Artillery1 being from the first an affair common, in almost all respects, to land and to sea service, and being applied2 to ships as the result of its prior development on land, it would be expected that naval4 practice should in its evolution follow in the wake of that on land. And so it has, in the main, until the time of the Crimean War; since when, completely revolutionizing and in turn revolutionized by the rapid development of naval architecture and material, it has by far surpassed land practice both in variety and power. But while the wooden ship imposed its limitations no branch of affairs, perhaps, appeared to be more conservative in its practice than naval gunnery. No material seemed less subject to change, no service less inclined to draw lessons from war experience. And in recent years the truck carriage has often been taken as typifying the great lack of progress in all naval material which existed between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries.
Whether there was in fact so great a stagnation5 as is commonly supposed, and to what causes such as existed may have been due, we may discern from an examination of the truck carriage itself and of its development from the earliest known forms of naval gun mounting.
§
The first large ordnance6 to be used on land, having as its object the breaching7 of walls and gates and the reduction of fortresses8, was mounted solidly in the ground in a way which would have been impracticable on board a ship at sea. In141 time, as the energy of discharge increased, this method of embedding9 the gun in soil grew dangerous: a certain recoil10 was necessary to absorb and carry off the large stresses which would otherwise have shattered the piece. In time, too, as the power of explosives and the strength of guns increased, their size diminished; cannon11, as we have seen, became more portable. No longer embedded12 in earth or fixed13 on ponderous14 trestles, they were transported from place to place on wheeled carriages. And on these carriages, massive enough to stand the shock of discharge and well adapted to allow a certain measure of recoil, the land ordnance were fired with a tolerable degree of safety.
Both of these methods were followed in principle when guns came to be used at sea.
In the early Mediterranean15 galley16 the cannon was mounted in a wooden trough placed fore17 and aft on the deck in the bow of the vessel18. The trough was secured to the deck. In rear of the cannon’s breech and in contact with it was a massive bitt of timber, worked vertically20, which took the force of the recoil. Later, as force of powder increased, this non-recoil system of mounting ordnance failed. The cannon had to be given a certain length of free recoil in order that, by the generation of momentum21, the energy which would otherwise be transmitted to the ship in the form of a powerful blow might be safely diverted and more gradually absorbed. Hence free recoil was allowed within certain limits, the cannon being secured with ropes or chains.
But, as had doubtless been found already with land ordnance, the violence of recoil depended largely upon the mass of the recoiling23 piece; for any given conditions of discharge the heavier the gun, the less violent was its recoil. It was a natural expedient24, then, to make the recoiling mass as large as possible. And this could be effected, without the addition of useless and undesirable25 extra deadweight, by making the wooden trough itself partake of the recoil. The cannon was therefore lashed26 solidly to the trough, and both gun and trough were left free to recoil in the desired direction. The primitive27 mounting helped, in short, by augmenting29 the weight of the recoiling mass, to give a quiet recoil and some degree of control over the piece.
Later, this trough or baulk of timber performed an additional function when used as a mounting for a certain form of gun. When the piece was a breech-loader—like those recovered from142 the wreck30 of the Mary Rose—the trough had at its rear end a massive flange31 projecting upwards32, forming the rear working face for the wedge which secured the removable breech chamber33 to the gun. “The shot and wadde being first put into the chase,” wrote Norton in 1628, “then is the chamber to be firmly wedged into the tayle of the chase and carriage.” The mounting was, in fact, an integral part of the gun. In the 8-inch breech-loading equipment of the Mary Rose which lies in the museum of the Royal United Service Institution in Whitehall there is evidence of two small rear wheels. Most of these early ship carriages had two wheels, but for the more powerful muzzle34-loaders introduced toward the middle of the sixteenth century, four came into favour. With four wheels our timber baulk has become a primitive form of the truck carriage of the succeeding centuries.90
But perhaps the truck carriage may more properly be regarded as a derivative35 of the wheeled mounting on which, as we have seen, land ordnance came eventually to be worked. The ship being a floating fort, the mode of mounting the guns would be that in vogue37 in forts and garrisons38 ashore39, and the land pieces and their massive carriages would be transferred, without modification40, for use on shipboard. How different the conditions under which they worked! The great cannon, whose weight and high-wheeled carriages were positive advantages when firing from land emplacements, suitably inclined, were found to work at great disadvantage under sea conditions. Their great weight strained the decks that bore them, and their wheeled carriages proved difficult to control and even dangerous in any weather which caused a rolling or pitching of the gun platform. With the introduction of portholes their unfitness for ship work was doubtless emphasized; there was neither height nor deck-space enough to accommodate them between decks. Hence the necessity for a form of carriage suitable for the special conditions of sea service, as well as for a size of gun which would be within the capacity of a ship’s crew to work. In the early Tudor ships the forms of mounting were various: guns were mounted on two or four-wheeled carriages, or sometimes, especially the large bombards, upon “scaffolds” of timber.91 By Elizabeth’s reign41 the limit143 had been set to the size of the gun; the demi-cannon had been found to be the heaviest piece which could be safely mounted, traversed, and discharged. This and the smaller guns which were plied3 with such effect against the Spanish Armada were mounted on low, wheeled, wooden carriages which were the crude models from which the truck carriage, the finished article of the nineteenth century, was subsequently evolved. Even then the carriages had parts which were similar and similarly named to those of the later truck carriage; they had trunnion-plates and sockets43, capsquares, beds, quoins, axle-trees, and trucks.92 On them the various pieces—the demi-cannons, the culverins, the basilisks and sakers—were worked by the nimble and iron-sinewed seamen44; run out by tackles through their ports, and traversed by handspikes. Loaded and primed and laboriously46 fired by means of spluttering linstocks, the guns recoiled47 upon discharge to a length and in a direction which could not be accurately48 predicted. The smaller guns, at any rate, had no breechings to restrain them: these ropes being only used for the purpose of securing the guns at sea, and chiefly in foul49 weather.93
On the whole these low sea carriages appear to have proved satisfactory, and their continued use is evidence that they were considered superior to those of the land service pattern. “The fashion of those carriages we use at sea,” wrote Sir Henry Manwayring in 1625, “are much better than those of the land; yet the Venetians and others use the other in their shipping50.” In essentials the carriage remained the same from Elizabeth to Victoria. Surviving many attempts at its supercession in favour of mechanically complicated forms of mounting, it kept its place in naval favour for a surprising length of time; challenging with its primitive simplicity51 all the elaborate mechanisms52 which pitted themselves against it.
An illuminating54 passage from Sir Jonas Moore’s treatise55 on144 artillery, written in 1689 and copied from the Hydrographie of the Abbé Fournier, shows at a glance the manner in which the armament of small Mediterranean craft of that period was disposed, and the method on which the guns were mounted. “At sea the ordnance are mounted upon small carriages, and upon four and sometimes two low wheels without any iron work. Each galley carries ordinarily nine pieces of ordnance in its prow56 or chase, of which the greatest, and that which delivers his shot just over the very stem, and lies just in the middle, is called the Corsiere or ‘cannon of course’ or ‘chase cannon,’ which in time of fight doth the most effectual service. It carries generally a shot of thirty-three or forty pounds weight, and are generally very long pieces. It recoils57 all along the middle of the galley to the mast, where they place some soft substance to hinder its farther recoil, that it might not endamage the mast. Next to this Corsiere are placed two Minions58 on each side, which carries a five or six-pound ball; and next to these are the Petrieroes, which are loaded with stone-shot to shoot near at hand. Thirdly, there are some small pieces, which are open at the breech, and called Petrieroes a Braga, and are charged with a moveable chamber loaded with base and bar shot, to murder near at hand. And the furthest from the Corsiere are the Harquebuss a Croc, which are charged with small cross-bar shot, to cut sails and rigging. All these small pieces are mounted on strong pins of iron having rings, in which are placed the trunnions with a socket42, so that they are easily turned to any quarter.
“All the guns are mounted upon wheels and carriages; moreover the Petrieroes, which are planted in the forecastle and quarter to defend the prow and stern, are mounted upon strong pins of iron without any reverse; the greatest pieces of battery are planted the lowest, just above the surface of the water, the smallest in the waist and steerage, and with the Petrieroes in quarter-deck and forecastle. Upon the sea, to load great ordnance they never load with a ladle, but make use of cartridges59, as well for expedition as security in not firing the powder, which in time of fight is in a continual motion.”
Before passing to a consideration of the truck carriage in detail there is an important circumstance to be noted60 with regard to the conditions under which its design and supply to the naval service were regulated. It is a remarkable61 fact that, during almost the whole of what may be called the truck145 carriage era, the arming of ships with ordnance, the supply of the requisite62 guns and their carriages, the design of the guns and their mode of mounting, was no part of a naval officer’s affair. The Board of Ordnance had control both of land and of sea artillery. From the death of Sir William Wynter onwards the mastership of the ordnance by sea was absorbed into the mastership of the ordnance by land. From this arrangement, as may be imagined, many inconveniences arose, and many efforts were made at various times to disjoin the offices and to place the armament of ships under naval control. For, apart from the fact that at an early date the ordnance office acquired “an unenviable reputation for sloth64 and incapacity,”94 the interests of the sea service were almost bound to suffer under such a system. And in fact the inconvenience suffered by the navy, through the delays and friction65 resulting from the system whereby all dealings with guns and their mountings and ammunition66 were the work of military officials, was notorious. The anomalous67 arrangement survived, in spite of the efforts of reformers, till far into the nineteenth century. Probably the Board of Ordnance argued honestly against reintroducing a dual22 control for land and sea artillery material. They had, at any rate, strong interests in favour of the status quo. For, writing in the year 1660, Sir William Slingsby noted regretfully that “the masters of the ordnance of England, having been ever since of great quality and interest, would never suffer such a collop to be cut out of their employment.”
The arming of ships, therefore, apart from the original assignment of the armament, remained in the province of the military authorities.
§
An examination of the design of the perfected truck carriage and a glance at the records of its performances in action show that the advocates of rival gun mountings were not altogether incorrect in their contention68 that the manner in which the broadside armament of our ships was mounted was wrong in principle and unsatisfactory in actual detail. The many defects of the truck carriage were indeed only too obvious.
In the first place, the breechings were so reeved that the force sustained by them in opposition69 to the recoil of the gun tended inevitably70 to cause the piece to jump. The reaction of146 the breeching acted along lines below the level of the gun-axis71; the breeching therefore exerted a lifting force which, instead of pressing down all of the four trucks upon the deck and thus deadening the recoil, tended to raise the fore trucks in the air and reduce the friction of the carriage upon the deck. The larger the gun and the higher the gun-axis above the trucks, the greater was this tendency of the gun to lift and overturn. If the rear trucks, about which the gun and carriage tended to revolve72, had been set at some distance in rear of the centre of gravity of the equipment, it would have been rendered thereby73 more stable. But space did not permit of this. And actually they were so placed that, when discharge was most violent, the weight of the equipment was scarcely sufficient to oppose effectively the tendency to jump. Again, the anchoring of the breeching to two points in the ship’s frames, one on either side of the gun, was wrong and liable to have serious consequences. For with this arrangement not only had the breeching to be continuously “middled” as the gun shifted its bearing, but even when accurately adjusted the “legs” of the breeching bore an unequal strain when the gun was fired off the beam. In other words, the horizontal angles subtended between the gun-axis, when off the beam, and the two lines of the breeching were unequal; one side of the breeching took more of the blow of gunfire than the other; and not infrequently the gun carriage was thrown round violently out of the line of recoil, with damage to the equipment and injury to the crew.
The design of the carriage was in no way influenced, apparently74, by a desire to obtain a minimum area of port opening in combination with a maximum traverse of the gun. For the broad span of the front part of the carriage soon caused the gun to be “wooded” when slewed75 off the beam. And a further disadvantage of this broad span was in the effect it had of automatically bringing the gun right abeam76 every time it was hauled out after loading: the front span of the carriage coming square with the timbers of the port-sill.
