Such were the circumstances in which the carronade first came into use. And the following advertisement, appearing in Edinburgh shortly afterwards, sufficiently6 explains the incentive7 for exploiting the new type of ordnance8, and the reason of its popularity among shipowners, passengers and crews. “To sail March 5, 1779, the Glasgow, Robert Paterson master, mounting fourteen twelve-pounders, and men answerable.... N.B.—The Carron vessels9 are fitted out in the most complete manner for defence at a very considerable expense, and are well provided with small arms. All mariners11, recruiting parties, soldiers upon furlow, and all other steerage passengers who have been accustomed to the use of fire-arms, and who will engage in defending themselves, will be accommodated with their passage to and from London, upon satisfying the masters for their provisions, which in no instance shall exceed 10s. 6d. sterling12. The Carron vessels sail regularly as usual, without waiting for the convoy13.”
The carronade was a very short, light, carriage gun of relatively14 large bore, made to take a standard size of long-gun shot and project it, by means of a small charge of powder,126 against an enemy at close range. Its proprietors15 soon found a market for the produce of their foundry, not only for merchant ships but for men-of-war. The reputation of the new ordnance quickly spread; carronades found a place almost immediately among the orthodox armament of the greater number of our fighting ships; and kept their place till, after a chequered career of half a century, during which they contributed both to victory and to defeat, they were finally discarded from the sea service.
The story of the carronade begins some little time before the meeting of the Carron board in the year 1778. It will be remembered that in 1747 Mr. Benjamin Robins16 had advocated, in a much-talked-of paper, an increase in the calibre of warships17’ guns at the expense of their ranging power, and that in support of his argument he had drawn19 attention to two features of ship actions—first, that the great majority of duels20 were fought at close quarters; secondly21, that the destructive effect of a cannon-ball against an enemy’s hull22 depended largely on the external dimensions of the ball, the larger of two balls producing an effect altogether out of proportion to the mere23 difference in size.
However invalid24 may have been the arguments founded on these assertions—and that there was a serious flaw in them time was to show—there could be no doubt that, so far as considerations of defence were concerned, the conclusions reached were of important value. In the case of a merchant packet defending herself from boarding by a privateer, for example, a light, short-ranging gun throwing a large ball would give far more effective protection than a small-calibre long gun. And if, moreover, the former involved a dead weight less than a quarter, and a personnel less than half, of that involved by the latter, the consideration of its superiority in action was strongly reinforced, in the opinion of shipowners and masters, by less advertised considerations of weight, space, and equipment—very important in their relation to the speed and convenience of the vessel10, and hence to all concerned.
So the arguments of Robins, though propounded25 solely26 with reference to warships, yet applied27 with special force to the defensive28 armament of merchant ships. A conception of this fact led a very able artillerist29, General Robert Melville, to propose, in 1774, a short eight-inch gun weighing only thirty-127one hundredweight yet firing a nicely fitting sixty-eight pound ball with a charge of only five and a half pounds of powder. This piece he induced the Carron company to cast, appropriately naming it a Smasher. Of all the carronades the Smasher was the prototype. It possessed30 the special attributes of the carronades in the superlative degree; the carronade was a reproduction, to a convenient scale, of the Smasher. That General Melville was the prime inventor of the new type, has been placed beyond doubt by the inscription31 on a model subsequently presented to him by the Carron Company. The inscription runs: “Gift of the Carron Company to Lieut.-General Melville, inventor of the Smashers and lesser32 carronades for solid, ship, shell, and carcass shot, etc. First used against French ships in 1779.”85
In almost every respect the Smasher was the antithesis33 of the long gun: the advantages of the one were founded on the shortcomings of the other. For instance, the smallness of the long gun’s ball was a feature which, as ships’ sides came to be made stronger and thicker, rendered the smaller calibres of long guns of a diminishing value as offensive armament. It was becoming increasingly difficult to sink a ship by gunfire. The round hole made near the enemy’s water-line was insufficient34 in size to have a decisive effect; the fibres of the timber closed round the entering shot and, swelled35 by sea-water, half closed the hole, leaving the carpenter an easy task to plug the inboard end of it. The large and irregular hole made by a Smasher, on the other hand, the ragged36 and splintered opening caused by the crashing of the large ball against the frames and timbers, was quite likely to be the cause of a foundering37. Again, the high velocity38 of the long gun’s ball, while giving it range and considerable penetrative power, was actually a disadvantage when at close quarters with an enemy. The maximum effect was gained, as every gunner knew, when the ball had just sufficient momentum39 to enable it to penetrate40 an opponent’s timbers. The result of a high velocity was often128 to make a clean hole through a ship without making a splinter or causing her to heel at all. Hence the practice of double-shotting: a system of two units which, as we have just seen, was less likely to prove effective than a system of a larger single unit. On the other hand the Smasher vaunted its low muzzle41 velocity. As for the relative powder charges, that of the long gun was wastefully42 large and inefficient44, while that of the Smasher was small and very effective. It was in this respect, perhaps, that the Smasher showed itself to the greatest advantage. And as this feature exerted from the first an important influence on all other types of ordnance, we will examine in some detail the means by which its high efficiency was attained45.
