I have gone at considerable length into the opinions of Sir John French, as expressed in his Introduction to von Bernhardi's work—partly because it is more important for us to know what our own Cavalrymen think than what German Cavalrymen think, and partly because it will be easier for the reader to estimate the value of the German writer's views if he is already familiar with Sir John French's way of thinking. We should expect, of course, to find identity between the views of the two men, since Sir John French acclaims2 the German author as the fountain of all wisdom; but on that point the reader would be well advised to reserve judgment3.
I shall now discuss "Cavalry1 in War and Peace," and first let me say a few more words on a very important point—the circumstances of its composition.
When General von Bernhardi wrote his first[Pg 54] book, "Cavalry in Future Wars," he did not take the current German Cavalry Regulations as his text, because they were too archaic4 to deserve such treatment. He condemned5 them in the mass, and, independently of them, penned his own scheme for a renovated6 modern Cavalry. After about nine years of complete neglect, during which the two great wars in South Africa and Manchuria were fought, the German authorities decided7 that some recognition of modern conditions must be made. They have recently re-armed the Cavalry with a good carbine, and issued a new book of Cavalry Regulations. These circumstances induced the General to write his second book, "Cavalry in War and Peace," and to throw it into the form of a direct criticism of the official Regulations, which he constantly quotes in footnotes and uses in the text of his own observations and constructive8 recommendations.
What is the result? The first point to notice is that he regards the new official Regulations, "though better than the old ones," as thoroughly9 and radically10 bad. His writings, he says, "have fallen on barren soil." He condemns11 them almost invariably for precisely12 the same reason as before, namely, that they virtually ignore the rifle in practice, and continue the ancient and worn-out traditions of the steel, with mere13 lip-[Pg 55]service to the modern scientific weapon. But a disappointment was in store for those who had hoped that the mental process involved in criticizing concrete Regulations, as well as the vast mass of instructive phenomena15 presented by the two wars which, when he wrote first, were still "future wars" to him, would arouse the General himself to a realization16 of the inconsistencies in his own earlier work.
These hopes have been falsified. The fascination17 of the arme blanche was proof against the test, and the result is one of the strangest military works which was ever published. Bitter satire18 as it is on the official system of training, any impartial19 reader must end by sympathizing, not with the satirist20, but with the officials satirized21. They at any rate try to be logical. Their concessions23 to fire are the thinnest pretence24; their belief in shock undisguised and sincere. Whatever follies25 and errors this belief involves them in, they pursue their course with unflinching consistency26, sublimely27 careless of science and modern war conditions.
Their critic, on the other hand, keenly alive to the absurdities28 inculcated, has not the mental courage to insist on the only logical alternatives. Faced with the necessity of proving their absurdity29, he refuses to use the only effective weapon avail[Pg 56]able, gives away his own case for fire by weak concession22 to shock, and succeeds in producing a work which will convince no one in Germany, and the greater part of which, as a practical guide to Cavalrymen, in this country or any other, is worthless. A mist of ambiguity30 shrouds31 what should be the simplest propositions. We move through a fog of ill-defined terms and vague qualifications. We puzzle our brains with academical distinctions, and if we come upon what seems to be some definite recommendation, we are pretty sure to find it stultified32 in another chapter, or even in the same chapter, by a reservation in the opposite sense. The key to each particular muddle33, to each ambiguity, to each timid qualification, to each confusing doctrinaire34 classification, is always the same—namely, that the writer, from sheer lack of knowledge of what modern fire-tactics are, at the last moment shrinks from his own theories about their value. What has happened is exactly what one would expect to happen. In Germany the General admits his failure, and in England he is hailed by Sir John French, who politely ignores his blunders about fire-action, as the apostle of the steel, instead of what he really is, the apostle, though the ineffectual apostle, of the rifle.
Let us first be quite clear as to his opinion of[Pg 57] the present German Cavalry. "While all other Arms have adapted themselves to modern conditions, Cavalry has stood still," he says on the first page of his Introduction. They have "no sort of tradition" for a future war (p. 5). Their training creates "no sound foundation for preparation for war." It is "left far behind in the march of military progress." "It cannot stand the test of serious war." It is trammelled by the "fetters35 of the past," and lives on "antiquated36 assumptions" (p. 6). Its "mischievous37 delusions38" will result in "bitter disappointment" (p. 175). Many of the new Regulations "betoken39 failure to adapt existing principles to modern ideas" (p. 361); others "do not take the conditions of reality into account"; or "cannot be regarded as practical"; or are "provisional"; and of one set of peculiarly ludicrous evolutions he uses the delightful40 phrase that they are "included in the Regulations with a view to their theoretical and not for their practical advantages" (p. 333). He stigmatizes41 "the formal encounters," the "old-fashioned knightly42 combats," the "pro14 forma evolutions," the "survivals of the Dark Ages," the "spectacular battle-pieces," the "red-tape methods," the "tactical orgies," the "childish exercises," and "set pieces" of peace man?uvres. The origin of the trouble, he says,[Pg 58] is "indolent conservatism" (p. 366). "Development in our branch of the Service has come to a standstill" (ibid.). The officers do not study history or the progress of foreign Cavalries43. And he reiterates44 again and again his general conclusion that the Cavalry is unprepared for war.
Such is the material which forms his text. And we may ask at once, is a book based on such an appalling45 state of affairs, and addressed exclusively to a Cavalry described as being given over to ancient shibboleths46, mischievous delusions and antiquated assumptions—is such a book likely to deserve the effusive47 and unqualified praise of our own foremost Cavalry authority? Is it likely to be worthy48 of becoming the Bible of a modern and progressive Cavalry, such as Sir John French considers our own Cavalry, trained under his own guidance, to be? Is it likely to be "exhaustive," "convincing," "complete"?
To suppose so is to insult the intelligence of our countrymen. We do not teach the ABC in our Universities. Our natural science schools do not assume that their pupils belong to the "Dark Ages," and waste two-thirds of their energy in laborious49 refutations of such extinct superstitions50 as witchcraft51. The education of our sailors to modern naval52 war is not conducted[Pg 59] on the assumption that the Navy consists of wooden sailing-vessels whose inadequacy53 to modern conditions must be elaborately demonstrated. A gunnery course—and the reader will note the analogy—does not consist mainly of arguments designed to prove that the cutlass is no longer so important a weapon as the long-range gun and the torpedo54. Nor—in the military sphere—are our Infantry55 and Artillery56 instructed with a view to weaning them from the cult57 of the pike and the catapult.
So, too, we may be quite sure that there is something radically wrong when our Cavalry, in their search for an authoritative58 exposition of modern Cavalry tactics, are reduced to relying on a foreign writer who writes for a Cavalry ignorant of the elements of modern Cavalry tactics, and a good half of whose work is taken up with scoldings and appeals which from our British point of view are grotesquely60 redundant61. All that is good in what von Bernhardi says about fire-action we know from our own war experience. All his errors about fire-action we can detect also from our own war experience.
We should expect Sir John French to comment on these facts, to warn his readers that the book under review was written for a Cavalry unversed in modern war and blind to its teaching. We[Pg 60] should expect some note of pride and satisfaction in the fact that his own national Cavalry did not need these scathing62 and humiliating reminders63 that war is not a "theoretical" and "childish" pastime, but a serious and dangerous business; some hint to the effect that perhaps we, with our three years' experience of the modern rifle, may have something useful to tell General von Bernhardi about principles which he has framed in the speculative64 seclusion65 of his study. Not a word, not a hint of any such warning or criticism. The topic is too dangerous. Once admit that South Africa counts—to say nothing of Manchuria—once begin to dot the "i's" and cross the "t's" of the German's speculations66, and the arme blanche is lost. Instead, we have the passionless reservation from Sir John French that "he does not always approve" of those German Regulations, so many of which von Bernhardi thinks prehistoric68 and ludicrous, and at the end of his Introduction we have a fervent69 appeal to the British Cavalry not to "expose our ignorance and conceit70" by overvaluing our own experience, but to "keep abreast71 with every change in the tendencies of Cavalry abroad," and to "assimilate the best of foreign customs" to our own. "Keep abreast!" What an expression to use in such a connection! "Best foreign cus[Pg 61]toms!" Where are these customs? There appears to be only one answer—namely, that these customs are in reality the very customs which von Bernhardi attacks with such savage72 scorn, and yet by such ineffective and half-hearted methods that he leaves them as strong as before. His qualifications and reservations give Sir John French a loophole, so that what, read through English eyes, should be a final condemnation73 of the steel becomes to him a vindication74 of the steel.
The link between the two writers is that both disregard the facts of modern war. Since these facts are fatal to the steel theory, both are compelled to disregard them. What wars, then, according to the German expert, are the uneducated German Cavalry to study? He deals with this point on page 5. He dismisses the wars of Frederick the Great and Napoleon. He dismisses the Franco-German War of 1870-71, as we might expect from his earlier work, where he pointed75 out how meagre and feeble were the performances of the Cavalry compared with those of other Arms. He dismisses the Russo-Turkish War for the same reason, and, by implication, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. All these wars, he says, "present a total absence of analogy." Then, entirely76 disregarding the whole period in which science perfected the firearm, he dismisses the wars in South[Pg 62] Africa and Manchuria. And he comes back to what? The American War of Secession of 1861-1865, which "appears to be the most interesting and instructive campaign for the service of modern Cavalry," but which is "almost unknown" in Germany. In any other branch of study but that of Cavalry an analogous77 recommendation would be received with a compassionate78 smile. The element of truth and sense in it—and there is much truth and sense in it—is so obvious and unquestioned as not to need expression for the benefit of any well-informed student. The American horsemen discovered that the rifle must be the principal weapon of Cavalry, and through that discovery made themselves incomparably more formidable and efficient in every phase and function of war than the European Cavalries, who ignored and despised the American example in the succeeding European struggles. So far the writer is on the sound ground of platitude79.
But has nothing notable happened since 1865? A very important thing has happened. The Civil War firearm is now a museum curiosity. Science has devised a weapon of at least five times the power—smokeless, quick-firing, and accurate up to ranges which were never dreamt of in 1865. Even the American weapon reduced shock to a wholly secondary place, and gave fire unques[Pg 63]tioned supremacy80. The modern weapon has eliminated shock altogether, and inspired new and far more formidable tactics—just as mobile, just as dashing, just as fruitful of "charges," but based on fire. Von Bernhardi cannot bring himself to contemplate81 this result. He must have his lances and swords, and is compelled therefore to go back to 1865, when the death-knell of those weapons was already being sounded; and in doing so he writes his own condemnation.
This is how his book opens: "The great changes which have taken place in military science since the year 1866 have forced all arms to adopt new methods of fighting. It was first and foremost the improvement in the firearm which wrought82 the transformation83 on the battle-field." (My italics.) Since the year 1866! And yet the Cavalry are to go back to a war prior to that year for their instruction, and are to neglect the only wars in which the improved firearm has been tested! In point of fact, General von Bernhardi shows no sign of having closely studied even the American War of 1861-1865 with a view to finding out how the Americans used their firearms in conjunction with their horses. On this vital technical matter he writes throughout from a purely84 speculative standpoint, without a single allusion85 to the American technical methods, much less to the[Pg 64] methods of our own and the Boer mounted riflemen of 1899-1902.
We must add in fairness that the General seems to be conscious that a war half a century old cannot be implicitly87 relied on for instruction, and he concludes his historical remarks, therefore, by the depressing conclusion that "there remains88, then, nothing for us—with no practical war experience to go on—but to create the groundwork of our methods of training from theoretical and speculative reflection."
On this question of the most instructive war for Cavalry study Sir John French preserves an eloquent89 silence. He dismisses South Africa and Manchuria, but he does not echo the recommendation as to America. Thereby90 hangs a tale. For years before the South African War, for years before von Bernhardi was heard of in England, the ablest military historian of our time, the late Colonel Henderson, had been dinning91 the moral of America into the ears of our Cavalry authorities, without producing the smallest effect. His prophecies were abundantly justified92—more than justified, for he wrote on the basis of the rifle of 1865, and the rifle of 1899 totally eliminated the shock-tactics which were still practicable in 1865. He died in 1902, before the Boer War was over, but in one of the last essays written before his[Pg 65] death he told the Cavalry that shock was extinct. "Critics of the Cavalry work in South Africa," he says, "do not seem to have realized that the small bore and smokeless powder have destroyed the last vestiges93 of the traditional r?le of Cavalry" ("Science of War," p. 376).
It can be readily understood, therefore, that to refer our Cavalry of the present day to Colonel Henderson's brilliant and learned writings upon the American Civil War, would be a course highly dangerous to the interests of the lance and sword. Sir John French confines himself to urging his subalterns to read such "acknowledged authorities" as Sir Evelyn Wood and General von Bernhardi. But why is Sir Evelyn Wood singled out? Eminent94 as he is, he has not the requisite95 modern war experience. Why not Lord Roberts, who has, and who is the only living British officer with a European reputation? General von Bernhardi himself has not been on active service since 1870, when he served as a Lieutenant96 in the war against France. Sir John French will not advance the cause of the arme blanche in that way. He cannot stifle97 knowledge by an index. He need not agree with Lord Roberts, but to ignore him when speaking of "acknowledged authorities," to accuse him by implication of making "appeals from ignorance[Pg 66] to vanity," is unworthy of Sir John French. If he believes in his cause, let him urge the Cavalry to hear both sides; it can do no harm. For my part, I would most strongly urge every Cavalry soldier to read von Bernhardi and Sir John French.
II.—General Principles of Combat.
To return to the book under discussion. Is it possible to gain from it any clear and definite idea of the respective functions and the relative importance of the rifle and the lance and sword as weapons for Cavalry? Unfortunately, no. We have to deal with hazy98 generalizations99 scattered100 over the whole volume, each with its qualification somewhere else. It is true that warnings against the use of the steel greatly preponderate101; and although, by selecting quotations103 from various chapters, each party to our controversy104 could easily claim the General as an adherent105 to his cause, the advocates of the rifle could certainly amass106 more favourable107 texts. The following passage might almost be regarded as conclusive—"We must be resolute108 in freeing ourselves from those old-fashioned knightly combats, which have in reality become obsolete109 owing to the necessities of modern war" (p. 111)—if its teaching were not weakened by such a[Pg 67] maxim110 as this: "The crowning-point of all drill and of the whole tactical training is the charge itself, as on it depends the final result of the battle" (p. 325). But let us get closer to his actual argument. The reader should carefully study pp. 101 to 105, where, under the heading "B.—The Action of Cavalry" and sub-heading "1.—General," the author discusses in close detail the action of "Cavalry in the fight." The reader may wonder why he should have to wait till the hundredth page for this discussion. With the exception of some introductory pages, whose general sense, on the question of weapons, is against the lance and sword, the greater part of the first hundred pages are devoted111 to "Reconnaissance, Screening, and Raids," functions none of which, least of all the third, can be performed without fighting, or at least the risk of fighting, while fighting cannot be performed without weapons. The reason probably is that the author, in arranging his scheme, instinctively112 tended, like all Cavalry writers, to regard reconnaissance as a sphere where Cavalry can confidently rely on meeting only Cavalry of exactly the same stamp as themselves, and where combats will as a matter of course be decided in the old knightly fashion by charges with steel.
Such a state of things has no resemblance to[Pg 68] real war. Raids, for example, are invariably levelled against fixed113 points and stationary114 detachments. The author himself is acutely aware of this truth, as we shall see hereafter; but the postponement115 of the topic of weapons until the middle of the book is typical of the confused arrangement of the whole, a confusion attributable to the ubiquity of the rifle in all combats and the insuperable difficulty of supposing it to be an inferior weapon to the steel.
It is impossible, therefore, to adhere strictly116 to the order in which the author arranges his treatise117. I shall begin with the general chapter just referred to, and proceed, as far as possible, according to his own order from that point onwards.
First of all, he finds it necessary to reject the plan of "dividing tactical principles according to the idea of the pre-arranged battle and the battle of encounter," a course which gives one an insight into the lifeless pedantry118 he has had to combat in the branch of military science he has made his own. Unfortunately, his own classification, so far as it bears upon weapons, is little better. He distinguishes the "great battle," in which "the fighting is always of a pre-arranged nature," from "the fight of the independent Cavalry," where "it is possible to distinguish between an encounter and an arranged[Pg 69] affair." This is vague enough, but what follows is vaguer. One infers that there is to be little or no shock in the "great battle," where the Cavalry "must conform to the law of other arms in great matters and small." And then he goes on: "But the fight is deeply influenced even in the former case [i.e., in the combats of the independent Cavalry] by the co-operation of these other arms, and I believe that only in exceptional cases will a purely Cavalry combat take place—at all events, on a large scale. When squadrons, regiments119, and perhaps even brigades, unassisted by other arms, come into collision with one another, the charge may often suffice for a decision. But where it is an affair of large masses, it will never be possible to dispense120 with the co-operation of firearms, and in most cases a combination of Cavalry combat, of dismounted fighting, and Artillery action, will ensue."
What lies behind this ambiguous language, which, remember, is the outcome of pure "speculation67"? What principle is he trying to express? Let us proceed: "We must not conceal121 from ourselves the fact that in a future war it will be by no means always a matter of choice whether we will fight mounted or dismounted. Rather by himself seizing the rifle will the opponent be able to compel us to adopt dismounted action. On[Pg 70] our man?uvre grounds the charge on horseback is always the order of the day, as against Artillery or machine-guns. The umpires continually allow such attacks to succeed, and the troops ride on as if nothing had happened. Equally fearless of consequences, do they expose themselves to rifle-fire; but there are no bullets. In real war it is different."
It is needless to point out that the words I have italicized destroy the whole case for the steel. They are an admission of the true principle that the rifle governs combat, whether the rifle is used by men with horses or men without horses. It is characteristic of the author that he cannot bring himself in this perilous122 context in set words to include Cavalry among those who "seize the rifle"; but the words themselves imply it, for we do not speak of Infantry "seizing the rifle." At a later point the author is a little bolder in the development of his meaning. "Our probable opponents, too, will certainly often advance dismounted. At all events, they are endeavouring to strengthen Cavalry divisions by cyclist battalions123 and Infantry, and perhaps by Mounted Infantry, and thereby already show a remarkable124 inclination125 to conduct the fight, even of Cavalry, with the firearm, and only to use their horses as a means of mobility126, as was the custom of the Boers in[Pg 71] South Africa"—and he might, of course, add, of the British mounted riflemen and of the British Cavalry. If only the author, who has advanced thus far on the path of common sense, would just for one experimental moment assume an open mind on the question of the steel, assume that it may perhaps be not merely partially127, but wholly obsolete, and study the Boer War with real care from that point of view! He evidently thinks there is something in this idea of using horses as a means of mobility and the rifle as the operative weapon. He expressly warns his Cavalry that their probable enemy is showing ominous128 signs of adopting this system, and that their adoption129 of it will force the German Cavalry to conform.
Now mark that magical word "mobility." It is the germ of a new idea, a faint effort to escape from the dupery of phrases. Hitherto he has always spoken of "dismounted action" as distinguished130 from "mounted" or "Cavalry" combat. These phrases are always used by Cavalry theorists. They take the place of argument, implying as they do that the use of the rifle reduces horsemen to the condition of Infantry, robbing them of mobility and all that glamour131 of dash and vigour132 which illuminates133 the mounted arm. The truth lies in the contrary direction.[Pg 72] Without rifle power Cavalry lose all effective mobility. They can ride about in vacuo, so to speak; but directly they enter the zone of rifle-fire they are paralyzed, unless they can use their horses and their rifles in effective combination. Then they can do what they please. Then, if necessary, they can even charge mounted, though that function is no more inseparably associated with their action than the charge at the double is inseparably associated with the action of Infantry. But is it not somewhat ludicrous to describe as "dismounted action," in contradistinction to "mounted action," a charge which ends, as the Boer charges ended, within point-blank or decisive range of the enemy and culminates135 in a murderously decisive fire-attack?
The worst of it is that General von Bernhardi will not analyze136 his own warnings and suggestions and see what they really lead him to. He appears to see in these troublesome hordes137 of "cyclists" and "Mounted Infantry" who menace the old order of things and are forcing Cavalry to conform to fire by fire, only auxiliaries138 to the orthodox Cavalry. But Cavalry themselves carry the very weapon which is promoting the revolution; nor should any self-respecting, properly trained Cavalry need to fortify139 itself[Pg 73] from these external sources. At a later stage I shall have to show, from our own Mounted Infantry Manual, how grotesque59 are the results obtained by the theoretical co-operation of steel and fire in two different types of troops.
And Sir John French? He has read these passages, and with one word of manly140 pride in the war experience of his own countrymen, home and colonial—experience bought at terrible cost, and not without bitter humiliation141, in three years of "real war"—he could set the speculative German author right, illuminate134 the tortuous142 paths in which his reason strays. So far from taking this course, he proves himself more reactionary143 than his foreign colleague; for the reader will see at once that the spirit of passages quoted above is quite different from the spirit of Sir John French's Introduction. Von Bernhardi is alarmed by the prospect144 of meeting mounted riflemen who, as he knows and expressly admits, will impose upon his Cavalry fire-tactics of which they are contemptuously ignorant. He is alarmed at the prospect of the hostile Cavalry themselves "conducting the fight with the firearm." Sir John French, as I have shown, believes, and says, that our mounted riflemen and our Cavalry, if they act as such, will "become the prey145 of the first foreign[Pg 74] Cavalry they meet," running defenceless and helpless from the field. This is an example of the way in which Cavalry science proceeds, and it is a wonder that collaborators of the eminence146 of General von Bernhardi and General Sir John French do not see the humour of the thing, to use no stronger expression.
One watches with amusement the process by which the German author endeavours to soften147 the shock of the revelations he has just made to a Cavalry acutely sensitive about its ancient traditions. One of his plans, here and in many other parts of the book, is to play with the words "offence" and "defence," which, as I pointed out in commenting on Sir John French's Introduction, have such a strangely perverse148 influence on the Cavalry mind. "It lies deeply embedded149 in human nature," he says (p. 105), "that he who feels himself the weaker will act on the defensive150"; and on the next page: "In general, it may be relied upon that defence will be carried out according to tactical defensive principles, and that with the firearm." Here is another example (italicized by me): "Mounted, the Cavalry knows only the charge, and has no defensive power, a circumstance which strengthens it in carrying out its offensive principles by relieving its leader of the onus151 of choice" (p. 113). Observe[Pg 75] the idea suggested by these passages—namely, that the rifle is only a defensive weapon. Subtle indirect flattery of those who carry those terrible weapons of "offence," the lance and sword! But, alas152! what he calls the "offensive spirit" must accept the terms imposed by the baser weapon. "It requires an enormous amount of moral strength," he says, "to maintain the offensive spirit, even after an unfavourable conflict, and continually to invoke153 the ultimate decision anew." There is a romantic atmosphere about this which might appeal to his hearers. Spent with charges, brilliant, but perhaps not wholly successful, they must resign themselves eventually to more sober, if less "knightly," methods. But this is not what he really means. He has just said that even in combats of the independent Cavalry the shock-charge will occur only "in exceptional cases." The probable opponents are to "advance dismounted"—in other words, to attack dismounted. This, he warns the Cavalry, will necessitate154 fire-action on their part. Why talk, then, about "relief from the onus of choice"? What is to happen when both sides are at grips on terms of fire? Is there a mutual155 deadlock156, both remaining in "defence"? In that case there would be no battles and no necessity to go to war at all. Surely the common sense of[Pg 76] the matter is that the rifle rules tactics, and that, ceteris paribus, the best riflemen will attack and win.
At heart the General believes this—his whole book is a witness to this fact—but how can he expect to get his beliefs accepted if he continually stultifies157 those beliefs by soothing158 ambiguities159 about the "offensive spirit"? Nor does he confine himself to ambiguity. Take a passage like this from p. 19, at the very outset of his chapter on "Reconnaissance, Screening, and Raids": "The very essence of Cavalry lies in the offensive. Mounted, it is incapable160 of tactical defence, but in order to defend itself, must surrender its real character as a mounted arm, and seize the rifle on foot." (The italics are mine.)
Conceive the mental chaos161 which can produce an expression of an opinion like this at the beginning of a work designed to reform the backward German Cavalry. Here, stated in formal, precise terms, is the very doctrine162 upon which that Cavalry works; which, as the author himself a hundred times assures us, is the source of all its "antiquated assumptions" and of its total unpreparedness for real war. The framers of the Regulations have only to point to this passage, and then, with perfect justice, to consign163 all the General's tirades164 first to mockery and then to oblivion. Sir John French,[Pg 77] again more reactionary than his German confrère, seizes on this passage, to the exclusion165 of all which contradict it, and triumphantly166 produces his own analogous formula. To neglect the steel, he says, is to "invert167 the r?le of Cavalry, and turn it into a defensive arm."
While Sir John French sticks to his point, and elaborates it even to the implicit86 denial of an offensive spirit to Infantry, General von Bernhardi is perfectly168 conscious of the absurdity of maintaining that it is only "in order to defend itself" that Cavalry "seize the rifle" on foot. We obtain, perhaps, the best insight into his method of reasoning in A II. ("Attack and Defence"). On p. 112 he says that Cavalry should "endeavour to preserve their mobility in the fight, and that mounted shock-action, therefore, should be regarded as its proper r?le in battle." This quotation102 is an excellent one for the advocates of the steel, but it would reduce to impotence any Cavalry which acted upon it. And we ask immediately, what is the sense of calling shock the "proper r?le" of Cavalry, when, according to the author himself, it is only to be used in exceptional cases, even in fights of the independent Cavalry, and when riflemen, who advance dismounted, can render it impracticable? Why not say at once that the proper or normal[Pg 78] r?le of Cavalry is fire-action, and the exceptional or abnormal r?le shock-action?
The fallacy, of course, lies in the word I have italicized, "therefore," implying that mounted action and shock-action are synonymous, and that there is no mounted action without shock-action. It is natural enough that the author should turn his back on South Africa and Manchuria when he has to maintain such a proposition as this; but how does he reconcile it even with the facts of the American Civil War, which he holds up as the most valuable guide to modern Cavalry? Stuart, Sheridan, Wilson, and the other great leaders, would have laughed at it, and they used wretchedly imperfect firearms. They rode just as far and to just as good purpose whether they used the firearm or the steel, and they fought to win, with whatever weapon was the best weapon at the moment.
The General himself expresses the right idea when he says in another passage "that it is not a question whether Cavalrymen should fight mounted or dismounted, but whether they are prepared and determined169 to take their share in the decision of an encounter, and to employ the whole of their strength and mobility to that end." That is plain common sense; but how is he to get it acted upon by a Cavalry to whom the very idea is strange if he calls shock the "proper r?le" of[Pg 79] Cavalry, and contrasts the "offensive spirit" inherent in it with the defensive use of the rifle?
Yet he redeems170 the rifle handsomely enough in numbers of other passages. "It must be kept in view," he says on p. 113, "that it is the offensive on foot that the Cavalry will require," and he condemns the Regulation which inculcates the opposite principle and deals with the fire-fight only as a method of action from which Cavalry "need not shrink." He shakes his head gravely over the ominous suggestion in the same Regulation that cyclists and Infantry in waggons171 are to be added to the Army Cavalry, in order, by fire, to "overcome local resistance." In a flash of insight he perceives the possibility of those heretical Mounted Infantry masquerading as the hostile Cavalry, and necessitating172 cyclists and Infantry in waggons to dislodge them before the "knightly combats" can be brought about. "It is a matter of significance," he solemnly observes, "that Infantry in waggons may be detailed173 to accompany the strategic Army Cavalry." There will soon be a demand, he prophesies174, "for Infantry from the Army Cavalry when there is any question of a serious attack on foot, and herewith the free action of the Cavalry will be limited once and for all." Is there no lesson from South Africa here?
[Pg 80]
The fact is that the kind of thing he fears happened from the first, and continued to happen until the Cavalry abandoned steel weapons and became mounted riflemen. During the first year of the war there was no independent Cavalry force operating strategically without the assistance of mounted riflemen. There could not have been, because the fire-power of the Cavalry was insufficient175, and there is and can be no independence in modern war without a high degree of fire-power. Cavalry leaders usually asked also for the tactical assistance of mounted riflemen. The theory, surviving even now in the current manuals, was that those troops were to form a "pivot177" for the shock-action of Cavalry. The theory, of course, was exploded from the first, and sometimes the mounted riflemen became the most effective and mobile portion of the composite force. Mounted riflemen were a truly independent Arm. They never asked for the assistance of Cavalry on the ground that Cavalry carried steel weapons. The rifle was all they cared about, and they had good rifles of their own, while the Cavalry had bad carbines. The only big independent Cavalry enterprise during the first year of the war—the divisional march across the Eastern Transvaal in October, 1900—was a fiasco. The Cavalry[Pg 81] formed but an escort to their own transport, and developed no offensive power.
Von Bernhardi, just now thoroughly in his fire-mood, strongly condemns the theory of dependence176 on other Arms, which will "tie the Cavalry" to the very troops from which they expect support. "The army Cavalry, then, can only preserve its independence if it can rely upon its own strength even in an attack on foot." He goes on to criticize Regulation No. 456, which lays down that "Cavalry must endeavour to bring dismounted attacks to a conclusion with the utmost rapidity, so that they may regain178 their mobility at the earliest possible moment." The regulation, which has its counterpart in the British Manual, indeed, is laughable to anyone who has seen modern war. Troopers who spend 90 per cent. of their time on exercises with the steel will necessarily attack badly, clumsily, and slowly on foot, and it is a cruel jest to tell them to attack quickly and brilliantly. In a fire-contest the best riflemen will attack the quickest and do the best.
But the General wastes his breath in scolding the Regulations. They are more logical than he is, because they do not seriously contemplate this derogatory work of fire. He says, indeed, that unnaturally179 accelerated attacks on foot by men who do not know how to attack on foot only[Pg 82] succeed in peace, and will "lead inevitably180 to defeat in war," and that to set a time limit to a fire-attack is absurd; but by interspersing181 qualifying phrases about loss of mobility and loss of time he himself nullifies his own warnings. "The result of an attack on foot," he says (p. 116), "must, of course, justify182 the lives expended183 and the time occupied, which must both be regarded as lost in estimating the further operative value of the force." Men who read that will say: "Why waste time at all, then?" It is in flagrant contradiction, of course, with his previously184 expressed principle that hostile fire imposes fire-action on Cavalry; that there is no choice; that, whether they like it or not, they must engage in this r?le, which, nevertheless, is not their "proper r?le." The clue to the confusion, as always, is his view, founded on mere word-play, that mounted action is unthinkable without shock with steel weapons.
At the end of this section on "Attack and Defence" he continues to play into the hands of the framers of the Regulations which he denounces. Here is an immortal185 phrase: "The same holds good of the defence. Cavalry will only undertake this when absolutely obliged." This is the kind of maxim which one finds scattered broadcast through Cavalry literature—as if there could be any offence without defence, between or against[Pg 83] whatever classes of soldiers. Fancy telling Infantry or Artillery in so many words that they should only undertake defence when absolutely obliged! And yet they are just as much offensive Arms as Cavalry, and by the light of historical facts during the last century a great deal more so.
I need not go into the reason again. The General is in his steel-mood, and is unconsciously limiting offence to the steel weapons. The next instant he is in his fire-mood, pointing out that, however much Cavalry in defence may yearn186 once more for "free movement" (he means shock), they must be prepared on occasion to defend themselves—i.e., with fire—to the last man. And he very aptly illustrates187 from the Manchurian War (which at an earlier point he had said to be without interest for Cavalry), pointing to the stubborn defence of Sandepu by a Japanese Cavalry Brigade. We cannot help wishing that Sir John French would quote and confirm an opinion like this, flatly contradicted though it is a little later,[2] and use his influence to erase188 from our own Cavalry Manual (p. 215) that disastrous189 injunction that the defences of a position which Cavalry have to hold should be "limited to those of the simplest kind."
If the words "attack" and "defence" have a[Pg 84] fatal fascination for both the German and the British authors, General von Bernhardi is equally influenced by another verbal formula, and that is "the combination of Cavalry combat" (or, what is the same thing to him, mounted combat—that is, shock-combat) "with dismounted fighting." "The r?le of Cavalry in the fight will then apparently190 consist," he says on page 106, "of a combination of the various methods of fighting." It is a tempting191 formula, tempting by its very vagueness, and calculated on that account to appeal, perhaps, to the less hopelessly conservative German Cavalry officers; but it remains throughout his book literally192 a formula. How the thing is to be done in practice, how shock is to be "combined" with fire, he never attempts, even from a speculative point of view, to explain. It may sound perhaps easy enough. In the war of 1861-1865, which he professes193 to take as his model, it undoubtedly194 was possible, if by no means easy. But times have changed. The modern rifle, whose profound influence on combat he admits, has made impossible the old formations. In his own phrase, it has revolutionized war. It enforces a degree of extension which renders impracticable those sudden transformations195 to close mass which alone can lead to shock, while the zone of danger it creates is so far-reaching that these mass forma[Pg 85]tions on horseback cannot subsist196. The conditions which used to permit leaders to resolve on shock have vanished. The fire-zone used to be so limited that bodies of Cavalry could hang on its outer limit, and seize the rare opportunities which might arise for a short gallop197 ending in shock. Now we have to deal with artillery and rifles of immense range and deadliness. And if by a miracle you do get into close quarters in your mass formation, you find—crowning disillusionment!—nothing solid on which to exert shock. You used to find it a century ago, because men used to fight in close order, but science has altered that. However, that point does not immediately arise from the question of "combination." The narrow issue there is how to effect the transition from fire to shock, and there is not a word in this volume to elucidate198 the point. There is not a word in our own Cavalry Manual. The thing has never been done in modern war. The combination of shock and fire tactics is an academical speculation. What we know is that shock has failed, and that the open-order rifle-charge, which has superseded199 the shock-charge, is evolved naturally from the fire-fight. You must, in the words of Lord Roberts, fight up to the charge, if charge there be; but you can win, as Infantry can win, without any mounted charge at all.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
cavalry
|
|
| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
acclaims
|
|
| 向…欢呼( acclaim的第三人称单数 )； 向…喝彩； 称赞…； 欢呼或拥戴（某人）为… | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
judgment
|
|
| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
archaic
|
|
| adj.(语言、词汇等)古代的，已不通用的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
condemned
|
|
| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
renovated
|
|
| 翻新，修复，整修( renovate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
decided
|
|
| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
constructive
|
|
| adj.建设的，建设性的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
thoroughly
|
|
| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
radically
|
|
| ad.根本地，本质地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
condemns
|
|
| v.（通常因道义上的原因而）谴责( condemn的第三人称单数 )；宣判；宣布…不能使用；迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
precisely
|
|
| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
mere
|
|
| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
pro
|
|
| n.赞成，赞成的意见，赞成者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
phenomena
|
|
| n.现象 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
realization
|
|
| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
fascination
|
|
| n.令人着迷的事物，魅力，迷恋 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
satire
|
|
| n.讽刺，讽刺文学，讽刺作品 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
impartial
|
|
| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
satirist
|
|
| n.讽刺诗作者，讽刺家，爱挖苦别人的人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
satirized
|
|
| v.讽刺，讥讽( satirize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
concession
|
|
| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
concessions
|
|
| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
pretence
|
|
| n.假装，作假；借口，口实；虚伪；虚饰 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
follies
|
|
| 罪恶，时事讽刺剧； 愚蠢，蠢笨，愚蠢的行为、思想或做法( folly的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
consistency
|
|
| n.一贯性，前后一致，稳定性；(液体的)浓度 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
sublimely
|
|
| 高尚地，卓越地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
absurdities
|
|
| n.极端无理性( absurdity的名词复数 )；荒谬；谬论；荒谬的行为 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
absurdity
|
|
| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
ambiguity
|
|
| n.模棱两可；意义不明确 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
shrouds
|
|
| n.裹尸布( shroud的名词复数 )；寿衣；遮蔽物；覆盖物v.隐瞒( shroud的第三人称单数 )；保密 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
stultified
|
|
| v.使成为徒劳，使变得无用( stultify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
muddle
|
|
| n.困惑，混浊状态；vt.使混乱，使糊涂，使惊呆；vi.胡乱应付，混乱 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
doctrinaire
|
|
| adj.空论的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
fetters
|
|
| n.脚镣( fetter的名词复数 )；束缚v.给…上脚镣，束缚( fetter的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
antiquated
|
|
| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
mischievous
|
|
| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
delusions
|
|
| n.欺骗( delusion的名词复数 )；谬见；错觉；妄想 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
betoken
|
|
| v.预示 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
delightful
|
|
| adj.令人高兴的，使人快乐的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
stigmatizes
|
|
| v.使受耻辱，指责，污辱( stigmatize的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
42
knightly
|
|
| adj. 骑士般的 adv. 骑士般地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
cavalries
|
|
| 骑兵（cavalry的复数形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
44
reiterates
|
|
| 反复地说，重申( reiterate的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
appalling
|
|
| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
shibboleths
|
|
| n.（党派、集团等的）准则( shibboleth的名词复数 )；教条；用语；行话 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
effusive
|
|
| adj.热情洋溢的；感情(过多)流露的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
worthy
|
|
| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
laborious
|
|
| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
superstitions
|
|
| 迷信，迷信行为( superstition的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
witchcraft
|
|
| n.魔法，巫术 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
naval
|
|
| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
inadequacy
|
|
| n.无法胜任，信心不足 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
torpedo
|
|
| n.水雷，地雷；v.用鱼雷破坏 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
infantry
|
|
| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
artillery
|
|
| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
cult
|
|
| n.异教，邪教；时尚，狂热的崇拜 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
authoritative
|
|
| adj.有权威的，可相信的；命令式的；官方的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
grotesque
|
|
| adj.怪诞的，丑陋的；n.怪诞的图案，怪人（物） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
grotesquely
|
|
| adv. 奇异地,荒诞地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
redundant
|
|
| adj.多余的，过剩的；(食物)丰富的；被解雇的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
scathing
|
|
| adj.（言词、文章）严厉的，尖刻的；不留情的adv.严厉地，尖刻地v.伤害，损害（尤指使之枯萎）( scathe的现在分词) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
reminders
|
|
| n.令人回忆起…的东西( reminder的名词复数 )；提醒…的东西；（告知该做某事的）通知单；提示信 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
speculative
|
|
| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
seclusion
|
|
| n.隐遁，隔离 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
speculations
|
|
| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
speculation
|
|
| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
prehistoric
|
|
| adj.（有记载的）历史以前的，史前的，古老的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
fervent
|
|
| adj.热的，热烈的，热情的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
conceit
|
|
| n.自负，自高自大 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
abreast
|
|
| adv.并排地；跟上(时代)的步伐，与…并进地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
savage
|
|
| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
condemnation
|
|
| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
vindication
|
|
| n.洗冤，证实 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
pointed
|
|
| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
entirely
|
|
| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
analogous
|
|
| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
compassionate
|
|
| adj.有同情心的，表示同情的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
platitude
|
|
| n.老生常谈，陈词滥调 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
supremacy
|
|
| n.至上；至高权力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
contemplate
|
|
| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
wrought
|
|
| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
transformation
|
|
| n.变化；改造；转变 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
purely
|
|
| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
allusion
|
|
| n.暗示，间接提示 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
implicit
|
|
| a.暗示的，含蓄的，不明晰的，绝对的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
implicitly
|
|
| adv. 含蓄地, 暗中地, 毫不保留地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
remains
|
|
| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
eloquent
|
|
| adj.雄辩的，口才流利的；明白显示出的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
thereby
|
|
| adv.因此，从而 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
dinning
|
|
| vt.喧闹（din的现在分词形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
justified
|
|
| a.正当的，有理的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
vestiges
|
|
| 残余部分( vestige的名词复数 )； 遗迹； 痕迹； 毫不 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
eminent
|
|
| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
requisite
|
|
| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
96
lieutenant
|
|
| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
stifle
|
|
| vt.使窒息；闷死；扼杀；抑止，阻止 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
hazy
|
|
| adj.有薄雾的，朦胧的；不肯定的，模糊的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
generalizations
|
|
| 一般化( generalization的名词复数 )； 普通化； 归纳； 概论 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
scattered
|
|
| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
101
preponderate
|
|
| v.数目超过；占优势 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
102
quotation
|
|
| n.引文，引语，语录；报价，牌价，行情 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
103
quotations
|
|
| n.引用( quotation的名词复数 )；[商业]行情（报告）；（货物或股票的）市价；时价 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
104
controversy
|
|
| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
105
adherent
|
|
| n.信徒，追随者，拥护者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
106
amass
|
|
| vt.积累，积聚 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
107
favourable
|
|
| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
108
resolute
|
|
| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
109
obsolete
|
|
| adj.已废弃的，过时的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
110
maxim
|
|
| n.格言，箴言 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
111
devoted
|
|
| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
112
instinctively
|
|
| adv.本能地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
113
fixed
|
|
| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
114
stationary
|
|
| adj.固定的，静止不动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
115
postponement
|
|
| n.推迟 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
116
strictly
|
|
| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
117
treatise
|
|
| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
118
pedantry
|
|
| n.迂腐，卖弄学问 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
119
regiments
|
|
| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
120
dispense
|
|
| vt.分配，分发；配(药)，发(药)；实施 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
121
conceal
|
|
| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
122
perilous
|
|
| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
123
battalions
|
|
| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
124
remarkable
|
|
| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
125
inclination
|
|
| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
126
mobility
|
|
| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
127
partially
|
|
| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
128
ominous
|
|
| adj.不祥的，不吉的，预兆的，预示的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
129
adoption
|
|
| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
130
distinguished
|
|
| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
131
glamour
|
|
| n.魔力，魅力；vt.迷住 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
132
vigour
|
|
| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
133
illuminates
|
|
| v.使明亮( illuminate的第三人称单数 )；照亮；装饰；说明 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
134
illuminate
|
|
| vt.照亮，照明；用灯光装饰；说明，阐释 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
135
culminates
|
|
| v.达到极点( culminate的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
136
analyze
|
|
| vt.分析，解析 (=analyse) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
137
hordes
|
|
| n.移动着的一大群( horde的名词复数 )；部落 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
138
auxiliaries
|
|
| n.助动词 ( auxiliary的名词复数 )；辅助工，辅助人员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
139
fortify
|
|
| v.强化防御，为…设防；加强，强化 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
140
manly
|
|
| adj.有男子气概的；adv.男子般地，果断地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
141
humiliation
|
|
| n.羞辱 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
142
tortuous
|
|
| adj.弯弯曲曲的，蜿蜒的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
143
reactionary
|
|
| n.反动者，反动主义者；adj.反动的，反动主义的，反对改革的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
144
prospect
|
|
| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
145
prey
|
|
| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
146
eminence
|
|
| n.卓越，显赫；高地，高处；名家 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
147
soften
|
|
| v.(使)变柔软；(使)变柔和 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
148
perverse
|
|
| adj.刚愎的；坚持错误的，行为反常的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
149
embedded
|
|
| a.扎牢的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
150
defensive
|
|
| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
151
onus
|
|
| n.负担；责任 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
152
alas
|
|
| int.唉(表示悲伤、忧愁、恐惧等) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
153
invoke
|
|
| v.求助于(神、法律)；恳求，乞求 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
154
necessitate
|
|
| v.使成为必要，需要 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
155
mutual
|
|
| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
156
deadlock
|
|
| n.僵局，僵持 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
157
stultifies
|
|
| v.使成为徒劳，使变得无用( stultify的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
158
soothing
|
|
| adj.慰藉的；使人宽心的；镇静的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
159
ambiguities
|
|
| n.歧义( ambiguity的名词复数 )；意义不明确；模棱两可的意思；模棱两可的话 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
160
incapable
|
|
| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
161
chaos
|
|
| n.混乱，无秩序 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
162
doctrine
|
|
| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
163
consign
|
|
| vt.寄售（货品），托运，交托，委托 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
164
tirades
|
|
| 激烈的长篇指责或演说( tirade的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
165
exclusion
|
|
| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
166
triumphantly
|
|
| ad.得意洋洋地；得胜地；成功地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
167
invert
|
|
| vt.使反转，使颠倒，使转化 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
168
perfectly
|
|
| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
169
determined
|
|
| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
170
redeems
|
|
| 补偿( redeem的第三人称单数 )； 实践； 解救； 使…免受责难 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
171
waggons
|
|
| 四轮的运货马车( waggon的名词复数 )； 铁路货车； 小手推车 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
172
necessitating
|
|
| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
173
detailed
|
|
| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
174
prophesies
|
|
| v.预告，预言( prophesy的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
175
insufficient
|
|
| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
176
dependence
|
|
| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
177
pivot
|
|
| v.在枢轴上转动；装枢轴，枢轴；adj.枢轴的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
178
regain
|
|
| vt.重新获得，收复，恢复 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
179
unnaturally
|
|
| adv.违反习俗地；不自然地；勉强地；不近人情地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
180
inevitably
|
|
| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
181
interspersing
|
|
| v.散布，散置( intersperse的现在分词 )；点缀 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
182
justify
|
|
| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
183
expended
|
|
| v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
184
previously
|
|
| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
185
immortal
|
|
| adj.不朽的；永生的，不死的；神的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
186
yearn
|
|
| v.想念；怀念；渴望 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
187
illustrates
|
|
| 给…加插图( illustrate的第三人称单数 )； 说明； 表明； （用示例、图画等）说明 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
188
erase
|
|
| v.擦掉；消除某事物的痕迹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
189
disastrous
|
|
| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
190
apparently
|
|
| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
191
tempting
|
|
| a.诱人的, 吸引人的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
192
literally
|
|
| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
193
professes
|
|
| 声称( profess的第三人称单数 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
194
undoubtedly
|
|
| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
195
transformations
|
|
| n.变化( transformation的名词复数 )；转换；转换；变换 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
196
subsist
|
|
| vi.生存，存在，供养 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
197
gallop
|
|
| v./n.(马或骑马等)飞奔；飞速发展 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
198
elucidate
|
|
| v.阐明，说明 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
199
superseded
|
|
| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |