Now as the evolution of mind progresses actions no longer serviceable may survive in connection with given feelings, remain indicative of them; thus the strong beating 346of the heart in fear and the scowl13 in anger. Such survival actions which occur in connection with all kinds of feelings, and especially with those which are pre-human in their origin, are with particular emphasis styled expressions. The scowl in anger is considered as expression rather than the actual blow struck, which is equally the result and indication of anger.[F]
F. Wundt says that when in emotion we look “sour” we think we are actually tasting the sour, and so make the repulsing14 action, “sour” look. (Lectures on Psychology15, p. 283.) I think it more probable that the “sour” look is the survival expression of such an emotion as disappointment. It is likely that the genesis of disappointment was in tasting the sour for the supposedly sweet, e.g., lemon for orange, and the “sour” look has remained as expression of disappointment long since its utility ceased. The genesis and early growth of most emotions is in connection with certain sense experiences and their related actions, and these actions tend to remain as “expressions” long after their real quality as actions has disappeared. Hence it is by survival, and not because he thinks himself tasting something sour, that a man looks “soured” by disappointment when I fail to give him money as promised. So also black is gloomy because we are diurnal16, and our ancestors were diurnal. If nocturnal, black would seem joyous17, white gloomy. (Cf. Wundt, ibid., p. 375.)
Expression is then primarily all action connected with all consciousness, secondarily, it is useless action continued by force of habit and transmitted to descendants. But still many expressions are more than mere18 actions or their survivals. To be sure, Darwin and many Darwinists maintain that the expressions do not arise or exist for their own value as such, but they are entirely19 incidental. Expression is not the function of the so-called expressions, but they are entirely functional20 survivals. While, however, we must admit that many expressions have arisen and been preserved in this manner, yet I think it is altogether hasty to deny the function and value of expression per se. Expression has existed as a function from very early phases of life, and it underlies21 all bisexuality and sociality which have been such important 347elements in evolution. Organic sound-producing structures, whose sole utility from the very first is for attracting attention, early appear, and further voice seems to have its origin in the demand for love-call and call to young. Gregariousness23 is made possible in almost all its forms by purposive expression. There comes early, then, a will, not merely in performing some definite act at prompting of a feeling, but also a use in simply expressing it to others, communicating the fact of having pain or pleasure states to others. The cry of pain in young animals is a cry for help, and as such has been favoured in the struggle for existence. The usefulness of this action is solely24 as expression, and as expression it has arisen and been developed. Expression here is not an incidental view of a physiological26 action, but exists for its own value to the individual. Such expressions have their use in their significance, and as the true language of feeling are to be interpreted by the principle of serviceability. An expression which is and continues, by reason of its utility, as a sign-language, visual, auditory, or otherwise, as gesture love-calls, etc., may be termed pure expression as distinguished28 from incidental expression, like blushing, pallor, etc., which exist, not for their significance, though they are significant. Incidental expression includes also the sphere of degraded action. Yet what seems mere degraded action may be true expression, as beckoning29, which is an abridgement of the action of pulling one to oneself and of movement towards oneself; but this motion of the hands exists, not for this end, nor as survival, but merely as significant of a desire on the part of the gesturer. In the higher ranges of life we well know the large place played by pure expression as distinguished from incidental expression. It is not necessary to suppose that pure expression consists merely in “voluntary and consciously” employing “means of communication” (Darwin, Expression of the Emotions, p. 256); thus, the scream of 348an infant is equally pure expression, whether the infant employs it knowingly or not as such, for screaming of the young has doubtless arisen and been preserved in natural selection because of its utility as significant. There is then, I think, a group of activities which are not merely incidentally expressive30, but originate and exist for expression as a useful thing in the battle of life.
But we have not exhausted31 the principles of expression when we refer to present or past serviceability as an action in general or to service as expression. It is plain that in any activity prompted by any feeling there comes at a certain high intensity32 a more or less pathologic over-functioning of the organs concerned, with under-functioning of others. Emotion as action stimulator33 in any high degree always enhances some physiologic25 function to the depression of others. The blood, for instance, is forcibly withdrawn34 from various parts to certain specially active parts, and this withdrawal35 gives rise to an appearance which may be termed a negative expression, as the pallor in fear. Certain other phenomena connected with fear, as change of colour in the hair, cold sweat, and trembling of the muscles, which are mentioned by Darwin as unexplained, are probably due to this negative principle (Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, New York, 1886, p. 350; but compare pp. 81 and 308, where these disturbances36 are ascribed to direct action of the nervous system. Darwin does not, however, distinctly state or treat the principle we here mention as a distinct law). As the body is an inter-related system of organs, stimulation37 to one organ means an effect upon all, excitation of some, depression of others; thus to an acute observer the whole body is symptomatic of every feeling, and, indeed, of every consciousness. In the natural and normal course emotion, to do its work most effectively, implies little or no marked negative expression, but the nervous energy generated flows freely and directly to the organs which 349are to do service, without greatly impairing38 general function. Fear thus acts at first simply and advantageously; but in its later history fear becomes greatly complicated, and instead of freely issuing in serviceable action with not excessive heightening or depressing of any function, its outlet39 seems as it were choked, and the nervous energy spends itself within the body in violent disturbances of vital organs. Fear becomes then decadent40 and loses its place as evolutionary41 factor, becoming impediment rather than aid to progress. Negative expression must then be considered as especially notable in the later exhibitions of an emotion when concentration becomes morbid42 and ineffective, losing its advantageousness, and the emotion is being supplanted43 by other psychic44 factors. Great injury and death itself may result from the abnormal action of fear and other primarily useful psychoses.
