The campaign of 1644 opened badly for the King. In January, Sir Thomas Fairfax defeated Lord Byron and the King’s Irish forces at Nantwich. In March, Waller defeated Hopton at Cheriton in Hampshire, and frustrated5 his intended advance into Sussex. In April, Newcastle, after striving in vain to bar Leslie’s progress in Durham, was forced to throw himself into York, where Leslie and the Fairfaxes besieged7 his army. In May, the forces of Waller and Essex advanced upon Oxford8. The Royalists evacuated9 Reading and Abingdon, and Charles, fearing to be blockaded in Oxford, left the city to be defended by its garrison10, and with about six thousand men made his escape to Worcester. But Essex, instead of pursuing and crushing the King’s weak army as he ought to have done, delegated the task to Waller, and set out himself to recover the south-western counties and relieve Lyme.
In April, while Waller and Essex were preparing for their movement on Oxford, the army of the Eastern Association under Manchester took the field. Its first business was to reconquer Lincolnshire,—the debatable land between the north and east,—for Rupert’s defeat of the besiegers of Newark in March, 1644, had thrown Lincolnshire once more into the hands of the Royalists. On May 6th, Manchester’s army recaptured Lincoln, and at the beginning of June he joined the two armies which beleaguered11 York with about nine thousand men. Of these nine thousand, three thousand were 104cavalry under the command of Cromwell. York held out stubbornly; some detached forts were taken and the suburbs burnt, but an attempted assault was bloodily13 repulsed14. At the end of June, news came that Prince Rupert with fifteen thousand men had crossed the hills from Lancashire, and was marching to the relief of the city. The three generals, Leven, Fairfax, and Manchester, raised the siege in order to give battle to Rupert’s army, but when they assembled their forces on the south bank of the Ouse, Rupert crossed to the northern bank, and reached York without striking a blow. On the morning of July 2nd, the parliamentary generals, finding themselves outman?uvred, and the resumption of the siege rendered impossible, were in full retreat to the south, when Rupert’s attacks on their rearguard forced them to halt and offer battle. They drew up their army on some rising ground between Tockwith and Marston, overlooking the open moor15 on which the Royalists had taken their post. Between the armies, and marking the southern boundary of the moor, ran a hedge, and ditch, which Rupert had lined with musketeers, and some similar obstacles strengthened the royalist left flank. Rupert’s army, reinforced by Newcastle’s forces from York, numbered about eighteen thousand men, while the Parliamentarians amounted to about twenty-seven thousand, but the Royalists had the advantage of a strong defensive16 position, and of open ground on which their cavalry12 could man?uvre freely.
For three hours the two armies faced each other 105in battle array; a few cannon17-shots were exchanged, but neither army advanced. The Roundheads fell to singing psalms18, and the royalist generals came to the belief that there would be no fighting that day. About five, the whole parliamentary line began to move forward, and Cromwell, with the cavalry forming its left wing, attacked Lord Byron and the royalist right. Cromwell had under his command all the horse and dragoons of the Eastern Association, half a regiment3 of Scottish dragoons, and three weak regiments of Scottish cavalry who formed his reserve,—in all not less than four thousand men, of whom one thousand were dragoons. The dragoons rapidly drove the royalist musketeers from the ditch, and enabled the cavalry to pass it. Cromwell led the way, and with the first troops who crossed charged the nearest regiment of Royalists. His own division, says a contemporary narrative19, “had a hard pull of it; for they were charged by Rupert’s bravest men both in front and flank.” But as fast as they could form, the other troops of Cromwell’s first line charged in support of their leader, erelong the foremost regiments of the Royalists were broken, and, pursuing their victory, Cromwell’s men engaged the second line.
