It must, one might surmise3, have given him some embarrassment4 to pen this second eulogy5. The previous book had been "perspicuous," "logical," "intelligent," and, above all, "exhaustive and complete." Two wars, it is true, had intervened, but neither, according either to Sir John French or, we may say at once, to General von Bernhardi, was of any interest to Cavalry. What fresh matter, either for German exposition or for British eulogy, could there be? That is one of the questions I shall have to elucidate7, and I may say here that the only new fact for General von Bernhardi is the recent promulga[Pg 16]tion of a revised set of Regulations for the German Cavalry, Regulations which, in his opinion, though "better than the old ones," are still almost as mischievous8, antiquated9, and "unsuitable for war" as they can possibly be, and whose effect is to leave the German Cavalry "unprepared for war." But this is not a new fact which could properly strengthen Sir John French in recommending the German author to the British Cavalry as a brilliantly logical advocate of the lance and sword, and it is not surprising, therefore, that the tone of his second introduction is slightly different from that of the first.
For the first time there appears a reference to the German Cavalry Regulations, from which the English reader would gain an inkling of the fact that General von Bernhardi is not a prophet in his own country, and that all is not harmony and enlightenment among the "progressive" Cavalry schools of Europe. On one specific point—raids—Sir John French "ventures to disagree" with General von Bernhardi, and he writes, also in quite general terms, that he does not "approve of all that the German Regulations say about the employment of Cavalry in battle." But even this latter note of criticism is very faint and deprecatory; nor is there[Pg 17] anything to show that the writer, except on the one point mentioned, is not thoroughly10 at one with the German author's principles. The main purpose of this Introduction, as of the earlier one, is to claim that Bernhardi's book is a triumphant11 justification12 of the lance and sword. It is a "tonic13 for weak minds," an antidote14 against the "dangerous heresies15" of the English advocates of the mounted rifleman, whose "appeals from ignorance to vanity" deserved scornful repudiation16.
Once more, and in warmer language than ever, the General protests against the pernicious tendency to attach value to the lessons of South Africa; but this time, fortunately, he gives some specific reasons for regarding the war as "abnormal," and I shall devote the rest of this chapter to an examination of these reasons.
They are four: (1) That the "Boer commandos dispersed17 to the four winds when pressed, and reunited again some days or weeks later hundreds of miles from the scene of their last encounter." This curious little summary of the war shows to what almost incredible lengths of self-delusion18 a belief in the arme blanche will carry otherwise well-balanced minds—minds, too, of active, able men like Sir John French, who have actually been immersed in the events under discussion.[Pg 18] One fails at first to see the smallest causal relation between the phenomena19 of the war as he sets them forth20 and the combat value of the lance and sword, but the implied argument must be this: that these weapons could not be given a fair trial in combat because there was no combat, or, rather, only combat enough to cause the hundred casualties and prisoners for which, by the recorded facts, the lance and sword were accountable.
We figure a bloodless war, in which at the mere21 glimpse of a khaki uniform the enemy fled for "hundreds of miles"—at such lightning speed, moreover, that one of the chief traditional functions of the arme blanche, pursuit, was wholly in abeyance22. Who would gather that there had been a "black week"; that Botha and Meyer held the Tugela heights for four months against forces between three and four times their superior in strength; that Ladysmith (where there were four Cavalry regiments23) was besieged24 for four months, Kimberley for the same period, and Mafeking for seven months; that for at least nine months no "dispersion" took place even remotely resembling that vaguely25 sketched26 by Sir John French; and that during the whole course of the war no tactical dispersion took place which would conceivably affect the efficacy[Pg 19] of the lance and sword as weapons of combat? A mere statement of the fact that the net rate of Boer retreat, even during the purely27 partisan28 warfare29 of 1901-02, was almost invariably that of ox-waggons (two miles an hour on the average), that until the last year of the war the Boers were generally accompanied by artillery31, and that from the beginning of the war to the end not a single waggon30 or a single gun was ever captured through the agency, direct or indirect, of the lance and sword, shatters the hypothesis that these weapons had any appreciable32 combat value.
