This tone is even more pronounced in his letters for some following months. If anything, it is France rather than England that seems to be looked upon as the chief offender20, with whom there was the greater danger of armed collision. A fortnight after Congress had assembled he wrote to[292] Barlow, the new minister to France, that though justified21 in assuming the French decrees to be so far withdrawn22 that a withdrawal24 of the British orders might be looked for, "yet the manner in which the French government has managed the repeal25 of the decrees, and evaded26 a correction of other outrages27, has mingled28 with the conciliatory tendency of the repeal as much of irritation29 and disgust as possible." "In fact," he adds, "without a systematic30 change from an appearance of crafty31 contrivance and insatiate cupidity32, for an open, manly33, and upright dealing34 with a nation whose example demands it, it is impossible that good-will can exist; and that the ill-will which her policy aims at directing against her enemy should not, by her folly35 and iniquity36, be drawn23 off against herself." French depredations37 upon American commerce in the Baltic were "kindling38 a fresh flame here," and, if they were not stopped, "hostile collisions will as readily take place with one nation as the other;" nor would there be any hesitation39 in sending American frigates40 to that sea, "with orders to suppress by force the French and Danish depredations," were it not for the "danger of rencounters with British ships of superior force in that quarter."
By this time, however, Congress, under the lead of younger, vigorous men—chief among them Clay and Calhoun—panting for leadership and distinction, was beginning its clamor for war with England. How much respect had Madison for[293] this movement, and how much faith in it? A letter to Jefferson of February 7 answers both questions. Were he not evidently amused, he would seem to be contemptuous. "To enable the Executive to step at once into Canada," he says, "they have provided, after two months' delay, for a regular force requiring twelve to raise it, and after three months for a volunteer force, on terms not likely to raise it at all for that object. The mixture of good and bad, avowed41 and disguised motives42, accounting44 for these things, is curious enough, but not to be explained in the compass of a letter." This is not the tone of either hope or fear. If war was in his mind at that time, it was not war with England. Three weeks later he writes to Barlow at Paris. On various points of negotiation45 between that minister and the French government, he observes much that "suggests distrust rather than expectation." He complains of delay, of vagueness, of neglect, of discourtesy, of a disregard of past obligations as to the liberation of ships and cargoes46 seized, and of late condemnations of ships captured in the Baltic; and concerning all these and other grievances47 he says: "We find so little of explicit48 dealing or substantial redress49 mingled with the compliments and encouragements, which cost nothing because they mean nothing, that suspicions are unavoidable; and if they be erroneous, the fault does not lie with those who entertain them." He believed that France, in asking for a new treaty, which he thinks[294] unnecessary, is only seeking to gain time in order to take advantage of future events. The commercial relations between the two countries are so intolerable that trade "will be prohibited if no essential change take place." Unless there be indemnity50 for the great wrongs committed under the Rambouillet decree, and for other spoliations, he declares that "there can be neither cordiality nor confidence here; nor any restraint from self-redress in any justifiable51 mode of effecting it." The letter concludes with the emphatic52 assertion that, if dispatches soon looked for "do not exhibit the French government in better colors than it has yet assumed, there will be but one sentiment in this country; and I need not say what that will be."