Apart from the inefficiency46 inherent in the small-ball-and-big-velocity system the long gun laboured under mechanical disadvantages from which its squat47 competitor was happily free. In the eighteenth century the state of workshop practice was so primitive48 as to render impossible any fine measurements of material. Until the time of Whitworth the true plane surface, the true cylinder49 and the true sphere were unattainable in practice. For this reason a considerable clearance50 had to be provided between round shot and the bores of the guns for which they were intended; in other words, the inaccuracies which existed in the dimensions of guns and shots necessitated52 the provision of a certain “windage.” But other considerations had also to be taken into account. The varying temperatures at which shot might require to be used; the fouling53 of gun-bores by burnt powder; the effect of wear and rust54 on both shot and bore, and especially the effect of rust on the shot carried in ships of war (at first enlarged by the rust and then, the rust flaking56 or being beaten off with hammers, reduced in size)—all these factors combined to exact such disproportionate windage that, in the best conditions, from one-quarter to one-third of the force of the powder was altogether lost, while, in the worst conditions, as much as one-half of the propulsive57 force of the powder escaped unused. Not only was a large charge required, therefore, but the range and aim of the loosely fitting shot was often incorrect and incalculable; the motion of the shot was detrimental58 to the surface of the bore and the life of the gun; while the recoil59 was so boisterous60 as sometimes to dismount and disable the gun, injure the crew, and even endanger the vessel.
129 The inventor of the Smasher, by eliminating this obvious deficiency of the long gun, gave to his weapon not only a direct advantage due to the higher efficiency of the powder-charge, but also several collateral61 advantages arising from it, such as, economy of powder, ease of recoil, and small stresses upon the mounting and its supporting structure.
It had been laid down by Dr. Hutton in 1775, as one of the chief results of the systematic62 experiments carried out by him at Woolwich in extension of the inquiries63 originated by Robins, that if only the windage of guns could be reduced very important advantages would accrue64; among others, a saving of at least one-third of the standard charges of powder would result. General Melville determined65 to give the Smasher the very minimum of windage necessary to prevent accident. The shortness of the bore favoured such a reduction. The large diameter, though at first it might appear to render necessary a correspondingly large windage, was actually an advantage from this point of view. For, instead of adhering to the orthodox practice with long guns, of making the windage roughly proportional to the diameter of the bore, he gave the Smasher a windage less than that of a much smaller long gun, arguing that though a certain mechanical clearance was necessary, yet the amount of this clearance was in no way dependent on the diameter of the shot or piece. The large size of the Smasher acted therefore to its advantage. The windage space through which the powder gases could escape was very small in relation to the area of the large ball on which they did useful work.
But this divergence66 from the standard practice would appear to necessitate51 the provision of special ammunition67 for use with the Smasher: the nicely fitting sixty-eight pound ball would require to be specially55 made for it? And this would surely militate against the general adoption68 of the Smasher in the public service? No such difficulty confronted the inventor. For, curiously69 enough, the principle on which the dimensions of gun-bores and shot were fixed70 was the reverse of the principle which obtains to-day. Instead of the diameter of the gun being of the nominal71 dimension and the diameter of the shot being equal to that of the gun minus the windage, the diameter of the shot was the datum72 from which the amount of the windage and the calibre of the gun were determined.