In this hand-to-hand combat Cromwell was wounded in the neck by a pistol-shot fired so near his eyes that it half blinded him, but, though for a short time disabled, he did not leave the field. Meanwhile Rupert himself, who had been at supper in the rear when the attack began, galloped20 up with fresh regiments and, rallying his men, drove back 106Cromwell’s troopers. It was but a temporary check, for David Leslie with Cromwell’s second line fell on Rupert’s flank, and the royalist cavalry was irretrievably routed. Sending the light Scottish regiments of the reserve in pursuit of the flying Cavaliers, Cromwell and Leslie reformed their tired squadrons, and halted to find out how the battle had gone in other quarters of the field. Tidings of disaster soon reached them, and it became plain that the battle was more than half lost for the Parliament. Sir Thomas Fairfax, wounded and almost alone, came with the news that the horse of the right wing under his command were defeated and flying. His own regiment had charged with success, and broken through the enemy; those who should have supported him, disordered by the furze and the rough ground they had to pass through to debouch22 upon the moor, had been charged by the Royalists, and completely scattered23. The infantry24 of the parliamentary centre had fared little better. The advance had been at first successful all along the line, some guns had been taken, and the ditch passed. On the left, Manchester’s foot, led by Major-General Crawford, had outflanked the infantry opposed to them, and were still gaining ground. In the centre, Lord Fairfax’s foot and the Scottish regiments supporting them, repulsed by Newcastle’s white-coated north-countrymen, and trampled25 down by their own flying horse, were in full flight. On the right, the main body of the Scottish infantry was hard pressed; some regiments gave way as their brethren in the centre had done; others maintained their ground manfully. Yet with the centre of the parliamentary line pierced, and the cavalry of the right wing driven from the field, the position of these isolated26 regiments, exposed to attack in front and flank both, seemed hopeless. So thought old Leven, who, after striving in vain to rally the runaways27, gave up the day for lost, and galloped for Leeds. Lord Fairfax, too, was carried off the field in the rout21 of his infantry, though he returned later.
107While Goring28’s victorious29 horse pursued the fugitives30, or stopped to plunder31 the baggage, Sir Charles Lucas, with another division of Goring’s command, employed himself in attacking the Scottish infantry. Maitland’s and Lindsey’s regiments on the extreme right of the line stood like rocks, and beat off three charges with their pikes. Like their ancestors at Flodden, and with better fortune,
“The stubborn spearmen still made good
Their dark, impenetrable wood,
Each stepping where his comrade stood
The instant that he fell.”
Help was now at hand. Sweeping32 across the moor behind the royalist centre, Cromwell and Leslie came with their whole force to the relief of the Scots. With them too marched Crawford and the three brigades of Manchester’s foot. As they advanced, Lucas’s horse suspended their attack, and Goring’s men streamed back from pursuit and pillage33 to meet this new antagonist34.
Cromwell’s cavalry now occupied the very ground where Goring’s men had been posted when the battle 108began, and met them at “the same place of disadvantage” where Sir Thomas Fairfax had been routed. The struggle was short but decisive, and when the last squadrons of the royalist horse were broken, Cromwell turned to co-operate with Crawford and the Scots in attacking the royalist infantry. Some of Rupert’s veteran regiments made good their retreat to York; Newcastle’s white-coats got into a piece of enclosed ground, and sold their lives dearly; the rest scattered and fled under cover of the protecting darkness. About three thousand Royalists fell in the battle, while sixteen guns, one hundred colours, six thousand muskets35, and sixteen hundred prisoners were the trophies36 of the victors. Rupert left York to its fate, and made his way back to Lancashire with some six thousand men, and the city itself surrendered a fortnight later.
In the despatch37 which the three Generals addressed to the Committee of Both Kingdoms, they gave no account of the details of the battle, and made no mention of Cromwell’s services. Private letters were more outspoken38. One described him as “the chief agent in obtaining the victory.” Some people spoke39 of him as “the saviour40 of the three kingdoms,” though Cromwell repudiated41 the title with some anger. The friends of the Scottish army depreciated42 his services, attributed what his cavalry achieved to David Leslie, and circulated reports that Cromwell had taken no part in the battle after his first charge.
The utterances43 of the royalist leader both before and after the battle showed that he appreciated 109Cromwell’s importance more justly. “Is Cromwell there?” asked Rupert of a prisoner taken just before the battle, and it was Rupert too who, after the battle, gave Cromwell the nickname of “Ironside” or “Ironsides.” The title was derived44, according to a contemporary biographer, “from the impenetrable strength of his troops, which could by no means be broken or divided,” and it was extended later from the leader to the soldiers themselves.
Cromwell’s only account of the battle is contained in a few lines written to his brother-in-law, Colonel Valentine Walton.
“England,” he said, “and the Church of God hath had a great favour from the Lord in this great victory given unto us, such as the like never was since this war began. It had all the evidences of an absolute victory, obtained by the Lord’s blessing45 upon the godly party principally. We never charged but we routed the enemy. The left wing, which I commanded, being our own horse, saving a few Scots in our rear, beat all the Prince’s horse. God made them as stubble to our swords. We charged their regiments of foot with our horse, and routed all we charged. The particulars I cannot relate now; but I believe of 20,000 the Prince hath not 4000 left. Give glory, all the glory, to God.”
Cromwell’s letter has been charged with concealing46 the services of David Leslie and the Scots. But every word of his brief account was true. He did not give the particulars of the fight, because he was writing a letter of condolence, not a despatch. Walton’s son, a captain in Cromwell’s own regiment, had 110fallen in the battle, and Cromwell wrote to tell the father details of his son’s death. He began with the news of the great victory in order that Walton might feel that his son’s life had not been idly thrown away. Then he turned suddenly to the real subject of the letter. “Sir, God hath taken your eldest47 son away by a cannon shot. It brake his leg. We were necessitated48 to have it cut off, whereof he died.” Next he praised the dead—the “gallant young man,” “exceeding gracious,” “exceedingly beloved in the army of all that knew him,” who had died “full of comfort,” lamenting49 nothing save that he could no longer serve God against his enemies, and rejoicing in his last moments to “see the rogues50 run.” In the spring, Cromwell had lost his own son, Captain Oliver, who died not in battle, but of smallpox51 in his quarters at Newport. “A civil young gentleman, and the joy of his father,” said a newspaper recording52 it. He referred to this now while seeking to comfort Walton. “You know my own trials this way; but the Lord supported me with this, that the Lord took him into the happiness we all pant after and live for.” Let the same faith support Walton, and let “this public mercy to the Church of God” help him to forget his “private sorrow.” So closed the letter, revealing in its tenderness and sympathy, its enthusiasm and its devotion to the cause, the depths of Cromwell’s nature, and the secret of his power over his comrades in arms.
After the fall of York, the three parliamentary armies separated. Leven and the Scots turned 111northwards again to besiege6 Newcastle, the Fairfaxes remained to capture the royalist strongholds in Yorkshire, and Manchester, taking on his way Sheffield Castle and a few smaller garrisons53, returned to Lincoln. All August he remained there idle, declining even to besiege Newark. He was weary of the war, anxious for an accommodation with the King, and shocked at the spread of sectarian and democratic opinions in his army and in the kingdom. Cromwell, as the protector of the sectaries, was at daggers-drawn with Major-General Crawford, who attempted to suppress them; Crawford cashiered an officer on the ground that he was an Anabaptist, and Cromwell and some of his colonels threatened to lay down their commissions unless Crawford was removed. A compromise of some kind was patched up, but Cromwell’s influence over Manchester was at an end.
Meanwhile, in the south of England the campaign so prosperously begun was ending in disaster. Charles had turned on his pursuer, and defeated Waller at Cropredy Bridge, in Oxfordshire, on June 29th. Leaving Waller’s disorganised and mutinous54 army too weak to do any harm, he followed Essex into the west, and, joined by the forces of the western Royalists, threatened to overpower him. At the end of August, the Committee of Both Kingdoms ordered the army of the Eastern Association to go to the succour of Essex. Cromwell was eager to do so. “The business,” he wrote to his friend Walton, “has our hearts with it, and truly, had we wings we would fly thither55.” Manchester’s army, 112though ill provided with necessaries, and slandered56 by evil tongues as factious57, was ready to serve anywhere. “We do never find our men so cheerful as when there is work to do.” But he went on to hint that there were obstructives in high places, who were less willing to fight than their soldiers. “We have some amongst us much slow in action; if we could all intend our own ends less, and our own ease too, our business would go on wheels for expedition.”
Before Manchester stirred from Lincoln the anticipated disaster came. At Lostwithiel on September 2nd, Skippon and the infantry of Essex’s army were forced to capitulate and to lay down their arms. The horse escaped by a night march through a gap in the royalist lines, while Essex himself and a few officers fled by sea. After his victory the King returned slowly to Oxford, and Manchester with the greatest reluctance58 moved south-west to meet him. “My army,” he said openly, “was raised by the Association and for the guard of the Association. It cannot be commanded by Parliament without their consent.” It was imperative59 that Charles should be fought before he could get to his old headquarters at Oxford, while his army was weakened by the forces left behind in the west, but Manchester’s refusal to advance allowed the Royalists to reach Newbury before the King was obliged to fight. At Newbury, on October 27th, Manchester’s army, strengthened by Waller’s forces and by what remained of Essex’s troops, made a joint60 attack on the King. Charles had only ten thousand men to oppose to the nineteen thousand brought against him, but he 113had chosen a strong position between two rivers, protected on one side by Donnington Castle, and covered, where it was most assailable61, by intrenchments. Above all, his army was under a single commander, while the Parliament’s was directed by a committee. Essex was absent from illness, and the Committee of Both Kingdoms hoped to avoid disputes by putting the command in commission.
The parliamentary scheme was that Skippon’s foot, with the horse of Cromwell and Waller, should attack the King’s position on the west, while Manchester assaulted it on the north-east. It failed through lack of combination. Skippon’s infantry carried the royalist intrenchments, and recaptured several guns they had lost in Cornwall, but the cavalry, impeded62 by the nature of the ground, could effect little. Manchester delayed his attack till it was too late to assist them, and was repulsed with heavy loss. Nevertheless the result of the day’s fighting was that the King’s position was so seriously compromised that only a retreat could save his army. In the night, the royalist army silently marched past Manchester’s outposts, and by morning it was half way to Wallingford. Waller and Cromwell set out in pursuit with the bulk of the cavalry, but as Manchester and the majority of the committee refused to support them with infantry Charles made good his retreat to Oxford. A fortnight later, the King, reinforced by Rupert with five thousand men, returned to relieve Donnington Castle and carry off the artillery63 he had left there (October 9, 1644). He offered battle, and Cromwell was eager to fight, 114but Manchester and a majority of the committee declared against it. Foot and horse alike were greatly reduced in numbers, and the latter “tired out with hard duty in such extremity64 of weather as hath been seldom seen.” Manchester, in addition to military reasons, urged political arguments against risking a battle.
“If we beat the King ninety-nine times, yet he is King still, and so will his posterity65 be after him; but if the King beat us once we shall all be hanged, and our posterity made slaves.” “My Lord,” retorted Cromwell, “if this be so, why did we take up arms at first? This is against fighting ever hereafter. If so, let us make peace, be it ever so base.”
But much as he might despise Manchester’s logic66, he had to bow to the logic of facts, and to accept the view of the committee in general.
So ended the campaign of 1644. The north of England had been definitely won, and with capable leadership the defeat of Essex in Cornwall might have been compensated67 by the defeat of the King in Berkshire. When Cromwell came to reflect on the incidents of the last few months, he attributed the failure to obtain this victory entirely68 to Manchester. He had failed, apparently69, not through accident or want of foresight70, but through backwardness to all action. And this backwardness, concluded Cromwell, came “from some principle of unwillingness71 to have the war prosecuted72 to a full victory; and a desire to have it ended by an accommodation on some such terms to which it might be disadvantageous to 115bring the King too low.” On November 25th, Cromwell rose in the House of Commons, told the story of the Newbury campaign, and made this charge against Manchester. Manchester vindicated73 his generalship in the House of Lords, alleging74 that he had always acted by the advice of the council of war, and that Cromwell was a factious and obstructive subordinate. Then, leaving military questions alone, he made a bitter attack on Cromwell as a politician. He had once given great confidence to the Lieutenant-General, but latterly he had become suspicious of his designs, and had been obliged to withdraw it. For Cromwell had spoken against the nobility, and had said that he hoped to live to see never a nobleman in England. He had expressed himself with contempt against the Assembly of Divines, and with animosity against the Scots for attempting to establish Presbyterianism in England. Finally, he had avowed75 that he desired to have none but Independents in the army of the Eastern Association, “so that in case there should be propositions for peace, or any conclusion of a peace, such as might not stand with those ends that honest men should aim at, this army might prevent such a mischief76.”
Cromwell did not deny these utterances, and their revelation produced the effect which Manchester had anticipated. An enquiry into errors in the conduct of the war developed into a political quarrel. The Lords took up the cause of Manchester as the cause of their order. The Scots intrigued77 against Cromwell as the enemy of their creed78. “For the interest of our nation,” wrote Baillie, “we must crave79 reason 116of that darling of the sectaries,” and talked of breaking the power of that potent80 faction81 “in obtaining his removal from the army, which himself by his over-rashness has procured82.” Some of the Scottish leaders consulted together on the feasibility of accusing Cromwell as an “incendiary” who had sought to cause strife83 between the two nations, but the English lawyers consulted advised against it.
“Lieutenant-General Cromwell,” said Mr. Maynard, “is a person of great favour and interest with the House of Commons, and with some of the peers likewise, and therefore there must be proofs, and the most clear and evident proofs against him, to prevail with the Parliament to judge him an incendiary.”
As the controversy84 proceeded, the Lower House declared on Cromwell’s side, and the conviction of Manchester’s incapacity spread amongst its members. But, instead of pressing the charge home, Cromwell drew back. A personal triumph, to be gained at the cost of a rupture85 between the two Houses, and perhaps a rupture between England and Scotland, was not worth gaining. What he wanted was military efficiency and the vigorous conduct of the war, and he resolved to use the dissatisfaction which Manchester’s slackness had roused in order to obtain these ends, and to abandon the personal charges to secure them. The moment was propitious86, for on November 23rd the Commons had ordered the Committee of Both Kingdoms to consider the reorganisation of the whole army. On December 9th, when the report on the charges against 117Manchester was brought in to the House of Commons, Cromwell turned the debate to the larger issue. The important thing now, he said, was to save the nation out of the bleeding, almost dying condition, which the long continuance of the war had brought it into.
“Without a more speedy, vigorous, and effectual prosecution87 of the war, we shall make the kingdom weary of us, and make it hate the name of a Parliament.”
“For what do the enemy say? Nay88 what do many say that were friends at the beginning of the Parliament? Even this: That the members of both Houses have got great places and commands, and the sword into their hands; and what by interest in Parliament, what by power in the army, will perpetually continue themselves in grandeur89, and not permit the war speedily to end, lest their own power should determine with it.... If the army be not put into another method and the war more vigorously prosecuted, the people can bear the war no longer, and will enforce you to a dishonourable peace.”
He went on to abandon his attack upon Manchester, by recommending the House not to insist upon any complaint against any commander. Oversights90 could rarely be avoided in military affairs, and he acknowledged that he had been guilty of them himself. The essential was not to enquire91 into the causes of these failures, but to apply a remedy to them. That remedy, as he had already suggested, was the reorganisation of the army, and a change in its commanders. “And I hope,” he concluded, “we have 118such true English hearts and zealous92 affections towards the general weal of our mother country, as no members of either House will scruple93 to deny themselves, and their own private interests for the public good.”
Cromwell’s suggestion was at once adopted, and, before the debate ended, a resolution was passed that no member of either House of Parliament should during the war hold any office or command either military or civil. Ten days later, on December 19th, the Self-Denying Ordinance94 passed the House of Commons and was sent up to the Lords. The Lords demurred95, and delayed, and at last rejected it, on the ground that they did not know what shape the new army would take. The Commons immediately formulated96 their scheme, nominated Sir Thomas Fairfax as the future General, and fixed97 the new army at twenty-two thousand men. On the 15th of February, 1645, the Lords accepted it, much against their will; and on April 3rd, with still greater reluctance, they accepted a second Self-Denying Ordinance. But the new ordinance was much less stringent98 than the old. It simply ordained99 that all members of the two Houses holding office should lay down their commissions within forty days of its passing, and said nothing to prevent their reappointment in the future if the two Houses thought fit. So much at least the Peers had gained by their resistance.
Cromwell had been a leader in the earlier portion of this struggle. He had been one of the tellers100 for the majority which voted Fairfax General in 119place of Essex, and had urged that Fairfax should have full liberty in the choice of his officers. His own military career seemed over, for he could scarcely expect to retain his command when all other members lost theirs. If he had sought to keep it, he would have continued the prosecution of Manchester rather than striven to erect101 a legal barrier against his own employment. But before the struggle ended, and before the second Self-Denying Ordinance was passed or even introduced, he was once more in the field. In the west of England, Weymouth and Taunton were hard pressed by a royalist army under Goring. Waller was ordered to advance and relieve them, but without reinforcements he was too weak to do so. Parliament ordered Cromwell’s regiment to join Waller; it murmured, grew mutinous, and seemed about to refuse obedience102. On March 3rd, the House ordered Cromwell to go with it, its murmurs103 ceased, and obedience was immediately restored. Cromwell made no objection to putting himself under Waller’s command, and Waller found him an admirable subordinate. There was nothing in his bearing, wrote Waller, to show that he was conscious of having extraordinary abilities; “for although he was blunt, he did not bear himself with pride or disdain104. As an officer he was obedient, and did never dispute my orders, or argue upon them.” What struck Waller most was that, whilst a man of few words himself, Cromwell had a way of making others talk, and a singular sagacity in judging their characters, and discovering their secrets.
120Waller’s expedition accomplished105 its object: a royalist regiment of horse was captured, an imperilled body of parliamentary foot successfully brought off, and at the end of April Cromwell returned to headquarters to lay down his commission. It remained to be seen whether Parliament could dispense106 with his services, and above all whether the army would be content to lose a general who had gained the confidence of the soldiers more than any leader whom the war had produced.
点击收听单词发音
1 regain | |
vt.重新获得,收复,恢复 | |
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2 regiments | |
(军队的)团( regiment的名词复数 ); 大量的人或物 | |
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3 regiment | |
n.团,多数,管理;v.组织,编成团,统制 | |
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4 covenant | |
n.盟约,契约;v.订盟约 | |
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5 frustrated | |
adj.挫败的,失意的,泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 );挫败;使受挫折;令人沮丧 | |
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6 besiege | |
vt.包围,围攻,拥在...周围 | |
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7 besieged | |
包围,围困,围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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8 Oxford | |
n.牛津(英国城市) | |
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9 evacuated | |
撤退者的 | |
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10 garrison | |
n.卫戍部队;驻地,卫戍区;vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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11 beleaguered | |
adj.受到围困[围攻]的;包围的v.围攻( beleaguer的过去式和过去分词);困扰;骚扰 | |
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12 cavalry | |
n.骑兵;轻装甲部队 | |
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13 bloodily | |
adv.出血地;血淋淋地;残忍地;野蛮地 | |
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14 repulsed | |
v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 );驳斥;拒绝 | |
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15 moor | |
n.荒野,沼泽;vt.(使)停泊;vi.停泊 | |
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16 defensive | |
adj.防御的;防卫的;防守的 | |
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17 cannon | |
n.大炮,火炮;飞机上的机关炮 | |
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18 psalms | |
n.赞美诗( psalm的名词复数 );圣诗;圣歌;(中的) | |
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19 narrative | |
n.叙述,故事;adj.叙事的,故事体的 | |
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20 galloped | |
(使马)飞奔,奔驰( gallop的过去式和过去分词 ); 快速做[说]某事 | |
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21 rout | |
n.溃退,溃败;v.击溃,打垮 | |
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22 debouch | |
v.流出,进入 | |
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23 scattered | |
adj.分散的,稀疏的;散步的;疏疏落落的 | |
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24 infantry | |
n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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25 trampled | |
踩( trample的过去式和过去分词 ); 践踏; 无视; 侵犯 | |
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26 isolated | |
adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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27 runaways | |
(轻而易举的)胜利( runaway的名词复数 ) | |
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28 goring | |
v.(动物)用角撞伤,用牙刺破( gore的现在分词 ) | |
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29 victorious | |
adj.胜利的,得胜的 | |
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30 fugitives | |
n.亡命者,逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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31 plunder | |
vt.劫掠财物,掠夺;n.劫掠物,赃物;劫掠 | |
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32 sweeping | |
adj.范围广大的,一扫无遗的 | |
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33 pillage | |
v.抢劫;掠夺;n.抢劫,掠夺;掠夺物 | |
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34 antagonist | |
n.敌人,对抗者,对手 | |
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35 muskets | |
n.火枪,(尤指)滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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36 trophies | |
n.(为竞赛获胜者颁发的)奖品( trophy的名词复数 );奖杯;(尤指狩猎或战争中获得的)纪念品;(用于比赛或赛跑名称)奖 | |
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37 despatch | |
n./v.(dispatch)派遣;发送;n.急件;新闻报道 | |
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38 outspoken | |
adj.直言无讳的,坦率的,坦白无隐的 | |
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39 spoke | |
n.(车轮的)辐条;轮辐;破坏某人的计划;阻挠某人的行动 v.讲,谈(speak的过去式);说;演说;从某种观点来说 | |
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40 saviour | |
n.拯救者,救星 | |
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41 repudiated | |
v.(正式地)否认( repudiate的过去式和过去分词 );拒绝接受;拒绝与…往来;拒不履行(法律义务) | |
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42 depreciated | |
v.贬值,跌价,减价( depreciate的过去式和过去分词 );贬低,蔑视,轻视 | |
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43 utterances | |
n.发声( utterance的名词复数 );说话方式;语调;言论 | |
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44 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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45 blessing | |
n.祈神赐福;祷告;祝福,祝愿 | |
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46 concealing | |
v.隐藏,隐瞒,遮住( conceal的现在分词 ) | |
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47 eldest | |
adj.最年长的,最年老的 | |
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48 necessitated | |
使…成为必要,需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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49 lamenting | |
adj.悲伤的,悲哀的v.(为…)哀悼,痛哭,悲伤( lament的现在分词 ) | |
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50 rogues | |
n.流氓( rogue的名词复数 );无赖;调皮捣蛋的人;离群的野兽 | |
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51 smallpox | |
n.天花 | |
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52 recording | |
n.录音,记录 | |
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53 garrisons | |
守备部队,卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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54 mutinous | |
adj.叛变的,反抗的;adv.反抗地,叛变地;n.反抗,叛变 | |
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55 thither | |
adv.向那里;adj.在那边的,对岸的 | |
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56 slandered | |
造谣中伤( slander的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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57 factious | |
adj.好搞宗派活动的,派系的,好争论的 | |
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58 reluctance | |
n.厌恶,讨厌,勉强,不情愿 | |
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59 imperative | |
n.命令,需要;规则;祈使语气;adj.强制的;紧急的 | |
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60 joint | |
adj.联合的,共同的;n.关节,接合处;v.连接,贴合 | |
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61 assailable | |
adj.可攻击的,易攻击的 | |
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62 impeded | |
阻碍,妨碍,阻止( impede的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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63 artillery | |
n.(军)火炮,大炮;炮兵(部队) | |
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64 extremity | |
n.末端,尽头;尽力;终极;极度 | |
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65 posterity | |
n.后裔,子孙,后代 | |
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66 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
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67 compensated | |
补偿,报酬( compensate的过去式和过去分词 ); 给(某人)赔偿(或赔款) | |
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68 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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69 apparently | |
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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70 foresight | |
n.先见之明,深谋远虑 | |
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71 unwillingness | |
n. 不愿意,不情愿 | |
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72 prosecuted | |
a.被起诉的 | |
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73 vindicated | |
v.澄清(某人/某事物)受到的责难或嫌疑( vindicate的过去式和过去分词 );表明或证明(所争辩的事物)属实、正当、有效等;维护 | |
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74 alleging | |
断言,宣称,辩解( allege的现在分词 ) | |
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75 avowed | |
adj.公开声明的,承认的v.公开声明,承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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76 mischief | |
n.损害,伤害,危害;恶作剧,捣蛋,胡闹 | |
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77 intrigued | |
adj.好奇的,被迷住了的v.搞阴谋诡计(intrigue的过去式);激起…的兴趣或好奇心;“intrigue”的过去式和过去分词 | |
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78 creed | |
n.信条;信念,纲领 | |
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79 crave | |
vt.渴望得到,迫切需要,恳求,请求 | |
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80 potent | |
adj.强有力的,有权势的;有效力的 | |
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81 faction | |
n.宗派,小集团;派别;派系斗争 | |
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82 procured | |
v.(努力)取得, (设法)获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 );拉皮条 | |
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83 strife | |
n.争吵,冲突,倾轧,竞争 | |
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84 controversy | |
n.争论,辩论,争吵 | |
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85 rupture | |
n.破裂;(关系的)决裂;v.(使)破裂 | |
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86 propitious | |
adj.吉利的;顺利的 | |
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87 prosecution | |
n.起诉,告发,检举,执行,经营 | |
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88 nay | |
adv.不;n.反对票,投反对票者 | |
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89 grandeur | |
n.伟大,崇高,宏伟,庄严,豪华 | |
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90 oversights | |
n.疏忽( oversight的名词复数 );忽略;失察;负责 | |
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91 enquire | |
v.打听,询问;调查,查问 | |
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92 zealous | |
adj.狂热的,热心的 | |
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93 scruple | |
n./v.顾忌,迟疑 | |
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94 ordinance | |
n.法令;条令;条例 | |
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95 demurred | |
v.表示异议,反对( demur的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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96 formulated | |
v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 );规划;确切地阐述;用公式表示 | |
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97 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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98 stringent | |
adj.严厉的;令人信服的;银根紧的 | |
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99 ordained | |
v.任命(某人)为牧师( ordain的过去式和过去分词 );授予(某人)圣职;(上帝、法律等)命令;判定 | |
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100 tellers | |
n.(银行)出纳员( teller的名词复数 );(投票时的)计票员;讲故事等的人;讲述者 | |
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101 erect | |
n./v.树立,建立,使竖立;adj.直立的,垂直的 | |
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102 obedience | |
n.服从,顺从 | |
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103 murmurs | |
n.低沉、连续而不清的声音( murmur的名词复数 );低语声;怨言;嘀咕 | |
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104 disdain | |
n.鄙视,轻视;v.轻视,鄙视,不屑 | |
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105 accomplished | |
adj.有才艺的;有造诣的;达到了的 | |
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106 dispense | |
vt.分配,分发;配(药),发(药);实施 | |
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