Eight years have elapsed since the Boer War. Memories are short, and it is possible now to print a statement of this sort, which, if promulgated5 during the dust and heat of the war itself, when the lance and sword fell into complete and well-merited oblivion, and when mounted men on both sides were judged rigidly6 by their proficiency7 in the use of the horse and the rifle, would have excited universal derision. The words which follow recall one of the writer's "abnormalities" already commented on: "If in European warfare8 such mounted riflemen were to separate and scatter9, the enemy would be well pleased, for he could then reconnoitre and report every movement, and make his plans in all security. In South Africa the mounted riflemen were the hostile army itself, and when they had dispersed10 there was nothing left to reconnoitre; but when will these conditions recur12?" When, indeed? There was nothing, it seems, to reconnoitre, because the enemy always "scattered13 and dispersed." And the Generals were "well pleased"! "Nothing left to reconnoitre"! One can only marvel14 at the courage of Sir John French in breathing the word "reconnoitre" in connection with Cavalry work in South Africa.
[Pg 38]
He ought to admit that Cavalry reconnaissance was bad, and that the army suffered for it. No historian has ever defended it. It was the despair of Generals who wanted information as to the position of the enemy. Wits apart, the rifle ruled reconnaissance, as it obviously always must rule it. Ceteris paribus, the best rifleman is the best scout15. The Cavalry were not good riflemen, and were therefore not good scouts16. Not a single Boer scout from the beginning to the end of the war was hurt by a sword or lance. Those weapons were a laughing-stock to foe17 and friend alike. And Sir John French's proposition is, not so much that the reconnaissance was good—presumably, that goes without saying—but that there was nothing to reconnoitre, thanks, apparently18, to the terror spread by the lance and sword.
Such a travesty19 of the war may be left to speak for itself. But it is very important to comprehend the root idea which underlies20 it, an idea which, as we shall see, reappears in a less extreme form in General von Bernhardi's writings. It is expressed in the words "we should invert the r?le of Cavalry, turn it into a defensive arm." The rifle, it will be seen, is regarded as a defensive weapon, in contradistinction to the lance and sword, which are offensive weapons. To sustain this theory,[Pg 39] it is absolutely necessary, of course, to proceed to the lengths to which Sir John French proceeds—to declare, in effect, that there was no war and no fighting; for if once we concede that there was a war, study its combats and compute21 their statistical22 results, we are forced to the conclusion that the rifle must have been used in offence as well as in defence. Abstract reflection might well anticipate this conclusion by suggesting that a defensive weapon and a defensive class of soldiers are contradictions in terms.
There must be two parties to every combat, and, unless there is perfect equilibrium23 in combat, one side or the other must definitely be playing an offensive r?le; and, even in equilibrium, both sides may be said to be as much in offence as in defence, whatever weapons they are using. The facts mainly illustrate24 the abstract principle. The Boers could not have taken guns and prisoners while acting25 on the defensive. Talana Hill, Nicholson's Nek, Spion Kop, Stormberg, Sannah's Post, Nooitgedacht, Zilikat's Nek, Bakenlaagte, were not defensive operations from the Boer point of view. Nor were Magersfontein, Colenso, Elandslaagte, Paardeberg defensive operations from the British point of view. Whether the rifles were in the hands of Infantry26 or mounted troops is immaterial. A rifle is a rifle, who[Pg 40]ever holds it. It is just as absurd to say that the Boers who rode to and stormed on foot Helvetia and Dewetsdorp belonged to a defensive class of soldiers as it is to say that the Infantry who walked to and stormed Pieter's Hill belonged to a defensive class of soldiers. It is still more absurd to say that the Boers who charged home mounted at Sannah's Post, Vlakfontein, Bakenlaagte, Roodewal, Blood River Poort, and many other actions, and the British mounted riflemen who did similar things at Bothaville, were performing a defensive function, while the Cavalry who pursued at Elandslaagte were performing an offensive function. Take this action of Elandslaagte, the solitary27 genuine example of a successful charge with the arme blanche. By whom was the real offensive work done? By the Infantry and by the Imperial Light Horse acting dismounted, and by the Artillery28. After hours of hard and bloody29 fighting, these men stormed the ridge30 and forced the Boers to retreat. In the act of retreat they were charged by the Cavalry, who had hitherto been spectators of the action.
It might be objected that I am taking a verbal advantage of Sir John French. He is guilty, it may be argued, only of the lesser31 fallacy—that of thinking that the rifle is a defensive weapon for[Pg 41] mounted men as distinguished32 from Infantry. Not so. He perceives the logical peril33 of admitting that the rifle is an offensive weapon for any troops, and in another passage, when deprecating attacks on the "Cavalry spirit" (p. vii), makes use of the following words: "Were we to seek to endow Cavalry with the tenacity34 and stiffness of Infantry, or take from the mounted arm the mobility35 and the cult36 of the offensive which are the breath of its life, we should ruin not only the Cavalry, but the Army besides." (The italics are mine.) It may be pointed37 out that, but for their firearms and the mobility and offensive power derived38 from them, the Cavalry in South Africa would indeed have been "ruined" beyond hope of rehabilitation39.
But let us look at the underlying40 principle expressed. Infantry are "stiff and tenacious41" (that is, obviously, in defence). Cavalry have the "cult of the offensive." Those are the distinctive42 "spirits" of the two Arms. The bitter irony43 of it! Which Arm really displayed the most "offensive spirit" in South Africa? Study the lists of comparative casualties in the two Arms during that period of the war in which Infantry were mainly engaged. If at Talana, the Battle of Ladysmith, Colenso, Dronfield, Poplar Grove44, Karee Siding, Sannah's Post, Zand River, Doorn[Pg 42]kop, or Diamond Hill, the Cavalry in their own sphere of work had shown the offensive power displayed by the Infantry in the battles on the Tugela, or in Methuen's campaign from Orange River to Magersfontein, or at Driefontein, Doornkop, Bergendal, and Diamond Hill, the war would have showed different results. There was no distinction in point of bravery between any branches of the Services. Fire-power and fire-efficiency were the tests, and lack of a good firearm and of fire-efficiency on only too many occasions fatally weakened the offensive spirit of the Cavalry.
And what of the "tenacity and stiffness" with which we must not "seek to endow" Cavalry? Ominous45 words, redolent of disaster! Have not they fully46 as much need of those qualities as Infantry? Imagine our Cavalry doing the work that the Boers had to do on so many score of occasions—to fight delaying rearguard actions against immensely superior numbers, with no reserves, and a heavy convoy47 to protect. We shall be fortunate if, through reliance on and skill in the use of the rifle, they display as much tenacity and stiffness as Botha's men at Pieter's Hill or Koch's men at Elandslaagte against forces four times their superior in strength, to say nothing of such incidents as Dronfield, where 150 Boers defied a whole division of Cavalry and several batteries;[Pg 43] of Poplar Grove and Zand River, where small hostile groups virtually paralyzed whole brigades; or of Bergendal, where seventy-four men held up a whole army. There was nothing abnormal tactically or topographically about any of these incidents. Any function performed by the Boer mounted riflemen may be demanded from our Cavalry in any future war. Suppose them, for example, vested with the strictly48 normal duty of covering a retreat against a superior force of all arms; suppose a squadron, like the seventy-four Zarps at Bergendal, ordered to hold the cardinal49 hill of an extended position, and their leader replying: "This is not our business. We are an offensive Arm. We cannot entrench50, and we have not the tenacity and stiffness of Infantry. Our business is to charge with the lance and sword." Would the General be well pleased?
The reader will ask for the key to this curious discrimination between the "spirits" of Cavalry and Infantry. It is this: The lance and sword, when pitted against the rifle, can, if they are used at all, only be used in offence. Men sitting on horseback, using steel weapons with a range of a couple of yards, plainly cannot defend themselves against riflemen. Even the Cavalry tacitly admit this principle, and if they accepted its logical consequence, a logical consequence completely con[Pg 44]firmed by the facts of modern war, they would admit, too, that the sword and lance cannot be used for offence against riflemen in modern war. But they will not admit that. "Tant pis pour les faits," they say. "All modern war is abnormal. Our steel weapons dominate combat. Without them we are nothing."
In these circumstances they are forced to set up this strange theory—that Cavalry is a peculiarly "offensive" Arm, a theory which the reader will find expressed in all Cavalry writings. On the face of it the theory is meaningless. It is a mere51 verbal juggle52, because, as I said before, there are two parties to every combat, and defence is the necessary and invariable counterpart of offence. All combatant soldiers, including Cavalry, carry firearms, and if Cavalry choose to use these firearms in offence, by hypothesis they will impose fire-action on the defence, whether the defence consists of Cavalry or any other class of troops. Conversely, if they use their rifles in defence, as by hypothesis they must, they will impose fire-action on the attacking force, be it Cavalry or any other Arm. In other words, the rifle governs combat. That is why the lance and sword disappeared in South Africa. Both in offence and defence the Boer riflemen forced the Cavalry to accept combat on terms of fire.
[Pg 45]
And what kind of Cavalry do our Cavalrymen count upon meeting in our next war? They count, incredible as it seems, upon meeting Cavalry not superior, but inferior, to the Boer mounted riflemen, inferior because, as I shall show from von Bernhardi, they defy science, shut their eyes to the great principle of the supremacy53 of fire, are prepared deliberately54 to abdicate55 their fire-power, and hope to engage, by mutual56 agreement, as it were, and on the understanding that suitable areas of level ground can be found, in contests of crude bodily weight.
And what of the action of Cavalry against other Arms? We know Sir John French's opinion about mounted riflemen. They will gallop57 for their lives "defenceless" at the approach of "good" Cavalry. But Infantry, riflemen without horses, who cannot gallop, but can only run? Their case, it would seem, must be still more desperate. They are not only defenceless, but destitute58 even of the means of flight. And yet even Sir John French credits them, if not with an offensive spirit, at least with "tenacity and stiffness," derived, of course, from their rifles. But their mounted comrades, armed with these same rifles, lack these soldierly qualities. We arrive thus at the conclusion that the horse, which one would naturally suppose to be a source of[Pg 46] immensely enhanced mobility and power, is a positive source of danger to a rifleman unless he also carries a lance or sword.
Here is the reductio ad absurdum of the arme blanche theory, and I beg for the reader's particular attention to it. Of course, the conclusion is in reality too absurd; for Sir John French himself does not really believe that Infantry are a defensive Arm. In point of fact, no serious man believes that Infantry in modern war have anything whatever to fear from the lance and sword, and their training-book is written on that assumption. Nor does Sir John French really believe that Mounted Infantry are a defensive Arm who run from Cavalry; otherwise, he would never rest until he had secured the complete abolition59 of our Mounted Infantry, who are now, under his official sanction, designed to act, not only as divisional mounted troops against steel-armed Continental60 Cavalry, but to co-operate with, and in certain events take the place of, our own regular Cavalry in far wider functions, and are presumably not going to be whipped off the field at the distant glimpse of a lance or sword. And I may say here that the reader can obtain no better and more searching sidelight on the steel theory than by studying the Mounted Infantry Manual (1909) for the rules given about similar[Pg 47] and analogous61 functions. Nor, if Sir John French went the whole length of the theory, would he, as Inspector-General, have permitted our Colonial mounted riflemen to think that they might be of some Imperial value in a future war. It is only in order to sustain his a priori case for the steel weapons that he finds himself forced into the logical impasses62 to which I have drawn63 attention.
There is one further point to deal with before leaving Sir John French's Introduction. He admits the necessity of a rifle for Cavalry, and we may presume him to admit that the Boer War proved the necessity for a good rifle and the futility64 of a bad carbine. When, in his opinion, is this rifle to be used? "I have endeavoured to impress upon all ranks," he writes on page xvii, "that when the enemy's Cavalry is overthrown65, our Cavalry will find more opportunities of using the rifle than the cold steel, and that dismounted attacks will be more frequent than charges with the arme blanche. By no means do I rule out as impossible, or even unlikely, attacks by great bodies of mounted men against other arms on the battle-field; but I believe that such opportunities will occur comparatively rarely, and that undue67 prominence68 should not be given to them in our peace training." (The italics are mine.)
[Pg 48]
This is a typically nebulous statement of the combat functions of Cavalry in modern war, and, like the generality of such statements, will be found to contain, if analyzed69, a refutation of the writer's own views on the importance of the arme blanche. We ask ourselves immediately why he thought it necessary to account for the failure of the arme blanche in South Africa by the elaborate accumulation of arguments for "abnormality" developed a few pages earlier. After all, it seems, the war, in its bearing upon the efficacy of weapons, was normal. The Boers had no "Cavalry" in the writer's use of the word—that is, steel-armed Cavalry. What he assumes to be the primary and most formidable objective of our own steel-armed cavalry was, therefore, by a fortunate accident, non-existent. There was no need to "overthrow66" it, because there was nothing to overthrow, and our Cavalry was free from the outset to devote its attention to the "other Arms"—that is, to riflemen and Artillery—assumed evidently by the writer to be a secondary and less formidable objective. But here, apparently, "opportunities" for the arme blanche are to occur "comparatively rarely" in any war, European or otherwise, whether the riflemen show "tenacity and stiffness" or "disperse11 for hundreds of miles"; whether the horses are[Pg 49] perennially71 fresh or perennially fatigued72; whether we outnumber the foe or they outnumber us; whether annexation73 or mere victory is our aim.
If only, we cannot help exclaiming, this principle had been recognized in 1899! We knew the Boers had no swords or lances: we had always known it. If only we had prepared our Cavalry for the long-foreseen occasion, trained them to fire, given them good firearms, and impressed upon them that opportunities for shock would occur "comparatively rarely," instead of teaching them up to the last minute that fire-action was an abnormal, defensive function of their Arm, worthy74 of little more space in their Manual than that devoted75 to "Funerals," and much less than that devoted to "Ceremonial Escorts."
The root of the fallacy propounded76 by Sir John French lies in his refusal to recognize that a rifle may be just as deadly a weapon in the hands of Cavalry as in the hands of "other Arms," and, indeed, a far more deadly weapon, thanks to the mobility conferred by the horse. If, for example, Infantry can, as he tacitly admits they can, force Cavalry to adopt fire-action, a fortiori can Cavalry, if they choose, force Cavalry to adopt fire-action. In other words, the rifle governs combat, as it did, in fact, govern combat in South Africa and Manchuria. But Cavalry operating[Pg 50] against Cavalry, according to Sir John French, are not so to choose. We can only speculate upon what may happen if one side is so unsportsmanlike as to break the rules and masquerade as another Arm. The stratagem77 is simple, because the rifle kills at a mile, and the orthodox Cavalry may be unaware78 until it is too late that the unorthodox Cavalry is playing them a trick. Meanwhile the best riflemen, whether they have horses or not, will win, and horsemen who have spent 80 or 90 per cent. of their time in steel-training will have cause to regret their error.
But Sir John French contemplates79 no such awkward contingencies80. We may surmise81, however, that it is owing to an uncomfortable suspicion of his own fallacy that in this paragraph and elsewhere he is so careful to isolate82 inter-cavalry combats from mixed combats, and to postulate83 the complete "overthrow" of one Cavalry—an overthrow effected solely84 by the arme blanche—before permitting the surviving Cavalry, in Kipling's words, to "scuffle mid70 unseemly smoke." He has a formula for the occasion. In this paragraph it is "when the enemy's Cavalry is overthrown." On page xiv, speaking of raids, which he deprecates, he says: "Every plan should be subordinate to what I consider a primary necessity—the absolute and complete[Pg 51] overthrow of the hostile Cavalry"; and on page xv: "If the enemy's Cavalry has been overthrown, the r?le of reconnaissance will have been rendered easier," a truism upon which the Boer War throws a painfully ironical85 sidelight.
If the reader is puzzled by this curiously86 superfluous87 insistence88 on the "overthrow" of the enemy analogous to the equally superfluous insistence on the "offensive" character of the Cavalry Arm, he will once more find an explanation in the anomalous89 status of the arme blanche. No one would dream of repeatedly impressing upon Infantry, for example, as though it were a principle they might otherwise overlook, that their primary aim must be the absolute and complete overthrow of the hostile Infantry. But the advocate of the arme blanche is always on the horns of a dilemma90. He dare not admit that the rifle in the hands of Cavalry is as formidable a weapon as in the hands of Infantry, if not a far more formidable weapon. He therefore instinctively91 tends to picture steel-armed Cavalry as perpetually pitted against steel-armed Cavalry. Both sides are always in offence until the moment when one is "completely and absolutely overthrown." Then some other r?les, very vaguely92 delineated, open up to the victor. Needless to say, this picture bears no resemblance to war.[Pg 52] Troops are not, by mutual agreement, sorted out into classes, like competitors in athletic93 sports. Every Arm must be prepared to meet at any moment any other Arm, and any other weapon.
Nor do these "complete and absolute" obliterations of one Arm by its corresponding Arm ever, in fact, happen. That they could ever happen through the agency of the lance and sword is the wildest supposition of all. Compared with rifles, these weapons are harmless. Even the most backward and ignorant Cavalry, trained to rely absolutely on the lance and sword, would, if it found itself beaten in trials of shock, or, like the Japanese Cavalry, greatly outnumbered, resort to the despised firearm, imitate the tactics and vest itself with something of the "tenacity and stiffness," as well as with the aggressive potency94, of those "other Arms," which, by hypothesis, must be attacked with the rifle; and in doing so it would force its antagonist95 to do the same.
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1
invert
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| vt.使反转，使颠倒，使转化 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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promulgated
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| v.宣扬（某事物）( promulgate的过去式和过去分词 )；传播；公布；颁布（法令、新法律等） | |
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rigidly
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| adv.刻板地，僵化地 | |
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proficiency
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| n.精通，熟练，精练 | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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scatter
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| vt.撒，驱散，散开；散布/播；vi.分散，消散 | |
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dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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disperse
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| vi.使分散；使消失；vt.分散；驱散 | |
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recur
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| vi.复发，重现，再发生 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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marvel
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| vi.(at)惊叹vt.感到惊异；n.令人惊异的事 | |
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scout
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| n.童子军，侦察员；v.侦察，搜索 | |
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scouts
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| 侦察员[机，舰]( scout的名词复数 )； 童子军； 搜索； 童子军成员 | |
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foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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travesty
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| n.歪曲，嘲弄，滑稽化 | |
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underlies
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| v.位于或存在于（某物）之下( underlie的第三人称单数 )；构成…的基础（或起因），引起 | |
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compute
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| v./n.计算，估计 | |
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statistical
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| adj.统计的，统计学的 | |
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equilibrium
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| n.平衡，均衡，相称，均势，平静 | |
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illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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solitary
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| adj.孤独的，独立的，荒凉的；n.隐士 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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tenacity
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| n.坚韧 | |
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mobility
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| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
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cult
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| n.异教，邪教；时尚，狂热的崇拜 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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rehabilitation
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| n.康复，悔过自新，修复，复兴，复职，复位 | |
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underlying
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| adj.在下面的，含蓄的，潜在的 | |
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tenacious
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| adj.顽强的，固执的，记忆力强的，粘的 | |
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distinctive
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| adj.特别的，有特色的，与众不同的 | |
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irony
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| n.反语，冷嘲；具有讽刺意味的事，嘲弄 | |
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grove
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| n.林子，小树林，园林 | |
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ominous
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| adj.不祥的，不吉的，预兆的，预示的 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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entrench
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| v.使根深蒂固；n.壕沟；防御设施 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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52
juggle
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| v.变戏法，纂改，欺骗，同时做；n.玩杂耍，纂改，花招 | |
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supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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54
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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abdicate
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| v.让位，辞职，放弃 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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gallop
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| v./n.(马或骑马等)飞奔；飞速发展 | |
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destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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continental
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| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
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analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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impasses
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| 绝境（impasse的复数形式） | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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futility
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| n.无用 | |
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overthrown
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| adj. 打翻的，推倒的，倾覆的 动词overthrow的过去分词 | |
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overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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undue
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| adj.过分的；不适当的；未到期的 | |
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prominence
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| n.突出；显著；杰出；重要 | |
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analyzed
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| v.分析( analyze的过去式和过去分词 )；分解；解释；对…进行心理分析 | |
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mid
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| adj.中央的，中间的 | |
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perennially
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| adv.经常出现地；长期地；持久地；永久地 | |
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fatigued
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| adj. 疲乏的 | |
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annexation
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| n.吞并，合并 | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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propounded
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| v.提出（问题、计划等）供考虑[讨论]，提议( propound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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stratagem
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| n.诡计，计谋 | |
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unaware
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| a.不知道的，未意识到的 | |
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contemplates
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| 深思，细想，仔细考虑( contemplate的第三人称单数 )； 注视，凝视； 考虑接受（发生某事的可能性）； 深思熟虑，沉思，苦思冥想 | |
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contingencies
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| n.偶然发生的事故，意外事故( contingency的名词复数 )；以备万一 | |
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surmise
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| v./n.猜想，推测 | |
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isolate
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| vt.使孤立，隔离 | |
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postulate
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| n.假定，基本条件；vt.要求，假定 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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ironical
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| adj.讽刺的，冷嘲的 | |
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curiously
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| adv.有求知欲地；好问地；奇特地 | |
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superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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insistence
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| n.坚持；强调；坚决主张 | |
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anomalous
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| adj.反常的；不规则的 | |
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dilemma
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| n.困境，进退两难的局面 | |
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instinctively
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| adv.本能地 | |
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vaguely
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| adv.含糊地，暖昧地 | |
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athletic
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| adj.擅长运动的，强健的；活跃的，体格健壮的 | |
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potency
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| n. 效力，潜能 | |
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antagonist
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| n.敌人，对抗者，对手 | |
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