoid any act or word which might savour of interference in the sole management by the Argentine of purely119 Argentine affairs. As has been indicated elsewhere in these pages, such interference is the one thing regarding which the Argentine is very jealously suspicious. He may have framed most of his Constitution on that of the United States, but he never would have permitted the States or anyone else to do it for him.
Apart from the transparent120 incorruptibility, from without, at all events, of all members of the National Governments of both Republics, there is a pleasant free-and-easiness about the manner of Presidential and Ministerial receptions.
The salons121 in which all-comers are received are large, airy and well lighted; and are furnished with leather-covered sofas, seated on which visitors wait their turn for the President or Minister to grant them a few words of conversation; during which his Excellency sits down on the sofa beside them, cigarette in hand like everyone else in the room.
At a longer, special, conference, coffee also is served, hot in winter and iced in summer, even in the offices of subordinate officials; and rumour122 has it that it is over this inexhaustible supply of Nationally provided coffee and cigarettes that internal politics are “made.” In Argentina politics of this kind are kaleidoscopic123; groups and individuals forming fresh combinations and antagonisms124 too rapidly and from too deeply underlying125 motives for anyone not profoundly versed126 and continually engaged in the game to be able to follow it with anything approaching comprehension.
Much of this has doubtless disappeared under the influence of Dr. Saenz Pe?a; whose fearlessly honourable127 nature judged, and judged rightly, that the National Government of Argentina is now in a position to face without apprehension128 any public opinion of its acts and policy.
[76]
Naturally the spirit of intrigue, the love of which, almost for itself, has roots deep down in Argentine human nature, cannot yet be reckoned as dead; but it is certainly in the course of being driven further and further away from the centres of higher civilization by a superior ethical129 conception of the duties of Government; even as the long-horned native cattle have been ousted130 to frontier districts by the appreciation131 by Estancieros of the incomparable advantages, to themselves, of Shorthorns and Herefords.
In Uruguay there always has been much less tendency to intrigue. There, a man was a Red or a White, a conscientious132 supporter of the Rural or Urban party. While as for Finance the Commercial Community has always and unswervingly seen to it that its realm be kept clean and untarnished by even the breath of scandal. It may here be objected that now and again, foreign concessionaires have made bargains with the National Government strangely profitable to themselves. The true answer to such an observation would be that in such cases the Government has invariably been the quite innocent victim of greater experience and far-sightedness in such matters than its own advisers133 had ever had opportunity to attain4.
Uruguayans would maintain the National credit by emptying their own private pockets if need be and, in fact, have expressed their intention of doing so on more than one occasion when, as is mentioned in another chapter, the Government allowed itself to be frightened into proposals for issues of paper currency not founded on a strictly134 gold basis. A proceeding62 which would have spelt repudiation135 of a portion of the National liabilities; in the manner of the Argentine “Conversion Law.”
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. And it is no sign of bias136 to give Uruguay credit for plain facts which incontrovertibly prove her sense of the sanctity of moral as well as legal obligation.
True, she was never in quite such a financial tangle137 as[77] that in which Argentina found herself in 1891; but she has often been poverty-stricken, and yet has always paid to the utmost centesimo.
Generally, it may be said that a similar honesty prevails in all branches of Government and fiscal affairs throughout Uruguay.
For a glance at some small ways that are dark and tricks that are vain, before these are entirely swept away, as they now are being, before the healthy wind of moral improvement (healthy even though, as some cynics assert, it has been raised only by perception of the fact that in the long run, honesty is the best policy) one must go to distant parts of Argentina and there grope amid the intricacies of Provincial and Municipal Administration. There, undoubtedly138, we may come across semi-obscure corners from which a highly respectable chartered accountant would fly horror-stricken. But we should also recognize that the whole small fabric139 of intrigue and petty robbery is a Punchinello’s secret; well known to and sympathetically approved by the whole surrounding populace, whose attitude to the robber is that of “Good luck to him! I should do the same if I had his chance.” Of no use to endeavour to stir up public opinion to demand the prosecution140 or dismissal of Authorities or Officials who are perfectly well known to have been defrauding141 the public for years.
Not a bit of it. You would only get for an answer, “What? get rid of him now that he’s fat and get a lean one in his place who would be far worse!” Meaning that a needy142 man would steal more than a rich one. Local opinion would hold that that way lay madness only; and the would-be reformer would be merely regarded with pitying scorn.
