Thus already in 1913, the fear of Balkan complications in both Argentina and Uruguay was represented by a general fall in what previously3 may have been somewhat inflated4, or at least too anticipatory5, land values.
This fall, coupled with and increased by relatively6 bad harvests, marked the commencement of rather bad times in both Republics. In this regard it may be well to say that comparatively bad times come easily and swiftly on a country like Argentina, the prosperity of which depends very largely indeed on its cereal production and in which landowners and agriculturists from the largest Estanciero to the smallest Chacrero have long been encouraged by Nature to regard each coming year as inevitably7 more prosperous than its predecessor8. The result of this optimism, usually justified9 by the event, is that when any set-back, caused, say, by late frosts or early rains, such as farmers in less favoured lands would take as an ordinary risk of their occupation, does occur, the streets of Buenos Aires are immediately filled with men with long faces running to the Banks and anxiously discussing the ruin which, apparently11, seems to them to be staring them in the face, notwithstanding[94] that most of them must often have been through similar “crises” before.
One need only go “on ’Change” to be almost convinced that the whole vaunted prosperity of the Republic is tumbling about its ears. Even newspapers, which, by this time at least, ought to know better, join in the panic cry.
At such times people possessed13 of Capital and common sense make good investments; the Banks tide everyone else over quite comfortably enough not to interfere14 with the socially obligatory15 summer gathering16 at Mar-del-Plata; the following harvest is a bumper17; and all is well again in the best and sunniest of all possible Republics.
That is the usual course of happenings after inferior harvests but, as is easy to imagine, the present situation is as unique in South America as it is in all other parts of the world. On the River Plate, indeed, it was, if one may be permitted the expression, aggravated18 by anticipation19 consequent on the (almost miraculous20 for these countries) following of yet another rainy harvest-time.
On the top of all came August with its declarations of European War, the first result of which in the River Plate Republics was intimate realization21 of the extent to which they had been dependent on Europe since the commencement of their real commercial development.
They were thrown entirely22 on their own resources and ability with no chance of any immediate10 help from outside.
It is to the credit of both Republics that they rose to the situation. Seven days of Bank Holiday were at once proclaimed in Argentina; during which time the Ministry23 of Finance and other Government departments were loyally assisted by both native and foreign bankers and financiers to devise necessary measures.
In the result Laws were summarily passed by Congress to prevent all exportation of gold; outgoing ships might only take with them sufficient coal to last them till they reached the next port in South America (Argentina and Uruguay as[95] yet produce no practically valuable coal, so that they are dependent on import for their stocks of this fuel), and provision was made that cereal exports should be limited to the surplus of such produce after the retention25 of a liberal allowance for home consumption until the next harvests.
Uruguay adopted similar protective measures.
So far so good, but the Argentine Banks, generally, were faced with the necessity for immediate decision under conditions which, unfortunately, are all too frequently recurrent in rapidly progressing countries. Many of the securities held by them were obviously not worth the value that they had been taken for, in consequence of the previous shrinkage of values above alluded26 to.
This was a momentous27 matter for consideration during the seven days’ Bank holiday.
In the result, all Banks adopted the policy of cutting losses even at the risk, amounting to extreme likelihood, of letting their weaker customers drown,[17] while mercy was only extended to those evidently strong enough to keep afloat throughout the crisis and its after effects.
This decision taken, and enforced on the reopening of the Banks, scarcely any credit establishment took any advantage of the Moratorium28 declared by the Government.
In Uruguay the situation proved easier on account of a comparative absence of the complication of securities based on inflated values. Here again the Uruguayan showed his superiority in the matter of cautiously prudent29 finance over his more enthusiastically volatile30 over-river cousin.
This observation notwithstanding, it is now clear that although a severe financial pinch is still felt in both countries, the Argentine and Uruguayan ships of State are both fully31 trimmed to enable them to ride over bad financial weather,[96] the first shock of which was the most perilous32 to meet and needed the most prompt and intelligent handling.
In the result neither country will eventually be any worse for the moral effects of having suddenly been left to its own resources.
Meanwhile land, especially, perhaps, in Argentina, offers an opportunity to Capital such as, as has been said elsewhere in these pages, everyone for humanitarian33 reasons must hope will never occur again.
Given knowledge of just where and what to buy, large fortunes await those with courage and capital to purchase either town lots or agricultural and pastoral land in either Republic; in Argentina preferably for earlier realization.
Once peace is declared, and even before, it needs little imagination to perceive the wealth to be secured by the agricultural and live-stock produce on markets suddenly deprived of much of the usual output of sources of cereal supply as Russia and Canada, through withdrawal34 of labour for military purposes, and faced with an enormously increased demand for meat and grain caused by the necessary shortage of production over all War-infected areas.
In fact Argentina and Uruguay are likely soon to experience the truth of the proverb, “It’s an ill wind that blows nobody any good,” and they are among the very few countries of the world about the commercial conditions of which, after the war, it is pretty safe to prophesy35 in the direction of a prompt return, in an enhanced degree, to their normal course of ever-growing prosperity.
Always with the factor of population and consequent sufficiency of agricultural labour being reserved for consideration after the event. A large and very serious reservation which cannot safely be lost sight of by anyone desirous of land speculation36 in either of the two countries under discussion.
Let the reader pardon this recurrent insistence37 on this question of population, made in the hope that it may help to open the eyes of the Authorities concerned, especially[97] Argentine, to the crying necessity in their country’s interests for practically workable inducements to true colonization38, as distinguished39 from mere40 partial exploitation of necessitous wage-earners. And the eyes not only of the Authorities, but of everyone having a pecuniary41 interest of any sort in either Republic, so that their Congresses and landowners may be forced to consider the question in the liberal and enlightened spirit which alone can remove the greatest menace to their country’s economic progress.
If the two Governments and great landowners would only devote one-tenth part of the admirable ingenuity42 and energy with which they, and the Argentine especially, have very successfully combated locust43 invasions to the attraction of small-holding proprietary44 agriculturalists, the River Plate Territories would soon break into an irruption of statues of the originators of such measures which would outrival the vast quantity of those erected45 to the memories of Generals San Martin, Artígas and Urquíza. (One could travel far in Argentina without discovering a town which does not possess a statue of the first-named deliverer of his country. Uruguay has also many San Martin statues, but runs preferably, as is natural, to Urquíza and, lately, in consequence of the whitewashing46 efforts of modern historians, Artígas.)
In view of the actual situation, financial and commercial statistics relating to the ante-war era necessarily seem to savour mustily of the back-number. This savour is, however, more due to imagination than to actual fact, since such statistics are just as interesting as ever they were and really show the normal trend of things economic to be resumed and likely to be followed in even a more favourable47 course, as far at least as Export is concerned. As for the Import of manufactured goods an attempt to deal with some of the probabilities or possibilities of this question in its future aspects is made later in this chapter.