Besides the particular organs to serviceable activity with the subsidiary physiological functioning, and the indirect depression, we must still note other principles which may control expression. Nervous energy under the incitement45 of emotion is often in excess of the demand for the required action, and it will then overflow46 into correlated activities along the line of least resistance. Also when the suitable action is checked for any reason, its motive47 force backs up and overflows48 in new channels. Indefinite and purposeless movements of various kinds thus result which may be expressive of the emotion of which they are incidentally the result. Any one who has watched an Irish setter tracing game must have remarked the wavings of the tail becoming more rapid when the scent49 becomes stronger. When the dog is running very fast, the tail-waggings are less noticeable than when moving slowly, although the interest may seemingly be the same in both cases. It is obvious that a fast run uses to a large extent the superfluous50 energy which was discharging in tail movements, and when the useful running is 350checked the tail motion recommences with greater force, serving as a safety-valve. The frisking of young animals and children is also largely due to diffusion51 of so-called superfluous nerve-force, and is expressive of general sensations of pleasure. All feeling is motor in its natural value and tendency, and unless the resulting energy is fully52 used in some special serviceable action, it will discharge itself along the easiest and most habitual53 lines laid down by inheritance. Thus the peculiar54 ancestral experience of animals is always expressed by their spontaneous diffusive55 activities. It will be remarked that the principle of diffusion is the reverse of negative expression, being an overflow of force as opposed to withdrawal. Excessive generation of energy is certainly uneconomical, and we must consider that at first emotion tended rather to less than the required amount, than more.
The phenomena of diffusive expression, in the strict sense, are thus rather late in appearance. The very lowest forms of life have no infancy56 or play period, and from the first are directly active in the struggle for existence. Yet the play period was certainly evolved through natural selection as a fully educative and preparatory stage, wherein the actions most demanded in actual life are unconsciously practised and a general basis of reserve force is accumulated. Play activity is a living on inherited energy and in the inherited modes: the kitten pouncing57, the horse prancing58, etc. Play is then rather a mode of activity than a mode of expression; it is expressive only in the way that all action is expressive. Expression proper is only in those modes of action which are carried on, whether consciously or unconsciously, by virtue59 of their significance value. If everything which is expressive is called an expression, we must include all the bodily actions and phenomena which can in any wise be connected with consciousness. I use the term diffusion in the narrow sense of spontaneous overflow of energy in 351excess of that absolutely required for the advantageous action. I do not refer to the general diffusion of emotional effect throughout the whole organism, which always occurs by the very nature of organism. Thus the pain from a pin-prick certainly modifies to some extent every cell in the body; there is a direct wave of influence from the psychic experience, and this is propagated throughout the whole organism by reason of its essential interdependency of parts; it echoes and re-echoes throughout the whole. The physiological result is then in simplest cases extremely complicated. However, this mere general fact of diffusion is a biological truism, and does not explain any expression, but simply asserts that every feeling, by virtue of its physical basis, affects the organism as a whole. Emotion issues specially in motor activities because its origin was as stimulant to necessary action, but this action involved internal organs, especially the circulatory and respiratory, and indirectly60 the whole body in every part. The explanation of an expression must always be in tracing back to the original serviceable actions with their demands on special subsidiary organs, and their depression of certain related organs, and not in reference to the general law of diffusion, which is but another term for the essential continuity of the organism. A useful principle of expression must not merely say that there is by the nature of organism a general bodily result from every emotion, but it must explain the particular expressions.
We make them so far four principles or forms of expression, which we instance in saying that the blow of an angry man is general activity expression, shaking the fist at one, purposive expression, scowling61 as remnant of watching foe62 intently in the open air is survival expression, and twitching63 and trembling of certain muscles is diffusive expression. Every emotion commonly issues in all four forms, in direct activity with associated survival tendencies and purposive expression, and a surplus of energy runs 352over into certain natural and easy motions, or a deficiency of energy in certain organs manifests itself, the negative side of diffusive expression.[G]
G. Since emotion comes in waves, expression is reduplicated. This may throw some light on such an expression as laughter. Landor says the Ainu do not in the proper sense laugh, but they roar with delight. It may be that laughter is reiterated64 roar as resulting from reiterated psychic impulses and feelings. As in the growth of an emotion, waves are multiplied, the expression becomes more reduplicate, and thus laughter tends to become more rippling65 and articulate. The cachinnation and explosiveness has thus a plausible66 explanation, which I merely suggest. At least Prof. Dewey’s explanation (Psychological Review, I., 559) that “both crying and laughing fall under the same principle of action—the termination of a period of effort”—is quite too general. Tension ceasing, effort stopped, we “breathe freely,” take deep inspirations. Laughter is far from being the usual outcome of such a status.
Darwin makes antithesis67 a principle of expression. Thus the expression of affection in the dog or cat toward its master cannot, says Darwin, be traced in any wise to serviceability, and we must seek its explanation merely as unconsciously and instinctively68 assumed as directly contrary to the serviceable hostile expressions. A dog’s expression of anger is, or has been, directly serviceable action, but the expressions of affectionate pleasure seem never to have had such an origin, but to have arisen merely as antithetic to the former, and so establishing the utmost distinctness of impression. To convey most clearly a motion of its friendliness70 the dog naturally assumes those attitudes which are most diverse from its expression of hostility71. Their serviceability as expressions is best attained72 by being completely antithetical, and the more antithetical the better under natural selection. However, if this be the case, antithesis scarcely deserves, it seems to me, the name of a principle of expression, but it merely denominates the fact that opposite emotions in the struggle for existence tend to exhibit themselves in opposite ways as similar emotions in similar ways; but 353we need neither antithesis nor similarity as a principle. I believe that serviceability past or present either as direct action or as expression is the prime impetus74 of what we term the expression of the emotions, and I confess I do not see much force in Darwin’s Chapter on Antithesis. If, however, opposition75 has a meaning for life, as Darwin seems to imply, then does not the expression come under the law of serviceability? If there is any opposition in expression, I should explain this in general by utility rather than by antithesis per se. Thus take the gestures instanced by Darwin (ibid., p. 65), of pushing away with the hand when telling one to go away, and of pulling toward when telling one to come; these gestures are, indeed, antithetic, but their explanation does not lie in the fact of the antithesis, but in the fact of the past serviceable habit, by which individuals disliked or liked were repelled76 or attracted. In the present instance the person motioned to may be far beyond the reach of the arms, but still the gesture may be more than mere useless survival, for it acts as emphasis of the vocal78 expression, and has its influence there.
