Then it is also true that no man had worked harder, perhaps none had worked so hard, to bring the public mind to a serious consideration of affairs and a recognition of the necessity of reorganizing the government, if the States were to be held together. Never, it seemed, had men better reason[85] to be satisfied with the result of their labors5 when, a few months later, the new Constitution was accepted by all the States. Yet the time was not far distant when even Madison would be in doubt as to the character of this new bond of union, and as to what sort of government had been secured by it. Nor till he had been dead near thirty years was it to be determined6 what union under the Constitution really meant; nor till three quarters of a century after the adoption7 of that instrument was the more perfect union formed, justice established, domestic tranquillity8 insured, the general welfare promoted, and the blessings9 of liberty secured to all the people, which by that great charter it was intended, in 1787, to ordain10 and establish. All the difficulties, which they who framed it escaped by their work, were as nothing to those which it entailed11 upon their descendants.
Two parties went into the convention. On one point, of course, they were agreed, else they would never have come together at all,—that a united government under the Articles of Confederation was a failure, and, unless some remedy should be speedily devised, States with common local interests would gravitate into separate and perhaps antagonistic12 nationalities. But the differences between these two parties were radical13, and for a time seemed insurmountable. One proposed simply to repair the Articles of Confederation as they might overhaul14 a machine that was out of gear; the other proposed to form an altogether new Con[86]stitution. One wanted a merely federal government; not, however, meaning by that term what the other party—soon, nevertheless, to be known as Federalists—were striving for, but a confederation of States, each independent of all the rest and supreme15 in its own right, while consenting to unite with the rest in a limited government for the administration of certain common interests.[10]
This idea of the independence of the States was a survival of the old colonial system, when each colony under its distinct relation to the crown had attained16 a growth of its own with its separate interests. Each of these colonies had become a State. The Revolution had secured to each, it was maintained, a separate independence, achieved, it was true, by united efforts, but not therefore binding17 them together as a single nation. It was held [87]as a legitimate18 result of that doctrine19 that each State, not the people of the State, whether many or few, should be represented by the same number of votes in a federal government as they were under the Articles of Confederation, because such a government was a union of States, not of a people.
All men, it was argued,—going back to a state of nature,—are equally free and independent; and when a government is formed every man has an equal share by natural right in its formation and in its subsequent conduct. While numbers are few, every member of the State exercises his individual right in person, and none can rightfully do more than this, however wise, or powerful, or rich he may be. But when government by the whole body of the people becomes cumbersome20 and inconvenient21 through increase of numbers, the individual citizen loses none of his rights by intrusting their exercise to representatives, in choosing and instructing whom all have an equal voice. So when States are united in a confederacy each State has the same relation to that government that individuals have to each other in a single State. They are free and equal, and none has a larger share of rights in the confederacy because its people are more numerous, or because it is richer or more powerful, than the rest. In such a confederacy it is not the individual citizen who is to be represented, but the individual State. In such a confederacy there would be the same[88] representation for a State, say of ten thousand inhabitants, as for one of fifty thousand. This, it was maintained, preserved equality of suffrage22 in the equality of States; while the representation of the individual citizens of the States would be in reality inequality of suffrage, because the autonomy of the State would be lost sight of. If in such a case it were asked what had become of the rights which the majority of forty thousand had inherited from nature, the answer was that those rights were preserved and represented in the state government. The difficulty, nevertheless, remained: how to reconcile in practice this doctrine of the equal rights of States, where there might be a minority of persons, with the actual rights of the whole people where, according to the underlying23 democratic doctrine, the good of the whole must be decided24 by the larger number.
Those who proposed only to amend25 the old Articles of Confederation, and opposed a new Constitution, objected that a government formed under such a Constitution would be not a federal but a national government. Luther Martin said, when he returned to Maryland, that the delegates "appeared totally to have forgot the business for which we were sent.... We had not been sent to form a government over the inhabitants of America considered as individuals.... That the system of government we were intrusted to prepare was a government over these thirteen States, but that in our proceedings we adopted principles[89] which would be right and proper only on the supposition that there were no state governments at all, but that all the inhabitants of this extensive continent were in their individual capacity, without government, and in a state of nature." He added that "in the whole system there was but one federal feature, the appointment of the senators by the States in their sovereign capacity, that is, by their legislatures, and the equality of suffrage in that branch; but it was said that this feature was only federal in appearance."
The Senate, the second house as it was called in the convention, was in part created, it is needless to say, to meet, or rather in obedience26 to, reasoning like this. There was almost nobody who would have been willing to abandon the state governments, as there was next to nobody who wanted a monarchy27. "We were eternally troubled," Martin said, "with arguments and precedents28 from the British government." He could not get beyond the fixed29 notion that those whom he opposed were determined to establish "one general government over this extensive continent, of a monarchical30 nature." If he, and those who agreed with him, sincerely believed this to be true, it was natural enough that the frequent allusions31 to British precedents, as wise rules for American guidance in constructing a government, should be looked upon as an unmistakable hankering after lost flesh-pots. Should the state governments be swept away, it might be that, in time of danger[90] from without or of peril32 from internal dissensions, the country, under "a government of a monarchical nature," might drift back to its old allegiance. If those who feared, or said they feared, this were not quite sincere, the temptation was almost irresistible33 to use such arguments to arouse popular prejudice against political opponents. It is curious that Madison seemed quite unconscious of how much the frequent allusions in his articles in "The Federalist" to the British Constitution might strengthen these accusations34 of the opposition35; while he half believed that the same thing in others showed in them a leaning toward England, from which he knew that he himself was quite free.
The Luther Martin protestants were too radical to remain in the convention to the end, when they saw that such a confederacy as they wanted was impossible. But there were not many who went the length they did in believing that a strong central government was necessarily the destruction of the state governments. Still fewer were those who would have brought this about if they could. That the rights of the States must be preserved was the general opinion and determination, and it was not difficult to do this by limiting the powers of the higher government, or federal as it soon came to be called, and by the organization of the second house, the Senate, in which all the States had an equal representation. The smaller States were satisfied with this concession3, and the larger[91] were willing to make it, not only for the sake of the union, but because of the just estimate in which they held the rights belonging to all the States alike. The real difficulty, as Madison said in the debate on that question, and as he repeated again and again after that question was settled, was not between the larger and smaller States, but between the North and the South; between those States that held slaves and those that had none.
Slavery in the Constitution, which has given so much trouble to the Abolitionists of this century, and indeed to everybody else, gave quite as much in the last century to those who put it there. Many of the wisest and best men of the time, Southerners as well as Northerners, and among them Madison, were opposed to slavery. They could see little good in it, hardly even any compensation for the existence of a system so full of evil. There was hardly a State in the union at that time that had not its emancipation36 society; and there was hardly a man of any eminence37 in the country who was not an officer, or at least a member, of such a society. Everywhere north of South Carolina, slavery was looked upon as a misfortune which it was exceedingly desirable to be free from at the earliest possible moment; everywhere north of Mason and Dixon's line, measures had already been taken, or were certain soon to be taken, to put an end to it; and by the ordinance38 for the government of all the territory north of the Ohio River it was[92] absolutely prohibited by Congress in the same year in which the Constitutional Congress met.
But it was, nevertheless, a thing to the continued existence of which the anti-slavery people of that time could consent without any violation39 of conscience. Bad as it was, unwise, wasteful40, cruel, a mockery of every pretense41 of respect for the rights of man, they did not believe it to be absolutely wicked. If they had so believed, let us hope they would have washed their hands of it. As it was, it was only a question of expediency42 whether, for the sake of the union, they should protect the system of slavery, and give to the slaveholders, as slaveholders, a certain degree of political power. To refuse to admit a slaveholding State into the union did not occur, probably, to the most earnest opponent of the system; for that would have been simply to say that there should be no union. That was what Madison meant in saying so repeatedly that the real difficulty in the way was, not the difference between the large and the small States, but the difference between the slaveholding and the non-slaveholding States. If there could be no conciliation43 on that point there could be no union.
Some hoped, perhaps, rather than believed, that slavery was likely to disappear ere long at the South as it was disappearing at the North. It is an impeachment44 of their intelligence, however, to suppose that they relied much upon any such hope. The simple truth is that slavery was then, as it[93] continued to be for three quarters of a century longer, the paramount45 interest of the South. To withstand or disregard it was not merely difficult, but was to brave immediate46 possible dangers and sufferings, which are never voluntarily encountered except in obedience to the highest sense of duty; or to meet a necessity, from which there was no manly47 way of escape. The sense of absolute duty was wanting; the necessity, it was hoped, might be avoided by concessions. It can only be said for those who made them that they did not see what fruitful seeds of future trouble they were sowing in the Constitution.
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1
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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3
concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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4
concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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5
labors
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| v.努力争取(for)( labor的第三人称单数 )；苦干；详细分析；（指引擎）缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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6
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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9
blessings
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| n.（上帝的）祝福( blessing的名词复数 )；好事；福分；因祸得福 | |
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10
ordain
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| vi.颁发命令；vt.命令，授以圣职，注定，任命 | |
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11
entailed
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| 使…成为必要( entail的过去式和过去分词 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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12
antagonistic
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| adj.敌对的 | |
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13
radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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14
overhaul
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| v./n.大修，仔细检查 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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16
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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cumbersome
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| adj.笨重的，不便携带的 | |
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inconvenient
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| adj.不方便的，令人感到麻烦的 | |
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suffrage
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| n.投票，选举权，参政权 | |
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23
underlying
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| adj.在下面的，含蓄的，潜在的 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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25
amend
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| vt.修改，修订，改进；n.[pl.]赔罪，赔偿 | |
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obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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27
monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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28
precedents
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| 引用单元； 范例( precedent的名词复数 )； 先前出现的事例； 前例； 先例 | |
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29
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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monarchical
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| adj. 国王的，帝王的，君主的，拥护君主制的 =monarchic | |
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allusions
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| 暗指，间接提到( allusion的名词复数 ) | |
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32
peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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accusations
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| n.指责( accusation的名词复数 )；指控；控告；（被告发、控告的）罪名 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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emancipation
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| n.（从束缚、支配下）解放 | |
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37
eminence
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| n.卓越，显赫；高地，高处；名家 | |
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38
ordinance
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| n.法令；条令；条例 | |
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39
violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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40
wasteful
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| adj.（造成）浪费的，挥霍的 | |
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41
pretense
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| n.矫饰，做作，借口 | |
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42
expediency
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| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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43
conciliation
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| n.调解，调停 | |
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44
impeachment
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| n.弹劾；控告；怀疑 | |
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45
paramount
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| a.最重要的，最高权力的 | |
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46
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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47
manly
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| adj.有男子气概的；adv.男子般地，果断地 | |
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