[98]
CURRENCY
The “Caja de Conversión” (A term for which “Conversion48 Chest” is the usual clumsy translation, though “Conversion Box” stands as a triumph of the translator’s art. Perhaps “Conversion Office” sounds best, though it does not convey a true idea of vaults49 filled with sacks of golden coin and therefore “Conversion Bank” is here preferred) is an Argentine Government Institution under the control of the National Ministry of Finance created for the purpose of dealing50 with the issue, exchange, and conversion of the currency of the country. It issues the paper currency and must hold in reserve sufficient gold to meet the circulating paper money; it also mints the nickel and copper51 coinage of the country.
Under the Conversion Law a fixed52 ratio was assigned as between gold and paper. A paper dollar, instead of being theoretically equivalent in value to a gold dollar, was declared to be worth only 44 cents gold; thus with 44 cents gold as the fixed equivalent of one dollar paper and, conversely, 2·27 paper dollars that of one dollar gold, and the smallest gold coin minted the equivalent of 2? dollars gold, the use of paper in all the odd amounts of everyday transactions is inevitable53 and consequently the major portion of the gold which reaches the country is forced by the public need of the more convenient currency into the “Caja de Conversión.”
The accumulation of gold in the “Caja” on December 31st, 1915, was well over 61 millions sterling54, and it must be noted55 that these accumulations cannot leave the “Caja” under any consideration (unless by special sanction of Congress), except in exchange for paper currency, until the time when the currency shall be placed on a logically complete metallic56 basis. The provisions of the Conversion Law in this regard are exceptionally stringent57; under them every official of the “Caja,” from the highest to the lowest,[99] is personally responsible for their observance, and they cannot be overruled by any power in the land. So, until Congress approves what is commonly referred to as the conversion, the store of gold in the “Caja” will continue practically intact and will increase.
The misuse58 of this term “Conversion” has given rise to much confusion of ideas, even in Argentina. The actual conversion took place with the above-mentioned assignment of the fixed ratio of value between gold and paper.
It is obvious that the present is not the moment for the change in the form of the currency, but it should be added that apart from the immediate effects of the war the time for that change has not yet arrived. Irresponsible projects for the change have been put forward from time to time during recent years, but official declarations in that regard have never yet gone further than complacent59 platitudes60 to the effect that the time for it was fast approaching; without, however, the faintest indications of any schemes for carrying the change out in practice. Besides, under the Law it cannot be accomplished61 until a fund or deposit in the Bank of the Nation, and to which the National Government makes contributions out of revenue, has reached the amount necessary to form a reserve against the paper currency in circulation prior to the passing of the Conversion Law. For a long while past, the amount of that fund stood at six millions sterling, but this amount (then still insufficient62 for such reserve) became reduced in August last to two millions sterling in consequence of special financial measures adopted by the Argentine Government at the outbreak of the war and referred to more fully in the chapter on “The War.”
On the 31st of December, 1914, the Argentine Government held gold accumulations to the value in round figures of 63 millions sterling, of which, as has been seen, 2 millions pertain63 to the Conversion Fund at the Bank of the Nation. This fund must not be confused with the amounts in the “Caja,” the uses of the former (apart from its constituting, as[100] has been said, a reserve against the paper currency in circulation previously to the passing of the Conversion Law) being limited to the purposes of foreign exchange, the benefit of the Fund itself and to aid the control of the market; while the accumulations in the “Caja” can only, in normal circumstances, leave it in exchange for paper currency.
Besides the actual gold in the “Caja” this Institution held at the end of 1915 gold and bonds to the value of over 14 millions sterling which had been deposited at the various Argentine Legations. These deposits have naturally increased largely since. Besides all this the Bank of the Nation, the Bank of the Province of Buenos Aires and the private banks held large amounts of gold.
Uruguay has not introduced, and has always resisted the temptation to introduce, any such complications of her currency; which is on a thorough gold basis.
The Argentine Conversion Law was passed in 1899 and abrogated64 in 1901-2 by Congress (in consequence of the anticipation of possible war with Chile, over the frontier question, the payment by the Nation of Provincial65 debts and the closing of Argentine ports because of an outbreak of bubonic plague).
Therefore the present solid financial status of the Argentine Republic dates from only twelve, or, on the most liberal reckoning, fifteen years ago.
Uruguay’s first surplus (of $453,110) accrued66 in 1905-6; though an increased surplus has figured in each Uruguayan National Budget since that date.
Equivalent Values.
Argentine $1, gold = 3s. 11?d.
” $1, paper = 1s. 8?d.
Uruguayan $1 = 4s. 3???d. ($1·3? cents U.S.A.).
￡1 = $5·05 gold, Argentine.
￡1 = $11·45 paper, Argentine.
￡1 = $4·70, Uruguayan.
[101]
THE ARGENTINE MONETARY67 SYSTEM
Is controlled by the Conversion law, above referred to, which fixed a ratio between the value of the paper and gold currencies and made these interchangeable at that ratio until the time should be judged to have arrived for the substitution of metallic coinage for paper.
The law was passed as the only available though drastic remedy for the state of financial chaos68, nothing less, in which Argentina found herself for some years after the crisis of 1891. For the coming of this chaos Argentines blame the European Bankers who, at least, looked on whilst the country floundered into it. For this view they have considerable reason. The Bankers were men of great experience in Finance; of which the Argentines of that day had little or none. Argentina relied on the men who had taken her Finances in hand for the development of her vast natural resources. She awoke to find herself in a financial condition which would have spelt a century of ruin to any less nature-favoured land. And it was an Argentine, Se?or Ricardo Pillado, now Director-General of the Division of Commerce and Industry in the Ministry of Agriculture, who devised the Law which, though it in effect involved a partial repudiation69 of the country’s liabilities, at any rate made possible the financial renaissance70 on which her present great prosperity was founded.
As has been seen, the Conversion Law said that a paper dollar should be equivalent to 44 cents gold and that conversely a gold dollar should be worth 2·27 paper dollars. This ratio was supposed to have been fixed by taking the average ratio of value between paper and gold over a certain period immediately prior to the passing of the Law.
This basis is now believed to have been fictitious71, it being found that, had such an average of values been struck, a paper dollar would have become the equivalent to something much more like 60 cents gold. So that in fact a repudiation[102] of 40 cents liability on every paper dollar in circulation was made to become one of 56 cents.
That, however, is past history; and the existing Law appears likely to remain in operation for an indefinite time to come.
It has its inconveniences. Institutions and traders are obliged by Law to keep their books in both currencies. There is no gold coin available as an equivalent to 1 paper dollar. One needs to have a clear 50 dollars’ worth of notes before one can get gold out of the Conversion Bank; so that all transactions involving odd amounts must be carried through with the aid of paper. In point of fact gold is only seen in the course of important transactions. Still, the gold is there, in the country, in the Conversion Bank; and cannot be withdrawn72 from the coffers of that Institution except as against paper dollars, nor can paper dollars be issued except as against gold actually in the Conversion Bank. For the absolutely strict observance of these rules everyone concerned, from the President of the Republic down to the humblest employee of the Caja is personally responsible under the law. By the operation of the law the Republic holds a usually ever-increasing stock of gold; the accumulation of which is aided by the inconvenience for practical exchange of the figures ·44 and 2·27.