Darwin for some reason constantly ignores the serviceability of expression as such—not so much as a fact, but as a principle—and hence its relation to natural selection, whereby he involves himself in needless difficulties. If an expression is of use, why should it not arise through natural selection as well as a limb, a wing, or an eye? Like other functions, expression may be incidental or may adapt variations attained originally for other ends, but in the case of the voice, at least, we have an original organ of expression as instrument of intercommunication.
Nor can I think Darwin’s treatment of the expressions of affection by the dog as due to antithesis a very happy or satisfactory solution. In the first place, the expression of friendliness by the dog is not the complete antithesis of that of hostility. The dog barks both out of friendly 354joy and from anger, as Darwin himself states. Some dogs also, as I have often observed in my dog, show pleasurable affection by wrinkling up the lips and showing the teeth, an act which is often mistaken for a hostile demonstration79. Dogs also, as is the habit with my own, will often express affection in the same way as the cat (ibid., fig80. 10), by rubbing against one. This is but an instance of a general law of expression of affectionate emotion, i.e., closeness of contact with the beloved object which is liked as promoting pleasure. This instinctive69 expression of love or liking81 certainly had its origin in serviceability, the appropriate effort toward the pleasure-giving thing or animal, but specially in the relation of parent and offspring, and in that of alliance in danger. Again, the tail of a hostile dog is, as figured by Darwin, straight and erect82, but the opposite of this is the tail tucked between the legs when fleeing from pursuers in fear, rather than the position when showing friendliness to its master. My own opinion of the rise of the friendly expression of dog, cat, and other animals toward man is that they are in the main, at least, transferred from the serviceable friendly expressions used among themselves in a wild or domesticated83 state. I have repeatedly seen small dogs, who attach themselves to some large dog as their master, fawn84, posture85, and lick this master precisely86 as this master does his human master. Dogs and cats also show their affection and care for their offspring in many expressive acts which are transferred to their human owners. These expressions were primarily either directly serviceable actions, as the licking, or serviceable for expression as such, as various sounds made to give assurance of presence of food, or of safety. In general, it seems to me that when antithesis has occurred, it has arisen out of serviceability and not vice12 versa.
With reference to the wagging of the tail in the dog, this is far from being an expression of affection alone. I have already mentioned the case of the setter where the 355movement of the tail is largely due to diffusion of superfluous energy, analogous87 to nervous habits like pacing the floor or biting the nails in human beings. With some dogs at least, as I have noticed in my own St. Bernard, the tail is switched slowly back and forth88 when approaching another dog with hostile intent. We have not as yet a sufficient number of facts at hand with reference to the history of the dog to pronounce the tail wagging as originating by virtue of its use as expression. And what is the rationale of the origin of the tail in the dog and cat, and for what reason has it been perpetuated89? Is it a prehensile90 survival—which has been taken advantage of in the breeding of the pug—or is it a sexual characteristic, or did it originate to perform some directly advantageous action, as the tail of the cow and horse, or did it come into being as an organ of expression? Is the tail-wagging recognised by animals themselves as an expression as it is by man? These are questions on which we must have more data than we now possess in order to make any sufficient answers.
Again, the rise of the barking by dogs under domestication91 is another problem on which little can be said with certainty for lack of data. Darwin’s remark that it may arise by imitation of the loquacity92 of man seems to me ludicrously inadequate93, and there seems no element of imitation in the noise produced. Domesticated animals in general tend to use the vocal organs for louder sounds than when in the wild state, for with wild animals the value of a loud noise as expression in any way is largely counterbalanced by its betraying presence to enemies. When natural enemies of the dog are driven out by man there will be a tendency toward a larger use of the vocal organs, both with reference to companion dogs and also to man. The particular sound, the bark, is determined94 by the nature of the whole vocal apparatus95. The bark was, no doubt, originally to frighten aggressors, 356as I have often seen a large dog frighten a small dog from a piece of meat by a sudden resounding96 bark. Gradually attained as a mode of terrifying his competitive associates and certain game which it follows under domestication, and so preserved and developed by natural selection, the tendency is also powerfully strengthened by artificial selection, the best barker, other things being equal, being chosen for breeding by man. When the bark has become a common and habitual practice, it becomes a vent97 for superfluous energy developed by joy and other emotions. Like snarling98 or grinning, it is also a play form, and thus becomes denotative of joy by association. To impress one’s friendliness or hostility upon others, to appease99 or terrify, are the two main ends of expression with both man and animals, and this function is excited in various ways by different species, as determined by environment. The danger signal and the safety signal, the beware or welcome, is amplified100 and varied101 according to particular requirements which must be fully investigated before we can give any complete rationale of any expression. Conciliatory and menacing expressions and gestures have been evolved and matured in strict correlation102 under the same general law of natural selection, and neither one nor the other is due to antithesis. It is entirely unlikely that of such expressions, one, the hostility side, was first developed by natural selection, the other owing its rise to a distinct principle, antithesis.
However, I am not ready to deny antithesis all force as principle of expression, but it seems to me it should be ranged with law of similarity or analogy as subsidiary, and largely influential103 only in the higher types of expression, especially the teleologic104 human, as in gesture. Thus, if thumbs up means pity, thumbs down would naturally be used to denote pitilessness. To nod the head means assent105 or yes, to shake the head means dissent106 or no, though the exact antithesis would be to throw the head 357backward—assent signal with some tribes. However, while it may be asserted that, as a general law, that like emotions express themselves in like ways, unlike in unlike, this can hardly be used to throw much light on expression. Given a particular emotion and its expression, we can by no means deduce immediately the expression of the opposition emotion. Particular conditions and special organic limitations will always make this impracticable, and it is the office of the scientist to study expression in the course of evolution as of service under a multitude of conflicting interests and distracting difficulties.
We view expression then as mainly due to the principle of advantageous variation in the struggle for existence. Expression is the action required in the battle for life, or accompaniments to assist this action, or the call for aid to bring it about. Natural selection is the first and fundamental law of expression, negative expression and superfluous energy both being secondary and often pathologic in tendency.