As for the system of recoil, while the recoiling of the carriage with the gun had an advantage in reducing the stresses brought on the hull77 structure, yet this arrangement had the correlative disadvantage that the carriage as well as the gun had to be hauled out again. And, as regards safety, it is a matter for surprise that the system of chocking recoil by means of large147 ropes—of absorbing the momentum of a heavy gun and its carriage in a distance corresponding to the stretch of the breechings under their suddenly applied load—was not far more injurious than experience proved to be the case. Even so, the results obtained from it were far from satisfactory. “It is a lamentable78 truth”—we quote Sir William Congreve, writing in 1811—“that numbers of men are constantly maimed, one way or another, by the recoiling of the heavy ordnance used on board ships of war. Most of the damage is done by the random79 recoil of the carriage which, moving with the gun along no certain path, is much affected80 by the motion of the vessel and the inequalities of the deck. It is difficult to know, within a few feet, to where the carriage will come, and the greatest watchfulness81 is necessary on all hands to prevent accidents.” This refers, observe, to the truck gun under control. How terrible an uncontrolled gun could be, may be read in the pages of Victor Hugo’s Quatre-Vingt-Treize, of which romance the breaking loose of a piece on the gun-deck of a frigate82 forms a central incident. It was conjectured83 that the old Victory, Admiral Balchen’s flagship which went down off the Casquets in 1744, “mouse and man,” was lost through the breaking loose of her great guns in a gale84.95
A TRUCK GUN
The accessories of the truck carriage were a source of frequent accident. The attachment85 of breechings and tackles to the ship’s side often involved disablement in action, the numerous bolts being driven in as missiles among the crew, who were also in danger of having their limbs caught up in the maze86 of ropes and trappings with which the deck round the gun was encumbered87. Considered as a mechanism53 the148 whole gun-equipment was a rude and primitive affair; the clumsy carriage run out to battery by laborious45 tackles, the cast-iron gun laid by a simple wedge, the whole equipment traversed by prising round with handspikes—by exactly the same process, it has been remarked, as that by which the savage88 moved a log in the beginning of the world.
Why, then, did the truck carriage maintain its long supremacy89?
The answer is, that with all its acknowledged defects it had merits which universally recommended it, while its successive rivals exhibited defects or disadvantages sufficient to prevent their adoption90 to its own exclusion91. It was a case, in fact, of the survival of the fittest. And if we examine its various features in the light of the records of its performances in action (the truck carriage appears in the background of most of our naval letters and biographies), we shall understand why it was not easily displaced from favour with generation after generation of our officers and seamen.
In the first place the truck carriage, a simple structure of resilient elm, with bed, cheek-plates, and trunnions strongly fitted together and secured by iron bolts, was better adapted than any other form for the prevention of excessive stresses, resulting from the shock of recoil, on either gun or ship’s structure. By the expedient of allowing the whole gun equipment to recoil freely across the deck, by allowing the energy of recoil to assume the form of kinetic92 energy given to the gun and carriage, the violent reactionary93 stresses due to the sudden combustion94 of the gunpowder95 were safely diverted from the ship’s structure, which was thus relieved of nearly the whole of the firing stresses. Moreover, by allowing the gun to recoil readily under the influence of the powder-gases the gun itself was saved from excessive stresses which would otherwise have shattered it. From this point of view the weight of the carriage, relatively96 to that of the gun, was of considerable importance. If the carriage had been at all too heavy it would not have yielded sufficiently97 under the blow of the gun, and, howsoever strongly made, would eventually have been destroyed, if it had not by its inertia98 caused the gun to break; if too light, the violence of the recoil would have torn loose the breechings. Actually, and as the result of a process of trial-and-error continuously carried on, the weight of the finally evolved elm carriage was so nicely adapted to that of its gun that a recoil of the most suitable proportions149 was generally obtained, a free yet not too boisterous99 run back. This, of course, upon an even keel. Conditions varied100 when the guns were at sea upon a moving platform. With the ship heeled under a strong wind the weather guns were often fired with difficulty owing to the violence of the recoil. On the other hand the listing of the ship when attacking an enemy from windward favoured the lee guns by providing a natural ramp101 up which they smoothly102 recoiled and down which they ran by gravity to battery, as in a shore emplacement. Of which advantage, as we know, British sea tactics made full use at every opportunity.
It was strong, simple, and self-contained. Metal carriages, whose claims were periodically under examination, proved brittle103, too rigid104, heavy, and dangerous from their liability to splinter. Gunslides, traverses, or structures laid on the deck to form a definite path for the recoil of the gun (such as the Swedish ships of Chapman’s time, for example, carried) were disliked on account of their complication, the deck-space occupied, and the difficulty which their use entailed105 of keeping the deck under the gun dry and free from rotting; though beds laid so as to raise the guns to the level of the ports were sometimes fitted, and were indeed a necessity in the earlier days owing to the large sheer and camber given to the decks. The use of compressors, or of adjustable106 friction devices, in any form, for limiting the recoil, was objected to on account of the possibilities which they presented for accident owing to the forgetfulness of an excited crew. The truck carriage, being self-contained and independent of external adjustment, was safe in this respect.
The four wood trucks were of the correct form and size to give the results required. The resistance of a truck to rolling depends largely upon the relative diameters of itself and its axle. It was thus possible, by making gun-carriage trucks of small diameter and their axles relatively large, to obtain the following effect: on gunfire the carriage started from rest suddenly, the trucks skidding107 on the deck without rotating and thus checking by their friction the first violent motion of recoil; during the latter phase of the recoil the trucks rotated, and the carriage ran smoothly back until checked by the breechings.
The friction of the trucks on the deck was also affected, however, by another feature of the design: the position of150 the trunnions relatively to the axis of the gun. How important was this position as influencing the history of land artillery, we have already seen. Truck guns were nearly always “quarter-hung,” or cast with their trunnions slightly below their axis, so as to cause the breech to exert a downward pressure on firing, and thus augment28 the friction of the rear trucks on the deck and check the recoil. The position of the trunnions was studied from yet another point of view: namely, to give the minimum of jump to the gun and ensure a smooth start to the recoil. With this object they were so placed that the two ends of the gun were not equally balanced about the trunnion axis, but a preponderance of about one-twentieth of the weight of the gun was given to the breech-end, thus bringing a slight pressure, due to deadweight alone, upon the quoin.
As for this quoin or primitive wedge by which the gun was roughly laid, this had a great advantage over the screw (which gained a footing, as an alternative, when the carronade came into use) in that it allowed of rapid changes of elevation108 of the gun. Hence, though the quoin was liable to jump from its bed on gunfire and do injury to the crew, it kept its place as an accessory almost as long as the truck carriage itself survived.
There was one advantage possessed109 by the truck carriage which was perhaps the most important of all: its superior transportability. The gun equipment was easily transferable, and what this meant to the seaman110 may be gathered from the accounts of the way in which, in sailing-ship days, ships’ armaments were continually being shifted. The armament, we have noted, was not embodied111, as it is to-day, as an integral part of the design of the ship. The guns and their carriages were in the nature of stock articles, which could be changed in size, number and position according to the whim112 of the captain or the service of the ship. And there was every reason why all parties concerned, and especially the ordnance people, should tend to standardize113 the forms of guns and carriages, to keep them self-contained and as independent as possible of the special requirements of individual ships or positions. The shifting of guns was constantly going on in a commissioned ship. At sea they were lashed against the sides so as to leave as clear a deck as possible. In chase a shifting of guns, among other heavy weights, was resorted to in order that the vessel151 should not lose way by plunging114 heavily. If she set sail on a long voyage some of the guns were struck down into the hold, to stiffen115 her and give her an increased stability. And on her return to harbour the guns might be removed for examination and repair by the ordnance officials, the ship being laid alongside a sheer hulk for the purpose. In the days before the sheathing116 of ships’ bottoms was successfully practised, and in the absence of docks, it was constantly necessary to careen ships for the repair of their ground-timbers, for the cleaning of their sides and the caulking117 of their seams. This, again, necessitated118 a shifting or complete removal of most of their stores and ordnance. Great advantages were offered, therefore, from having gun-carriages compact, self-contained, and capable of being quickly removed from one place to another.
§
Having inspected the truck carriage in some detail, let us now briefly119 glance at the development of its use which took place in the last hundred years of its service, between the middle of the eighteenth and the middle of the nineteenth centuries.
The stream of improvement in naval gunnery began to flow strongly under the administration of Lord Anson. New methods of firing, experiments with priming tubes to replace the primitive powder horns and trains of vent36 powder, and gun locks to replace the dangerous and unreliable slow match and linstock,96 were under trial in the fleets commanded by Admiral Hawke, but with results not altogether satisfactory. The locks supplied were lacking in mechanical precision, and the tubes—“very pernicious things” they were voted—were apt to fly out and wound the men. But that the unsatisfactory results obtained were not due to defects inherent in the new devices was soon clearly proved. Twenty years later an eminent120 gunnery officer, Sir Charles Douglas, by perseverance121 and an152 enthusiastic attention to mechanical detail, succeeded in making both locks and priming tubes a practical success, greatly enhancing by their aid the rate and effectiveness of fire of the great guns. Flint-locks of his own design he bought and fitted to the guns of his ship at his private expense. Flannel-bottomed cartridges, to replace the parchment-covered cartridges which had caused so much fouling122, and goose-quill priming tubes, were provided by him, and to him is certainly due the credit for initiating123 the series of improvements in material which, trivial as they may seem in detail, yet in the aggregate124 had the effect of placing our gunnery at a relatively high level in the ensuing wars.
In addition to introducing improvements in methods of firing, Sir Charles Douglas did much to improve the efficiency of the truck carriages themselves. On his appointment to the Duke in 1779 he at once began to put his schemes in hand. To ease the recoil of the guns and to save their breechings he devised and fitted steel springs in some way to the latter; with such surprising good effect (he reported) that even with a restricted length of recoil no breeching, not even that of a 32-pounder weather gun double-shotted and fired over a slippery deck, was ever known to break. The recoil he further eased by loading the truck carriage with shot, which he slung125 on it, thereby augmenting the recoiling mass. He also proposed and tried another apparatus126 having the same effect: suspended weights, secured to the carriage by ropes reeved through fairleads, which on recoil the gun was made to lift. Which weights also had an effect in helping127 to run the gun out again which he calculated to be equal to that of two extra men on the tackles.
Perhaps the principal improvements due to Sir Charles Douglas were those which had as their object the firing of ships’ guns on other bearings than right abeam. He realized the importance of possessing a large arc of training for his guns; and with this object he cleared away all possible obstructions128 on the gun decks of the Duke, removing and modifying knees, standards and pillars to allow his guns to be pointed129 a full four points before and abaft130 the beam: a degree of obliquity131 hitherto unknown in the navy for broadside armament. To traverse the carriages quickly to the required line of bearing he had eyebolts fitted in line between the guns for attachment to the tackles; and to shorten and control the recoil and thus153 allow of firing on an extreme bearing in a confined space, and also to improve the rate of fire, he shod the carriage-trucks with wedges designed to act as drags. “We now dare to fire our guns without running them out,” he wrote to Lord Barham, “and so as to admit of the ports being shut, with certain impunity132, even to the obliquity of three points before or abaft the beam. A wedge properly adapted is placed behind each truck, to make up for the reduction of space to recoil in, in firing to windward or in rolling weather. The gun first ascends133 the wedges by rotation134, and when stopped, performs the remainder of her recoil as a sledge135, so feebly as scarce to bring her breeching tight. The bottoms of the wedges, to augment their friction against the deck, are pinked, tarred, and rubbed with very rough sand or with coarse coal dust. This method has also, I hear, been adopted in the union.”