There is no doubt but that the object which the framers of the Conversion Law originally had in view, the rehabilitation74 of the country’s Finance and credit, has been fulfilled long ago; and it is for other reasons that Foreign Capitalists and Banks, to whom Argentina must still look for the means of her fuller development, prefer to let the dual75 monetary system, with its several practical inconveniences, continue instead of encouraging Congress to declare the purpose of the Law fulfilled, by which declaration it would, by its terms, lapse76 ipso facto. On that happening there would be a period, momentary77 only, in all probability, but still a period, during which the coffers of the Conversion Bank would be open[103] through the automatic lapse of the Law of its creation. And Capitalists and Bankers, grown very prudent indeed in their generation, prefer that those coffers should remain closed and safeguarded as they are; even at the cost of some few extra clerks to cope with a system which otherwise works very satisfactorily.
Shin-plasters, as the paper dollars are called by Anglo-Argentines, fulfil all the purposes of daily life as well as would silver or other metallic tokens. Paper dollars, guaranteed by gold, have also other advantages over a metal coinage which might not be so fully guaranteed.
Therefore the Conversion Law remains78 a live letter on the Argentine Statute79 Book.
It is, however, a vulgar error to refer to the time when other tokens might be substituted for paper as the time for “Conversion.” Conversion really took place with the coming into operation of the law which converted a fluctuating ratio into a fixed one.
The speculation in gold, referred to elsewhere, which had attained80 disastrous81 dimensions just prior to the passing of the Law, was another evil to which that Law put an end. Then as now all everyday transactions were carried out in paper; but, then, no man could tell from hour to hour what the paper he held was worth. Everyone was by force of circumstances practically a gambler whether he wished to be one or not. The paper tokens for which he had sold his wares82 one day might be worth much more or less the next. Everyone had to make his own forecast of probabilities before he could make or give a price for anything; and therefore became a constant speculator, a gambler in futures83, in fact. The bad moral effects of such a state of things is obvious. Many other financial evils were rife84 at this time, which now have only historic interest, among them may be mentioned the Banks of Issue for which authority appears practically to have been given by the State to anyone able to procure85 and furnish offices. Stacks of the notes of these precious[104] Institutions still occupy space as curious lumber86 somewhere in the cellars and garrets of Government House. Valueless and best forgotten by a prosperous and enlightened nation which no longer needs any such awful examples to deter87 it from lapse into irregular finance.
Uruguay has a gold, silver and nickel coinage, but, as in Argentina, notes are the most common tokens, especially for amounts of $1 and upwards88. As will have been understood, Uruguay has no Caja de Conversión, her currency being and always having been on a direct gold basis.
COMMERCIAL CONDITIONS
One of the immediately world-wide effects of the great War has been the practically total elimination89 of German trade competition, an elimination which may not unreasonably90 be calculated to last for some time to come.
This therefore is the golden opportunity for other competitors to capture the large bulk of export trade which had gradually been absorbed and was in course of constantly increasing absorption in the countries under discussion by German firms.
Many Consular91 Reports and publications of the “Bureau of American Republics” have respectively dealt with the consequent loss of trade to Great Britain and the comparatively slow advance in that respect made by the United States and these documents have insistently92 pointed93 out the whys and wherefores of German commercial success over their chief rivals.
The writer cannot therefore lay claim to originality94 in the present observations, but does claim that his persistence95 in the reiteration96 of what he, and many greater than he, have continually urged on every possible occasion during the past decade has been and is in what appears to him to be the best interests of those most concerned.
Of the two nations the British still has the better opportunity to extend its commerce in both Argentina and[105] Uruguay. The reasons (apart from the actual kaleidoscopic97 financial and industrial situation) for this opinion are that the English (as all people hailing from the British Isles98 are commonly called in South America) have already acquired in both countries a firm reputation for straightforward99 dealing, founded on many years’ experience and untainted by any suspicion of underlying100 political motives101, whereas the South American Republics generally harbour a latent but constant resentment102 of what they rightly or wrongly consider to be the tendency of the United States to assume a dominating influence over both Americas. In fact to construe103 the Monroe doctrine104 as meaning, to cite the catch-phrase which to the innermost South American mind embodies105 something very closely resembling an unpleasant truth, “America for the North Americans.”
Therefore, pushing United States’ commerce is immediately met by a seemingly dull indifference106 to the merits of the wares it offers, praise it those wares never so loudly. And this observation suggests another of almost equal truth and importance, viz. that the loud and strenuous107 vaunting of an article and the hustling108 methods so much admired in the great Republic of the North are worse than useless in Spanish South America. “Why so much talk and so much hurry to strike a bargain if the thing is really good?” is the mental attitude of the average Spanish American towards the vociferous109 North American traveller who usually makes the further mistake of appearing to wish to teach his listener the latter’s own business. This, as has been said elsewhere in these pages, is a thing no Argentine or Uruguayan will stand. No one is a more severe critic of himself, his methods and Institutions, no one is most enamoured of progress and improvement than he. But he must be the discoverer and chooser of the remedies for his own defects, he and he alone must be the arbiter110 of his own destinies and set his own house in order. In such matters he will brook111 no interference. And least of all from the United States.
[106]
It is surprising that the commercial ability of the latter country should not long ago have discovered and acted in harmony with this feature of South American psychology112. It seems, however, to have escaped appreciation113 by “Yankee” cuteness.
Accordingly, we find, in the present writer’s opinion, two existing obstacles (apart, as has been indicated above, from the present financial situation) to the extension of the trade of the United States in Argentina and Uruguay. One of these, the inappropriate method of approach usually pursued by travellers and the other a strong and jealous suspicion of the ulterior motives of the United States in endeavouring to strengthen her commercial foothold in the Southern Hemisphere. The first of these obstacles should be easily removable, unless, indeed, it be too firmly rooted in the North American mentality114. The second is a matter for extremely delicate state diplomacy115, and equally delicate behaviour of the United States’ delegates at each future “Congress of American Republics.”
Having thus glanced at seemingly obvious defects in United States methods we may turn to those of British manufacturers.
In their regard one can scarcely restrain the question, “Do they really want the South American trade at all?” Because, if they do, they set about getting it in the strangest possible ways. Their apparent attitude can be summed up by saying that they point-blank refuse to give a customer what he thinks he wants unless his ideas on that subject entirely coincide with what they think is best for themselves and, incidentally, it would seem, for him.
South American governments insist on the metrical system of weights and measures for Customs purposes: the British manufacturer persists in a firm refusal to contemplate116 anything but British Tons and Feet. This may seem a trifling117 matter to anyone not engaged in the Import trade of a metrical-system country, but in practice the rendering118[107] of British weights and measures into their metrical equivalents involves not only a large amount of clerical labour, but is also a frequent source of error in the results.