So, the size of the shot being fixed, a reduction of windage130 was obtainable in a new design of gun by boring it to a smaller than the standard diameter. And this was what the inventor of the Smasher did. The large ball, in combination with the restricted windage and the small charge of powder, gave the Smasher ballistic results far superior, relatively, to those obtained with the long gun. Its lack of ranging power was admitted. But for close action it was claimed that it would prove an invaluable73 weapon, especially in the defence of merchant ships.86 Not only would its large ball make such holes in the light hull of an enemy privateer as would break through his beams and frames and perhaps send all hands to the pumps; but, projected with just sufficient velocity to carry it through an opponent’s timbers, it would thereby74 produce a maximum of splintering effect and put out of action guns, their crews, and perhaps the vessel itself.
§
On the lines of the Smasher the “lesser carronades,” more convenient in size and more easily worked, were cast, and quickly made a reputation in merchant shipping. The Smasher itself was offered to the admiralty, but was never fitted in a royal ship; though trials were carried out with it later with hollow or cored shot, to ascertain75 how these lighter76 balls compared in action with the solid 68-pounders. Meanwhile the Carron Company found a large market for the lighter patterns of carronade; the 24, 18, and 12-pounders were sold in large numbers to private ships and letters-of-marque, and to some of the frigates78 and smaller ships of the royal navy. The progress of the new ordnance was watched with interest by the board of admiralty. In 1779 we have Sir Charles Douglas writing to Sir Charles Middleton in full accord with his views on the desirability of mounting Carron 12-pounders on the poop of the Duke, and suggesting131 24-pounders, three a side, upon her quarter-deck. To the same distinguished79 correspondent Captain Kempenfelt writes, deploring80 that no trials have yet been made with carronades. Shortly afterwards the navy board discusses the 68-pound Smasher and desires the master-general of ordnance to make experiment with it. A scale is drawn up by the navy board, moreover, and sanctioned by the admiralty, for arming different rates with 18-and 12-pounder carronades. The larger classes of ships, the first, second, and third rates, have their quarter-decks already filled with guns; but accommodation is found for a couple of carronades on the forecastles, and for half a dozen on the poop, which for nearly a century past has served chiefly as a roof for the captain’s cabin. This is now timbered up and given three pairs of ports, making a total of eight ports for the reception of carronades. In the case of smaller ships less difficulty is experienced. Ports are readily cut in their forecastles and quarter-decks, and in some cases their poops are barricaded81, to give accommodation for from four to a dozen carronades.87
The new weapon found its way into most of our smaller ships, not always and solely as an addition to the existing long-gun armament, for use in special circumstances, but in many cases in lieu of the long guns of the establishment. The saving in weight and space gained by this substitution made the carronade especially popular in the smaller classes of frigate77, the sloops82, and brigs; many of which became almost entirely83 armed with the type. The weak feature of the carronade, which in the end was to prove fatal to it—its feeble range and penetrating84 power—was generally overlooked, or accepted as being more than compensated85 for by its many obvious advantages. The carronade, it was said by many, was the weapon specially suited to the favourite tactics of the British navy—a yard-arm action.
There were others, however, who were inclined to emphasize the disability under which the carronade would lie if the enemy could contrive86 to avoid closing and keep just out of range. And on this topic, the relative merits of long gun and carronade as armament for the smaller ships, discussion among naval87 men was frequent and emphatic88. The king’s service was divided into two schools. The advocates of long guns could quote many a case where, especially in chase, the superior132 range of the long gun had helped to win the day. The advocates of the carronade replied with recent and conclusive89 examples of victories won by short-gun ships which had been able to get to grips and quickly neutralize90 the advantages of a superior enemy armed with long guns. When challenged with the argument that, since the advantages of the carronade entirely disappear at long ranges it is essential that ships armed with them should be exceptionally fast sailers, they replied, that the very lightness of a carronade armament would, other things being equal, give ships so armed the property required. As for out-ranging, they were even ready to back their carronades in that respect, if only they were well charged with powder. It was a matter of faith with many that, in spite of Dr. Hutton’s published proof to the contrary, a considerable increase of range could be obtained by the expedient91 of shortening the gun’s recoil; so that in chase it was a common procedure to lash92 the breechings of carronades to the ship’s timbers, to prevent recoil and to help the shot upon its way.
At first mechanical difficulties occurred in the fitting of the new carronade mountings which, though not due to any defect inherent in the equipments, nevertheless placed them under suspicion in certain quarters. Though the prototype had trunnions like a gun, the carronades afterwards cast were attached by lugs93 to wooden slides which recoiled94 on slotted carriages pivoted95 to the ship’s side timbers, the slide being secured to the carriage by a vertical96 bolt which passed down through the slot. The recoil was limited by breechings; but as these stretched continuously the bolt eventually brought up with a blow against the end of the slot in the carriage: the bolt broke, and the carronade was disabled. This happened at Praya Bay, where the carronades broke their beds, owing to slack breechings, after a few rounds. Captains complained, too, that the fire of the carronades was a danger to the shrouds97 and rigging.
A CARRONADE
In spite of these views the popularity of the new ordnance increased so rapidly that in January, 1781, there were, according to the historian James, 429 ships in the royal navy which mounted carronades. On the merits of these weapons opinion was still very much divided. The board of ordnance was against their adoption; the navy board gave them a mild approval. In practice considerable discretion98 appears to have been granted to the commanders of ships in deciding what133 armament they should actually carry.88 But the uncertainty99 of official opinion gave rise to a surprising anomaly: the carronade, although officially countenanced100, was not recognized as part of the orthodox armament of a ship. What was the cause of this is not now clear. It has been said in explanation, that the carronade formed too fluctuating a basis on which to rate a ship’s force; that a long-gun basis afforded a key to the stores and complement101 of a ship, whereas carronades had little effect on either complement or stores; or that it may have been merely inertia102 on the part of the navy board. Whatever the cause, the ignoring of the carronade, in all official quotations103 of ships’ armaments, led to great uncertainty and confusion in estimating the relative force of our own and other navies, to suggestions of deception104 on the part of antagonists105, to the bickering106 of historians and the bewilderment of the respective peoples. This extraordinary circumstance, that carronades with all their alleged107 advantages were not thought worthy108 to be ranked among the long guns of a ship, is commented on at length by James. “Whether,” he says, “they equalled in calibre the heaviest of these guns, added to their number a full third, or to their power a full half, still they remained as mere a blank in the ship’s nominal, or rated force, as the muskets109 in the arm-chest. On the other hand, the addition of a single134 pair of guns of the old construction, to a ship’s armament, removed her at once to a higher class and gave her, how novel or inconvenient110 soever, a new denomination111.”
While the products of the Carron firm were gaining unexpected success in the defence of merchant shipping, their value in ships of the line was not to remain long in doubt. Some of the heavier carronades had been mounted in the Formidable, Duke, and other ships, and their presence had a material effect in Admiral Rodney’s action of April, 1782. As had been generally recognized, the carronade was especially suited to the British aims and methods of attack—the destruction of the enemy by a yard-arm action. To the French, whose strategy and methods were fundamentally different, its value was less apparent. So that for long this country reaped alone the benefit of its invention; until in somewhat half-hearted way France gradually adopted it, and then mostly in the smaller sizes, and more apparently112 with a view to defence than for offensive purposes. In the action with de Grasse the carronades of the British fleet operated, in the opening stages, as an additional incentive to the enemy to avoid close quarters. And later, at the in-fighting, their weight of metal contributed in no small degree to the superiority of fire which finally forced him to surrender.
It was later in this same year that the carronade won its most dramatic victory as armament of a small ship. In order to give a thorough trial to the system the navy board had ordered the Rainbow, an old 44, to be experimentally armed with large carronades, some of which were of as large a calibre as the original Smasher; by which her broadside weight of metal was almost quadrupled. Thus armed she put to sea and one day fell in with the French frigate Hébé, armed with 18-pounder long guns. Luring113 her enemy to a close-quarter combat, the Rainbow suddenly poured into the Frenchman the whole weight of her broadside. The resistance was short, the Hébé surrendered, and proved to be a prize of exceptional value as a model for frigate design. The capture was quoted as convincing proof of the value of a carronade armament, and the type continued from this time to grow in popularity, until the termination of the war in 1783 put a stop to further experiments with it.
135
§
Throughout the long war which broke out ten years later the carronade played a considerable part in the succession of duels and actions which had their climax114 off Trafalgar. It was now generally adopted as a secondary form of armament, captains being permitted, upon application, to vary at discretion the proportion of long-gun to carronade armament which they wished to carry. In the smaller classes especially, a preponderance of carronades was frequently accepted; the accession of force caused by the substitution of small carronades for 6-and 9-pounder long guns in brigs and sloops could hardly be disputed. In ships-of-the-line the larger sizes continued in favour. The French now benefited, too, by their adoption; on more than one occasion their poop and forecastle carronades, loaded with langrage, played havoc115 with our personnel. Spaniards and Dutchmen did not carry them. How far their absence contributed to their defeats it is not now to inquire; but how the tide of battle would have been affected116 by them—if the Dutch fleet, for instance, had carried them at Camperdown—may be a not unprofitable speculation117.
Early in the war the carronade system was to score its greatest defensive triumph, and this, by a happy coincidence, in the hands of the old Rainbow’s commander.
The Glatton, one of a few East Indiamen which had been bought by the admiralty, was fitted out in 1795 as a ship of war, and left Sheerness in the summer of the following year under the command of Captain Henry Trollope to join a squadron in the North Sea. At her commander’s request she was armed with carronades exclusively. She was without ahead or astern fire, without a single long bow or stern chaser; she carried 68-pounder carronades along her sides, whose muzzles118 were so large that they almost filled the small port-holes of the converted Indiaman and prevented more than a small traverse. Off the Flanders coast she fell in one night with six French frigates, a brig-corvette, and a cutter; and at ten o’clock a close action began. The Glatton was engaged by her antagonists on both sides, her yard-arms almost touching119 those of the enemy. She proved to be a very dangerous foe120. Her carronades, skilfully121 pointed122 and served by supply parties who worked port and starboard pieces alternately, poured out their heavy missiles at point-blank range. So heavy was her fire that one136 by one the frigates had to haul off, severely123 damaged, and the Glatton was left at last to spend the night repairing her rigging unmolested, but in the expectation that the French commodore would renew the attack in the morning. To her surprise no action was offered. The blows of the 68-pounders had done their work. Followed by the Glatton with a “brag countenance,” the enemy retired124 with his squadron in the direction of Flushing.
The action had more than one lesson to teach, however, and no more ships, except small craft, were armed after this upon the model of the Glatton.
We must at this point mention an experiment made in the year 1796, at the instance of Sir Samuel Bentham, in the mounting of carronades on a non-recoil system. Sir Samuel, who in the service of Russia had armed long-boats and other craft with ordnance thus mounted, produced arguments before the navy board for attaching carronades rigidly125 to ships’ timbers; so as to allow of no other recoil than that resulting from the elasticity126 of the carriage and the materials connecting it to the ship. The ordnance board reported against the new idea. Sir Samuel pointed out that the idea was not new. Both the largest and the smallest pieces used on board ship (viz. the mortar128 and the swivel) had always been mounted on the principle of non-recoil. He showed how bad was the principle of first allowing a gun and its slide or carriage to generate momentum in recoil and then of attempting to absorb that momentum in the small stretch of a breeching-rope. He argued that a rifle held at the shoulder is not allowed to recoil: if it is, the rifleman smarts for it. He instanced the lashing129 of guns fast to the ship, especially in chase, for the purpose of making them carry farther. No; the novelty consisted in preparing suitable and appropriate fastenings for intermediate sizes of guns between the mortar and the swivel. The adoption of his proposal, he contended, would result in smaller guns’ crews, quicker loading, and greater safety.
As a result of these arguments certain sloops designed by him were armed on this principle; and in other cases, notably130 in the case of the boats used at the siege of Acre, the carronades and smaller types of long gun were successfully mounted and worked without recoil by attaching their carriages to vertical fir posts, built into the hull structures to serve as front pivots131. But, generally, the system was found to be impracticable.137 The pivots successfully withstood the stresses of carronades fired with normal charges of powder; no permanent injury resulted to the elastic127 hull structures over which the blows were spread. But the factor of safety allowed by this arrangement was insufficient to cover the wild use of ordnance in emergencies. The regulation of charges and the prevention of double-shotting was difficult in action, and pieces were liable to be over-charged in the excitement of battle in a way which Sir Samuel Bentham had failed to realize. Pivots were broken, ships’ structures strained, and the whole system found ill-adapted for warship18 requirements.
It was not till the war of 1812 that the fatal weakness of the carronade, as primary armament, was fully43 revealed. The Americans had not developed the carronade policy to the same extent as ourselves, for transatlantic opinion was never at this period enamoured of the short-range gun. Their well-built merchant ships, unhampered by tonnage rules or by the convoy system which had taken so much of the stamina132 from British shipping, were accustomed to trust to their speed and good seamanship to keep an enemy at a distance. Their frigates, built under less pedantic133 restrictions134 as to size and weight, were generally swifter, stouter135 and more heavily armed than ours. And, though they included carronades among their armament, these were not generally in so large a proportion as in our ships, and in part were represented by a superior type—the colombiad, a hybrid136 weapon of proportions intermediate between the carronade and the long gun. Our ships often depended heavily upon the carronade element of their armament. Experience was soon to confirm what foresight137 might, surely, have deduced: namely, that when pitted against an enemy who could choose his range and shoot with tolerable accuracy the carronade would find itself in certain circumstances reduced to absolute impotence.
This was to be the fate and predicament of our ships on Lakes Erie and Ontario, in face of the Americans. “I found it impossible to bring them to close action,” the English commodore reported. “We remained in this mortifying138 situation five hours, having only six guns in all the squadron that would reach the enemy, not a carronade being fired.” The same lesson was to be enforced shortly afterwards on the Americans. One of their frigates, the Essex, armed almost exclusively with carronades, was fought by an English ship,138 the Ph?be, armed with long guns. The Essex, it should be noted139, possessed the quality essential for a carronade armament, namely, superior speed. But the Ph?be fell in with her in circumstances when, owing to damage, her superior speed could not be utilized140. The captain of the Ph?be was able to choose the range at which the action should be fought. He kept at a “respectful distance”: within range of his own long guns and out of range of his opponent’s carronades. Both sides fought well, but the result was a foregone conclusion. The Essex, disabled and on fire, had to surrender. From that time the carronade was discredited141. For some years after the peace it found a place in the armament of all classes of British ships, but it was a fallen favourite. The French commission which visited this country in 1835 reported that, although still accounted part of the regular armament of older ships, the carronade was being replaced to a great extent by light long guns in newer construction. Opinion certainly hardened more and more against the type, and, gradually falling into disuse, it was at last altogether abandoned.
There was a feature of the carronade, however, which if it had been exploited might have made the story of the carronade much longer: might, in fact, have made the carronade the starting-point of the great evolution which ordnance was to undergo in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. We refer to the large area of its bore, as rendering142 it specially suitable for the projection143 of hollow spheres charged with powder or combustibles: in short, for shells. Although, as shown by the inscription on the model presented to him, General Melville’s invention covered the use of shell and carcass shot, yet there was no general appreciation145 in this country, at the time of its invention, of the possibilities which the new weapon presented for throwing charges of explosive or combustible144 matter against the hulls146 of ships. Empty hollow shot were tried in the original Smasher for comparison against solid shot, in case the latter might prove too heavy;—and these, as was pointed out by an eminent147 writer on artillery,89 possessed in an accentuated148 degree all the disadvantages of the carronade system, their adoption being tantamount to a reversion to the long-exploded granite149 shot of the medieval ordnance—but the use of filled shell in connection with carronades does not appear to have been seriously139 considered. The disadvantages of filled shell as compared with solid shot were fairly obvious; their inferiority in range, in penetrative power, in accuracy of flight, their inability to stand double-shotting or battering150 charges—all these were capable of proof or demonstration151. Their destructive effect, both explosive and incendiary, as compared with that of uncharged shot, was surprisingly under-estimated. Had it been otherwise, the carronade principle would have led naturally to the introduction of the shell gun. “The redeeming152 trait in the project of General Melville,” wrote Dahlgren, “the redeeming trait which, if properly appreciated and developed, might have anticipated the Paixhans system by half a century, was hardly thought of. The use of shells was, at best, little more than a vague conception; its formidable powers unrealized, unnoticed, were doomed153 to lie dormant154 for nearly half a century after the carronade was invented, despite the evidence of actual trial and service.”
In other respects the carronade did good service in the development of naval gunnery. Its introduction raised (as we have seen) the whole question of windage and its effects, and was productive of general improvement in the reduction and regulation of the windage in all types of gun. By it the advantages of quick firing were clearly demonstrated. And by its adoption in the ship-of-the-line it contributed largely to bring about that approach to uniformity of calibre which was so marked a feature of the armament schemes of the first half of the nineteenth century.
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scotch
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| n.伤口，刻痕；苏格兰威士忌酒；v.粉碎，消灭，阻止；adj.苏格兰(人)的 | |
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shipping
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favourable
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inspection
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authorize
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sufficiently
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vessels
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vessel
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mariners
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robins
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| n.知更鸟，鸫( robin的名词复数 )；（签名者不分先后，以避免受责的）圆形签名抗议书（或请愿书） | |
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17
warships
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| 军舰，战舰( warship的名词复数 )； 舰只 | |
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18
warship
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| n.军舰，战舰 | |
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19
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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duels
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| n.两男子的决斗( duel的名词复数 )；竞争，斗争 | |
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21
secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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22
hull
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| n.船身；(果、实等的)外壳；vt.去(谷物等)壳 | |
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23
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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24
invalid
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| n.病人，伤残人；adj.有病的，伤残的；无效的 | |
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25
propounded
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| v.提出（问题、计划等）供考虑[讨论]，提议( propound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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26
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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27
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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28
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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29
artillerist
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| 炮手，炮兵，炮术家 | |
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30
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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31
inscription
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| n.（尤指石块上的）刻印文字，铭文，碑文 | |
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32
lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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33
antithesis
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| n.对立；相对 | |
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34
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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35
swelled
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| 增强( swell的过去式和过去分词 )； 肿胀； （使）凸出； 充满（激情） | |
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36
ragged
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| adj.衣衫褴褛的，粗糙的，刺耳的 | |
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37
foundering
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| v.创始人( founder的现在分词 ) | |
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38
velocity
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| n.速度，速率 | |
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39
momentum
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| n.动力，冲力，势头；动量 | |
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40
penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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41
muzzle
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| n.鼻口部；口套；枪(炮)口；vt.使缄默 | |
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42
wastefully
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| 浪费地，挥霍地，耗费地 | |
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43
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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44
inefficient
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| adj.效率低的，无效的 | |
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45
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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46
inefficiency
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| n.无效率，无能；无效率事例 | |
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47
squat
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| v.蹲坐，蹲下；n.蹲下；adj.矮胖的，粗矮的 | |
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48
primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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49
cylinder
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| n.圆筒，柱(面)，汽缸 | |
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50
clearance
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| n.净空；许可(证)；清算；清除，清理 | |
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51
necessitate
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| v.使成为必要，需要 | |
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52
necessitated
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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53
fouling
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| n.（水管、枪筒等中的）污垢v.使污秽( foul的现在分词 )；弄脏；击球出界；（通常用废物）弄脏 | |
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54
rust
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| n.锈；v.生锈；(脑子)衰退 | |
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55
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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56
flaking
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| 刨成片，压成片； 盘网 | |
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57
propulsive
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| adj.推进的 | |
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58
detrimental
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| adj.损害的，造成伤害的 | |
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59
recoil
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| vi.退却，退缩，畏缩 | |
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60
boisterous
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| adj.喧闹的，欢闹的 | |
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61
collateral
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| adj.平行的；旁系的；n.担保品 | |
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62
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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63
inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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64
accrue
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| v.(利息等)增大，增多 | |
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65
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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66
divergence
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| n.分歧，岔开 | |
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67
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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68
adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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69
curiously
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| adv.有求知欲地；好问地；奇特地 | |
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70
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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71
nominal
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| adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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72
datum
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| n.资料；数据；已知数 | |
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73
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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74
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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75
ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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76
lighter
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| n.打火机，点火器；驳船；v.用驳船运送；light的比较级 | |
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77
frigate
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| n.护航舰，大型驱逐舰 | |
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78
frigates
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| n.快速军舰( frigate的名词复数 ) | |
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79
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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80
deploring
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| v.悲叹，痛惜，强烈反对( deplore的现在分词 ) | |
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81
barricaded
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| 设路障于，以障碍物阻塞( barricade的过去式和过去分词 )； 设路障[防御工事]保卫或固守 | |
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82
sloops
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| n.单桅纵帆船( sloop的名词复数 ) | |
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83
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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84
penetrating
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| adj.（声音）响亮的，尖锐的adj.（气味）刺激的adj.（思想）敏锐的，有洞察力的 | |
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85
compensated
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| 补偿，报酬( compensate的过去式和过去分词 )； 给（某人）赔偿（或赔款） | |
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86
contrive
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| vt.谋划，策划；设法做到；设计，想出 | |
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87
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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88
emphatic
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| adj.强调的，着重的；无可置疑的，明显的 | |
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89
conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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90
neutralize
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| v.使失效、抵消，使中和 | |
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91
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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92
lash
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| v.系牢；鞭打；猛烈抨击；n.鞭打；眼睫毛 | |
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93
lugs
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| 钎柄 | |
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94
recoiled
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| v.畏缩( recoil的过去式和过去分词 )；退缩；报应；返回 | |
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95
pivoted
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| adj.转动的，回转的，装在枢轴上的v.（似）在枢轴上转动( pivot的过去式和过去分词 )；把…放在枢轴上；以…为核心，围绕（主旨）展开 | |
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96
vertical
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| adj.垂直的，顶点的，纵向的；n.垂直物，垂直的位置 | |
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97
shrouds
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| n.裹尸布( shroud的名词复数 )；寿衣；遮蔽物；覆盖物v.隐瞒( shroud的第三人称单数 )；保密 | |
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98
discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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99
uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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100
countenanced
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| v.支持，赞同，批准( countenance的过去式 ) | |
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101
complement
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| n.补足物，船上的定员；补语；vt.补充，补足 | |
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102
inertia
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| adj.惰性，惯性，懒惰，迟钝 | |
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103
quotations
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| n.引用( quotation的名词复数 )；[商业]行情（报告）；（货物或股票的）市价；时价 | |
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104
deception
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| n.欺骗，欺诈；骗局，诡计 | |
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105
antagonists
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| 对立[对抗] 者，对手，敌手( antagonist的名词复数 )； 对抗肌； 对抗药 | |
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106
bickering
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| v.争吵( bicker的现在分词 )；口角；（水等）作潺潺声；闪烁 | |
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107
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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108
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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109
muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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110
inconvenient
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| adj.不方便的，令人感到麻烦的 | |
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111
denomination
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| n.命名，取名，(度量衡、货币等的)单位 | |
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112
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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113
luring
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| 吸引，引诱（lure的现在分词形式） | |
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114
climax
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| n.顶点；高潮；v.(使)达到顶点 | |
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115
havoc
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| n.大破坏，浩劫，大混乱，大杂乱 | |
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116
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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117
speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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118
muzzles
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| 枪口( muzzle的名词复数 )； （防止动物咬人的）口套； （四足动物的）鼻口部； （狗）等凸出的鼻子和口 | |
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119
touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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120
foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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121
skilfully
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| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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122
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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123
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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124
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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125
rigidly
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| adv.刻板地，僵化地 | |
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126
elasticity
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| n.弹性，伸缩力 | |
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127
elastic
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| n.橡皮圈，松紧带；adj.有弹性的；灵活的 | |
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128
mortar
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| n.灰浆，灰泥；迫击炮；v.把…用灰浆涂接合 | |
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129
lashing
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| n.鞭打；痛斥；大量；许多v.鞭打( lash的现在分词 )；煽动；紧系；怒斥 | |
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130
notably
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| adv.值得注意地，显著地，尤其地，特别地 | |
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131
pivots
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| n.枢( pivot的名词复数 )；最重要的人（或事物）；中心；核心v.（似）在枢轴上转动( pivot的第三人称单数 )；把…放在枢轴上；以…为核心，围绕（主旨）展开 | |
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132
stamina
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| n.体力；精力；耐力 | |
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133
pedantic
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| adj.卖弄学问的；迂腐的 | |
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134
restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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135
stouter
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| 粗壮的( stout的比较级 )； 结实的； 坚固的； 坚定的 | |
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136
hybrid
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| n.(动，植）杂种，混合物 | |
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137
foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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138
mortifying
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| adj.抑制的，苦修的v.使受辱( mortify的现在分词 )；伤害（人的感情）；克制；抑制（肉体、情感等） | |
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139
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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140
utilized
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| v.利用，使用( utilize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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141
discredited
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| 不足信的，不名誉的 | |
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142
rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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143
projection
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| n.发射，计划，突出部分 | |
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144
combustible
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| a. 易燃的,可燃的; n. 易燃物,可燃物 | |
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145
appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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146
hulls
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| 船体( hull的名词复数 )； 船身； 外壳； 豆荚 | |
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147
eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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148
accentuated
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| v.重读( accentuate的过去式和过去分词 )；使突出；使恶化；加重音符号于 | |
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149
granite
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| adj.花岗岩，花岗石 | |
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150
battering
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| n.用坏，损坏v.连续猛击( batter的现在分词 ) | |
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151
demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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152
redeeming
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| 补偿的，弥补的 | |
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153
doomed
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| 命定的 | |
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154
dormant
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| adj.暂停活动的；休眠的；潜伏的 | |
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