The struggle for existence is itself on the very face of it an expression of mind, namely, activity significant of certain will and feeling experience. Whatever shows mind is expression, and thus in a large sense every movement in the physical universe—and what is the universe but motion—and every organic activity may be construed107 as expression. Whether all force, motion, action, is or must be expression is, however, a philosophic108 investigation109 which we need not now discuss, though we may suspect that the height and depth of mind and so the range of expression is enormously beyond the science of to-day. However, restricting ourselves to the domain110 of animal life, it is obviously very difficult to determine just what activities of a given organism betray mind, and still more just what form of mentality is manifesting itself. Man, being the measure of all things, interprets himself in all, 358and even when he becomes aware of the dangers of anthropomorphism he cannot wholly disengage himself from the tendency. The subjective111 analogical interpretation112 is a necessary evil. Still man is the keenest sighted of all beings for expression, and actions in a very wide range which had not in fact the real function of expression become expressive to him. The primary value of fear for the deer is to make it run from danger, and the running becomes expressive of the fear to observers, though the running is not for the expression. Thus vital activities of many kinds are expressive, though their primary value is not in the expression. Activities whose sole or main value is to give expression are comparatively late, the value of expression in this narrow sense being in the mental impression thereby113 made upon other organisms. Thus actions which serve purely114 to frighten others, in making one’s self formidable by loud noises, as roar of lion, bark of dog, by erecting115 the hair, displaying claws, teeth, and other such actions are pure expressions.
There is a constant growth in the value of expressiveness116 as we ascend117 the scale of life, expression playing a larger and larger part till with man certain individuals become specialized118 as expressionists, artists, poets, and orators119. Further, fine art is expression which has its value, not in any exterior utility, but in itself alone, the subjective emotion seeking in a manner perfectly120 free from the common utilities of life to find itself a complete and perfect embodiment. Art here does not serve life, but life, art. The experience has in itself its own vindication121 for being, in that it expresses. Expression is no longer bare action nor yet a function to serve life, but it becomes a life in itself. In this ideal life of pure expression we recognise the necessity that the expressionist be emancipated122 from the struggle for existence, be freed from the sordid123 cares of life, and given up wholly to expressing his individuality with characteristic force; hence the State often pensions 359writers and artists. But apart from this ideal life, in the evolution of intricate sociality and industry and complex culture, expression becomes a more and more potent124 factor. Man in society must not only be, he must reveal himself, he must show what he is in order to achieve the most. Many fail, not for lack of faculty125, but for lack of expressive ability. Expression, then, in general, is a function which, starting from the most minute beginnings in the lower animals, culminates126 in man. In large part man is man by reason of his superior power of expression, especially by speech, oral and written. Evolution in man is on the mental side in particular, but a large part of this mentality has been given to the improvement of expression in making it more facile, full and rapid. The complete natural history of expression is yet to be written, and all that I attempt is to indicate the point of view for such an investigation.
There are two points further with reference to expression which merit a few remarks. The first is as to the reaction of expression on emotion. We have treated to some extent the relation of emotion to its expression, but we have also to consider the relation of an expression to its emotion and to emotion in general. We have all along assumed that the emotion as a factor in the evolution of life is an internal stimulus to a serviceable activity, which may be viewed as its expression, or may even have its value as such. That emotion, as stimulus of action, determines expression is, I think, a primary law. However, Prof. James maintains (Mind, xxxiv., 188) the reverse—that expression determines the emotion.[H] We do not strike because we are angry, but we are angry because we strike. Hence, in reality, the emotion is really the expression, that is, the emotion is the consciousness result of the so-called expression—it expresses the “expression” in terms of 360consciousness. We commonly speak of expressing our emotions, but we should rather speak of emotions as expressions in consciousness of certain bodily activities. But if we make emotion but a psychological incident and off-shoot of certain activities, I take it we run directly counter to the general function of mind in evolution as internal stimulant to useful activity. Emotion is, I judge, fundamentally a motive force and has its function, and so its rise and development as such. It is more than a by-product127, but even if it were, how should we account for it? After the serviceable activity has actually been brought about, after a man has really struck down his adversary128, what is the utility of emotion? We take it that the value of emotion lies in starting and supporting the activity, and it is advantageous economy that it cease immediately on the accomplishment129 of its end. While we must always suppose that emotion has its physical support in central neutral changes, yet the expression is truly such; that is, it is from a different impulse as determined by the emotional brain excitement. In the light merely of a theory of natural selection, mind in general, and emotion in particular, is more than incidental concomitant of physical changes, more than echo of corporeality130: it has a vital and central function in the evolution of life. Prof. James points to the fact that exercising the expressions or imagining the feeling calls up the feeling, as a proof of his theory. This, however, is merely a matter of association, and can prove neither a real precedent131 nor resultant. We may call up ideation as well as emotion by producing associated activities. In the interdependence of the conscious life, emotion, perception and willing call up each other without reference to causative order. Any one element of consciousness may be regarded either as resultant or stimulant, according as we look at preceding or following state of consciousness. In the order of evolution, pain and pleasure arise from certain actions in order to inhibit133 or stimulate134 361repetition of actions. Feeling is then, both resultant and stimulant. The emotions may arise from the expressions by association, but the original dependence132 is that of expression on emotion. The further test, that we cannot imagine an emotion without bringing in bodily presentation, is simply a necessity of the imaging faculty as such, an image by its very nature being concrete.
H. Professor James has of late largely modified his view (see Psychological Review, Sept., 1894).
While, then, I believe that emotion is the spring of expression, I am far from denying that the expression may not react upon the emotion. Whenever the will in any wise controls expression we mark modifications135 in the feeling. In the later evolution of life the directing of expression is of great importance, and expression is gradually subjected to the will. Hence, especially with man, it becomes possible to feel in certain ways and yet to repress the signs of feeling, to have strong emotions, and yet not betray them to those who might take advantage of them. When a strong emotion is forcibly and completely checked in its expression there is commonly rankling136. At least it is not true, as Darwin states (Ibid., p. 360), that “repression, as far as this is possible, of all outward signs softens138 our emotions.” Very often, as we all know by personal experience and by observation, the checking the free expression of emotion tends to intensify139, rather than soften137, the emotion. The school-girl, who, on hearing sad news, rushes away to have a good cry, weeps away her grief, and experiences a deep sense of relief; while the man who sternly represses the expression of grief often suffers acutely and long. Grief, of course, sometimes lies too deep for tears, and we often long to be able to express the pent-up emotion which chokes us. This state is the opposite of the free, natural expression of feeling such as we see in children. Children express themselves without self-control, for this is beyond them; but here is the power to will expression, but the effort is always futile140.