No. The change is coming and coming rapidly with the spirit of the age, and cannot be hastened in its inevitable143 course; and this change will be thorough, for it will only encounter the ineffectual opposition of a quite infantile dishonesty which has never seriously tried to keep secret the[78] practices which its vanity considered as so much evidence of its own admirable cleverness.
Do you think the milk-can inspector144 did not delight in telling that he had never seen a standard measure? Of course he did; and a Municipal Intendente of a small country town gets just as much pleasure from the knowledge that, while ten men appear on his Municipality’s monthly wage-sheets as road-menders, there are in fact only two and the remaining eight receipts are signed, for a consideration, per signature, by independent persons. A proceeding which, of course, is perfectly well known to and indeed accepted as immemorial custom by the general public. In these cases no one ever gets caught; because those chiefly concerned have always a pull in Provincial politics—otherwise they would never have found themselves occupying the positions they are in.
But, as the reader can see, all these are childish things; already vanishing and soon to be completely put away by the general and swift advance, moral as well as material, of the Republic.
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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electorate
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| n.全体选民；选区 | |
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fiscal
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| adj.财政的，会计的，国库的，国库岁入的 | |
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attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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autonomous
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| adj.自治的；独立的 | |
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administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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largo
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| n.广板乐章；adj.缓慢的，宽广的；adv.缓慢地，宽广地 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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scotched
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| v.阻止( scotch的过去式和过去分词 )；制止（车轮）转动；弄伤；镇压 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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predecessor
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| n.前辈，前任 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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ramifications
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| n.结果，后果( ramification的名词复数 ) | |
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oligarchies
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| n.寡头统治的政府( oligarchy的名词复数 )；寡头政治的执政集团；寡头统治的国家 | |
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vassals
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| n.奴仆( vassal的名词复数 )；（封建时代）诸侯；从属者；下属 | |
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provincial
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| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
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specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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22
scruple
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| n./v.顾忌，迟疑 | |
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23
depreciated
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| v.贬值，跌价，减价( depreciate的过去式和过去分词 )；贬低，蔑视，轻视 | |
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24
consular
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| a.领事的 | |
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25
puffed
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| adj.疏松的v.使喷出( puff的过去式和过去分词 )；喷着汽（或烟）移动；吹嘘；吹捧 | |
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26
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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27
insistence
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| n.坚持；强调；坚决主张 | |
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28
slur
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| v.含糊地说；诋毁；连唱；n.诋毁；含糊的发音 | |
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29
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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30
scrupulous
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| adj.审慎的，小心翼翼的，完全的，纯粹的 | |
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31
rant
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| v.咆哮；怒吼；n.大话；粗野的话 | |
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32
blackmail
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| n.讹诈，敲诈，勒索，胁迫，恫吓 | |
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33
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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34
docile
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| adj.驯服的，易控制的，容易教的 | |
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35
presidency
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| n.总统(校长，总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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36
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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37
realization
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| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
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38
epidemic
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| n.流行病；盛行；adj.流行性的，流传极广的 | |
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39
oligarchically
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| adj.寡头政治的，主张寡头政治的 | |
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40
enquire
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| v.打听，询问；调查，查问 | |
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41
disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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42
ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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43
democrat
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| n.民主主义者，民主人士；民主党党员 | |
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44
deposed
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| v.罢免( depose的过去式和过去分词 )；（在法庭上）宣誓作证 | |
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45
overt
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| adj.公开的，明显的，公然的 | |
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46
instigated
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| v.使（某事物）开始或发生，鼓动( instigate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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47
naught
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| n.无，零 [=nought] | |
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48
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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49
coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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50
conspired
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| 密谋( conspire的过去式和过去分词 )； 搞阴谋； （事件等）巧合； 共同导致 | |
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51
remonstrance
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| n抗议，抱怨 | |
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52
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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53
courteous
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| adj.彬彬有礼的，客气的 | |
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54
graceful
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| adj.优美的，优雅的；得体的 | |
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55
honourably
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| adv.可尊敬地，光荣地，体面地 | |
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56
straightforward
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| adj.正直的，坦率的；易懂的，简单的 | |
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57
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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58
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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59
citizenship
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| n.市民权，公民权，国民的义务(身份) | |
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60
scrutiny
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| n.详细检查，仔细观察 | |
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61
adverse
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| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
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62
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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63
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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64
hustled
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| 催促（hustle的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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65
lame
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| adj.跛的，(辩解、论据等)无说服力的 | |
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66
tenure
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| n.终身职位；任期；(土地)保有权，保有期 | |
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67
superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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68
backbone
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| n.脊骨，脊柱，骨干；刚毅，骨气 | |
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69
perennially
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| adv.经常出现地；长期地；持久地；永久地 | |
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70
contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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71
simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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72
obligatory
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| adj.强制性的，义务的，必须的 | |
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73
monstrously
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74
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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75
scarcity
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| n.缺乏，不足，萧条 | |
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76
doctrinaire
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| adj.空论的 | |
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77
plunged
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| v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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78
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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79
accomplishment
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| n.完成，成就，（pl.）造诣，技能 | |
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80
patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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81
obstinately
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| ad.固执地，顽固地 | |
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82
intimidation
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| n.恐吓，威胁 | |
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83
wholesome
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| adj.适合；卫生的；有益健康的；显示身心健康的 | |
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84
martial
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| adj.战争的，军事的，尚武的，威武的 | |
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85
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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86
whitewashed
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| 粉饰，美化，掩饰( whitewash的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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87
brilliance
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| n.光辉，辉煌，壮丽，（卓越的）才华，才智 | |
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88
artistic
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| adj.艺术(家)的，美术(家)的；善于艺术创作的 | |
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89
concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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90
physically
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| adj.物质上，体格上，身体上，按自然规律 | |
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91
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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92
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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93
contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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94
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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95
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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96
recurring
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| adj.往复的，再次发生的 | |
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97
piqued
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| v.伤害…的自尊心( pique的过去式和过去分词 )；激起（好奇心） | |
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98
torpid
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| adj.麻痹的，麻木的，迟钝的 | |
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99
upheaval
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| n.胀起，(地壳)的隆起；剧变，动乱 | |
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100
certified
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| a.经证明合格的；具有证明文件的 | |
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101
payable
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| adj.可付的，应付的，有利益的 | |
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102
uncommon
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| adj.罕见的，非凡的，不平常的 | |
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103
accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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104
zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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105
clique
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| n.朋党派系，小集团 | |
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106
frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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107
traitor
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| n.叛徒，卖国贼 | |
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108
cynical
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| adj.(对人性或动机)怀疑的，不信世道向善的 | |
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109
ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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110
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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111
inconvenient
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| adj.不方便的，令人感到麻烦的 | |
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112
primitively
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| 最初地，自学而成地 | |
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113
hospitable
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| adj.好客的；宽容的；有利的，适宜的 | |
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114
exalted
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| adj.(地位等)高的，崇高的；尊贵的，高尚的 | |
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115
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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116
corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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117
concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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118
intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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119
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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120
transparent
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| adj.明显的，无疑的；透明的 | |
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121
salons
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| n.（营业性质的）店( salon的名词复数 )；厅；沙龙（旧时在上流社会女主人家的例行聚会或聚会场所）；（大宅中的）客厅 | |
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122
rumour
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| n.谣言，谣传，传闻 | |
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123
kaleidoscopic
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| adj.千变万化的 | |
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124
antagonisms
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| 对抗，敌对( antagonism的名词复数 ) | |
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125
underlying
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| adj.在下面的，含蓄的，潜在的 | |
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126
versed
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| adj. 精通，熟练 | |
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127
honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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128
apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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129
ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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130
ousted
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| 驱逐( oust的过去式和过去分词 )； 革职； 罢黜； 剥夺 | |
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131
appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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132
conscientious
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| adj.审慎正直的，认真的，本着良心的 | |
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133
advisers
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| 顾问，劝告者( adviser的名词复数 )； （指导大学新生学科问题等的）指导教授 | |
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134
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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135
repudiation
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| n.拒绝；否认；断绝关系；抛弃 | |
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136
bias
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| n.偏见，偏心，偏袒；vt.使有偏见 | |
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137
tangle
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| n.纠缠；缠结；混乱；v.(使)缠绕；变乱 | |
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138
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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139
fabric
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| n.织物，织品，布；构造，结构，组织 | |
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140
prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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141
defrauding
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| v.诈取，骗取( defraud的现在分词 ) | |
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142
needy
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| adj.贫穷的，贫困的，生活艰苦的 | |
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143
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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144
inspector
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| n.检查员，监察员，视察员 | |
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