Congress all this while was lashing53 itself into fury against England. The ambitious young leaders of the Democratic party in the House were, so to speak, "spoiling for a fight," and they chose to have it out with England rather than with France. Not that there was not quite as much reason for resentment54 against France as against England. Some, indeed, of the more hot-headed were anxious for war with both; but these were of the more impulsive55 kind, like Henry Clay, who laughed in scorn at the doubt that he could not at a blow subdue56 the Canadas with a few regiments57 of Kentucky militia58. But war with England was determined59 upon, partly because the old enmity toward her made that intolerable[295] which to the old affection for France was a burden lightly borne; and partly because the instinctive60 jealousy61 of the commercial interest, on the part of the planter-interest, preferred that policy which would do the most harm to the North. On April 1, 1812, just five weeks after the writing of this letter to Barlow, Mr. Madison sent to Congress a message of five lines recommending the immediate62 passage of an act to impose "a general embargo63 on all vessels64 now in port or hereafter arriving for the period of sixty days." It was meant to be a secret measure; but the intention leaked out in two or three places, and the news was hurried North by several of the Federalist members in time to enable some of their constituents65 to send their ships to sea before the act was passed. Nor, probably, was it a surprise to anybody; for war with England had been the topic of debate in one aspect or another all winter, and the purpose of the party in power was plain to everybody. That the embargo was intended as a preparation for war was frankly66 acknowledged. An act was speedily passed, though the period was extended from sixty to ninety days. Within less than sixty days, however, another message from the President recommended a declaration of war. On June 3 the Committee on Foreign Relations, of which Calhoun was chairman, reported in favor of "an immediate appeal to arms," and the next day a declaratory act was passed. Of the seventy-nine affirmative votes in the House, forty-eight[296] were from the South and West, and of the other thirty-one votes from the Northern States, fourteen were from Pennsylvania alone. Of the forty-nine votes against it, thirty-four were from the Northern States, including two from Pennsylvania. On the 17th, a fortnight later, the bill was got through the Senate by a majority of six.
Mr. Madison for years had opposed a war with England as unwise and useless,—unwise, because the United States was not in a condition to go to war with the greatest naval67 power in the world; and useless, because the end to be reached by war could be gained more certainly, and at infinitely68 less cost, by peaceful measures. The situation had not changed. Indeed, up to within a month of the message recommending an embargo as a precursor69 of war, his letters show that, if he thought war was inevitable70, it must be with France, not England. But the faction71 determined upon war must have at their command an administration to carry out that policy. Their choice was not limited to Madison for an available candidate. Whoever was nominated by the Democrats72 was sure to be chosen, and Madison had two formidable rivals in James Monroe, secretary of state, and De Witt Clinton, mayor of New York, both eager for war. The choice depended on that question and between the embargo message of April 1 and the war message of June 1, the nomination73 was given to Madison by the congressional caucus74. It was understood, and openly asserted at the time by the[297] opponents of the administration, that the nomination was the price of a change of policy. At the next session of Congress, before a year had passed away, Mr. Quincy said in the House: "The great mistake of all those who reasoned concerning the war and the invasion of Canada, and concluded that it was impossible that either should be seriously intended, resulted from this, that they never took into consideration the connection of both those events with the great election for the chief magistracy which was then pending75. It was never sufficiently76 considered by them that plunging77 into a war with Great Britain was among the conditions on which the support for the presidency78 was made dependent." The assertion, so plainly aimed at Madison, passed unchallenged, though the charge of any distinct bargain was vehemently79 denied.
If Mr. Madison's conscience was not always vigorous enough to enable him to resist temptation, it was so sensitive as to prompt him to look for excuses for yielding. In a sense this was to his credit as one of the better sort of politicians, without assuming it to be akin80 to that hypocrisy81 which is the homage82 vice83 pays to virtue84. Perhaps it was this sentiment which led him to accept so readily the pretended disclosures of John Henry, and to make the use of them he did. These were contained in twenty-four letters, for which the President, apparently85 without hesitation, paid fifty thousand dollars. On March 9 he sent them to Congress with a message, and on the same day, in[298] a letter to Jefferson, alludes86 to them as "this discovery, or rather formal proof of the co?peration between the Eastern Junto87 and the British cabinet." In the message he intimates that this secret agent was sent directly by the British government to Massachusetts to foment88 disaffection, to intrigue89 "with the disaffected90 for the purpose of bringing about resistance to the laws, and eventually, in concert with a British force, of destroying the union" and reannexing the Eastern States to England. In the war message of June 1 these charges are repeated as among the reasons for an appeal to arms. Mr. Calhoun's committee followed this lead and improved upon it in the report recommending an immediate declaration of war. The Henry affair was declared an "act of still greater malignity91" than any of the other outrages against the United States of which Great Britain had been guilty, and that which "excited the greatest horror." The incident was seized upon, apparently, to answer a temporary purpose, and then, so far as Mr. Madison was concerned, was permitted to sink into oblivion. In the hundreds of pages of his published letters, written in later life, in which he reviews and explains so many of the events of his public career, there is no allusion92 whatever to the Henry disclosures, which in 1812 were held, with the ruin of American commerce and the impressment of thousands of American citizens, as an equally just cause for war. In truth there was nothing whatever in these disclosures, for which[299] was paid an amount equal to the salary of half a presidential term, to warrant the assumptions of either Mr. Madison's messages or Mr. Calhoun's report. The man had been sent, at his own suggestion, early in 1809, by the governor of Canada to Massachusetts to learn the state of affairs there and observe the drift of public opinion. His national proclivity—he was an Irishman—to conspiracy93 and revolution had led him to see in the dissatisfaction with the embargo a determination in the New England people to destroy the union, reannex themselves to England, and return to the flesh-pots of the colonial period. To learn how far gone they were in these designs, to put himself in intimate relations with the leading conspirators94 and to bring them into communication with Sir James Craig, the governor-general of Canada, that sufficient aid should come through him at the proper moment from the British government, was Henry's mission. Of this truly Irish plot Henry was the villain95 and Craig the fool; but it is hardly possible that three years afterward96 Madison and his friends, with all the letters spread before them, could really have been the dupes.
Henry went to Boston and remained there about three months, living at a tavern97. He found out nothing because there was nothing to be found out. He knew nobody, and nobody of any note knew him, and all the information he sent to Craig might have been, and doubtless was, picked up in the ordinary political gossip of the tavern barroom,[300] or culled98 from the columns of the newspapers of both parties. He compromised nobody, for—as Mr. Monroe, as secretary of state, testified in a report to the Senate—he named no person or persons in the United States who had, "in any way or manner whatever, entered into or countenanced99 the project or views" of himself and Craig; and all he had to say was pointless and unimportant, except so far as his opinions might have some interest as those of a shrewd observer of public events. Indeed, his own conclusion was that there was no conspiracy in the Eastern States; that the Federal party was strong enough to keep the peace with England; and that there was no talk of disunion, nor any likelihood of it unless it should be brought about by war. The correspondence itself showed, in a letter from Robert Peel, then secretary to Lord Liverpool, that the letters of Henry were found, as a matter of course, among Canadian official papers, as they related to public affairs; but they had either never attracted any attention or had been entirely100 forgotten, and Lord Liverpool was quite ignorant of any "arrangement or agreement" that had been made between the governor of Canada and his emissary to New England. It was only because of his failure to get any reward from the British government or from Craig's successor in Canada, for what he was pleased to call his services, that the adventurer came to Washington in search of a market for himself and his papers. He came at[301] an opportune101 moment. Notwithstanding the secretary of state frankly declared, that neither by writing nor by word of mouth did the man implicate102 by name anybody in the United States; notwithstanding one of the letters was evidence, the more conclusive103 because incidental, that the British secretary of state had known nothing of this mission contrived104 between Henry and Craig,—yet Mr. Madison pronounced the letters to be the "formal proof of the co?peration between the Eastern Junto and the British cabinet." The charge was monstrous105, for this pretended proof had no existence. If the President, however, could persuade himself that the story was true, it would help him to justify106 himself to himself for a change of policy, the result of which would be the coveted107 renomination for the presidency.
Not that there had never been talk of disunion in New England. There had been in years past, as there was to be in years to come. But talk of that kind did not belong exclusively to that particular period, nor was it confined to that particular region of country. Ever since the adoption108 of the Constitution the one thing that orators109, North and South, inside the halls of Congress and outside them, were agreed upon was, that in all debate there was one argument, equally good on both sides, to which there could be no reply; that in all legislation there was one possible supreme110 move that would bring all the wheels of government to a dead stop. The solemn warning or the angry[302] threat was always in readiness for instant use, that the bonds of the union, in one or another contingency111, were to be rent asunder112. But so frequent had been these warning cries of the coming wolf that they were listened to with indifference113, except when some positive act indicated real danger, as in the Jefferson-Madison "resolutions of '98." It was easy, therefore, to alarm the public with confessions114 of a secret emissary, as he pretended, who had turned traitor115 to the government which had employed him and to the conspirators to whom he had been sent; and the more reprehensible116 was it, therefore, in a President of the United States, to make the use that was made of this story, which an impartial10 examination would have shown was essentially117 absurd and infamously118 false. Mr. Madison's intelligence is not to be impugned119. He was too sagacious, as well as too unimpassioned a man, to be taken in by the ingenious tale of such an adventurer as Henry. In a letter to Colonel David Humphreys, written the next spring, in defense120 of the policy of commercial restrictions, he says: "I have never allowed myself to believe that the union was in danger, or that a dissolution of it could be desired, unless by a few individuals, if such there be, in desperate situations or of unbridled passions." New England, he continues, "would be the greatest loser by such an event, and not likely therefore deliberately121 to rush into it." "On what basis," he asks, "could New England and Old England form[303] commercial stipulations?" Their commercial jealousy, he contends, forbade an alliance between them, for that was "the real source of our Revolution." He closes with the significant assertion that, "if there be links of common interest between the two countries, they would connect the Southern and not the Northern States with that part of Europe." How, then, could he seriously accept Henry's pretended disclosures as "formal proof," as he wrote to Jefferson at that time, "of the co?peration between the Eastern Junto and the British cabinet"? By the Eastern Junto is meant the Federal party, or at least the influential122 and able leaders of that party; and he could not consider, nor would he have spoken of them as "a few individuals, if such there be, in desperate situations or of unbridled passions." He accepted, then, the Henry story in spite of his deliberate opinions, as a help to involve the country in a party war.
Even at the risk of some prolixity123 it is needful to follow the course of events that led to this war a little farther; for here was the culmination124 of Mr. Madison's career, and from his course in shaping and directing these events we best learn what manner of man he was, and where his true place is among the public men of our earlier history. For a year and a half the United States had acted on the assumption that France had recalled her decrees, and that England had not revoked her orders. The extracts from Mr. Madison's letters, given on previous pages, show his conviction that the revo[304]cation of either decrees or orders was practically no more true of one power than it was of the other. The government of the United States, nevertheless, submitted to the one, and against the other it first re?nacted the non-intercourse act, then proclaimed an embargo preparatory to war, and finally declared war. Yet the whole world knew, and nobody so surely as the emperor of France, that the Berlin and Milan decrees had never been formally repealed125 at all; meanwhile French outrages upon American commerce had continued, and all redress so persistently126 refused that, so late as the last week in February, 1812, the President intimated that war—war with France, not England—might prove the only remedy. But he suddenly yielded to the clamors of the war party at home, whatever may have been his motive43. Then, and not till then, were the decrees actually revoked by Napoleon. In May, 1812, more than a month after the President had recommended an embargo, the hostile purport127 of which was so well understood, a decree was proclaimed by the emperor which for the first time really revoked those of Berlin and Milan. True, it was dated—"purported to be dated," it was said in an official English document—April, 1811. But that was of no moment; the essential point was, that it had never seen the light; that any hint of its existence had never been given to the American government, or its representatives abroad, till the United States had taken measures to "cause their rights to be respected by the Eng[305]lish," which was the original condition of a revocation128 of the decrees. Its ostensible129 date was when the news reached France that non-intercourse had been again enforced against England in March, 1811; but its promulgation130 was to all intents and purposes the real date, when news reached France, in April or May, 1812, that war against England was finally determined upon.
The Duke of Bassano, the French minister, had not, moreover, brought out this year-old decree without pressure from the American minister, Barlow. The President had written Barlow, in that February letter already quoted, that if his expected dispatches did not "exhibit the conduct of the French government in better colors than it has yet assumed, there will be but one sentiment in this country, and I need not say what that will be." When the dispatches came, Mr. Madison received no assurances of redress for past wrongs and no promises for the future; but he learned, on the contrary, that Bassano, in a recent report to the emperor, had referred to the decrees of Berlin and Milan as still in force against all neutral nations which submitted to the seizure131 of their ships by the British when containing contraband132 goods or enemy's property. Naturally the British ministry133 was not slow in presenting this precious acknowledgment to the United States as a proof that she had all along been in the wrong, and that in common justice to England the non-importation act should now be repealed. The assurance was at the[306] same time repeated, possibly in a tone of considerable satisfaction, that when Napoleon really should revoke15 his decrees Great Britain was ready, as she always had been, to follow his example with her orders. It was an awkward dilemma134 for the President and his minister to France. But by this time, the Presidential nomination impending135, Mr. Madison had made up his mind what to do. He was not exactly a wolf; neither was Great Britain a lamb; but the argument he used was the argument of the fable136. Instead of advising—Bassano having declared the decrees still in force—a repeal of the non-importation act, as Great Britain claimed was in justice and comity137 her due, he recommended a war measure. But Barlow evidently felt himself to be under some decent restraint of logic138 and consistency139. He urged upon the French minister the necessity now of a positive and imperial declaration that the decrees, so far as regarded the United States, were absolutely revoked; for this recent assertion of Bassano, that they were still in force, put the United States in an attitude both towards France and England utterly140 and absurdly in the wrong. Barlow represented that, should the revocation be extended only to the United States, Great Britain would not for that alone repeal her orders. In that case France would lose nothing of the advantage of her present position, while everything would be lost should the United States be compelled to repeal her non-importation laws against England. Bassano was quick to see the[307] necessity of jumping into the bramble-bush and scratching his eyes in again, and he then produced his year-old edict. Being a year old, it of course covered all questions. But was it a year old? Who knew? It had never been published? No, the duke said; but it had been shown to Mr. Jonathan Russell, who at that time was chargé d'affaires at Paris. Mr. Russell denied it, though a denial was hardly needed. He would not have ventured to withhold141 information so important from his government; and it was evident, from the tone of his dispatches of a subsequent date, that he had no suspicion of its existence. For he had maintained it, as a point of "national honor," that the revocation of the French decrees must have preceded the President's proclamation of November 1, 1810; and this he would not have dared to do had he known that the actual revocation by the French minister was not made till six months after the date of the President's proclamation, and was then made secretly.
However, as if to defeat all these machinations of France and the United States, Great Britain immediately recalled her orders in council, when, in May, 1812, the Duke of Bassano announced the edict of April, 1811, revoking142 the Berlin and Milan decrees, though so far only as they concerned American vessels. The declaration of war of June 18 had not reached England, and there was still a chance for peace. Foster, the late English minister to the United States, learned at Halifax—where he had stopped on his way home—that[308] the orders in council were repealed, and he took immediate steps to bring about an armistice143 between the naval commanders on the coast of Nova Scotia, and between the governor of Canada and the American general, Dearborn, in command of the frontier. The government at Washington, however, refused to ratify144 any suspension of hostilities145. Some negotiations146 followed, but, decrees and orders being out of the way, there was nothing left to negotiate about except the question of impressment. Upon that question the two governments were as wide apart as ever, and not in the least likely to come together. Mr. Madison determined that on that ground alone the war should go on. It had been as good and sufficient ground for such a war any time for the past dozen years; but whether it could be settled by an appeal to arms was a question of possibilities and probabilities by which both Jefferson and Madison had hitherto been ruled. Was that still the essential question? With the result came the answer. Two years later the administration was glad to accept a treaty of peace in which impressment was not even alluded147 to. Great Britain did not relinquish148 by a syllable149 her assumed right to board American ships in search of British seamen150; and the administration instructed its peace commissioners151 not even to ask that she should.
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1
exasperated
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| adj.恼怒的 | |
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frigate
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| n.护航舰，大型驱逐舰 | |
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vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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rupture
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| n.破裂；(关系的)决裂；v.(使)破裂 | |
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dissuade
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| v.劝阻，阻止 | |
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avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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equanimity
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| n.沉着，镇定 | |
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proclivity
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| n.倾向，癖性 | |
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impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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impartiality
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| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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abated
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| 减少( abate的过去式和过去分词 )； 减去； 降价； 撤消（诉讼） | |
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offenses
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| n.进攻( offense的名词复数 )；（球队的）前锋；进攻方法；攻势 | |
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revoke
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| v.废除，取消，撤回 | |
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revoked
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| adj.[法]取消的v.撤销，取消，废除( revoke的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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offender
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| n.冒犯者，违反者，犯罪者 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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repeal
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| n.废止，撤消；v.废止，撤消 | |
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evaded
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| 逃避( evade的过去式和过去分词 )； 避开； 回避； 想不出 | |
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outrages
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| 引起…的义愤，激怒( outrage的第三人称单数 ) | |
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mingled
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| 混合，混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 )； 混进，与…交往[联系] | |
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irritation
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| n.激怒，恼怒，生气 | |
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systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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crafty
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| adj.狡猾的，诡诈的 | |
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cupidity
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| n.贪心，贪财 | |
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manly
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| adj.有男子气概的；adv.男子般地，果断地 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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iniquity
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| n.邪恶；不公正 | |
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depredations
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| n.劫掠，毁坏( depredation的名词复数 ) | |
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kindling
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| n. 点火, 可燃物 动词kindle的现在分词形式 | |
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hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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frigates
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| n.快速军舰( frigate的名词复数 ) | |
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41
avowed
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| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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42
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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44
accounting
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| n.会计，会计学，借贷对照表 | |
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negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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46
cargoes
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| n.（船或飞机装载的）货物( cargo的名词复数 )；大量，重负 | |
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grievances
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| n.委屈( grievance的名词复数 )；苦衷；不满；牢骚 | |
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explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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49
redress
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| n.赔偿，救济，矫正；v.纠正，匡正，革除 | |
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50
indemnity
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| n.赔偿，赔款，补偿金 | |
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51
justifiable
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| adj.有理由的，无可非议的 | |
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52
emphatic
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| adj.强调的，着重的；无可置疑的，明显的 | |
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53
lashing
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| n.鞭打；痛斥；大量；许多v.鞭打( lash的现在分词 )；煽动；紧系；怒斥 | |
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54
resentment
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| n.怨愤，忿恨 | |
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55
impulsive
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| adj.冲动的，刺激的；有推动力的 | |
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56
subdue
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| vt.制服，使顺从，征服；抑制，克制 | |
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57
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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58
militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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59
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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60
instinctive
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| adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的 | |
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61
jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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62
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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63
embargo
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| n.禁运（令）；vt.对...实行禁运，禁止（通商） | |
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64
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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65
constituents
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| n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素 | |
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66
frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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67
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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68
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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69
precursor
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| n.先驱者；前辈；前任；预兆；先兆 | |
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70
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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71
faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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72
democrats
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| n.民主主义者，民主人士( democrat的名词复数 ) | |
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73
nomination
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| n.提名，任命，提名权 | |
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74
caucus
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| n.秘密会议；干部会议；v.（参加）干部开会议 | |
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75
pending
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| prep.直到，等待…期间；adj.待定的；迫近的 | |
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76
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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77
plunging
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| adj.跳进的，突进的v.颠簸( plunge的现在分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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78
presidency
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| n.总统(校长，总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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vehemently
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| adv. 热烈地 | |
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80
akin
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| adj.同族的，类似的 | |
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81
hypocrisy
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| n.伪善，虚伪 | |
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82
homage
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| n.尊敬，敬意，崇敬 | |
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83
vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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84
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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85
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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86
alludes
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| 提及，暗指( allude的第三人称单数 ) | |
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87
junto
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| n.秘密结社；私党 | |
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88
foment
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| v.煽动，助长 | |
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89
intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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90
disaffected
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| adj.（政治上）不满的，叛离的 | |
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91
malignity
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| n.极度的恶意，恶毒；（病的）恶性 | |
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92
allusion
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| n.暗示，间接提示 | |
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93
conspiracy
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| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
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94
conspirators
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| n.共谋者，阴谋家( conspirator的名词复数 ) | |
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95
villain
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| n.反派演员，反面人物；恶棍；问题的起因 | |
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96
afterward
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| adv.后来；以后 | |
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97
tavern
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| n.小旅馆，客栈；小酒店 | |
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98
culled
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| v.挑选，剔除( cull的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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99
countenanced
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| v.支持，赞同，批准( countenance的过去式 ) | |
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100
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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101
opportune
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| adj.合适的，适当的 | |
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102
implicate
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| vt.使牵连其中，涉嫌 | |
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103
conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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104
contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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105
monstrous
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| adj.巨大的；恐怖的；可耻的，丢脸的 | |
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106
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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107
coveted
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| adj.令人垂涎的；垂涎的，梦寐以求的v.贪求，觊觎(covet的过去分词)；垂涎；贪图 | |
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108
adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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109
orators
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| n.演说者，演讲家( orator的名词复数 ) | |
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110
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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111
contingency
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| n.意外事件，可能性 | |
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112
asunder
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| adj.分离的，化为碎片 | |
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113
indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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114
confessions
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| n.承认( confession的名词复数 )；自首；声明；（向神父的）忏悔 | |
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115
traitor
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| n.叛徒，卖国贼 | |
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116
reprehensible
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| adj.该受责备的 | |
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117
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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118
infamously
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| 不名誉地 | |
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119
impugned
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| v.非难，指谪( impugn的过去式和过去分词 )；对…有怀疑 | |
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120
defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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121
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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122
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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123
prolixity
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| n.冗长，罗嗦 | |
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124
culmination
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| n.顶点；最高潮 | |
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125
repealed
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| 撤销，废除( repeal的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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126
persistently
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| ad.坚持地；固执地 | |
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127
purport
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| n.意义，要旨，大要；v.意味著，做为...要旨，要领是... | |
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128
revocation
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| n.废止，撤回 | |
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129
ostensible
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| adj.(指理由)表面的，假装的 | |
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130
promulgation
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| n.颁布 | |
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131
seizure
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| n.没收；占有；抵押 | |
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132
contraband
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| n.违禁品，走私品 | |
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133
ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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134
dilemma
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| n.困境，进退两难的局面 | |
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135
impending
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| a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
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136
fable
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| n.寓言；童话；神话 | |
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137
comity
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| n.礼让，礼仪；团结，联合 | |
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138
logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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139
consistency
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| n.一贯性，前后一致，稳定性；(液体的)浓度 | |
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140
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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141
withhold
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| v.拒绝，不给；使停止，阻挡 | |
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142
revoking
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| v.撤销，取消，废除( revoke的现在分词 ) | |
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143
armistice
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| n.休战，停战协定 | |
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144
ratify
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| v.批准，认可，追认 | |
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145
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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146
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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147
alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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148
relinquish
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| v.放弃，撤回，让与，放手 | |
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149
syllable
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| n.音节；vt.分音节 | |
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150
seamen
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| n.海员 | |
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151
commissioners
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| n.专员( commissioner的名词复数 )；长官；委员；政府部门的长官 | |
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