By promoting or repressing expression we do certainly 362influence emotion; but this volition141 is always for reason, and implies, then, a conflict of feelings. Thus, a feeling for propriety142 leads the man to control his tears, and this feeling in itself must tend to diminish the strength of the concomitant grief. However, though there is a measure of interference, we would be wrong in supposing that complex mental life is always comparatively weak in its component143 elements. The distraction144 of interest due to new feelings checking expression is not always equal to the relieving power of free or promoted expression. The direct checking of the expressional act certainly keeps back the current of energy from its natural channel, and the feeling has increased in duration, if not in quantity. The evanescent character of emotion with young children and with demonstrative people is well known.
But besides the changes which may come to the feeling through direct will-effected changes in the expression, we must also note that the mere consciousness of expression has often a definite influence. Thus, when greatly frightened, I may become conscious of the heart leaping into the throat, the trembling, etc.; and this consciousness of the expression acts in general as a diversion in the feeling which is expressed. Sometimes, indeed, it seems to add to the feeling, as when a girl blushes for her blushes. There is an intensification145 of self-consciousness which but heightens and renews the expression with renewed sense of expression, and then another flood of embarrassing self-consciousness, and so on in a long series. Here, however, the sense of expression does not in strictness add to the intensity of the original feeling, but it develops a new feeling of the same kind; at each step there is new occasion and a renewed feeling, but a total quantity is constituted, so that we are right enough in saying that the consciousness of her own blushing but added to her embarrassment146. Yet it may be stated as a general law that a consciousness of our expressive acts as such tends to decrease the original 363feeling from which the expression arises, inasmuch as the field of consciousness is thereby divided.
When the will attains147 control over expression we may not merely repress the impulse to expression when we feel strongly, but having no feeling of a given kind we may voluntarily adopt its expression, and this adoption148 of the expression very often leads by association to the real feeling. Again, when experiencing a feeling we may simulate the expression of another or even opposite feeling. It is often advantageous in the struggle for existence to throw others off their guard by deceiving them as to the real emotional state; hence, craft and guile149 have from a tolerably early stage in evolution played a part in the history of life. Animals and men alike soon appreciate the distinction between appearance and reality, that a kind and pleasant expression is often but the lure150 of malice151 and hostility, that injury is often meant where there is the show of benefit. Plants, as well as animals, often are quite other than they appear, both for offence and defence; and there is the wide field of mimetic protection which cannot, however, at present be brought under our subject.
Simulation of expression probably arose as an economical makeshift; a mere show which costs the organism little often attains ends which would otherwise require a vast deal of mental force. Thus we see children scared into desired behaviour by assumed anger, grief, etc.; and even animals, as I have noticed with dogs, likewise frequently affect expressions which have no support in real emotion. The unsophisticated, however, learn with great rapidity to distinguish between assumed and real emotion. Any one who has made a pretence152 of crying before little children must have remarked this. Simulation of expression in order to easily reach desired ends is thus rather limited, but still has a real value and a considerable place under natural selection.
However, expression may sometimes be simulated in 364order to attain73 the associated emotion. If we act mad, we often get mad, and thus, as we see in the plays of animals and children, merely assumed expression may lead to the real emotion. This way of attaining153 emotion by purposely enacting154 its known expression, we may call impression as the reverse of the expression order. Men may work themselves up into a fury, as well as vigorously express an anger directly occasioned. Actors and public speakers often take advantage of this reaction of expression on emotion, and thereby not merely affect an emotion, but have a certain real emotion, which cannot ever be na?ve. Thus Macready as Shylock used to prepare himself and get up “the proper state of white heat” by violently shaking a ladder. Poe in one of his tales makes a detective say, when wishing to know the thoughts of a wicked man, “I fashion the expression of my face as accurately155 as possible in accordance with the expression of his, and then wait to see what thoughts or sentiments arise in my mind or heart, as if to match or correspond with the expression.” This method of acting22 like another, that we may have and so know his thoughts and feelings, is a very difficult way of mind-reading.
But expression is often simulated on one or both sides with full understanding of it as such. This enters into play, and is the essence of the dramatic art. That the word play denotes both the sportive imitative actions of animals and men, and also a dramatic representation is not fortuitous or arbitrary. It is noticeable that among the lower animals the earliest and commonest play is playing at being angry or frightened, which corroborates156 the view of these emotions as probably the earliest and most fundamental in life. The correlated nature of fear and anger is shown by the way they are played at; thus you often see one dog with a show of anger chasing another who simulates fear, and then the parts are exchanged.
The great relation of pursuer and pursued is constantly 365mimicked among animals with interchanging of parts. So also among children the commonest plays are those of fleeing and chasing, as tag, hare and hound, hide and seek, etc., the fundamental elements of life being re-enacted under the superfluous energy which tends to flow most easily into the oldest and most habitual channels. Thus play has a high historic psychic importance. To attack and to run away are the most necessary and essential of life activities, and play has a certain pedagogic and preparative value, and has thereby been sanctioned by natural selection, for we see that in the evolution of life the tendency has constantly been to lengthen157 the play period. Among the lowest animals the individual at birth is immediately thrown into the struggle for existence and must battle for itself; there is no play time for it, but at once it enters upon direct life struggle; but in higher life there is a period of spontaneous free dramatic activity.
But not only is anger and fear shammed158 as a prominent and primitive159 play, but it is most common to stimulate to real anger or fear, and then in glee to show the inadequacy160 of the occasion to the victim. Every one has observed how frequently young animals play by teasing and scaring each other. The tricks of boys and practical jokes of men both point to the deep inbred power of anger and fear in life, and are at the same time symptomatic of their decline in power as dominant161 life factors. All children delight in scaring one another on pretence, in seeing the real expression and feeling themselves the moving powers in bringing it about. This satisfaction, which is aboriginal162, which is the reflex of the original pleasure sanction when power to scare others for one’s own benefit was being evolved in life, makes a large part of the enjoyment163 of such action. A large part of play-pleasure must, indeed, be set down to reflex of the earliest hard-earned pleasure experience; but a large part is also due to the thrill of excitement and the delight in activity per se. Later forms of plays are largely 366due to pure imitative propensity164, though often helped by reversal tendencies.
We note also that this perceived groundlessness of the action becomes a large element in later forms of play, as wit and humour, but the pleasure is plainly based on the power and the superiority of intelligence implied. It amuses the tyrant165 to throw his companions into mortal fear by the slightest suggestion, the smaller the occasion the more amusing the fright. And in general the slighter the real cause in relation to the effect produced, the more acute the pleasure, by reason of the supremacy166 thereby emphasized. It is always more amusing to scare a child by a slight movement of a finger than by a vigorous act of the whole body. It seems to me that it is by this association that disproportion, incongruity167, irrelevance168, however induced, become in themselves amusing, ludicrous, laughable. So the incongruous, in which I have no part whatever, becomes a comic spectacle and the basis of all comedy, yet also of the tragic169 and tragedy. In the tragic the discordance170 between what is and what ought to be, instead of pleasing, pains. What is comic to a coarse mind may seem tragic to the refined. A bird, distressed171 by the death of its mate, offering it food, might amuse a savage172 or a boy, but must be a pathetic sight to a civilized173 and cultured man, though both might be amused to see a child presenting food to its doll.
Not only may the incongruous which is comparatively unrelated to me be amusing as well as that which I myself bring about, but even when I am the victim I may be highly delighted by the intrinsic disproportion of my experience to the exciting cause. With some persons, perhaps rather few in number, the next best thing to playing a joke is having one played on them. This amusement at oneself occurs even among savages174. When Stanley was on the Congo, he was at one time greatly annoyed by the number of native visitors. In vain he 367tried to repel77 them, but one morning when a crowd had assembled at the river side, at some little distance, waiting an opportunity to board his vessel175, some of his men put on lion skins which were at hand, and acted the part so well that the intending visitors fled in abject176 terror. Having retired177 to a safe distance they looked back to see the men walking the deck with the lion skins in their hands and laughing most heartily178. Seeing then the groundlessness of their alarm the whole crowd burst into roars of laughter and shouted in merriment for a long time. Exhibitions of fright, we may remark, seem to be especially amusing to savages, as when an assembly of Africans of the lowest type went into ecstasies179 of uproarious delight on seeing a stereopticon picture of a frightened negro hastily climbing a tree to get out of the way of the gaping180 jaws181 of a crocodile.
Play is then very largely either a mutual182 shamming183 of expression, or a stimulating184 real expression in one by pretended expression in the other. The pleasure in deceiving others by simulating expression points to ancestral experience, for deceit has been one of the greatest factors in life evolution. That an individual seems to be an entirely different being from what he really is, has often been most advantageous in the struggle for existence, and hence a large variety of simulated expression has been employed. Children then, as repeating in play form the race history, take great delight in masquerading and so deceiving their acquaintances as to their identity, making false pleas for charity, etc. The drama has its roots in this form of play. To make others take us for quite different than we are gives us a high pleasure of power, and early man was often moved, in the breathing spells of the struggle for existence, to play at false personalities185 simply for the pleasure in itself of being a successful actor. There is also the counter pleasure of the spectators in piercing the simulated expression. It is only 368in latest phases of dramatic art that simulation comes to be appreciated for its own sake, that there is on both sides full and complete feeling of the illusory nature of the whole transaction, and an enjoyment of the art per se. Simulating expression is the actor’s art; but when the simulation is forgotten by either actor or audience, nature appears and art disappears.
While it is the province of the actor’s art to simulate expression, it is in general the office of fine art to imitate and render the expressive by image, picture, musical notes, etc. The artist is the expresser and simulator par4 excellence186, and complete and perfect expressiveness is his constant aim, though not for utility or amusement, but for the sake of awakening187 the ?sthetic emotion. I cannot then agree with Bosanquet, who, as I understand, makes ?sthetic feeling the emotion of expression, expression for expression’s sake. For expression by its very nature is such only as expressive, that is, as going beyond itself, as being a means, and not an end in itself, hence expression for expression’s sake is meaningless phrase. Expression, so far as it attempts to stand merely for itself, is an empty mannerism188 and a barren technique. Expression is only such as it is backed by the emotion expressed, as significant of some psychosis; and artistic189 expression or art is the expression of the artistic or ?sthetic emotion, a peculiar feeling about things, as apple blossoms, a sunset, a child playing. This emotion is often awakened190 by cognizance of an expression, as an expression of joy or horror by a child, and may thus be an emotion of or at expression, as also in the case where it is roused by the skill in purposive expression of any kind, ?sthetic or other, but expression is obviously not the only way of exciting the emotion, its object may be a mere patch of colour, a pure musical note, etc. ?sthetic emotion tends to manifest or express itself just like all emotions, and in attaining perfect expression it strengthens itself. Likewise 369language, as an instrument of thought, a logical expression, has strengthened thought, but a purely formal logic27 is as barren and void as a purely formal ?sthetic. Language as expressive of thought and as expressive of ?sthetic emotion is equally dependent upon what it expresses, and ?sthetics is thus not peculiar in its relation to expression.
The interpretation of expression in nature and art is often a hard matter and has given rise to much variance191. For instance, take the much discussed Laoko?n group; Winckelmann says the father sheds pity from his eyes like mist upon his sons; Lessing finds grief and noble endurance expressed; Goethe thinks the father shows pity for his youngest son, apprehension192 for the older son, and terror for himself; Lübke finds only mere pain manifested. Coming to a single feature, the mouth, we find the most diverse interpretation. Winckelmann says that here is an heroic soul who disdains193 to shriek194, and gives forth only “an anxious and suppressed sigh.” Lessing maintains also that here is a shriek softened195 into a sigh, but not “because a shriek would have betrayed an ignoble196 soul, but because it would have produced a hideous197 contortion198 of the countenance199.” Later critics have generally followed Lessing. It is obvious, I think, that the expression of the mouth is not shrieking200, but is moaning, groaning201, or sighing. On this quite a number of competent witnesses, physicians and psychologists whom I consulted, are practically agreed. However, it has occurred to me that the sighing or moaning of Laoko?n may not be a softened form at all, but the actual expression designed by the artists. It is generally supposed that the artist here desired to show mortal agony, and it is assumed that shrieking is the expression of mortal agony. This assumption seems to me correct when extreme pain is suddenly inflicted202; but when, as in the case of Laoko?n, the mortal wound is received only after the most exhausting 370struggle, the natural expression is moaning. The realistic sculptor203 would surely not give any softened form, but, shrinking from nothing, has expressed Laoko?n in this death grasp in the very act of giving up the ghost. Though the muscles of the limbs and trunk are still tense, yet the closing eyes, the head falling back, and the arm thrown toward the base of the brain indicate that the struggle is over, and the death moment has come, expressed vocally204 only by a moan. We do not need to find here then any conflict between realism and the artistic sense, but the simplest and most obvious interpretation is what the expression gives, sighing and moaning, which is the true one under the circumstances, and is so meant by the artist.
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1
mentality
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| n.心理，思想，脑力 | |
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2
stimulant
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| n.刺激物，兴奋剂 | |
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3
advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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par
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| n.标准，票面价值，平均数量；adj.票面的，平常的，标准的 | |
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specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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6
exterior
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| adj.外部的，外在的；表面的 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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inciting
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| 刺激的，煽动的 | |
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cerebral
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| adj.脑的，大脑的；有智力的，理智型的 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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stimulus
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| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
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vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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scowl
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| vi.(at)生气地皱眉，沉下脸，怒视；n.怒容 | |
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repulsing
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| v.击退( repulse的现在分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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diurnal
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| adj.白天的，每日的 | |
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17
joyous
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| adj.充满快乐的；令人高兴的 | |
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18
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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19
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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20
functional
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| adj.为实用而设计的，具备功能的，起作用的 | |
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21
underlies
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| v.位于或存在于（某物）之下( underlie的第三人称单数 )；构成…的基础（或起因），引起 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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gregariousness
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| 集群性；簇聚性 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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physiologic
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| a.生理学的 | |
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physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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28
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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29
beckoning
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| adj.引诱人的，令人心动的v.（用头或手的动作）示意，召唤( beckon的现在分词 ) | |
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30
expressive
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| adj.表现的，表达…的，富于表情的 | |
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exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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32
intensity
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| n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度 | |
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33
stimulator
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| n.刺激物，刺激者 | |
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34
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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disturbances
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| n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 )；打扰；困扰；障碍 | |
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37
stimulation
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| n.刺激，激励，鼓舞 | |
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impairing
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| v.损害，削弱( impair的现在分词 ) | |
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outlet
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| n.出口/路；销路；批发商店；通风口；发泄 | |
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40
decadent
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| adj.颓废的，衰落的，堕落的 | |
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41
evolutionary
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| adj.进化的；演化的，演变的；[生]进化论的 | |
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42
morbid
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| adj.病的；致病的；病态的；可怕的 | |
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43
supplanted
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| 把…排挤掉，取代( supplant的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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psychic
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| n.对超自然力敏感的人；adj.有超自然力的 | |
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45
incitement
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| 激励； 刺激； 煽动； 激励物 | |
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46
overflow
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| v.(使)外溢，(使)溢出；溢出，流出，漫出 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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48
overflows
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| v.溢出，淹没( overflow的第三人称单数 )；充满；挤满了人；扩展出界，过度延伸 | |
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49
scent
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| n.气味，香味，香水，线索，嗅觉；v.嗅，发觉 | |
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50
superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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51
diffusion
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| n.流布；普及；散漫 | |
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52
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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53
habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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54
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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55
diffusive
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| adj.散布性的，扩及的，普及的 | |
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56
infancy
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| n.婴儿期；幼年期；初期 | |
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57
pouncing
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| v.突然袭击( pounce的现在分词 )；猛扑；一眼看出；抓住机会（进行抨击） | |
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58
prancing
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| v.（马）腾跃( prance的现在分词 ) | |
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59
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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60
indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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61
scowling
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| 怒视，生气地皱眉( scowl的现在分词 ) | |
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62
foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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twitching
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| n.颤搐 | |
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64
reiterated
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| 反复地说，重申( reiterate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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rippling
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| 起涟漪的，潺潺流水般声音的 | |
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66
plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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67
antithesis
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| n.对立；相对 | |
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68
instinctively
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| adv.本能地 | |
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69
instinctive
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| adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的 | |
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70
friendliness
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| n.友谊，亲切，亲密 | |
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71
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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72
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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73
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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impetus
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| n.推动，促进，刺激；推动力 | |
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75
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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76
repelled
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| v.击退( repel的过去式和过去分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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77
repel
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| v.击退，抵制，拒绝，排斥 | |
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78
vocal
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| adj.直言不讳的；嗓音的；n.[pl.]声乐节目 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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80
fig
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| n.无花果(树) | |
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81
liking
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| n.爱好；嗜好；喜欢 | |
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82
erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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83
domesticated
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| adj.喜欢家庭生活的；（指动物）被驯养了的v.驯化( domesticate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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84
fawn
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| n.未满周岁的小鹿；v.巴结，奉承 | |
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85
posture
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| n.姿势，姿态，心态，态度；v.作出某种姿势 | |
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86
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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87
analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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88
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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89
perpetuated
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| vt.使永存（perpetuate的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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90
prehensile
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| adj.（足等）适于抓握的 | |
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91
domestication
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| n.驯养，驯化 | |
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92
loquacity
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| n.多话，饶舌 | |
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93
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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94
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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95
apparatus
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| n.装置，器械；器具，设备 | |
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96
resounding
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| adj. 响亮的 | |
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97
vent
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| n.通风口，排放口；开衩；vt.表达，发泄 | |
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98
snarling
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| v.（指狗）吠，嗥叫， （人）咆哮( snarl的现在分词 )；咆哮着说，厉声地说 | |
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99
appease
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| v.安抚，缓和，平息，满足 | |
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100
amplified
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| 放大，扩大( amplify的过去式和过去分词 )； 增强； 详述 | |
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101
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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102
correlation
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| n.相互关系，相关，关连 | |
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103
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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104
teleologic
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| adj.目的论的 | |
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105
assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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106
dissent
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| n./v.不同意，持异议 | |
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107
construed
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| v.解释（陈述、行为等）( construe的过去式和过去分词 )；翻译，作句法分析 | |
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108
philosophic
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| adj.哲学的，贤明的 | |
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109
investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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110
domain
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| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
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111
subjective
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| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
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112
interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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113
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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114
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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115
erecting
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| v.使直立，竖起( erect的现在分词 )；建立 | |
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116
expressiveness
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| n.富有表现力 | |
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117
ascend
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| vi.渐渐上升，升高；vt.攀登，登上 | |
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118
specialized
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| adj.专门的，专业化的 | |
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119
orators
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| n.演说者，演讲家( orator的名词复数 ) | |
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120
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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121
vindication
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| n.洗冤，证实 | |
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122
emancipated
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| adj.被解放的，不受约束的v.解放某人（尤指摆脱政治、法律或社会的束缚）( emancipate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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123
sordid
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| adj.肮脏的，不干净的，卑鄙的，暗淡的 | |
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124
potent
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| adj.强有力的，有权势的；有效力的 | |
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125
faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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126
culminates
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| v.达到极点( culminate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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127
by-product
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| n.副产品，附带产生的结果 | |
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128
adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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129
accomplishment
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| n.完成，成就，（pl.）造诣，技能 | |
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130
corporeality
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| n.肉体的存在，形体的存在 | |
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131
precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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132
dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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133
inhibit
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| vt.阻止，妨碍，抑制 | |
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134
stimulate
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| vt.刺激，使兴奋；激励，使…振奋 | |
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135
modifications
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| n.缓和( modification的名词复数 )；限制；更改；改变 | |
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136
rankling
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| v.（使）痛苦不已，（使）怨恨不已( rankle的现在分词 ) | |
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137
soften
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| v.(使)变柔软；(使)变柔和 | |
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138
softens
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| （使）变软( soften的第三人称单数 )； 缓解打击； 缓和； 安慰 | |
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139
intensify
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| vt.加强；变强；加剧 | |
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140
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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141
volition
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| n.意志；决意 | |
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142
propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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143
component
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| n.组成部分，成分，元件；adj.组成的，合成的 | |
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144
distraction
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| n.精神涣散，精神不集中，消遣，娱乐 | |
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145
intensification
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| n.激烈化，增强明暗度；加厚 | |
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146
embarrassment
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| n.尴尬；使人为难的人(事物)；障碍；窘迫 | |
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147
attains
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的第三人称单数 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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148
adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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149
guile
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| n.诈术 | |
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150
lure
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| n.吸引人的东西，诱惑物；vt.引诱，吸引 | |
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151
malice
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| n.恶意，怨恨，蓄意；[律]预谋 | |
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152
pretence
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| n.假装，作假；借口，口实；虚伪；虚饰 | |
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153
attaining
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的现在分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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154
enacting
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| 制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的现在分词 ) | |
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155
accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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156
corroborates
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| v.证实，支持（某种说法、信仰、理论等）( corroborate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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157
lengthen
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| vt.使伸长，延长 | |
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158
shammed
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| 假装，冒充( sham的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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159
primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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160
inadequacy
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| n.无法胜任，信心不足 | |
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161
dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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162
aboriginal
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| adj.（指动植物）土生的，原产地的，土著的 | |
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163
enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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164
propensity
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| n.倾向；习性 | |
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165
tyrant
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| n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人 | |
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166
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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167
incongruity
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| n.不协调，不一致 | |
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168
irrelevance
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| n.无关紧要；不相关；不相关的事物 | |
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169
tragic
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| adj.悲剧的，悲剧性的，悲惨的 | |
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170
discordance
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| n.不调和，不和，不一致性；不整合；假整合 | |
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171
distressed
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| 痛苦的 | |
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172
savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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173
civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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174
savages
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| 未开化的人，野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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175
vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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176
abject
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| adj.极可怜的，卑屈的 | |
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177
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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178
heartily
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| adv.衷心地，诚恳地，十分，很 | |
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179
ecstasies
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| 狂喜( ecstasy的名词复数 )； 出神； 入迷； 迷幻药 | |
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180
gaping
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| adj.口的；张口的；敞口的；多洞穴的v.目瞪口呆地凝视( gape的现在分词 )；张开，张大 | |
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181
jaws
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| n.口部；嘴 | |
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182
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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183
shamming
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| 假装，冒充( sham的现在分词 ) | |
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184
stimulating
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| adj.有启发性的，能激发人思考的 | |
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185
personalities
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| n. 诽谤，（对某人容貌、性格等所进行的）人身攻击； 人身攻击；人格, 个性, 名人( personality的名词复数 ) | |
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186
excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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187
awakening
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| n.觉醒，醒悟 adj.觉醒中的；唤醒的 | |
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188
mannerism
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| n.特殊习惯，怪癖 | |
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189
artistic
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| adj.艺术(家)的，美术(家)的；善于艺术创作的 | |
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190
awakened
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| v.（使）醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
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191
variance
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| n.矛盾，不同 | |
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192
apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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193
disdains
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| 鄙视，轻蔑( disdain的名词复数 ) | |
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194
shriek
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| v./n.尖叫，叫喊 | |
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195
softened
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| （使）变软( soften的过去式和过去分词 )； 缓解打击； 缓和； 安慰 | |
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196
ignoble
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| adj.不光彩的，卑鄙的；可耻的 | |
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197
hideous
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| adj.丑陋的，可憎的，可怕的，恐怖的 | |
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198
contortion
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| n.扭弯，扭歪，曲解 | |
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199
countenance
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| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
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200
shrieking
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| v.尖叫( shriek的现在分词 ) | |
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201
groaning
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| adj. 呜咽的, 呻吟的 动词groan的现在分词形式 | |
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202
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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203
sculptor
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| n.雕刻家，雕刻家 | |
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204
vocally
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| adv. 用声音, 用口头, 藉著声音 | |
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