It is essential to a clear understanding of the events, directly preceding the fall of the Confederacy, to pause here and glance at the means with which that result was so long delayed, but at last so fully1 accomplished2.
From official northern sources, we learn that General Grant crossed the Rapidan with three corps3, averaging over 47,000 men. Therefore, he must have fought the battles of the Wilderness4 with at least 140,000 men. At that time the total strength of General Lee's morning report did not show 46,000 men for duty. Between the Wilderness and Spottsylvania, Grant was re-enforced to the extent of near 48,000 picked men; and again at Cold Harbor with near 45,000 more. Northern figures admit an aggregate5 of 97,000 re-enforcement between the Rapidan and the James! In that time, Lee, by the junction6 of Breckinridge and all the fragments of brigades he could collect, received less than 16,000 re-enforcement; and even the junction with Beauregard scarcely swelled7 his total additions over 20,000.
Grant's army, too, was composed of the picked veterans of the North—for his Government had accepted large numbers of hundred-day men for local and garrison8 duty, that all the seasoned troops might be sent him. Yet with an aggregate force of 234,000 men, opposed to a total of less than 63,000, General Grant failed signally in the plan, or plans of his campaign—losing in twenty-six days, and nine heavy fights and several skirmishes, seven men for one of General Lee's!
Can any candid9 thinker analyze10 these results and then believe Grant a strategist—a great soldier—anything but a pertinacious11 fighter? Can one realize that anything but most obstinate12 bungling13 could have swung such an army round in a complete circle—at a loss of over one-half of its numbers—to a point it could have reached in twenty-four hours, without any loss whatever? For the soldiers of the North, in this disastrous14 series of blunders, fought with constancy and courage. Beaten day after day by unfailing troops in strong works, they ever came again straight at those impregnable positions, against which obstinate stolidity15, or blind rage for blood, drove them to the slaughter16. Hancock's men especially seemed to catch inspiration from their chivalric17 leader. Broken and beaten at the Wilderness—decimated at Spottsylvania, they still were first in the deadly hail of Cold Harbor—breaking our line and holding it for a moment. Sedgwick and Warren, too—though the victim of unjust prejudice, if not of conspiracy—managed their corps with signal ability, in those ceaseless killings19 into which Grant's "strategy" sent them.
Nor was the immense superiority of numbers already shown, all. For this main advance—like every other of General Grant's—had co-operating columns all around it. Add to the men under his immediate20 command, those of the adjunct forces under his inspiration—Butler, 35,000, Hunter, 28,000 and Sigel, 10,000—and there foots up a grand total of 307,000 men!
We may, therefore, consider that General Lee, in the summer campaign of 1864, kept at bay and nullified the attack of 307,000 men with scarcely one-fifth their number; not exceeding 63,000![1]
While Grant was engaged in his pertinacious failures to flank Lee, General Sheridan—whose fame as a cavalry21 leader was already in the mouths of men in such pet names as "Little Phil" and "Cavalry Sheridan"—made a raid of considerable proportions toward Richmond. Flanking Lee upon the right, he proceeded over the North and South Anna, damaging the railroads at Beaver22 Dam and Ashland stations. Thence he moved toward Richmond, but was met at Yellow Tavern23 by General Stuart with a small body of his cavalry and a hastily-collected force of infantry24. A sharp engagement resulted in forcing the enemy off; when he passed down the James to Turkey Island, where he joined Butler's forces.
But the fight had one result far more serious to the South—the death of General J. E. B. Stuart—the gallant25 and popular leader of Confederate cavalry; so ill to be spared in those days of watchful26 suspense27 to come, when General Lee keenly felt the loss of "the eyes of the army."
During the whole fight the sharp and continuous rattle28 of carbines, broken by the clear boom of field artillery29, was distinctly heard in Richmond; and her defenseless women were long uncertain what the result would be. They knew nothing of the force that was attacking, nor of that which was defending their homes; every man was away save the aged18 and maimed—and the tortures of doubt and suspense were added to the accustomed strain of watching the end of the fight. When the news came there was deep thankfulness; but it was solemn and shadowed from the sorrow that craped the victory.
Meantime, General Sigel had threatened the Valley with a heavy force; but, in mid-May he had been met by General Breckinridge and was defeated with such loss of men and munitions30, that he retreated precipitately31 across the Shenandoah. The co-operation of Sigel was virtually at an end.
But the more important co-operation had been equally unsuccessful. Simultaneously32 with Grant's passage of the Rapidan, General Butler, with an army of 35,000 men and a fleet of iron-clads, double-enders, gunboats and transports sufficient for a war with England, sailed up the James. This force was intended to proceed direct to Richmond, or to march into undefended Petersburg, as the case might seem best to warrant. The land forces disembarked at Bermuda Hundred and, after fortifying33 heavily on the line of Howlett's House, made serious demonstrations34 direct on Drewry's Bluff35. Butler supposed that, the defenses being entirely36 uncovered by the drain of men for Lee's army, he could carry them with ease. In this hope he relied much upon the powerful aid of the fleet; but Admiral Lee, ascending37 in a double-ender, lost his pioneer-boat, the "Commodore Jones" and very nearly his own flag-ship, by a torpedo38, opposite Signal Station. This stopped the advance of the fleet, as the river was supposed to be sown with torpedoes39.
Nowise daunted40, General Butler—like the true knight41 and chivalrous42 leader his entire career proves him to be—drew his line closer round the coveted43 stronghold. But on the 16th of May, Beauregard sallied out and struck the hero of New Orleans so suddenly and so sharply that he drove him, with heavy loss and utter demoralization, clear from his advanced lines to Bermuda Hundred. Only the miscarriage44 of a part of the plan, entrusted45 to a subordinate general, saved Butler's army from complete destruction.
As it was, he there remained "bottled up," until Grant's peculiar46 strategy had swung him round to Petersburg; and then the "bottle-imp" was released.
Seeing himself thus foiled on every hand—his magnificent plans utterly47 crushed, and his immense numbers unavailing—Grant struck into new combinations. Hunter had already penetrated49 into West Virginia as far as Staunton; and hounding on his men with the savagery50 of the bloodhound, was pushing on for Lynchburg and the railroad lines of supply adjacent to it. Grant at once detached Sheridan with a heavy force, to operate against the lines from Gordonsville and Charlottesville.
Simultaneously he, himself, was to strike a resistless blow at Petersburg; and thus with every avenue of supply cut off, the leaguered Capital must soon—from very weakness—drop into eager hands stretched out to grasp her.
On the 16th and 17th June, there were sharp and heavily-supported attacks upon portions of the Confederate line before Petersburg. The expectation evidently was to drive them in by sheer weight; for it was known only that part of Lee's forces had crossed the river, and the line was one of immense extent—requiring three times his whole force to man it effectively.
But, as ever before, General Grant underrated his enemy; and, as ever before, his cherished theory of giving six lives for one to gain his point failed. Both attacks were heavily repulsed51. Still holding to that theory, however, Grant attacked the whole Confederate front at dawn of the 18th. Driven back with heavy slaughter, the men were again sent in. Four times that day they rallied and came well up to the works; and four times they were sent back reeling and bleeding. Even Grant's obstinacy52 could not drive them again into certain destruction; and the assault on Petersburg had failed utterly, at the cost of 14,000 men for the experiment.
On that same day, Hunter was driven back from an assault on Lynchburg, and sent in disgraceful rout53 through West Virginia.
Hampton, too, had done his share as ever in the long war. He had caught Sheridan at Trevellian's Station, and compelled him to retreat and entirely abandon his part of Grant's new programme; and a little later he came upon Kautz and Wilson—in a railroad raid below Petersburg—and defeated them disastrously54, capturing their trains, artillery and a large proportion of their men.
Thus, by July, these rough and repeated lessons had taught even General Grant that hammering with flesh and blood upon earthworks was too costly55; that barn-burning and railroad-tearing cavalry were not effectual to reduce the city that had so laughed to scorn his brilliant tactics of the left flank!
A more disgusted, if not a wiser man, he sat down and fortified57 for a regular siege; as fully convinced as ever that the blood of the soldiers was the seed of the war; as fixed58 in his theory that he could spare seven lives for one and gradually by this fearful "swapping59, with boot," reduce the capital he had failed to win by soldierly methods or skillful combination.
And the southern people felt that was the test to be applied60 to them now. Bayonet and steel, rapine and torch had failed; but now the process of pulverizing61 was to come. "Southern blood!" was General Grant's war-cry—"Southern blood by the drop, if it take rivers of ours. Southern lives by the score—and we can well pay for them with the hundred!"
And, looking the alternative squarely in the face, the southern people for the last time girded their loins for the shock; feeling they could do what men might and when they could no longer do—they could die!
Once more the tide of battle had rolled away from Richmond; but it surged up, redder and rougher, against her sister city. And staunch little Petersburg braced62 herself to meet its advancing waves—ever offering to them her dauntless breast and ever riding above them, breathless but victorious63. Old men with one foot in the grave—boys with one foot scarce out of the cradle, stood side by side, with the bronzed veterans of Lee's hundred fights. Women sat quiet, the shells of Grant's civilized64 warfare65 tearing through their houses and through the hospitals. And fearless for themselves, they worked steadily66 on, nursing the wounded and the sick; giving from their daily-decreasing store with self-forgetfulness; encouraging the weak by their presence and their courage.
But not alone the fierce sounds immediately around them claimed the attention of the people of the Capital. From North Georgia came the hoarse67 echo of renewed strife68; and they felt, in sober truth, more immediate anxiety for the result there than at their own doors. Inured69 to danger and made familiar with its near approach, the people of Virginia looked calmly forward to the most fearful shock of battle, if it was nothing more. They knew the crushing force of Grant's numbers, but the danger was tangible70 and they could see a possible issue out of it, through blood and sacrifice. But they knew and felt that Atlanta was the back door to Richmond. Let the enemy once enter that and divide the spinal71 column of the Confederacy, and what hope was there! For a brief space the maimed and dying body might writhe72 with final strength; the quivering arms strike fierce, spasmodic blows; but no nourishment73 could come—the end must be death—and death from inanition!
The people knew and felt this fully. They were perfectly74 aware that, should Atlanta fall and the enemy penetrate48 to our rear lines of communication, the cause was lost. We might make a fierce resistance for the moment; but without supplies, all organized plan must cease. And the wildest hope indulged in that event was the possibility of a detached and guerrilla warfare that would make the country untenable.
Therefore, every eye was turned toward Dalton, where Johnston's little army now was—every ear was strained to catch the first echo of the thunder about to roll so ominously75 among the Georgia mountains.
Upon General Grant's elevation76 to the chief command, General W. T. Sherman had been left in charge in the West. Not discouraged by the failure of Grant's quadruple advance, two months before, Sherman divided his army—like that operating on the Rapidan—into three corps. Thomas, leading the center, or direct advance; Schofield, the left on the North-east, and McPherson the right on the South-west—he moved upon Dalton, almost simultaneously with Grant's passage of the Rapidan. And like Grant, he essayed a flank movement; but with far different result.
There was another point of similarity—the great disparity of numbers. Sherman could not have had in all, far short of 80,000 men; while Johnston's greatest exertions77 could not collect at Dalton an effective force of 35,000. Many of these, too, were local troops and raw levies78, green and undisciplined; while Sherman's forces were the flower of the western army.
Such were the points of similarity; but there was one great difference known to the Confederate leaders and people. Sherman would use every advantage of strategy and combination, rather than attempt the sledge-hammer style of attack developed by Grant. And there was more to be dreaded79 from his quiet and cautious approach—with its accompanying care for human life, that would preserve his army—than from any direct assault, however vigorous. This was proved at the very outset; for his advance on Dalton was a piece of military tact56 that—unlike Grant's at the Wilderness—was founded upon sound calculation. McPherson was thrown so far round to the South-west as seriously to threaten Johnston's communications; and by the 8th of June, the latter was forced to evacuate80 Dalton and retire down Resaca Valley toward the line of the Etowah river.
This movement was accomplished with quiet and perfect ease; keeping ever a steady front to the enemy, pressing rapidly on.
Feeling that the fate of the whole cause was now vested in the little army left him to defend the great key—Atlanta—Johnston was great enough to resist the opportunities for glorious battle; to give up, without a struggle—which could only entail81 resultless waste of men—the rich tracts82 so valuable to us; to offer himself to the condemnation83 of unthinking censure—all to insure the safety of that vital organ of Confederate life.
On the 14th June, the enemy pressed heavily against temporary works in Resaca Valley and was twice repulsed, with heavy loss. Then Johnston turned upon him and gained a decisive advantage—driving him two miles. On the two succeeding days, his attempts amounted to scarcely more than skirmishes; and on the third our troops resumed, unmolested, their retreat along the line of the Etowah. By the end of the month Johnston had taken up a strong position, with his center resting upon Kenesaw Mountain; while the enemy had thrown up works, at some points nearer even than those at Petersburg.
At dawn on the 27th, Sherman attacked along the whole line, directing his main strength to Kenesaw Mountain. He was repulsed decisively on both flanks and with especial slaughter in the center; losing over 3,500 men. Next day Cleburne's division defeated McPherson's corps in a severe fight, inflicting84 even heavier loss than it had sustained at Kenesaw Mountain. But these fights—while retarding85 the enemy's advance and causing him a loss three times our own—were all nullified by Sherman's effective use of that flanking process, so strangely misused86 by his rival in Virginia. Those movements were but those of pawns87 upon the board; while the serious check to Johnston at Dalton—the flank movement upon his right—was repeated here. On the 4th of July he was flanked out of his mountain fastnesses and was falling back upon Atlanta.
There is no stronger proof of the hold General Johnston had upon the masses of the people and of their respectful confidence in his great ability, than their reception of this news. They had watched his long retreat almost without a fight; had seen the enemy penetrate almost to the heart of Georgia, occupying rich tracts of our most productive land, just ready for the harvest; and finally had heard him thundering at the very gates of Atlanta—to enter which they felt were death to us. And yet the people never murmured at their general, nor at the army he commanded. There was an unshaken conviction that he was doing his best; that his best was the best. But the Government had not forgotten nor forgiven General Johnston; and for wholly inexplicable88 reasons, he was summarily transferred from his command and replaced by General Hood89, on the 18th of July.
People could not see the ground for Johnston's removal; for he had followed the very same line that had earned General Lee the wildest enthusiasm of the people, even while it gave him almost supreme90 control of the military power of the Confederacy. Lee had fallen back to his proper base—so had Johnston. The former had faced far greater odds91 and had inflicted92 far heavier punishment upon the enemy; but the latter had contended against strategic ability rather than blind force—against human sagacity rather than brute93 courage. And if Johnston had inflicted less damage, his wise abstinence from battle had saved many lives, invaluable94 now; and in the end he had placed his army in almost impregnable works around the great prize he was to guard. Foreseeing the result of his opponent's strategy, he had nullified it by seeking the position into which he would finally have been forced.
So far, the Virginia and the Georgia campaigns had been markedly similar in conduct and result. Both armies, driven by overwhelming numbers, had drawn95 their lines around their last strongholds; and there kept their enemy at bay. And had General Johnston been allowed to reap the reward of his clear foresight96 and patient abstinence—who can tell but the festering Lazarus might yet have risen whole, and defied the vast wealth of aggression97 hurled98 against it?
The universal and outspoken99 disgust of the people at the removal of Johnston, was in no sense referable to their objection to his successor. General Hood had forced their highest admiration101, and bought their warmest wishes, with his brilliant courageous102 and his freely-offered blood. They knew him to be dauntless, chivalrous and beloved by his men; and, even if untried in a great command, they were willing to give him the benefit of the doubt. His first movements, too—seemingly so brilliant and dashing, compared to the more steady but resultful ones of Johnston—produced a thrill of pride and hope with all the people, save the thoughtful few, who felt we could not afford now to buy glory and victory unless it tended to the one result—safety.
On the 20th July Hood assumed the offensive. He struck the enemy's right heavily and with success; repeating the blow upon his extreme left, on the 22d. The advantage on both days was with the Confederates; they drove the enemy from his works, captured several thousand prisoners, and killed and wounded over 3,000 men. But there was no solid gain in these fights; and, the enemy shifting his line after them further to the east, there was another furious battle on the 28th day of July.
In this Hood was less successful, losing heavily and gaining little or no ground. The results of the fights at Atlanta were briefly103 these: Hood had broken the long and sagacious defensive104 course; the people were perhaps inspirited at the cost of over 4,000 invaluable men; and the enemy was taught that we were too weak to drive him from his line, or even to make any solid impression on him.
Feeling this—and secure in a line of communication with his base—Sherman sat doggedly105 and grimly down before Atlanta. He felt he could wait.
But the end came, before even the Federal leader could have expected. After the fights at Atlanta, Hood feared the cutting of his communications. He was fearful, lest the system that had forced Johnston from Dalton and Kenesaw Mountain might be made available against him here; and the very means he had adopted to prevent it precipitated106 the disaster. He divided his forces into two distinct armies—sending one, under Lieutenant-General Hardee, to Jonesboro, twenty-two miles away!
Sherman, aware of the movement—which had in fact resulted from his threatening of Hood's flank—forced his superior numbers wedge-like into the gap, and effectually separated the wings. Then he struck in detail. Hardee, at Jonesboro, failed to make any impression upon him on the 1st of September, while Hood—weakened and unable to check his movements on the left—was forced, on the 31st August, to decide upon the evacuation of Atlanta!
This fatal movement was accomplished on the evening of the 1st of September, without further loss; but the key to the Confederate cause—the sole barrier to the onward107 sweep of Sherman to the ocean—was in his hands at last!
There may have been causes operating on General Hood that were not known to the people; for the results and their motive108 was shrouded109 in silence. His dispatch announcing the fall of the most important point was very brief; stating in a few lines that Hardee, having failed against the enemy at Jonesboro, while he could not oppose his flank movement at Atlanta, he had given up that city. Even later—when General Hood published his report of the Atlanta campaign—he differs in essential points from General Johnston, and neither his theories nor their carrying out are made comprehensible to the public.
There was a terrible shock to the people of the South in the fall of Atlanta. They knew its importance so fully that its loss was the more keenly felt. There came sudden revulsion from the hope that had begun once again to throb110 in the public pulse. The loud murmurs111 that had arisen after other defeats were wanting now; but a sullen112 and increasing gloom seemed to settle over the majority of the people. It was as though they were stunned113 by the violence of the shock and felt already its paralyzing influence. It was in vain that a ten days' truce114 was granted by the victorious enemy, during which Mr. Davis visited the army and spoke100 brave words of future victory. The people had now lost all faith in Mr. Davis and his methods; and they sullenly115 refused to accept the happy auguries116 of victory he drew from crushing defeat. Even the army itself—while still doggedly determined117 to strike its hardest to the bitter end—began to feel that it was fighting against hope.
And in that ten days' truce there was little chance for those worn and wasted battalions118 to recuperate119. There were no fresh men to send to their aid; few, indeed, were the supplies that could be forwarded them. But they looked into the darkness ahead steadily and calmly; they might not see their path in it, but they were ready to march without the path. And even as they watched and waited, so at Petersburg and Richmond a small but sleepless120 David watched the grim Goliath, stretched in its huge bulk before their gates. Ceaselessly the trains flashed back and forth121 over the iron link between those two cities—now Siamese-twinned with a vital bond of endurance and endeavor. Petersburg, sitting defiant122 in her circle of fire, worked grimly, ceaselessly—with what hope she might! and Richmond worked for her, feeling that every drop of blood she lost was from her own veins123 as well.
And so for many weary months the deadly strain went on; and the twin cities—stretched upon the rack—bore the torture as their past training had taught the world they must—nobly and well!
1 (Return)
Some time after the notes were made, from which these figures are condensed, two articles on Grant's campaign appeared in print—one in the New York "World," the other, by Mr. Hugh Pleasants, in "The Land We Love" magazine. Writing from diametrically opposite standpoints, with data gathered from opposing sources, Mr. Pleasants and the "World" very nearly agree in their figuring; and it was gratifying to this author to find that both corroborated124 the above estimates to within very inconsiderable numbers. Later historical papers have not materially changed them; save, perhaps, some southern claims still further to reduce Lee's army.
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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wilderness
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| n.杳无人烟的一片陆地、水等，荒漠 | |
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aggregate
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| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
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junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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swelled
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| 增强( swell的过去式和过去分词 )； 肿胀； （使）凸出； 充满（激情） | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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candid
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| adj.公正的，正直的；坦率的 | |
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analyze
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| vt.分析，解析 (=analyse) | |
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pertinacious
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| adj.顽固的 | |
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obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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bungling
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| adj.笨拙的，粗劣的v.搞糟，完不成( bungle的现在分词 )；笨手笨脚地做；失败；完不成 | |
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disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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stolidity
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slaughter
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| n.屠杀，屠宰；vt.屠杀，宰杀 | |
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chivalric
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| 有武士气概的，有武士风范的 | |
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aged
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killings
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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cavalry
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beaver
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tavern
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infantry
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gallant
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watchful
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suspense
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rattle
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| v.飞奔，碰响；激怒；n.碰撞声；拨浪鼓 | |
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artillery
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munitions
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precipitately
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simultaneously
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fortifying
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demonstrations
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bluff
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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ascending
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| adj.上升的，向上的 | |
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torpedo
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| n.水雷，地雷；v.用鱼雷破坏 | |
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torpedoes
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| 鱼雷( torpedo的名词复数 )； 油井爆破筒； 刺客； 掼炮 | |
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daunted
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| 使（某人）气馁，威吓( daunt的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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knight
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| n.骑士，武士；爵士 | |
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42
chivalrous
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| adj.武士精神的；对女人彬彬有礼的 | |
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43
coveted
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| adj.令人垂涎的；垂涎的，梦寐以求的v.贪求，觊觎(covet的过去分词)；垂涎；贪图 | |
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44
miscarriage
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| n.失败，未达到预期的结果；流产 | |
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45
entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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46
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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47
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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48
penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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49
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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50
savagery
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| n.野性 | |
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51
repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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52
obstinacy
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| n.顽固；（病痛等）难治 | |
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53
rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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54
disastrously
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| ad.灾难性地 | |
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55
costly
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| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
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56
tact
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| n.机敏，圆滑，得体 | |
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57
fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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58
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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59
swapping
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| 交换，交换技术 | |
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60
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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61
pulverizing
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| v.将…弄碎( pulverize的现在分词 )；将…弄成粉末或尘埃；摧毁；粉碎 | |
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62
braced
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| adj.拉牢的v.支住( brace的过去式和过去分词 )；撑牢；使自己站稳；振作起来 | |
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63
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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64
civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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65
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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66
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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67
hoarse
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| adj.嘶哑的，沙哑的 | |
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68
strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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69
inured
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| adj.坚强的，习惯的 | |
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70
tangible
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| adj.有形的，可触摸的，确凿的，实际的 | |
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71
spinal
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| adj.针的，尖刺的，尖刺状突起的；adj.脊骨的，脊髓的 | |
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72
writhe
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| vt.挣扎，痛苦地扭曲；vi.扭曲，翻腾，受苦；n.翻腾，苦恼 | |
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73
nourishment
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| n.食物，营养品；营养情况 | |
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74
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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ominously
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| adv.恶兆地，不吉利地；预示地 | |
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76
elevation
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| n.高度；海拔；高地；上升；提高 | |
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77
exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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78
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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79
dreaded
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| adj.令人畏惧的；害怕的v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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80
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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81
entail
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| vt.使承担，使成为必要，需要 | |
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82
tracts
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| 大片土地( tract的名词复数 )； 地带； （体内的）道； （尤指宣扬宗教、伦理或政治的）短文 | |
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83
condemnation
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| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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84
inflicting
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的现在分词 ) | |
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85
retarding
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| 使减速( retard的现在分词 )； 妨碍； 阻止； 推迟 | |
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86
misused
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| v.使用…不当( misuse的过去式和过去分词 )；把…派作不正当的用途；虐待；滥用 | |
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87
pawns
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| n.（国际象棋中的）兵( pawn的名词复数 )；卒；被人利用的人；小卒v.典当，抵押( pawn的第三人称单数 )；以（某事物）担保 | |
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88
inexplicable
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| adj.无法解释的，难理解的 | |
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89
hood
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| n.头巾，兜帽，覆盖；v.罩上，以头巾覆盖 | |
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90
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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91
odds
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| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
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92
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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93
brute
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| n.野兽，兽性 | |
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94
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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95
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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96
foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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97
aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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98
hurled
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| v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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99
outspoken
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| adj.直言无讳的，坦率的，坦白无隐的 | |
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100
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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101
admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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102
courageous
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| adj.勇敢的，有胆量的 | |
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103
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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104
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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105
doggedly
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| adv.顽强地，固执地 | |
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106
precipitated
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| v.（突如其来地）使发生( precipitate的过去式和过去分词 )；促成；猛然摔下；使沉淀 | |
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107
onward
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| adj.向前的，前进的；adv.向前，前进，在先 | |
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108
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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109
shrouded
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| v.隐瞒( shroud的过去式和过去分词 )；保密 | |
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110
throb
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| v.震颤，颤动；(急速强烈地)跳动，搏动 | |
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111
murmurs
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| n.低沉、连续而不清的声音( murmur的名词复数 )；低语声；怨言；嘀咕 | |
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112
sullen
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| adj.愠怒的，闷闷不乐的，(天气等)阴沉的 | |
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113
stunned
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| adj. 震惊的，惊讶的 动词stun的过去式和过去分词 | |
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114
truce
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| n.休战，(争执，烦恼等的)缓和；v.以停战结束 | |
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115
sullenly
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| 不高兴地，绷着脸，忧郁地 | |
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116
auguries
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| n.（古罗马）占卜术，占卜仪式( augury的名词复数 )；预兆 | |
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117
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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118
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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119
recuperate
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| v.恢复 | |
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120
sleepless
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| adj.不睡眠的，睡不著的，不休息的 | |
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121
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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122
defiant
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| adj.无礼的，挑战的 | |
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123
veins
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| n.纹理；矿脉( vein的名词复数 )；静脉；叶脉；纹理 | |
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124
corroborated
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| v.证实，支持（某种说法、信仰、理论等）( corroborate的过去式 ) | |
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