It was also adopted in the Formidable, in which ship Sir Charles fought as first captain to Admiral Rodney in the great fight which took place three years after the above was written. At the Battle of the Saints not a single goose-quill failed in the Formidable, nor did a gun require to be wormed so long as the flannel-bottomed cartridges held out. Of the hundred and twenty-six locks fitted in the Duke, only one failed; with this exception a single Kentish black flint served for each gun throughout the whole engagement. The oblique136 fire which our ships were enabled to employ so shattered the enemy by the unexpectedly rapid and concentrated fire poured into him, that victory was not left long in doubt; the toll137 of his killed and wounded was enormous. The Duke, it was reckoned, fired twice as many effective shots as would have been possible under the old system. The Formidable reported that two, and sometimes three, broadsides were fired at every passing Frenchman before he could bring a gun to bear in reply.97 If all the ships of the fleet, it was said, had been able to use their guns as they were used in these two, very few of the enemy would have escaped. The advantage accruing138 to the British fleets from the improvements initiated139 and developed by Sir Charles Douglas and other captains of his time was palpable and undisputed. It is possible, however, that the total effect produced by all these developments in gunnery material, both154 in this action and in those of the following war, may have been insufficiently141 emphasized by historians?
It is to the war which broke out with the United States of America in 1812 that we must turn to see the truck equipment working at its highest point of efficiency. By this time the advantage of gun-sights98 for giving accuracy of aim has been seized by a few individual officers, and sights of various patterns have been fitted by enthusiasts142. No official encouragement is given, however, to experiments with sights and scales and disparting devices, and once again it is left to private initiative and expense to make a further advance toward efficiency. Applications for gun-sights are rejected during the war on the ground that these novelties are “not according to the regulation of the Service.”99
These are the circumstances in which a certain vessel in the royal navy exhibits such a superiority in gunnery over her contemporaries as to render her conspicuous143 at the time and, for several decades afterwards, the accepted model by which all such as care may measure themselves.
The Shannon, nominally144 a 38-gun frigate, carried twenty-eight 18-pounder long guns on her gun deck and fourteen carronades, 32-pounders, upon her quarter-deck and forecastle; in addition to four long 9-pounders. She was commanded by Captain Philip Broke, whose fame as a gallant145 commander is secure for all time but whose attainments146 in the realm of gunnery have been less widely appreciated. Captain Broke, possessing a keen insight into the possibilities of the Shannon’s armament, set himself to organize, from the first day of his ship’s memorable147 commission, her crew and material for the day of battle. No other ship of the time was so highly organized. For all the guns sighting arrangements were155 provided by him. To each gun-carriage side-scales of his own design were attached, marked with a scale of degrees and showing by means of a plumb-bob the actual heel of the ship; so that every gun could be laid by word of command at any desired angle of elevation. For giving all guns a correct bearing a circle was inscribed148 on the deck round every gun-port, degrees being represented by grooves149 cut in the planks150 and inlaid with white putty; by which device concentration of fire of a whole battery was rendered possible, the sheer of the ship being compensated151 for by cutting down the carriages and adjusting them with spirit-levels.
METHOD OF GUN-EXERCISE IN H.M.S. “SHANNON”
From a pamphlet by Captain S. J. Pechell, R.N.
Beside these improvements applied to his material—steps which seem simple and obvious to-day, but which were far-sighted strides in 1812—the training of his personnel was a matter to which he paid unremitting attention. His gunners were carefully taught the mysteries of the dispart. Gun drill was made as realistic as possible and prizes were given out of his private purse for the winners of the various competitions. Often a beef cask, with a piece of canvas four feet square attached to it, was thrown overboard as a target, the ship being laid to some three hundred yards away from it. The captain’s log was full of such entries as: “Seamen at target,” “fixed and corrected nine-pounder sights,” “mids at target and carronade,” “swivels in maintop,” “practised with musket,” “exercised at the great guns,” etc. etc. Systematic152 instruction in working the guns, fixing sights and reading scales, was carried out. And a method of practising gun-laying, which later came to be used in other ships from the example set by the Shannon, is illustrated153 by the accompanying sketch154. A gun was taken onto the quarter-deck and secured; a spar was placed in its muzzle with a handspike lashed156 across it; and then two men surged the gun by means of the handspike to imitate the rolling of the ship, while the captain of the gun, crouching155 behind it, looked along his line of sight for the target (a disc placed in the forepart of the ship) and threw in the quoin when he had taken aim.
With such a training did the captain of the Shannon prepare for the duel156 which fortune was to give him with the Chesapeake. The pick of the British fleets was to meet an American of average efficiency. Superiority of gunnery would have decided157 that famous action in favour of the former, it may safely be said, whatever the conditions in which it had been fought. At long range the deliberate and practised aim of the Shannon’s 18-pounders would have overborne even the good individual shooting of an American crew. At night or in foggy weather or in a choppy sea the Shannon’s arrangements for firing on a given bearing and at a given elevation would have given her the superiority. As it happened, the combined and correct fire at pistol range, of long gun and carronade—the long gun, double-shotted, searching the Chesapeake’s decks with ball and grape, the carronade splintering her light fir-lined sides and spreading death and destruction among the crew—quickly secured a victory, and showed the naval world the value of high ideals in the technique of gunnery.
In the Shannon we have the high-water mark of smooth-bore gunnery. From that time onward63, in spite of the precedents158 which her captain created, little appears to have been done in the way of extending his methods or of applying his improvements to the armament of the navy generally. As a consequence, relatively to the continuously improving defensive159 efficiency of the ships themselves there was an actual decline in the efficiency of the truck gun after the American War: a decline which culminated160 in Navarino. It was a time when “new-fangled notions,” developments of method and material, were viewed with strong suspicion, even with resentment161, by many of the most influential162 of naval officers. In the case of the truck gun, strong prejudices reacted against the general introduction of such refinements163 as had admittedly been found effective in exceptional cases, and the demand still went up for everything in connection with gunnery to be “coarsely simple.” To many it doubtless seemed impolitic, to say the least, that anything should be done in the way of mechanical development which would have the effect of substituting pure157 skill for the physical force and endurance, in the exertion164 of which the British seaman so obviously excelled. The truck gun was merely the rough medium by which this physical superiority gained the desired end, and it had been proved well suited to the English genius. Nothing more was asked than a rough equality of weapons. The arguments used against such finesse165 in gunnery as that used by the commander of the Shannon were much the same, it may be imagined, as those used at an earlier date (and with better reason) to prohibit the use of the mechanically worked crossbow in favour of the simple longbow, strung by the athletic166 arm of the English archer167.
That little was done for years to improve the truck gun equipment, is evident from a letter, written in 1825 by Captain S. J. Pechell and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean squadron, deploring168 the defective169 equipment of ships’ guns. Even at this date, it appears, few of the guns were properly disparted, few had sights or scales fitted to them. No arrangements had yet been generally adapted for permitting horizontal, or what Captain Broke had called “blindfold” firing; or for laying all the guns together by word of command. The truck carriages still gave insufficient140 depression, preventing a ship from firing her weather guns at point-blank when listed more than four degrees. The quantity of powder and shot allowed for exercise only amounted to one shot for each captain of a gun in seven months. No instruction was given in sighting or fixing sights, no system of instruction in principles was followed. And once again, as in the seventeenth century, the disadvantage under which naval gunnery laboured by reason of the dual control in all matters pertaining170 to the ordnance was strongly felt. “It is singular,” wrote Captain Pechell, “that the arming of a ship is the only part of her equipment which has not the superintendence of a Naval Officer. We have no sea Officer at the Ordnance to arrange and decide upon the proper equipment of Ships of War; or to carry into effect any improvement which experience might suggest. It is in this way that everything relating to the Ordnance on board a Man of War has remained nearly in the same state for the last thirty years; and is the only department (I mean the naval part of it) that has not profited by experience or encouraged Officers to communicate information. Much might be done now that the Marine171 Artillery are stationed at Portsmouth. At present it is not even generally known that158 a manual exercise exists.... If some such system were adopted, we should no longer consider the length of an action at its principal merit; the Chesapeake was beat in eleven minutes!”
Captain Pechell was a firm believer in the desirability of developing to its utmost British material. He had an enthusiastic belief, moreover, in the possibilities of his personnel; and stated his conviction that officers were only too anxious to be given the chance of instruction, prophesying172 an emulation173 among them and as great a desire to be distinguished174 “in gunnery as in Seamanship.” His advocacy of a system of gunnery training bore fruit later in the establishment of the Excellent at Portsmouth. The scheme for the development of a corps175 of scientific naval officers, which had been foreshadowed by Sir Howard Douglas in his classic treatise on Naval Gunnery and which was formulated176 later in detail by Captain Pechell, was one of the reforms brought to maturity177 by Sir James Graham in the year 1832.
Through all the subsequent changes of armament up to the Crimean War, from solid shot to shell-fire, the truck carriage maintained its place of favour. In 1811 Colonel (afterwards Sir William) Congreve had published a treatise demonstrating the defects of the truck carriage and proposing in its place a far more scientific and ingenious form of mounting. It lacked, however, some of the characteristics which, as we have seen, gave value to the old truck carriage. Except where special conditions gave additional value to its rival, the truck carriage kept its place. In 1820 an iron carriage was tried officially, for 24-pounders, but gave unsatisfactory results. In 1829 the Marshall carriage was tried, offering important advantages over the standard pattern. Its main feature was a narrow fore-carriage separate from the recoiling rear portion, this fore-carriage being pivoted178 to a socket in the centre of the gun-port. But still the truck carriage survived the very favourable179 reports given on its latest rival.
As concentration of fire became developed new fittings such as directing bars, breast chocks and training racers made their appearance and were embodied in its design. As the power of guns and the energy requiring to be absorbed on recoil increased, the rear trucks disappeared and gave place, in the two-truck Marsilly carriage, to flat chocks which by the friction of their broad surfaces against the deck helped more159 than trucks to deaden the motion of the carriage. The quoin, perfected by the addition of a graduated scale marked to show the elevation corresponding to each of its positions, gave place at length to various mechanical forms of elevating gear. The elm body was replaced by iron plates bolted and riveted180 together. And then at length, with the continuous growth of gun-energy, the forces of recoil became so great that the ordinary carriage constrained181 by rope breechings could no longer cope with them. The friction of wood rear-chocks against the deck was replaced by the friction of vertical19 iron plates, attached to the carriage, against similar plates attached to a slide interposed between carriage and deck, and automatically compressed: the invention, it is said, of Admiral Sir Thomas Hardy182. The truck carriage, as it had been known for centuries, had at last been left behind in the evolution of naval artillery.
* * * * *
With the advent183 of modern gun mountings the old anomaly of the divided responsibility of War Office and Admiralty became unbearable184; the necessity for a close adaptation of each gun to its ship-position, for careful co-ordination of the work of artillerist185, engineer and shipbuilder, produced a crisis which had important effects on future naval administration. A single paragraph will suffice to show the position as it presented itself in the early ’sixties. “There were a thousand points of possible collision,” wrote the biographer of Captain Cooper Key, the captain of the Excellent, “as it became more and more certain that gun carriages, instead of being loose movable structures capable of being used in any port, were henceforth to be fixed in the particular port which was adapted for them, with special pivoting186 bolts and deck racers—all part of the ship’s structure. Where the War Office work began and the Controller’s ended in these cases, no one knew, but the captain of the Excellent came in as one interfering187 between a married pair, and was misunderstood and condemned188 on both sides.”
In 1866 the solution was found. Captain Cooper Key was appointed to the Admiralty as Director-General of Naval Ordnance.
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1
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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plied
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| v.使用（工具）( ply的过去式和过去分词 )；经常供应（食物、饮料）；固定往来；经营生意 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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stagnation
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| n. 停滞 | |
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ordnance
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| n.大炮，军械 | |
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breaching
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| 攻破( breach的过去式 )； 破坏，违反 | |
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fortresses
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| 堡垒，要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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embedding
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| 把…嵌入，埋入( embed的现在分词 )； 植入； 埋置； 包埋 | |
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recoil
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| vi.退却，退缩，畏缩 | |
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cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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embedded
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| a.扎牢的 | |
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13
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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ponderous
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| adj.沉重的，笨重的，(文章)冗长的 | |
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Mediterranean
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| adj.地中海的；地中海沿岸的 | |
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16
galley
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| n.（飞机或船上的）厨房单层甲板大帆船；军舰舰长用的大划艇； | |
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17
fore
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| adv.在前面；adj.先前的；在前部的；n.前部 | |
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18
vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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19
vertical
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| adj.垂直的，顶点的，纵向的；n.垂直物，垂直的位置 | |
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vertically
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| adv.垂直地 | |
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21
momentum
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| n.动力，冲力，势头；动量 | |
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22
dual
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| adj.双的；二重的，二元的 | |
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23
recoiling
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| v.畏缩( recoil的现在分词 )；退缩；报应；返回 | |
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24
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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25
undesirable
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| adj.不受欢迎的，不良的，不合意的，讨厌的；n.不受欢迎的人，不良分子 | |
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26
lashed
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| adj.具睫毛的v.鞭打( lash的过去式和过去分词 )；煽动；紧系；怒斥 | |
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27
primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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28
augment
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| vt.(使)增大，增加，增长，扩张 | |
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29
augmenting
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| 使扩张 | |
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30
wreck
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| n.失事，遇难；沉船；vt.(船等)失事，遇难 | |
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flange
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| n.边缘，轮缘，凸缘，法兰 | |
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32
upwards
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| adv.向上，在更高处...以上 | |
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33
chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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muzzle
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| n.鼻口部；口套；枪(炮)口；vt.使缄默 | |
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derivative
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| n.派(衍)生物；adj.非独创性的，模仿他人的 | |
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vent
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| n.通风口，排放口；开衩；vt.表达，发泄 | |
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Vogue
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| n.时髦，时尚；adj.流行的 | |
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garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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ashore
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| adv.在(向)岸上，上岸 | |
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40
modification
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| n.修改，改进，缓和，减轻 | |
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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42
socket
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| n.窝，穴，孔，插座，插口 | |
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43
sockets
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| n.套接字，使应用程序能够读写与收发通讯协定(protocol)与资料的程序( Socket的名词复数 )；孔( socket的名词复数 )；（电器上的）插口；托座；凹穴 | |
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44
seamen
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| n.海员 | |
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45
laborious
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| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
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laboriously
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| adv.艰苦地；费力地；辛勤地；（文体等）佶屈聱牙地 | |
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47
recoiled
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| v.畏缩( recoil的过去式和过去分词 )；退缩；报应；返回 | |
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48
accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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49
foul
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| adj.污秽的；邪恶的；v.弄脏；妨害；犯规；n.犯规 | |
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50
shipping
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| n.船运（发货，运输，乘船） | |
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51
simplicity
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| n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯 | |
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52
mechanisms
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| n.机械( mechanism的名词复数 )；机械装置；[生物学] 机制；机械作用 | |
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53
mechanism
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| n.机械装置；机构，结构 | |
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54
illuminating
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| a.富于启发性的，有助阐明的 | |
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55
treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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56
prow
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| n.(飞机)机头，船头 | |
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57
recoils
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| n.（尤指枪炮的）反冲，后坐力( recoil的名词复数 )v.畏缩( recoil的第三人称单数 )；退缩；报应；返回 | |
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58
minions
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| n.奴颜婢膝的仆从( minion的名词复数 )；走狗；宠儿；受人崇拜者 | |
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59
cartridges
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| 子弹( cartridge的名词复数 )； （打印机的）墨盒； 录音带盒； （唱机的）唱头 | |
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60
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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62
requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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63
onward
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| adj.向前的，前进的；adv.向前，前进，在先 | |
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64
sloth
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| n.[动]树懒；懒惰，懒散 | |
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65
friction
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| n.摩擦，摩擦力 | |
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66
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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67
anomalous
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| adj.反常的；不规则的 | |
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68
contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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69
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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71
axis
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| n.轴，轴线，中心线；坐标轴，基准线 | |
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72
revolve
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| vi.(使)旋转；循环出现 | |
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73
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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75
slewed
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| adj.喝醉的v.杀死，宰杀，杀戮( slay的过去式 )( slew的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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76
abeam
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| adj.正横着(的) | |
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77
hull
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| n.船身；(果、实等的)外壳；vt.去(谷物等)壳 | |
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lamentable
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| adj.令人惋惜的，悔恨的 | |
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random
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| adj.随机的；任意的；n.偶然的(或随便的)行动 | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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81
watchfulness
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| 警惕，留心； 警觉（性） | |
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82
frigate
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| n.护航舰，大型驱逐舰 | |
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83
conjectured
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| 推测，猜测，猜想( conjecture的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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84
gale
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| n.大风，强风，一阵闹声（尤指笑声等） | |
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85
attachment
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| n.附属物，附件；依恋；依附 | |
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86
maze
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| n.迷宫，八阵图，混乱，迷惑 | |
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encumbered
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| v.妨碍，阻碍，拖累( encumber的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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88
savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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89
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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90
adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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91
exclusion
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| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
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92
kinetic
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| adj.运动的；动力学的 | |
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93
reactionary
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| n.反动者，反动主义者；adj.反动的，反动主义的，反对改革的 | |
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94
combustion
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| n.燃烧；氧化；骚动 | |
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95
gunpowder
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| n.火药 | |
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96
relatively
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| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
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97
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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98
inertia
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| adj.惰性，惯性，懒惰，迟钝 | |
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99
boisterous
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| adj.喧闹的，欢闹的 | |
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100
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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101
ramp
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| n.暴怒，斜坡，坡道；vi.作恐吓姿势，暴怒，加速；vt.加速 | |
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102
smoothly
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| adv.平滑地，顺利地，流利地，流畅地 | |
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103
brittle
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| adj.易碎的；脆弱的；冷淡的；(声音)尖利的 | |
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104
rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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105
entailed
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| 使…成为必要( entail的过去式和过去分词 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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106
adjustable
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| adj.可调整的，可校准的 | |
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107
skidding
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| n.曳出，集材v.（通常指车辆） 侧滑( skid的现在分词 )；打滑；滑行；（住在）贫民区 | |
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108
elevation
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| n.高度；海拔；高地；上升；提高 | |
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109
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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110
seaman
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| n.海员，水手，水兵 | |
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111
embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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112
whim
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| n.一时的兴致，突然的念头；奇想，幻想 | |
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113
standardize
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| v.使符合标准，使标准化 | |
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114
plunging
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| adj.跳进的，突进的v.颠簸( plunge的现在分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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115
stiffen
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| v.(使)硬，(使)变挺，(使)变僵硬 | |
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116
sheathing
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| n.覆盖物，罩子v.将（刀、剑等）插入鞘( sheathe的现在分词 )；包，覆盖 | |
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117
caulking
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| n.堵缝；敛缝；捻缝；压紧v.堵（船的）缝( caulk的现在分词 )；泥…的缝；填塞；使不漏水 | |
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118
necessitated
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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119
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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120
eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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121
perseverance
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| n.坚持不懈，不屈不挠 | |
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122
fouling
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| n.（水管、枪筒等中的）污垢v.使污秽( foul的现在分词 )；弄脏；击球出界；（通常用废物）弄脏 | |
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123
initiating
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| v.开始( initiate的现在分词 )；传授；发起；接纳新成员 | |
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124
aggregate
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| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
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125
slung
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| 抛( sling的过去式和过去分词 )； 吊挂； 遣送； 押往 | |
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126
apparatus
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| n.装置，器械；器具，设备 | |
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127
helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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128
obstructions
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| n.障碍物( obstruction的名词复数 )；阻碍物；阻碍；阻挠 | |
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129
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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130
abaft
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| prep.在…之后；adv.在船尾，向船尾 | |
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131
obliquity
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| n.倾斜度 | |
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132
impunity
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| n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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133
ascends
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| v.上升，攀登( ascend的第三人称单数 ) | |
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134
rotation
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| n.旋转；循环，轮流 | |
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135
sledge
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| n.雪橇，大锤；v.用雪橇搬运，坐雪橇往 | |
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136
oblique
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| adj.斜的，倾斜的，无诚意的，不坦率的 | |
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137
toll
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| n.过路(桥)费；损失，伤亡人数；v.敲(钟) | |
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138
accruing
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| v.增加( accrue的现在分词 )；（通过自然增长）产生；获得；（使钱款、债务）积累 | |
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139
initiated
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| n. 创始人 adj. 新加入的 vt. 开始，创始，启蒙，介绍加入 | |
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140
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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141
insufficiently
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| adv.不够地，不能胜任地 | |
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142
enthusiasts
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| n.热心人，热衷者( enthusiast的名词复数 ) | |
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143
conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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144
nominally
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| 在名义上，表面地； 应名儿 | |
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145
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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146
attainments
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| 成就，造诣； 获得( attainment的名词复数 )； 达到； 造诣； 成就 | |
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147
memorable
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| adj.值得回忆的，难忘的，特别的，显著的 | |
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148
inscribed
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| v.写，刻( inscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；内接 | |
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149
grooves
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| n.沟( groove的名词复数 )；槽；老一套；（某种）音乐节奏v.沟( groove的第三人称单数 )；槽；老一套；（某种）音乐节奏 | |
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150
planks
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| （厚）木板( plank的名词复数 )； 政纲条目，政策要点 | |
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151
compensated
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| 补偿，报酬( compensate的过去式和过去分词 )； 给（某人）赔偿（或赔款） | |
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152
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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153
illustrated
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| adj. 有插图的，列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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154
sketch
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| n.草图；梗概；素描；v.素描；概述 | |
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155
crouching
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| v.屈膝，蹲伏( crouch的现在分词 ) | |
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156
duel
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| n./v.决斗；(双方的)斗争 | |
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157
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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158
precedents
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| 引用单元； 范例( precedent的名词复数 )； 先前出现的事例； 前例； 先例 | |
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159
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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160
culminated
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| v.达到极点( culminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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161
resentment
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| n.怨愤，忿恨 | |
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162
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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163
refinements
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| n.（生活）风雅；精炼( refinement的名词复数 )；改良品；细微的改良；优雅或高贵的动作 | |
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164
exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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165
finesse
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| n.精密技巧，灵巧，手腕 | |
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166
athletic
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| adj.擅长运动的，强健的；活跃的，体格健壮的 | |
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167
archer
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| n.射手，弓箭手 | |
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168
deploring
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| v.悲叹，痛惜，强烈反对( deplore的现在分词 ) | |
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169
defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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170
pertaining
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| 与…有关系的，附属…的，为…固有的(to) | |
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171
marine
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| adj.海的；海生的；航海的；海事的；n.水兵 | |
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172
prophesying
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| v.预告，预言( prophesy的现在分词 ) | |
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173
emulation
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| n.竞争；仿效 | |
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174
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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175
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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176
formulated
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| v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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177
maturity
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| n.成熟；完成；(支票、债券等)到期 | |
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178
pivoted
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| adj.转动的，回转的，装在枢轴上的v.（似）在枢轴上转动( pivot的过去式和过去分词 )；把…放在枢轴上；以…为核心，围绕（主旨）展开 | |
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179
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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180
riveted
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| 铆接( rivet的过去式和过去分词 )； 把…固定住； 吸引； 引起某人的注意 | |
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181
constrained
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| adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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182
hardy
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| adj.勇敢的，果断的，吃苦的；耐寒的 | |
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183
advent
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| n.(重要事件等的)到来，来临 | |
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184
unbearable
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| adj.不能容忍的；忍受不住的 | |
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185
artillerist
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| 炮手，炮兵，炮术家 | |
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186
pivoting
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| n.绕轴旋转，绕公共法线旋转v.（似）在枢轴上转动( pivot的现在分词 )；把…放在枢轴上；以…为核心，围绕（主旨）展开 | |
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187
interfering
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| adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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188
condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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