A most actively119 patriotic120 Briton who is the head of a large Importing firm in Montevideo told the present writer not long ago that in spite of his patriotism121 he had been driven to deal with German firms because, for one reason, of the constant inflictions on him of $80 fines by the Customs Authorities, that sum being the statutory fine in Uruguay for any misstatement of weight or bulk on a declaration.
He, in common with the generality of Importers in Argentina or Uruguay, had found himself confronted by several very weighty reasons for necessarily transferring the bulk of his orders from British to German firms, the chief of which was that above summed up; namely, that British manufacturers would not adapt themselves to his customers’ requirements.
“We are making this, that, or the other pattern” of whatever the article in question may be, and “if you don’t like that you must go elsewhere” is the gist122 of the average British manufacturer’s last word in the discussion. And, as the Importer is not running a Commercial Museum of articles of the highest quality or best British taste, but has to sell what he imports to customers who have lamentably123 independent ideas of what they want, he does go elsewhere, that is to say he did, and, most frequently, to Germany. To Germany, where most things were at all events cheaper, and where, if qualities were not so good as in the United Kingdom, manufacturers were adaptable124, and their travelling representatives spoke125 Spanish and understood the ways and wishes and even the foibles of South American customers.
As a rule, commercial travellers from either Great Britain or the United States do not speak anything like fluent Spanish. Therefore, they are obliged to engage interpreters to accompany them on their business calls, while they were quite unable to take advantage of the opportunities sought[108] for by their Spanish-speaking German competitors of mingling126 in the semi-social life of their customers. In the bar or restaurant the German traveller was a jolly good fellow always ready to pay his share of the wine bill and with his pockets filled with more than passable cigars and he could enjoy and respond to the local humour and generally take part in all the fun of a jovial127 evening-out; for which the Argentine, especially, is always ready and willing to find an excuse.
Now, doing persuasive128 business through an interpreter is by no means an invariably satisfactory proceeding129, because the interpreter’s own mentality inevitably intervenes and unconsciously colours both sides of the argument with tinges130 of his own individuality. He says what he thinks you wish to say, and often enough replies with the best rendering he can make, not always an entirely accurate one, of what he conceives to be the meaning of the other party to the discussion. As for the evening-out! One has only to imagine the effects of a laborious131 translation of always very allusive132 wit; the point of which in Argentina most frequently hinges on double-meaning.
The German studied the language, and, as far as he could, the tastes and ways of the people of the country he intended visiting before he set out on his commercial travels.
Travellers of other nationalities should do likewise if they wish to secure a substantial share of the trade now left open to their bidding.[18]
And British manufacturers, if so be that (I repeat the question) they do want the South American markets for their goods, must make up their minds to suit the requirements of those markets whatever may be their own private opinion of South American tastes and ways. They must still remember that although German competition has ceased and may continue non-existent for even a very long time to come, and while Belgium is, for the time being, hopelessly crippled, there are other nations who desire to rise, and may succeed[109] in rising, to an occasion which, for the awful cause of it, one can only hope will never occur again.
It is a truly great opportunity for both British and United States Commerce, in which, as has been pointed out, the former has a very considerable start in the political and commercial sympathies and prejudices of South Americans. Nothing which British manufacturers cannot remedy appears to exist to prevent them from taking extremely profitable advantage of that start, not only for the recovery of lost ground, but for grasping a very large share of new openings. Will they? Do they really care enough about extending their businesses to do so?
That is the only question, and it is one which they alone can, and soon, we hope, must answer; one way or the other. If they do not want new business or wish that old business should come back to them, there is no more to be said. And no more grumbling133 to be indulged in about the proportionate falling back of British trade in South America.
It may be objected that the United States, the full manufacturing activities of which remain unimpaired by the withdrawal of labour for military purposes and the output of which is not absorbed to so great an extent as it is with us for war material, have for that reason already a great start of Great Britain in all foreign markets. To this objection I would reply that the time for the struggle for the Argentine and Uruguayan markets is hardly yet; because climatic accident still recently produced results which, coupled with the falling on them of the shadow of the Great Terror, suspended their purchasing power. Two very lean years of cereal production due to weather, the occurrence of two consecutive134 seasons of which is without parallel in these countries’ history, were followed by another perilously135 rainy harvest time complicated by shortage of harvest labour due to war risks, and imagined risks, of the transport of the usual army of Italian harvesters who (like the Golondrinas—swallows—after which they are nicknamed in South[110] America) annually136 go to Argentina and Uruguay[19] and return to Italy after the harvest has been got in. These causes temporarily paralysed Argentine and Uruguayan commercial activity by, as has been said, suspending the purchasing powers of both.
But with the productive recovery[20] of these countries with their enormous natural endowments and producing as they do all the foodstuffs137 that the populations of poor war-trampled Europe need most, what a call for all kinds of agricultural machinery138 will come from them in return for their meat and cereals and in order that more and more land may be laid under contribution for the production of these primarily necessary supplies! Failing other labour sources, an augmented139 stream of Italian “swallow” and permanent emigration will set out for the River Plate, wealth will develop on both shores of that river, and with wealth the demand for all the manufactured things to the desire for which wealth gives rise. Hardware, cutlery, cotton and woollen cloths, electrical appliances and material; the host of things which Britain makes and Germany once sold will come into increasing demand in South America with the spring of the new era on which the whole civilized140 world will enter when the blackness of devastation141 shall have passed and the evil which created it be rendered powerless for further ruinous crime.
Would that the millions of able-bodied men murdered by this war could have been utilized142 instead as an agricultural expeditionary force on the shores of the River Plate! They and their children and the world would have been the richer for their labour carried out under conditions as happy as their present, and for many (alas!) past, task is terrible. They would have supplied that in which Argentina and Uruguay are lacking, namely, the human element, for the[111] development of their natural resources. Countries in which vast areas of land yet await the plough for cereal cultivation143 and the improvement of their natural rough pasturage and other vast areas of rich alluvial144 soil need only irrigation to turn them into a terrestrial paradise.
Capital never is and never will be wanting for good investment, but the fund of human labour cannot be drawn73 upon by a mere signature. And the daily waste of thousands of lives for the full activity of which there is ample room and urgent need on behalf of the millions remaining is, sentiment apart and from a commercial point of view alone, the saddest thing in War.
Europe needs bread and meat not only to fulfil her normal needs but also to replace her own interrupted production of these prime necessities of life. The River Plate countries can produce both in practically unlimited145 quantities; provided only that they can obtain the necessary labour a ghastly wastage of which is going on daily in Europe, some parts of which are consequently threatened with famine.
Surely if civilization be anything but a mere theoretic expression there will never be another great war!
With this pious146 hope we may pass to a more concrete subject, namely, commercial credit on both sides of the River Plate.
As has been indicated in another chapter, Uruguay enjoys a more literally147 creditable reputation than her bigger sister. The causes of this have also been already dealt with.