But that is only the negative side of the argument. We have to deal with a mass of plain, positive facts in favour of the rifle as an aggressive weapon for mounted troops. The Boer rifle caused us 29,000 casualties, over 40 guns and 10,000 men taken in action—losses which, to say the least, are evidence that some stiff fighting took place; for men who, when "pressed," run for "hundreds of miles" cannot take prisoners and guns.
We have before us the details of some hundreds of combats, in which Cavalry as well as other classes of troops were engaged, and the only effective way of testing the value of the steel weapons is to see what actually happened in these combats. The result of this inquiry33 is to show[Pg 20] that the lance and sword were practically useless both in attack and defence, whatever the relative numbers and whatever the nature of the ground. No serious historian has ever attempted to make out any case to the contrary. No responsible man at the time would have ventured publicly to assert the contrary. It was patent to everybody—leaders and men—that the Boers were formidable because they were good mounted riflemen, and that our bitter need was for mounted riflemen as good as theirs. It is only when years of peace have drugged the memory and obliterated34 the significance of these events—melancholy and terrible events some of them—that it is possible to put forward the audacious claim that the lance and sword had no chance of proving their value because the Boers invariably ran away from them.
It must be evident that if this first reason for the failure of the lance and sword given by Sir John French is valid35, it would be needless to proffer36 any others. And the others he does proffer only demonstrate further the weakness of his case. "Secondly," he says, "the war in South Africa was one for the conquest and annexation37 of immense districts, and no settlement was open to us except the complete submission38 of our gallant39 enemy." Such a campaign, he goes on to say, "is the most difficult[Pg 21] that can be confided40 to an army," etc. Perfectly41 true—we agree; but what bearing has this obvious truth on the combat value of the lance and sword?
The issue before us is this: Is a certain mode of fighting possible in modern days? Is it practicable for men to remain in their saddles and wield42 steel weapons against men armed with modern rifles? "No," answers Sir John French, "it is not practicable, if your aim is annexation and the complete submission of a gallant enemy." Poor consolation43 for the unhappy taxpayer44 who pays for the maintenance of exceedingly expensive mounted troops, and commits himself to a scheme of conquest and annexation in the faith that these troops are efficient instruments of his will! Where would Sir John French's argument lead him, if he only followed it up and supplied the missing links? But that is the worst of this interminable controversy45. Such nebulous arguments never are worked out in terms of actual combat on the battle-field.
Thirdly, says Sir John French, the horses were at fault. "We did not possess any means for remounting our Cavalry with trained horses...." "After the capture, in rear of the army, of the great convoy46 by De Wet, our horses were on short commons, and consequently lost condition,[Pg 22] and never completely recovered it." This is an old argument, expressed in the old vague, misleading way. The war lasted nearly three years, beginning in October, 1899. The period referred to by Sir John French was in February, 1900. Long before this, when there was no complaint about the horses, the futility47 of the lance and sword, and the grave disabilities under which the Cavalry laboured owing to their inadequate48 carbine, had been abundantly manifest. The steel weapons may be said to have been obsolete49 after Elandslaagte, on the second day of the war.
At the particular period referred to by Sir John French—the period of the operations against Cronje and Kimberley—heat and drought did undoubtedly50 play havoc51 with all the horses in both armies, with those not only of the Cavalry, but of the mounted riflemen and Artillery on both sides. In February, 1900, a third of Cronje's small force was on foot, a pretty severe disability, since his whole force was scarcely equal to our Cavalry division alone, with its gunners and mounted riflemen included, while it was less than a quarter as strong as the whole army at the disposal of Lord Roberts. Sir John French makes use of a misleading expression when he says that "the Cavalry horses lost condition, and never completely recovered it." Nine-tenths of[Pg 23] the horses here referred to succumbed52 altogether within a few months, and the Cavalry, like nearly all the mounted troops engaged in the operations in question, were completely remounted in June, for the grand advance from Bloemfontein to Pretoria.
During the succeeding two years of warfare all the mounted troops, Cavalry included, were several times remounted. So were the Boer troops, who, of course, had no remount organization at all for "trained" or untrained horses, and had to be content with anything they could pick up on the veldt. Yet, besides imposing53 fire-tactics on the Cavalry in every type of combat alike, they invaded the traditional sphere of Cavalry (and were imitated to some extent by our own Colonials and Mounted Infantry54) by developing on their own account a most formidable type of mounted charge, which during the last year of the war alone cost us 18 guns and 2,500 men killed, wounded, and prisoners. These charges were made with little rats of starveling ponies55, whose extreme speed was scarcely that of the slow canter of an ordinary Cavalry charger.
If Sir J. French were to descend56 to statistics and facts, he would find it impossible to trace any causal relation between the efficacy of the lance and sword and the condition of the horses from[Pg 24] time to time. The phenomena are precisely57 the same under all conditions from first to last. Everywhere and always the rifle is supreme58. The better the horse, the better help for the rifle—that is all. In point of fact, he is quite aware that the principal success of the regular Cavalry was achieved when the horses were at their worst—that is to say, in the very period he refers to, when the Cavalry headed off Cronje and pinned him, purely by fire-action, to the river-bed at Paardeberg. Another good performance—though it was by no means specially59 a Cavalry performance; for mounted riflemen and Infantry were associated with the Cavalry—was the prolonged screening operations in front of Colesberg (November to January, 1900). There was no complaint about the horses then, but the sabre never killed or hurt a Boer. It was only once drawn60 from the scabbard, and was speedily resheathed, owing to hostile fire.
I pass to the last and strangest of Sir John French's reasons for regarding the war as abnormal in the sense that it gave no opportunity for the use of the lance or sword. It is this: That, "owing to repeated and wholesale61 release of prisoners who had been captured and subsequently appeared in the field against us, we were called upon to fight, not 86,000 or 87,000 men, but[Pg 25] something like double that number or more, with the additional disadvantage that the enemy possessed62 on his second and third appearance against us considerable experience of our methods and a certain additional seasoned fitness." Here again is a proposition which alone is sufficient to destroy the case for the lance and sword. If, as a defence of those weapons, it means anything, it must mean that the Cavalry, by means of their steel weapons, were perpetually taking prisoners, to no purpose, because these prisoners were constantly released. Gradually the enemy learnt "experience of our methods," that is, of our shock-methods with the lance and sword, and, armed with this experience and the "seasoned fitness" produced by successive spells of fighting, they eventually countered or evaded63 those shock-methods, with what result we are not told. But such an interpretation64 is inadmissible. What Sir John French surely should say is precisely the reverse of what he does imply—namely, that we started the war in an ignorance of the Boer methods which cost us scores of millions of pounds; that we slowly learnt experience of those methods, and ultimately conquered the Boers and ended the war by imitating those methods. That is the plain moral of the war, as enforced by every historian.
[Pg 26]
Observe that, for the sake of argument, I am accepting as historically accurate Sir John French's statement about the advantage possessed by the Boers owing to the release of their prisoners. It is almost superfluous65 to add that the statement, in the sense he uses it, has no historical foundation. The truth is exactly the opposite. The advantage was immensely on our side. The Boers took many thousands of British prisoners, but permanently66 retained none, because they had no means of retaining them. During the last year of the war prisoners were released on the spot. A large proportion of these men fought again, some several times. No Boer prisoner of war—that is, captured in action—was released. In December, 1900, we had about 15,000 in our possession; in May, 1902, about 50,000.
It was mainly by this attrition of the Boer forces that we reduced them to submission. The element of historical truth in Sir John French's proposition is this: that in 1900, after the fall of Bloemfontein, a considerable number of Boers surrendered voluntarily, not in action, and were dismissed to their farms under a pledge not to fight again—a pledge which they broke, under circumstances into which we need not enter. There are no exact statistics as to the numbers of these men, but at an outside estimate they[Pg 27] cannot have amounted to more than 5 per cent. of the total number of Boers engaged in the war. In any case, the point is totally irrelevant67 to the question of shock-tactics. That is a question of combat, and in combat, as Sir John French is aware, the Boers were, nine times out of ten, greatly outnumbered.
Such are Sir John French's reasons for the failure of the lance and sword in South Africa. They constitute an instructive revelation of the mental attitude of the advocates of those weapons. Is it not plain that we are dealing68 here with a matter of faith, not of reason; of dogma, not of argument; of sentiment, not of technical practice? The simple technical issue—what happens in combat?—is persistently69 evaded, and refuge sought in vague and inaccurate70 generalizations71, which, when tested, turn out to throw no light upon the controversy.
Sir John French himself manages to demonstrate in this same Introduction that the question is really one of sentiment. It is a seemingly incurable72 delusion with him that the whole campaign on behalf of the rifle is an attack of a personal nature on the war exploits of himself and the regular Cavalry, instead of being, what it really is, an attack on the lances and swords carried by the Cavalry. This delusion carries him[Pg 28] to the strangest lengths of professional egotism. In the whole of this Introduction there is not a line to indicate that any British mounted rifleman unprovided with steel weapons took part in the war, or that the tactics and conduct of these men have the smallest interest for Englishmen or the smallest bearing on the present controversy. No one would gather that our Colonial mounted riflemen led the way in tactical development, and frequently, brief and rough as their training had been, excelled the Cavalry in efficiency, simply because they were trained on the right principles with the right weapon.
"Even in South Africa," says Sir John French, "grave though the disadvantages were under which our Cavalry laboured from short commons and overwork" [as though these disadvantages were not shared equally by our mounted riflemen and by the Boers themselves!], "the Boer mounted riflemen acknowledged on many occasions the moral force of the cold steel, and gave way before it." Then follows a concrete instance, taken from the action of Zand River in May, 1900.
Anyone familiar with the history of the war must have felt deep bewilderment at the General's choice, for purposes of illustration, of this action, which has not generally been held to have reflected high credit on the Cavalry.
[Pg 29]
It is needless to discuss the battle in detail, because the accounts of it are set forth clearly and accurately73 enough in the "Official" and Times Histories, and, inter6 alia, in Mr. Goldman's work, "With French in South Africa." As a very small and unimportant episode in the battle, there was certainly a charge by a whole brigade of regular Cavalry against some Boers whom the Times History describes as a "party," and whom Mr. Goldman, who was present, estimates at 200 in number; but it is perfectly clear, from all accounts, (1) that the casualties resulting from the charge were too few to deserve record; (2) that the charge had no appreciable effect upon the fortunes of the day; (3) that the Cavalry on the flank in question suffered serious checks and losses at the hands of a greatly inferior force; and (4) that Sir John French's turning force, like General Broadwood's turning force on the opposite flank, completely failed to perform the supremely74 important intercepting75 mission entrusted76 to them by Lord Roberts, and failed through weakness in mobile fire-action.
Sir John French's version of the action teems77 with inaccuracies. All the cardinal78 facts, undisputed facts to be found in any history, upon which the judgment79 of the reader as to the efficacy of the steel must depend, are omitted. There[Pg 30] are no figures of relative numbers, no times, no description of the terrain80, no statement of casualties. I will instance only one, but the greatest, error of fact. He writes that "the r?le of the Cavalry division was to bring pressure to bear on the right flank of the Boer army, in order to enable Lord Roberts to advance across the river and attack the main Boer forces."
This is a highly misleading account of Roberts's tactical scheme for the battle. Eight thousand Boers, disposed in a chain of scattered81 detachments, held no less than twenty-five miles of country along the north bank of the Zand River, their right resting on the railway, which ran at right angles to the river. We had 38,000 men, including 12,000 mounted men, of whom 5,000 were regular Cavalry. To have used the mounted Arm merely to "bring pressure to bear" upon the Boer flanks would have been a course altogether unworthy of Lord Roberts and the great army he controlled. He set no such limited aim before the Cavalry. He planned to surround and destroy the enemy by enveloping82 movements on both flanks, and gave explicit83 orders to that effect. French, with 4,000 men, had orders to ride round the Boer right flank, and seize the railway in their rear at Ventersburg Road. The same objective was given to the turning force[Pg 31] under Broadwood, 3,000 strong, on the Boer left. Both enveloping operations failed. To "press" the Boers into retreat was nothing. They must have retreated anyhow, in the face of an army five times their superior. The point was to prevent them from retreating into safety, to cut off their retreat, and with mounted turning forces together nearly equal to the whole Boer force this aim was perfectly feasible, given one condition, which was not fulfilled—that our mounted troops, headed by our premier84 and professional mounted troops, the Cavalry, could use their rifles and horses approximately as well as the Boers.
Now let us come to the heart of the matter.
Let us waive85 all criticism of the accuracy and completeness of Sir John French's narrative86, and test the grounds of his belief that it was owing to their fear of the sword that the Boers gave way when Dickson's brigade charged. The Cavalry carried firearms as well as swords, and outnumbered the party charged by at least five to one. We cannot apply the test of casualties, because there were so few. The only test we can apply is that of analogy from other combats. Conditions similar to those of Zand River were repeated, on a smaller or larger scale, thousands of times. Do we find that steel-armed mounted troops had greater moral effect upon the enemy than troops armed[Pg 32] only with the rifle? Did the presence of the lance and sword on the field of combat make any difference to the result? The answer, of course, is that it made no difference at all. Anyone can decide this question himself. We know precisely what troops were present, and how they were armed, in all the combats of the war.
We can detect many different factors at work, psychological, technical, tactical, topographical; but there is one factor which we can eliminate as wholly negligible, and that is the presence of the lance and sword. The same phenomena reappear whether those weapons are there or not. For example, during Buller's campaign for the conquest of Northern Natal87 (May to June, 1900) very little use was made of regular Cavalry. During the first phase, the advance over the Biggarsberg, the six regiments of Cavalry at Buller's disposal were left behind at Ladysmith. The mounted work throughout was done mainly by irregulars. Was it of a less aggressive and vigorous character on that account, by analogy, say, with the mounted operations during the advance of Roberts from Bloemfontein to Pretoria? We find, on the contrary, that the results were better. The total relative numbers on the Boer side and our side were about the same: we were about four to one. But while[Pg 33] Roberts had 12,000 mounted men, of whom 5,000 were Cavalry, Buller had only 5,500 mounted men, of whom 2,500 were Cavalry. Do we find that when the steelless irregulars mounted their horses, as Dickson's brigade mounted their horses, and made a rapid aggressive advance—"charged," that is—the Boers were any less inclined to retreat? On the contrary, they were more inclined to do so. Witness, for instance, Dundonald's long and vigorous pursuit with his irregular brigade over the Biggarsberg on May 14.
Or take the Bloemfontein-Pretoria advance, in which Zand River itself was an incident. Can we trace any further this alleged88 "terror of the cold steel"? Allowance must be made for the brief and inadequate training of the Mounted Infantry and Colonials; but, even with this allowance, a study of the facts shows that they did as well as the Cavalry, and sometimes better. The only effective local pursuit was made by Hutton's Australians at Klipfontein (May 30), where a gun was captured. These men had no steel weapons, yet they charged, and rode down their enemy.
Take Plumer's brilliant defence of Rhodesia with mounted riflemen. Take the relief of Mafeking, one of the most arduous89 and finely-executed undertakings90 of the war. Did the[Pg 34] 900 troopers of the Imperial Light Horse who carried it out suffer from the lack of swords and lances? They would not have taken them at a gift. Did their work compare unfavourably with that of the Cavalry Division, 6,000 strong, in the relief of Kimberley? On the contrary, when we contrast the numbers employed, the opposition91 met with and the distance covered (251 miles in eighteen days), we shall conclude that the achievement of the irregulars was by far the more admirable of the two.
An infinity92 of illustrations might be cited to prove the same point, but, in truth, it is a point which stands in no need of detailed93 proof. The onus94 probandi lies on those who defend weapons which palpably failed. It is the Cavalryman's fixed95 idea that "mounted action," as the phrase goes, is associated solely96 with steel weapons; that soldiers in the saddle are only formidable because they carry those weapons. Mounted riflemen are pictured as dismounted, stationary97, or as employing their horses only for purposes of flight. These fictions were blown to pieces by the South African War, and the irony98 of the case is that Sir John French gratuitously99 brings ridicule100 on the Cavalry by reviving them. If they are not fictions, the Cavalry stand condemned101 by their own pitifully trivial record of[Pg 35] work done with the steel. But this is to slander102 the Cavalry. They do not stand condemned; their steel weapons stand condemned. They themselves, like all other mounted troops, did well precisely in proportion to their skill in and reliance on the rifle and horse combined. Their lances were soon returned to store; their swords, after rusting103 in the scabbards for another year, were also, in the case of nearly all regiments, abandoned; a good Infantry rifle replaced the weak carbine, and the Cavalry became definitely recognized as mounted riflemen.
No one has ever regarded Sir John French himself as otherwise than a leader of conspicuous104 energy and resource. But, so far from owing anything to the lance and sword, he suffered heavily from the almost exclusive education of his troops to those weapons, and from the inadequacy105 of their firearm.
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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surmise
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| v./n.猜想，推测 | |
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embarrassment
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| n.尴尬；使人为难的人(事物)；障碍；窘迫 | |
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eulogy
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| n.颂词；颂扬 | |
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inter
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elucidate
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mischievous
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| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
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antiquated
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| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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triumphant
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| adj.胜利的，成功的；狂欢的，喜悦的 | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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tonic
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| n./adj.滋补品，补药，强身的，健体的 | |
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antidote
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| n.解毒药，解毒剂 | |
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heresies
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| n.异端邪说，异教( heresy的名词复数 ) | |
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repudiation
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| n.拒绝；否认；断绝关系；抛弃 | |
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dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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delusion
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| n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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abeyance
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| n.搁置，缓办，中止，产权未定 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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vaguely
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sketched
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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partisan
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| adj.党派性的；游击队的；n.游击队员；党徒 | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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waggon
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| n.运货马车，运货车；敞篷车箱 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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appreciable
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| adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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obliterated
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| v.除去( obliterate的过去式和过去分词 )；涂去；擦掉；彻底破坏或毁灭 | |
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valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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proffer
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annexation
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submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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confided
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| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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wield
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| vt.行使，运用，支配；挥，使用(武器等) | |
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consolation
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| n.安慰，慰问 | |
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taxpayer
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| n.纳税人 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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futility
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| n.无用 | |
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inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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obsolete
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| adj.已废弃的，过时的 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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havoc
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| n.大破坏，浩劫，大混乱，大杂乱 | |
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succumbed
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| 不再抵抗（诱惑、疾病、攻击等）( succumb的过去式和过去分词 )； 屈从； 被压垮； 死 | |
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imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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ponies
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| 矮种马，小型马( pony的名词复数 )； ￡25 25 英镑 | |
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descend
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| vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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wholesale
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| n.批发；adv.以批发方式；vt.批发，成批出售 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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evaded
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| 逃避( evade的过去式和过去分词 )； 避开； 回避； 想不出 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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irrelevant
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| adj.不恰当的，无关系的，不相干的 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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persistently
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| ad.坚持地；固执地 | |
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inaccurate
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| adj.错误的，不正确的，不准确的 | |
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generalizations
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| 一般化( generalization的名词复数 )； 普通化； 归纳； 概论 | |
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incurable
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| adj.不能医治的，不能矫正的，无救的；n.不治的病人，无救的人 | |
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accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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supremely
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| adv.无上地，崇高地 | |
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intercepting
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| 截取（技术），截接 | |
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entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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teems
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| v.充满( teem的第三人称单数 )；到处都是；（指水、雨等）暴降；倾注 | |
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cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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terrain
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| n.地面，地形，地图 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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enveloping
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| v.包围，笼罩，包住( envelop的现在分词 ) | |
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explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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premier
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| adj.首要的；n.总理，首相 | |
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waive
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| vt.放弃，不坚持(规定、要求、权力等) | |
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narrative
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| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
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natal
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| adj.出生的，先天的 | |
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alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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arduous
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| adj.艰苦的，费力的，陡峭的 | |
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undertakings
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| 企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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infinity
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| n.无限，无穷，大量 | |
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detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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onus
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| n.负担；责任 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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stationary
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| adj.固定的，静止不动的 | |
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irony
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| n.反语，冷嘲；具有讽刺意味的事，嘲弄 | |
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99
gratuitously
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| 平白 | |
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100
ridicule
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| v.讥讽，挖苦；n.嘲弄 | |
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101
condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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102
slander
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| n./v.诽谤，污蔑 | |
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103
rusting
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| n.生锈v.（使）生锈( rust的现在分词 ) | |
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104
conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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105
inadequacy
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| n.无法胜任，信心不足 | |
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