[95]But why should slaves be represented at all? "They are not free agents," said Patterson, a delegate to the convention from New Jersey2; they "have no personal liberty, no faculty3 of acquiring property, but, on the contrary, are themselves property, and, like other property, entirely4 at the will of the master. Has a man in Virginia a number of votes in proportion to the number of his slaves? And if negroes are not represented in the States to which they belong, why should they be represented in the general government?... If a meeting of the people was actually to take place in a slave State, would the slaves vote? They would not. Why, then, should they be represented in a federal government?" There could be but one reply, but that was one which it would not have been wise to make. It was slave property that was to be represented, and this would not be submitted to among slaveholders as against each other, while yet they were a unit in insisting upon it in a union with those who were not slaveholders. Among themselves slavery needed no protection; their safety was in equality. But to their great interest every non-slaveholder was, in the nature of things, an enemy; and prudence5 required that the power either to vote him down or to buy him up should never be wanting. It was as much a matter of instinct as of deliberation, for love of life is the first law. The truth was covered up in Madison's specious6 assertion that "every peculiar7 interest, whether in any class of citizens or any[96] description of States, ought to be secured as far as possible." The only "peculiar" interest, however, belonging either to citizens or States, that was imbedded in the Constitution, was slavery.
So Wilson of Pennsylvania asked: "Are they [the slaves] admitted as citizens—then why are they not admitted on an equality with white citizens? Are they admitted as property—then why is not other property admitted into the computation?" He was willing, however, to concede that it was a difficulty to be "overcome by the necessity of compromise."
Never, probably, in the history of legislation, was there a more serious question debated. Compromise is ordinarily understood to mean an adjustment by mutual8 concessions10, where there are rights on both sides. Here it meant whether the side which had no shadow of right whatever to that which it demanded would consent to take a little less than the whole. It was the kind of compromise made between the bandit and his victim when the former decides that he will not put himself to the trouble of shooting the other, and will even leave him his shirt. It was not difficult to understand that horses and cattle could be justly counted only where property was to be the basis of representation. Yet the slaves, who were counted, were, in the eye of the law, either personal property or real estate, and were no more represented as citizens than if they also had gone upon all fours. Their enumeration11, never[97]theless, was carried, and it so increased the representative power of their masters that inequality of citizenship12 became the fundamental principle of the government. This, of course, was to form an oligarchy13, not a democracy. Practically the government was put in the hands of a class, and there it remained from the moment of the adoption14 of the Constitution to the rebellion of 1860; while that class, including those of so little consequence as to own only a slave or two, in its best estate, probably never exceeded ten per centum of the whole people.
There was, if one may venture to say so, a singular confusion in the minds of the venerable fathers of the republic on this subject. They could not quite get rid of the notion that the slaves, being human, ought to be included in the enumeration of population, notwithstanding that their enumeration as citizens must necessarily disappear in their representation as chattels15. Slaves, as slaves, were the wealth of the South, as ships, for example, were the wealth of the North; but, being human, the mind was not shocked at having the slaves reckoned as population in fixing the basis of representation, though in reality they only represented the masters' ownership. But nobody would have been at a loss to see the absurdity16 of counting three fifths of the Northern ships as population. Even a Webster Whig of sixty-five years later could, perhaps, have understood that that was something more than an "unimportant[98] anomaly." There was no clearer-headed man in the convention than Gouverneur Morris; yet he said that he was "compelled to declare himself reduced to the dilemma17 of doing injustice18 to the Southern States or to human nature, and he must do it to the former." C. C. Pinckney of South Carolina declared that he was "alarmed" at such an avowal19 as that. Yet had the question been one of counting three fifths of the Northern ships in the enumeration of population, Morris would have discovered no "dilemma," and Pinckney nothing to be "alarmed" at. So palpable an outrage20 on common sense would have been merely laughed at by both.
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
In reply to Pinckney, however, Morris grew bolder. "It was high time," he said, "to speak out." He came there "to form a compact for the good of America. He hoped and believed that all would enter into such compact. If they would not, he was ready to join with any States that would. But as the compact was to be voluntary, it is in vain for the Eastern States to insist on what the Southern States will never agree to. It is equally vain for the latter to require what the other States can never admit, and he verily believed the people of Pennsylvania will never agree to a representation of negroes;" of negroes, he meant, counted as human beings, not for their own representation, but, as ships might be counted, for the increased representation of those who held them as property. The next day he "spoke21 out"[99] still more plainly. "If negroes," he said, "were to be viewed as inhabitants, ... they ought to be added in their entire number, and not in the proportion of three fifths. If as property, the word 'wealth' was right,"—as the basis, that is, of representation. The distinction that had been set up by Madison and others between the Northern and Southern States he considered as heretical and groundless. But it was persisted in, and "he saw that the Southern gentlemen will not be satisfied unless they see the way open to their gaining a majority in the public councils.... Either this distinction [between the North and the South] is fictitious22 or real; if fictitious, let it be dismissed, and let us proceed with due confidence. If it be real, instead of attempting to blend incompatible23 things, let us at once take a friendly leave of each other."
But could they take "a friendly leave of each other"? Should a union be secured on the terms the South offered? or should it be declined, as Morris proposed, if it could not be a union of equality? The next day Madison again set forth24 the real issue, quietly but unmistakably. "It seemed now," he said, "to be pretty well understood that the real difference of interests lay, not between the large and small, but between the Northern and Southern States. The institution of slavery and its consequences formed the line of discrimination." There is sometimes great power, as he well knew, in firm reiteration25. So long as[100] slavery lasted, the lesson he then inculcated was never forgotten. Thenceforward, as then, "the line of discrimination," in Southern politics, lay with "slavery and its consequences." One side would abate26 nothing of its demands; there could be no "friendly leave" unless the determination, on the other side, to overcome the desire for union and take the consequences was equally firm.
When the question again came up, however, Morris had not lost heart. His talk was the talk of a modern abolitionist:—
"He never would concur27 in upholding domestic slavery. It was a nefarious28 institution. It was the curse of Heaven on the States where it prevailed. Compare the free regions of the Middle States, where a rich and noble cultivation29 marks the prosperity and happiness of the people, with the misery30 and poverty which overspread the barren wastes of Virginia, Maryland, and the other States having slaves. Travel through the whole continent, and you behold31 the prospect32 continually varying with the appearance and disappearance33 of slavery.... Proceed southwardly, and every step you take through the great regions of slavery presents a desert increasing with the increasing proportion of these wretched beings. Upon what principle is it that the slaves shall be computed34 in the representation? Are they men? Then make them citizens, and let them vote. Are they property? Why then is no other property included? The houses in this city [Philadelphia] are worth more than all the wretched slaves who cover the rice swamps of South Carolina.... And what is the proposed compensation to the Northern States for a[101] sacrifice of every principle of right, of every impulse of humanity? They are to bind35 themselves to march their militia36 for the defense37 of the Southern States, for their defense against those very slaves of whom they complain. They must supply vessels38 and seamen39 in case of foreign attack. The legislature will have indefinite power to tax them by excises40 and duties on imports, both of which will fall heavier on them than on the Southern inhabitants; for the Bohea tea used by a Northern freeman will pay more tax than the whole consumption of the miserable41 slave, which consists of nothing more than his physical subsistence and the rags that cover his nakedness.... Let it not be said that direct taxation42 is to be proportioned to representation. It is idle to suppose that the general government can stretch its hand directly into the pockets of the people scattered43 over so vast a country.... He would sooner submit himself to a tax for paying for all the negroes in the United States than saddle posterity44 with such a Constitution."
So much of this as was not already fact was prophecy. Yet not many weeks later this impassioned orator45 put his name to the Constitution, though it had grown meanwhile into larger pro-slavery proportions. There was undoubtedly46 some sympathy with him among a few of the members; but the general feeling was more truly expressed a few days later by Rutledge of South Carolina, in the debate on the continuance of the African slave trade. "Religion and humanity," he said, "had nothing to do with this question. Interest alone is the governing principle with nations. The true[102] question at present is, whether the Southern States shall or shall not be parties to the union. If the Northern States consult their interest, they will not oppose the increase of slaves, which will increase the commodities of which they will become the carriers." The response came from Connecticut, Oliver Ellsworth saying: "Let every State import what it pleases. The morality or wisdom of slavery are considerations belonging to the States themselves. What enriches a part enriches the whole,"—especially Newport and its adjacent coasts, he might have added, with its trade to the African coast.
But a Virginian, George Mason, had another tone. He called the traffic "infernal." "Slavery," he went on, "discourages arts and manufactures. The poor despise labor47 when performed by slaves. They prevent the emigration of whites, who really enrich and strengthen a country. They produce the most pernicious effect on manners. Every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant48. They bring the judgment49 of Heaven on a country. As nations cannot be rewarded or punished in the next world, they must be in this. By an inevitable50 chain of causes and effects, Providence51 punishes national sins by national calamities52."
These were warnings worth heeding53. But Ellsworth retorted with a sneer54: "As he had never owned a slave, he could not judge of the effect of slavery on character." He said, however, that, "if it was to be considered in a moral light, we[103] ought to go farther, and free those already in the country." But, so far from that, he thought it would be "unjust toward South Carolina and Georgia," in whose "sickly rice swamps" negroes died so fast, should there be any intermeddling to prevent the importation of fresh Africans to labor, and, of course, to perish there. Perhaps it was this shrewd argument of the Connecticut delegate that suggested, half a century afterward55, to a Mississippi agricultural society, the economical calculation that it was cheaper to use up a gang of negroes every few years, and supply its place by a fresh gang from Virginia, than rely upon the natural increase that would follow their humane56 treatment as men and women. His colleague, Roger Sherman, came to Ellsworth's aid. It would be, he thought, the duty of the general government to prohibit the foreign trade in slaves, and, should this be left in its power, it would probably be done. But he would not, if the Southern States made it the condition of consenting to the Constitution that the trade should be protected, leave it in the power of the general government to do that which he acknowledged that it should and probably would do.
Delegates from Georgia and the Carolinas declared that to be the condition,—among them C. C. Pinckney of South Carolina. "He should consider," he said, "a rejection57 of the clause as an exclusion58 of South Carolina from the union." Nevertheless he said to the people at home, when[104] they came together to consider the Constitution: "We are so weak that by ourselves we could not form a union strong enough for the purpose of effectually protecting each other. Without union with the other States, South Carolina must soon fall." On the part of that State it had been a game of brag59 all along. The first lesson in the South Carolinian policy was given in the Constitutional Convention. Of the result, this was Pinckney's summing up to his constituents60:—
"By this settlement we have secured an unlimited61 importation of negroes for twenty years; nor is it declared that the importation shall be then stopped; it may be continued. We have a security that the general government can never emancipate62 them, for no such authority is granted.... We have obtained a right to recover our slaves, in whatever part of America they may take refuge, which is a right we had not before. In short, considering all circumstances, we have made the best terms, for the security of this species of property, it was in our power to make. We would have made better if we could, but on the whole I do not think them bad."
A more moderate and a more significant statement could hardly have been made.
On the foreign slave trade Madison had little to say, but, like most of the Southern delegates north of the Carolinas, he was opposed to it. "Twenty years," he said, "will produce all the mischief63 that can be apprehended64 from the liberty to import slaves. So long a term will be more dishonorable to the American character than to[105] say nothing about it in the Constitution." The words are a little ambiguous, though he is his own reporter. But what he meant evidently was, that any protection of the trade would dishonor the nation; for at another point of the debate, on the same day, he said that "he thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be property in men." Such property he was anxious to protect as the great Southern interest, so long as it lasted; but he was not willing to strengthen it by permitting the continuance of the African slave trade for twenty years longer under the sanction of the Constitution. But he held it to be, as he wrote in "The Federalist," "a great point gained in favor of humanity that a period of twenty years may terminate forever within these States a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided65 the barbarism of modern policy." He added, "The attempt that had been made to pervert66 this clause into an objection against the Constitution, by representing it as a criminal toleration of an illicit67 practice," was a misconstruction which he did not think deserving of an answer.
It was, in fact, a bargain which he had not approved of, and did not now probably care to talk about. It was made at the suggestion of Gouverneur Morris, who moved that the foreign slave trade, a navigation act, and a duty on exports be referred for consideration to a committee. "These things," he said, "may form a bargain among the Northern and Southern States." When the com[106]mittee reported in favor of the slave trade, C. C. Pinckney proposed that its limitation should be extended from 1800 to 1808. Gorham of Massachusetts seconded the motion, and it was carried by the addition of the votes of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut to those of Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.
The committee also reported the substitution of a majority vote for that of two thirds in legislation relating to commerce. The concession9 was made without much difficulty, a Georgia delegate and three of the four South Carolina delegates favoring it, two of the latter frankly68 saying they did so to gratify New England. It was, C. C. Pinckney said, "the true interest of the Southern States to have no regulation of commerce;" but he assented69 to this proposition, and his constituents "would be reconciled to this liberality," because, among other considerations, of "the liberal conduct [of the New England States] towards the views of South Carolina." There was no question of the meaning of this sudden avowal of friendly feeling. Jefferson relates in his "Ana," on the authority of George Mason, a member of the convention, that Georgia and South Carolina had "struck up a bargain with the three New England States, that if they would admit slaves for twenty years, the two southernmost States would join in changing the clause which required two thirds of the legislature in any vote."
The settlement of these questions was an opportune70 moment for the introduction of that relating[107] to fugitive71 slaves. Butler of South Carolina immediately proposed a section which should secure their return to their masters, and it was passed without a word. As Pinckney said in the passage already quoted, when he went back to report to his constituents, "it is a right to recover our slaves, in whatever part of America they may take refuge, which is a right we had not before."
It is notable how complete and final a settlement of the slavery question "these compromises," as they were called, seemed to be to those who made them. They were meant to be, as Mr. Madison called them, "adjustments of the different interests of different parts of the country," and being once agreed upon they were considered as having the binding72 force and stability of a contract. The evils of slavery were set forth as an element in the negotiation73, but no question of essential morality was raised that brought the system within the category of forbidden wrong. Whatever results might follow would be limited, it was thought, by the terms of the contract; whereas, in fact, the actual results were not foreseen, and could not be guarded against, except by the refusal to enter into any contract whatever.
On all other questions involving political principles,—the just relations of the federal government and the governments of the States; the relations between the larger and the smaller States; the regulation of the functions of the executive, the legislative74, and the judicial75 departments of[108] government,—on all these the framers of the Constitution brought to bear the profoundest wisdom. When one reflects upon the magnitude and character of the work, Madison's conclusion seems hardly extravagant76, that "adding to these considerations the natural diversity of human opinions on all new and complicated subjects, it is impossible to consider the degree of concord77 which ultimately prevailed as less than a miracle." There were, nevertheless, the gravest and most anxious doubts how far the Constitution would stand the test of time; yet as a system of government for a nation of freemen it remains78 to this day practically unchanged. But where its architects thought themselves wisest they were weakest. That which they thought they had settled forever was the one thing which they did not settle. Of all the "adjustments" of the Constitution, slavery was precisely79 that one which was not adjusted.
Madison's responsibility for this result was that of every other delegate,—no more and no less. Neither he nor they, whether more or less opposed to slavery, saw in it a system so subversive80 of the rights of man that no just government should tolerate it. That was reserved for a later generation, and even that was slow to learn. To the fathers it was, at worst, only an unfortunate and unhappy social condition, which it would be well to be rid of if this could be done without too much sacrifice; but otherwise, to be submitted to, like any other misfortune.
[109]While it did exist, however, Madison believed it should be protected, though not encouraged, as a Southern interest. The question resolved itself into one of expediency,—of union or disunion. What disunion would be, he knew, or thought he knew. Perhaps he was mistaken. Disunion, had it come then, might have been the way to a true union. "We are so weak," said C. C. Pinckney, "that by ourselves we could not form a union strong enough for the purpose of effectually protecting each other. Without union with the other States, South Carolina must soon fall." But he was careful to say this at home, not in Philadelphia. In the convention, Madison wrote a month after it adjourned81, "South Carolina and Georgia were inflexible82 on the point of the slaves." What was to be the union which that inflexibility83 carried was not foreseen. It was the children's teeth that were to be set on edge.
点击收听单词发音
1 suffrage | |
n.投票,选举权,参政权 | |
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2 jersey | |
n.运动衫 | |
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3 faculty | |
n.才能;学院,系;(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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4 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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5 prudence | |
n.谨慎,精明,节俭 | |
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6 specious | |
adj.似是而非的;adv.似是而非地 | |
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7 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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8 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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9 concession | |
n.让步,妥协;特许(权) | |
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10 concessions | |
n.(尤指由政府或雇主给予的)特许权( concession的名词复数 );承认;减价;(在某地的)特许经营权 | |
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11 enumeration | |
n.计数,列举;细目;详表;点查 | |
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12 citizenship | |
n.市民权,公民权,国民的义务(身份) | |
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13 oligarchy | |
n.寡头政治 | |
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14 adoption | |
n.采用,采纳,通过;收养 | |
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15 chattels | |
n.动产,奴隶( chattel的名词复数 ) | |
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16 absurdity | |
n.荒谬,愚蠢;谬论 | |
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17 dilemma | |
n.困境,进退两难的局面 | |
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18 injustice | |
n.非正义,不公正,不公平,侵犯(别人的)权利 | |
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19 avowal | |
n.公开宣称,坦白承认 | |
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20 outrage | |
n.暴行,侮辱,愤怒;vt.凌辱,激怒 | |
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21 spoke | |
n.(车轮的)辐条;轮辐;破坏某人的计划;阻挠某人的行动 v.讲,谈(speak的过去式);说;演说;从某种观点来说 | |
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22 fictitious | |
adj.虚构的,假设的;空头的 | |
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23 incompatible | |
adj.不相容的,不协调的,不相配的 | |
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24 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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25 reiteration | |
n. 重覆, 反覆, 重说 | |
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26 abate | |
vi.(风势,疼痛等)减弱,减轻,减退 | |
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27 concur | |
v.同意,意见一致,互助,同时发生 | |
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28 nefarious | |
adj.恶毒的,极坏的 | |
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29 cultivation | |
n.耕作,培养,栽培(法),养成 | |
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30 misery | |
n.痛苦,苦恼,苦难;悲惨的境遇,贫苦 | |
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31 behold | |
v.看,注视,看到 | |
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32 prospect | |
n.前景,前途;景色,视野 | |
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33 disappearance | |
n.消失,消散,失踪 | |
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34 computed | |
adj.[医]计算的,使用计算机的v.计算,估算( compute的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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35 bind | |
vt.捆,包扎;装订;约束;使凝固;vi.变硬 | |
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36 militia | |
n.民兵,民兵组织 | |
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37 defense | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
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38 vessels | |
n.血管( vessel的名词复数 );船;容器;(具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的)人 | |
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39 seamen | |
n.海员 | |
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40 excises | |
n.国内货物税,消费税( excise的名词复数 )v.切除,删去( excise的第三人称单数 ) | |
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41 miserable | |
adj.悲惨的,痛苦的;可怜的,糟糕的 | |
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42 taxation | |
n.征税,税收,税金 | |
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43 scattered | |
adj.分散的,稀疏的;散步的;疏疏落落的 | |
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44 posterity | |
n.后裔,子孙,后代 | |
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45 orator | |
n.演说者,演讲者,雄辩家 | |
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46 undoubtedly | |
adv.确实地,无疑地 | |
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47 labor | |
n.劳动,努力,工作,劳工;分娩;vi.劳动,努力,苦干;vt.详细分析;麻烦 | |
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48 tyrant | |
n.暴君,专制的君主,残暴的人 | |
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49 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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50 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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51 providence | |
n.深谋远虑,天道,天意;远见;节约;上帝 | |
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52 calamities | |
n.灾祸,灾难( calamity的名词复数 );不幸之事 | |
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53 heeding | |
v.听某人的劝告,听从( heed的现在分词 ) | |
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54 sneer | |
v.轻蔑;嘲笑;n.嘲笑,讥讽的言语 | |
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55 afterward | |
adv.后来;以后 | |
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56 humane | |
adj.人道的,富有同情心的 | |
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57 rejection | |
n.拒绝,被拒,抛弃,被弃 | |
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58 exclusion | |
n.拒绝,排除,排斥,远足,远途旅行 | |
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59 brag | |
v./n.吹牛,自夸;adj.第一流的 | |
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60 constituents | |
n.选民( constituent的名词复数 );成分;构成部分;要素 | |
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61 unlimited | |
adj.无限的,不受控制的,无条件的 | |
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62 emancipate | |
v.解放,解除 | |
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63 mischief | |
n.损害,伤害,危害;恶作剧,捣蛋,胡闹 | |
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64 apprehended | |
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 ); 理解 | |
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65 upbraided | |
v.责备,申斥,谴责( upbraid的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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66 pervert | |
n.堕落者,反常者;vt.误用,滥用;使人堕落,使入邪路 | |
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67 illicit | |
adj.非法的,禁止的,不正当的 | |
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68 frankly | |
adv.坦白地,直率地;坦率地说 | |
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69 assented | |
同意,赞成( assent的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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70 opportune | |
adj.合适的,适当的 | |
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71 fugitive | |
adj.逃亡的,易逝的;n.逃犯,逃亡者 | |
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72 binding | |
有约束力的,有效的,应遵守的 | |
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73 negotiation | |
n.谈判,协商 | |
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74 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
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75 judicial | |
adj.司法的,法庭的,审判的,明断的,公正的 | |
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76 extravagant | |
adj.奢侈的;过分的;(言行等)放肆的 | |
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77 concord | |
n.和谐;协调 | |
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78 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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79 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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80 subversive | |
adj.颠覆性的,破坏性的;n.破坏份子,危险份子 | |
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81 adjourned | |
(使)休会, (使)休庭( adjourn的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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82 inflexible | |
adj.不可改变的,不受影响的,不屈服的 | |
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83 inflexibility | |
n.不屈性,顽固,不变性;不可弯曲;非挠性;刚性 | |
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