In practice one can but advise anyone approached by firms in either country to do what it may be taken that any ordinarily prudent man of business would do, viz. to make due enquiry as to his proposed new customer. His means of doing this are really even better than if the latter were established in London or New York, since the commercial community in either Argentina or Uruguay is comparatively small and consequently, to use a current phrase, almost everyone there knows everyone else and a good deal about him and his business.
[112]
Several of the chief banks in Buenos Aires and Montevideo have their head offices in London and all have branches or accredited148 correspondents in the principal European and North American capitals and commercial centres.[21]
The wholesale149 importing houses in Argentina and Uruguay usually give ninety days’ acceptances for imported goods and in their turn give six months’ credit to their retail150 customers. This arrangement has now the sanction of long usage based on its practically being a division of the burden of credit given to the storekeeper by the Importer between the latter and the Exporter.
The system of banking151 in both Argentina and Uruguay differs little from that obtaining in England except for a certain amount of good single-name paper being taken on account of the usually intimate acquaintance with the business and standing12 of all leading firms possessed by the commercial community generally.
Rents and working expenses, including special traders’ taxes, in the Capitals of both Republics are high, but the scale of profits when calculated on anything like a reasonable turnover152 will in most cases be found to leave a balance in favour of both wholesale and retail traders which would be regarded as highly satisfactory by their European and North American brethren. In fact, it may fairly be said that if a man in either country does any appreciable153 bulk of business in any branch of commerce or trade he is doing what elsewhere would be considered as very good business indeed. When rumour154 assigns shakiness to any established firm it may be taken as certain that such rumour is founded on tales of speculation outside the lines on which that firm’s true business has been built up. There seems a temptation inherent in new countries for men who have earned money in businesses they understand to risk it in other speculations155 of which they have next door to no experience. This is, of[113] course, a phase of the “get rich quick” fever which frequently attacks the young inheritors of stable businesses which seem to them too slow and sure to be interesting or indeed to require much looking after.
At one time the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange was responsible for a large number of victims among all classes of the public, but of late years the public has fought very shy of it indeed; so shy in fact as now to be practically unrepresented in the share ring of that Institution. As a consequence of this abstention the few brokers156 and professional speculators who daily do what courtesy perhaps demands that one should call business there suggests the tale of the island the inhabitants of which lived simply by taking in each other’s washing.
Joking apart, however, the share ring in the Buenos Aires Temple of Mammon were best avoided by the uninitiate. In this ring there is always one, sometimes two (its strength does not run to more), media of pure speculation in course of manipulation by one speculative158 group or another. The names or nature of these media do not really seem to matter. They vary. Sometimes they may be the shares of the Dock Company of an inchoate159 Port, sometimes those of an Industrial Company with vague expectations. Indeed, vagueness which may be tinged160 by rumour and imagination with a hue161 dimly resembling that of impending162 rich surprise is almost essential to the initiation163 of this kind of gamble.
The shares are bulled out of all proportion to their even possible value for a little while and then no more is heard of them; and other very similar ones reign24 in their stead in the sensational164 place on the blackboard, on which all bargains during each day are chalked up as they are called out by the parties making them.
The end of these really stillborn booms is mystery. Who are the unfortunate last in? Strangers, doubtless, when there are any. But if there be none, as is the case more frequently than not? One hears vague talk of Paris and other European capitals and then silence for ever more.
[114]
Anyhow, the stranger, for whom this book is chiefly written, would, if he took a hand in any one of these games, soon find out that though he might see the price of the shares he had purchased mounting gaily165 up on the blackboard like mercury in the tropics he could never realize to any appreciable extent. Did he start to sell, then all the weak little bulls of whom his co-speculators would be composed, people to whom ten dollars a day one way or the other makes all the difference in their domestic budget, would rush to sell also out of sheer fright, and down would go the market on him like a guillotine. At the finish he would be left with a very large proportion of his probably not over-valuable holding; of which he would have little further news than notices regarding proposed reconstruction166 schemes, etc.
It must not, however, be imagined that the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange is by any means exclusively devoted167 to such work as that just indicated. On the contrary, many Bank and Industrial shares are also quoted and the other, the Securities, ring is just as genuinely serious as the gambling168 part of the share ring is meretricious169. The chief securities dealt in in the former are the Bonds of the National Cedulas, as “gilt edged” a security as could well be wished for.
These Cedulas are Bonds issued by the National Hypothecary Bank, an Institution of the National Government, as against mortgages of freehold property in the Republic; the method of their issue being, shortly, as follows.
An intending Mortgagor lodges170 a proposal with the Bank; on which his title is examined and the property offered valued by Government experts appointed for each purpose.
The result of the examination of title being satisfactory, the Bank states the amount for which on its valuation, fixed after leaving ample margin171 for possible depreciation172, it will accept the mortgage.
But the Bank has no cash funds, and therefore issues[115] Bonds, carrying interest at 6%, and subject to annual amortization173, for the amount agreed to be granted to the Mortgagor. The latter, if he require cash, as is usually the case (most of such borrowings being actually effected with the objects for which the Bank was founded, viz. improvements of the property mortgaged, extension of holding, or purchase of stock and implements), must take his bonds to the Stock Exchange for sale. For them there is always a free and open market, the price obtainable usually varying only according to ordinary accidents of supply and demand.
Many brokers hold standing orders for these Bonds, at a price, for Europe (before the War Antwerp was always a buyer at a certain level). The only really appreciable downward fluctuations174 of this security are of very short duration, an hour or two at most, and are due to what can only be condemned175 as the inconsiderate action of the Directors of the Hypothecary Bank. That is to say, the Bank’s acceptances of Mortgages are sometimes allowed to accumulate and then, all of a sudden, the Directors seem to get to work and sign and issue huge batches176 of Bonds. Not only do most of these find their way to the Stock Exchange, in consequence of anticipatory orders lodged177 with brokers by absent or upcountry mortgagors, but many such people leave selling orders with the Bank itself.
The result of all this frequently is that one fine morning or afternoon cartloads of these Bonds arrive on the Stock Exchange and flood the market, in spite of all the market can do with the best intention of sustaining prices.
Soon, however, the mass is absorbed by the home and foreign demand, and the little crisis which could never have occurred except through the bad management above described, is over and normal prices rule again.
All this relates to the current issues of these Bonds, the “Cedula Argentina” as they are now called.
Formerly178 they were issued in series, each of which was distinguished by an alphabetical179 letter. The last of these[116] lettered series was “L.” This system of series had inconveniences, inasmuch as the regulations under which they were issued prescribed redemption in Bonds of the same series, which interfered180 with entirely free dealing; some of the earlier series being now only obtainable at a high premium181 on account of the buyer’s need of them to make up a parcel.
The Securities ring also deals in debenture182 and other Bonds—National, Provincial and Municipal. The only speculation in which it usually indulges being of the very safest kind; in regard to which, indeed, the term investment would better apply.
The side of the large Hall of the Exchange opposite to that occupied by the Stock and Share rings is now tenanted by the “Bolsa de Cereales,” an institution the recent creation of which was due to the necessity, arising chiefly from the rapid developments of the milling industry, for dealing in “futures” in cereal production.
On the old Once Corn Exchange such dealings were and still are tabu, as savouring dangerously of the Chicago “Pit,” and much heated discussion took place before the new Exchange was at length authorized183 to register transactions in futures. The discussion was useful inasmuch as it brought about the framing of stringent regulations against the more ruinous forms of gambling in grain. In the result, the new Institution works very well and fulfils its ostensible184 purpose of assuring the miller185 against produce being held against him at times when he is under obligation to deliver flour. Thus, it has prevented instead of encouraging at least one vicious class of operations. Formerly, when all dealing in grain futures was illegal, the miller was continually at the mercy of operators in the cereal markets.
The Institution of the new Market was imperatively186 needed on account of the huge development and value of the milling industry.
For ordinary dealings the Once cereal market still holds its own.
[117]
THE BUENOS AIRES STOCK EXCHANGE
One needs some courage to write candidly187 about this institution, the more especially if one hopes to enter it again.
The building itself is the property of a company from which the members rent it. Part of it is now, as has been indicated, sublet188 to the members of the new Cereal Exchange.
One side of the rotunda—the great inner Hall of the “Bolza”—is therefore now tenanted by the dealers189 in stocks and shares, and the other, facing it, by those occupied with grain. Each exchange has two large blackboards on which prices are chalked up by attendants as deals are called by the parties making them. These prices then become official; and their genuineness is vouched190 by the fact of their having been called by members of the Exchange, who are held responsible by the Committee for the bona fides of these announcements.
The rules are now very strict on the question of calling of bona fide dealings only. At one time the announcement and consequent chalking up of fictitious deals (called “gatos,” or, as we might say, “wild cats”) became so scandalously frequent and unblushing that a stop had to be put to a malpractice which deceived the public, since all prices chalked up are published in the daily papers.
The first, usually, in regard to both the magnitude and importance of the dealings recorded on it, of these blackboards or “slates,” as they are called, is that reserved for transactions in Government and other important stocks; the second being that devoted to shares.
Thus the first board is mostly filled with records of the numbers and prices of National Cedulas dealt in, and the second with those of whatever one or two kinds of shares may for the time being be in fashion for what one may bluntly call gambling. For gambling, simply, is the end of[118] almost everything in the shape of speculation in the ephemerally chosen media. It is in regard to this gambling that the note of warning to the stranger already sounded may be repeated here. The really Argentine public has long ago had its fingers sufficiently192 often and severely193 burnt to have decided194 to give all Bolza speculation a wide berth195. And here one is brought face to face with a mystery which the present writer has as yet been wholly unable to explain in any fully satisfactory way.
This mystery is that, given the fact that the contributions of the public to Bolza gambling have since long ago become a negligible quantity, it seems clear that such speculation must be confined to a limited group of Bolza operators.
How, therefore, is it worth the while of any of these operators to survive for long as such? They are mostly, if not all, men of small capital, very small in many cases, yet there they are, day after day, busily occupied in attributing usually fictitious values to the shares of one, or at most two (for the time being) companies. Up go the prices of such shares, rising each day to giddier heights, till at last like balloons they disappear from sight and another set of shares takes their place as material for a boom. Who is the last man or men left with shares at top price? And what on earth does he do with them? These be questions the answers to which are hidden by a secrecy196 the completeness and continuity of which do credit to the initiate157 few whose common interest it is to maintain it.
The only protection of these people is a mutual197 defence against the common enemy, similar to that adopted by professional buyers at an ordinary auction198 against any innocent amateur who may stray into their midst. On the other hand, the mere presence of a known “bear” among these folk, completely paralyses all action on their part until his back is turned again. The writer now has in his mind’s eye a well-known figure, that of a powerful bear who was the terror of the speculative markets in the golden days when the public[119] still played the game and all went merrily except for his malevolent199 influence. He alone could frown all prices down; and he once held them down against the whole of the furious remainder of the Exchange. It was a never-to-be-forgotten conflict, from which he emerged victorious200 and with a name at which even the puny201 bulls of to-day still tremble. Though be it said, he now does little but lend money to those whom circumstances, or still, occasionally, he himself, have forced to carry over. Few Bolza members will fail to identify him from even this slight reference to his fame. The heyday202 of the Buenos Stock Exchange was that immediately preceding the passing of the “Conversion” law which fixed a ratio between gold and paper and thus ended the speculation in gold which had grown all too vigorous on wide fluctuations. After that, wild cats, resorted to as the next best stimulant203, quickly undermined the constitution of the Bolza and frightened the public; permanently204, it would still seem, from its precincts as far as gambling speculation is concerned. Such speculation, in any magnitude, has been dead since 1906; in consequence of the collapse205 at that time of a gold fever boom of which a shoal of doomed206 alluvial dredging Companies were part cause and part effect.
Nowadays, the real business, of which there is a large and constant volume, done on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange is in National “Cedulas.” This business has gradually gravitated into the hands of a few large brokers. The only drawback to these Bonds is their name, which might lead the ignorant in matters South American to confuse them with the Provincial (Province of Buenos Aires) Cedulas, the corrupt207 mismanagement of which caused a great scandal some years ago. Still “Cedula” means a “Bond,” and it would, after all, be idle to wish to abolish the latter word only because some English Bonds may have proved unworthy of the prestige usually attaching to that designation.
The question has often been raised as to whether, on the wording of the guarantee endorsed208 on National Cedulas, the[120] National Government is responsible for repayment209 of the principal as well as the interest on them. This, however, amounts almost to a quibble; of little, if any, more than abstract interest. The amortization of these Bonds is certainly guaranteed in like manner as is the interest on them, and only some tremendous crisis, now unimaginable, could so wreck210 the whole territory of the Republic that land values throughout that territory would simultaneously211 fall to an extent which could render impossible the redemption of mortgages granted in the first place with a very liberal margin between the actual market value of the land and the amounts of the Bonds issued on its security. For, it should be noted in this connection, a Cedula is not issued by the Bank on the Security of such or such designated property, it is issued on the security, guaranteed by the Bank after due investigation212, of all the mortgages held by it. So that, in effect, even if the whole of a Province were to be engulfed213 by an earthquake, the security of none of the Bank’s Cedulas would be affected214 by the loss since, at the margin reserved by the Bank, all the remainder of the lands on which it holds mortgages would still be ample security for all its bonds.
The reader who is already well acquainted with these matters must forgive me for thus setting them out in so obvious a way. I ask him to believe that there are still very many holders215 of Argentine National Cedulas possessed of only the vaguest ideas of how their Bonds came into existence, and practically none as to the real nature of the security for them, except a general sort of notion that they are Argentine Government Bonds.
As will be seen, the facts justify216 my dictum of a few pages back that these Bonds really offer as gilt-edged a security as anyone could wish for.
Other securities most commonly dealt in in the Securities side of the Market are “Credito Argentino,” National Internal debt, the “Premier Security” of the Country, as it has been called; and some Provincial and Municipal[121] Bonds. On the share side, the shares of the various Banks are usually the subject of the most really important quotations217 on the slate191.
Many first-class Argentine securities and shares seldom come on the market.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
dependence
|
|
| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
barometer
|
|
| n.气压表，睛雨表，反应指标 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
previously
|
|
| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
inflated
|
|
| adj.（价格）飞涨的；（通货）膨胀的；言过其实的；充了气的v.使充气（于轮胎、气球等）( inflate的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）膨胀；（使）通货膨胀；物价上涨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
anticipatory
|
|
| adj.预想的，预期的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
relatively
|
|
| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
inevitably
|
|
| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
predecessor
|
|
| n.前辈，前任 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
justified
|
|
| a.正当的，有理的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
immediate
|
|
| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
apparently
|
|
| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
standing
|
|
| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
possessed
|
|
| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
interfere
|
|
| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
obligatory
|
|
| adj.强制性的，义务的，必须的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
gathering
|
|
| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
bumper
|
|
| n.(汽车上的)保险杠；adj.特大的，丰盛的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
aggravated
|
|
| 使恶化( aggravate的过去式和过去分词 )； 使更严重； 激怒； 使恼火 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
anticipation
|
|
| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
miraculous
|
|
| adj.像奇迹一样的，不可思议的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
realization
|
|
| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
entirely
|
|
| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
ministry
|
|
| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
reign
|
|
| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
retention
|
|
| n.保留，保持，保持力，记忆力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
alluded
|
|
| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
momentous
|
|
| adj.重要的，重大的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
moratorium
|
|
| n.(行动、活动的)暂停(期)，延期偿付 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
prudent
|
|
| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
volatile
|
|
| adj.反复无常的，挥发性的，稍纵即逝的，脾气火爆的；n.挥发性物质 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
fully
|
|
| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
perilous
|
|
| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
humanitarian
|
|
| n.人道主义者，博爱者，基督凡人论者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
withdrawal
|
|
| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
prophesy
|
|
| v.预言；预示 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
speculation
|
|
| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
insistence
|
|
| n.坚持；强调；坚决主张 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
colonization
|
|
| 殖民地的开拓，殖民，殖民地化； 移殖 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
distinguished
|
|
| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
mere
|
|
| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
pecuniary
|
|
| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
ingenuity
|
|
| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
locust
|
|
| n.蝗虫；洋槐，刺槐 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
proprietary
|
|
| n.所有权，所有的；独占的；业主 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
ERECTED
|
|
| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
whitewashing
|
|
| 粉饰，美化，掩饰( whitewash的现在分词 )； 喷浆 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
favourable
|
|
| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
conversion
|
|
| n.转化，转换，转变 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
vaults
|
|
| n.拱顶( vault的名词复数 )；地下室；撑物跳高；墓穴 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
dealing
|
|
| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
copper
|
|
| n.铜；铜币；铜器；adj.铜(制)的；(紫)铜色的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
fixed
|
|
| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
inevitable
|
|
| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
sterling
|
|
| adj.英币的(纯粹的，货真价实的)；n.英国货币(英镑) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
noted
|
|
| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
metallic
|
|
| adj.金属的；金属制的；含金属的；产金属的；像金属的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
stringent
|
|
| adj.严厉的；令人信服的；银根紧的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
misuse
|
|
| n.误用，滥用；vt.误用，滥用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
complacent
|
|
| adj.自满的；自鸣得意的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
platitudes
|
|
| n.平常的话，老生常谈，陈词滥调( platitude的名词复数 )；滥套子 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
accomplished
|
|
| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
insufficient
|
|
| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
pertain
|
|
| v.(to)附属，从属；关于；有关；适合，相称 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
abrogated
|
|
| 废除（法律等）( abrogate的过去式和过去分词 )； 取消； 去掉； 抛开 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
provincial
|
|
| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
accrued
|
|
| adj.权责已发生的v.增加( accrue的过去式和过去分词 )；（通过自然增长）产生；获得；（使钱款、债务）积累 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
monetary
|
|
| adj.货币的，钱的；通货的；金融的；财政的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
chaos
|
|
| n.混乱，无秩序 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
repudiation
|
|
| n.拒绝；否认；断绝关系；抛弃 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
renaissance
|
|
| n.复活，复兴，文艺复兴 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
fictitious
|
|
| adj.虚构的，假设的；空头的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
withdrawn
|
|
| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
drawn
|
|
| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
rehabilitation
|
|
| n.康复，悔过自新，修复，复兴，复职，复位 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
dual
|
|
| adj.双的；二重的，二元的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
lapse
|
|
| n.过失，流逝，失效，抛弃信仰，间隔；vi.堕落，停止，失效，流逝；vt.使失效 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
momentary
|
|
| adj.片刻的，瞬息的；短暂的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
remains
|
|
| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
statute
|
|
| n.成文法，法令，法规；章程，规则，条例 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
attained
|
|
| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
disastrous
|
|
| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
wares
|
|
| n. 货物, 商品 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
futures
|
|
| n.期货，期货交易 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
rife
|
|
| adj.(指坏事情)充斥的，流行的，普遍的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
procure
|
|
| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
lumber
|
|
| n.木材，木料；v.以破旧东西堆满；伐木；笨重移动 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
deter
|
|
| vt.阻止，使不敢，吓住 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
upwards
|
|
| adv.向上，在更高处...以上 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
elimination
|
|
| n.排除，消除，消灭 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
unreasonably
|
|
| adv. 不合理地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
consular
|
|
| a.领事的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
insistently
|
|
| ad.坚持地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
pointed
|
|
| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
originality
|
|
| n.创造力，独创性；新颖 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
persistence
|
|
| n.坚持，持续，存留 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
96
reiteration
|
|
| n. 重覆, 反覆, 重说 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
kaleidoscopic
|
|
| adj.千变万化的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
isles
|
|
| 岛( isle的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
straightforward
|
|
| adj.正直的，坦率的；易懂的，简单的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
underlying
|
|
| adj.在下面的，含蓄的，潜在的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
101
motives
|
|
| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
102
resentment
|
|
| n.怨愤，忿恨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
103
construe
|
|
| v.翻译，解释 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
104
doctrine
|
|
| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
105
embodies
|
|
| v.表现( embody的第三人称单数 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
106
indifference
|
|
| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
107
strenuous
|
|
| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
108
hustling
|
|
| 催促（hustle的现在分词形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
109
vociferous
|
|
| adj.喧哗的，大叫大嚷的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
110
arbiter
|
|
| n.仲裁人，公断人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
111
brook
|
|
| n.小河，溪；v.忍受，容让 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
112
psychology
|
|
| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
113
appreciation
|
|
| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
114
mentality
|
|
| n.心理，思想，脑力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
115
diplomacy
|
|
| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
116
contemplate
|
|
| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
117
trifling
|
|
| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
118
rendering
|
|
| n.表现，描写 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
119
actively
|
|
| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
120
patriotic
|
|
| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
121
patriotism
|
|
| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
122
gist
|
|
| n.要旨；梗概 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
123
lamentably
|
|
| adv.哀伤地，拙劣地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
124
adaptable
|
|
| adj.能适应的，适应性强的，可改编的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
125
spoke
|
|
| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
126
mingling
|
|
| adj.混合的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
127
jovial
|
|
| adj.快乐的，好交际的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
128
persuasive
|
|
| adj.有说服力的，能说得使人相信的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
129
proceeding
|
|
| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
130
tinges
|
|
| n.细微的色彩，一丝痕迹( tinge的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
131
laborious
|
|
| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
132
allusive
|
|
| adj.暗示的；引用典故的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
133
grumbling
|
|
| adj. 喃喃鸣不平的, 出怨言的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
134
consecutive
|
|
| adj.连续的，联贯的，始终一贯的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
135
perilously
|
|
| adv.充满危险地，危机四伏地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
136
annually
|
|
| adv.一年一次，每年 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
137
foodstuffs
|
|
| 食物，食品( foodstuff的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
138
machinery
|
|
| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
139
Augmented
|
|
| adj.增音的 动词augment的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
140
civilized
|
|
| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
141
devastation
|
|
| n.毁坏；荒废；极度震惊或悲伤 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
142
utilized
|
|
| v.利用，使用( utilize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
143
cultivation
|
|
| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
144
alluvial
|
|
| adj.冲积的；淤积的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
145
unlimited
|
|
| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
146
pious
|
|
| adj.虔诚的；道貌岸然的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
147
literally
|
|
| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
148
accredited
|
|
| adj.可接受的；可信任的；公认的；质量合格的v.相信( accredit的过去式和过去分词 )；委托；委任；把…归结于 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
149
wholesale
|
|
| n.批发；adv.以批发方式；vt.批发，成批出售 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
150
retail
|
|
| v./n.零售；adv.以零售价格 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
151
banking
|
|
| n.银行业，银行学，金融业 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
152
turnover
|
|
| n.人员流动率，人事变动率；营业额，成交量 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
153
appreciable
|
|
| adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
154
rumour
|
|
| n.谣言，谣传，传闻 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
155
speculations
|
|
| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
156
brokers
|
|
| n.（股票、外币等）经纪人( broker的名词复数 )；中间人；代理商；（订合同的）中人v.做掮客（或中人等）( broker的第三人称单数 )；作为权力经纪人进行谈判；以中间人等身份安排… | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
157
initiate
|
|
| vt.开始，创始，发动；启蒙，使入门；引入 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
158
speculative
|
|
| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
159
inchoate
|
|
| adj.才开始的，初期的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
160
tinged
|
|
| v.（使）发丁丁声( ting的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
161
hue
|
|
| n.色度；色调；样子 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
162
impending
|
|
| a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
163
initiation
|
|
| n.开始 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
164
sensational
|
|
| adj.使人感动的，非常好的，轰动的，耸人听闻的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
165
gaily
|
|
| adv.欢乐地，高兴地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
166
reconstruction
|
|
| n.重建，再现，复原 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
167
devoted
|
|
| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
168
gambling
|
|
| n.赌博；投机 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
169
meretricious
|
|
| adj.华而不实的，俗艳的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
170
lodges
|
|
| v.存放( lodge的第三人称单数 )；暂住；埋入；（权利、权威等）归属 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
171
margin
|
|
| n.页边空白；差额；余地，余裕；边，边缘 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
172
depreciation
|
|
| n.价值低落，贬值，蔑视，贬低 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
173
amortization
|
|
| n.摊销，摊还，分期偿付 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
174
fluctuations
|
|
| 波动，涨落，起伏( fluctuation的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
175
condemned
|
|
| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
176
batches
|
|
| 一批( batch的名词复数 )； 一炉； （食物、药物等的）一批生产的量； 成批作业 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
177
lodged
|
|
| v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 )；暂住；埋入；（权利、权威等）归属 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
178
formerly
|
|
| adv.从前，以前 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
179
alphabetical
|
|
| adj.字母（表）的，依字母顺序的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
180
interfered
|
|
| v.干预( interfere的过去式和过去分词 )；调停；妨碍；干涉 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
181
premium
|
|
| n.加付款；赠品；adj.高级的；售价高的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
182
debenture
|
|
| n.债券；信用债券；（海关）退税凭单 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
183
authorized
|
|
| a.委任的，许可的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
184
ostensible
|
|
| adj.(指理由)表面的，假装的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
185
miller
|
|
| n.磨坊主 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
186
imperatively
|
|
| adv.命令式地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
187
candidly
|
|
| adv.坦率地，直率而诚恳地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
188
sublet
|
|
| v.转租；分租 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
189
dealers
|
|
| n.商人( dealer的名词复数 )；贩毒者；毒品贩子；发牌者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
190
vouched
|
|
| v.保证( vouch的过去式和过去分词 )；担保；确定；确定地说 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
191
slate
|
|
| n.板岩，石板，石片，石板色，候选人名单；adj.暗蓝灰色的，含板岩的；vt.用石板覆盖，痛打，提名，预订 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
192
sufficiently
|
|
| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
193
severely
|
|
| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
194
decided
|
|
| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
195
berth
|
|
| n.卧铺，停泊地，锚位；v.使停泊 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
196
secrecy
|
|
| n.秘密，保密，隐蔽 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
197
mutual
|
|
| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
198
auction
|
|
| n.拍卖；拍卖会；vt.拍卖 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
199
malevolent
|
|
| adj.有恶意的，恶毒的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
200
victorious
|
|
| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
201
puny
|
|
| adj.微不足道的，弱小的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
202
heyday
|
|
| n.全盛时期，青春期 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
203
stimulant
|
|
| n.刺激物，兴奋剂 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
204
permanently
|
|
| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
205
collapse
|
|
| vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
206
doomed
|
|
| 命定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
207
corrupt
|
|
| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
208
endorsed
|
|
| vt.& vi.endorse的过去式或过去分词形式v.赞同( endorse的过去式和过去分词 )；在（尤指支票的）背面签字；在（文件的）背面写评论；在广告上说本人使用并赞同某产品 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
209
repayment
|
|
| n.偿还，偿还款；报酬 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
210
wreck
|
|
| n.失事，遇难；沉船；vt.(船等)失事，遇难 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
211
simultaneously
|
|
| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
212
investigation
|
|
| n.调查，调查研究 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
213
engulfed
|
|
| v.吞没，包住( engulf的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
214
affected
|
|
| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
215
holders
|
|
| 支持物( holder的名词复数 )； 持有者； （支票等）持有人； 支托（或握持）…之物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
216
justify
|
|
| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
217
quotations
|
|
| n.引用( quotation的名词复数 )；[商业]行情（报告）；（货物或股票的）市价；时价 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |