I went to Thayetmyo, and there met the local officers and heard what account they had to give. They reported the remaining gangs to be small. Parties of Mounted Infantry2, with active police and civil officers, were told off to work both sides of the river, and a great improvement was effected in a few months.
I marched from Thayetmyo to Minhla, about seventy miles, having all the neighbouring villagers collected to meet me at each halting-place. They were encouraged to talk freely and tell their grievances3. They complained only of the impressment of carts and such-like matters inseparable from the constant movement of troops and the disturbed times. That they had suffered a good deal between the upper and the nether4 millstone—the Government and the dacoits—may be easily believed. But it was in great part their own fault, as they would not give our officers information.
Consultation5 of village headmen with Chief Commissioner6.
[91]
The country through which we marched was mostly dense7 forest and jungle, with very few villages. It was only necessary to see it to understand the difficulty of beating out of such cover small gangs of active men, unencumbered by anything except their arms, and able to get food from any hamlet. The wonder is that with a mere8 handful of Mounted Infantry at their disposal, our officers were able to run the dacoits down and exterminate9 them in so short a time.
Sir Benjamin Simpson, K.C.I.E., Surgeon-General, with the Government of India, who had been sent over by the Government to advise me about the medical establishments of the military police and of the province generally, accompanied me on this march.
From Minhla I went to Minbu and saw the officers there. I then went on to Pagan. In order to see the country about Popa, I rode from Pagan to Popa and back by another road. This country is very wild and densely10 wooded. It would seem to one riding through it to be uncultivated, but this is not the case. All the bottoms of the slopes are cultivated, and there are numerous shallow streams which in the dry weather have no water in them. The villages were few and poor-looking, mere huts with palm-leaf thatch11. The cattle, however, were numerous and good, carts stood in all the villages.
Not a man was to be seen anywhere, only women and children. We had lost our way and wanted a guide, and eventually were fain to ask for two women to show us the way. It is no wonder that Popa was the home of dacoits. Most of the people seemed at this time to live by stealing cattle from the neighbouring and more populous12 districts. Once they got the cattle into their villages, they kept them in enclosures, hidden away in the jungle, until they could drive them off to a distant market. This country was not brought under control for two years.
From Pagan I crossed to Pakokku and saw the Wunkadaw and her son, and Mr. Browning the Assistant Commissioner, and then went on to Myingyan. I had only time to inspect the station and see the officers and[92] talk to Brigadier-General Low, when a telegram came from Sir George White asking me to come up to Mandalay at once, as trouble threatened with the Wuntho Sawbwa.
This man's territory lay in a hilly country lying between the Katha district and the Chindwin River. He had been from the first year of our occupation a source of trouble; he refused to come in, and at one time objected to pay his tribute. Early in '87 the Commissioner of the Northern Division, Mr. Burgess, went to the town of Wuntho, which is on the eastern extremity13 of his country, and is not his real capital although he takes his title from it, to meet him. Mr. Burgess was accompanied by a military force. The matter was then arranged by the Sawbwa paying his tribute, but he refused to see our officers, and continued to give trouble by harbouring dacoits and insurgents14 who raided our territory.
It was the fixed15 policy of Lord Dufferin to preserve so far as might be these autonomous16 States. I have explained elsewhere how it came about that Shan States existed in this part of Burma, separated as they were by position and in their politics from the body of States on the Shan plateau. Every endeavour was made therefore to smooth matters and not to quarrel with the Wuntho man, whom we believed, and perhaps justly, to be actuated more by fear than by determined17 hostility18.
The circumstances which led Sir George White to call me to Mandalay were these. A regiment19 of Gurkhas was coming across from India to relieve another which had been some time in Burma. It was convenient to bring the relieving regiment down by the Kabaw Valley to the Chindwin, where they would meet the other. A road had been selected through the Wuntho territory by which both regiments20 should march. They were to meet on the Chindwin and exchange transport trains, thus saving expense and trouble.
This was a natural arrangement. The route did not pass through the Sawbwa's capital. The military authorities had satisfied themselves that it was practicable for troops. I agreed to the proposal, caused the matter to be carefully explained to the Sawbwa, and directed him to collect supplies and to clear the roads.
[93]
The Sawbwa replied, objecting to our troops passing through, and proposing an alternative route to which he had no objection. He based his opposition21 on the ground of personal fear, and referred to our assurance that Wuntho should not be occupied. I considered that we could not allow the Sawbwa to close his territory to us, and after consulting the Major-General, I told the Sawbwa through the Deputy Commissioner of Katha that the regiments must march by the road we had chosen. Rumours22 had been heard for some time that the Sawbwa was blocking his roads and preparing to oppose us in force. General White wished me to come up at once as the regiment leaving Burma had reached Kawlin, which is on the verge23 of Wuntho territory, and it was necessary to decide on the action to be taken in case its march was opposed. I decided24 to let it wait at Kawlin for ten days in order to give the Sawbwa time to reply to my order, utilising the delay by making arrangements to support and strengthen the Gurkhas in case we should have to fight. Soon after this decision had been reached, Sir George White sent me a telegram from the Colonel commanding the 43rd, dated from Kawlin, to the effect that the route by which he had been ordered to march was impracticable, and that the attempt to march along it would be opposed. General White advised the acceptance of the Sawbwa's alternative route, which was reported to have been prepared and supplied with provisions.
As my order sent through the Deputy Commissioner had been couched in very peremptory25 terms, I felt it inadvisable to withdraw. The Sawbwa was reported to be making preparations for opposing us by force, and if we drew back now our action would be certainly attributed to fear. There was telegraphic communication with Katha, but letters to Wuntho had to go on by messenger. It occurred to me that the Deputy Commissioner's messenger might still be stopped, and I telegraphed to Katha to recall him. Fortunately the letter was stopped at Kawlin. Under these circumstances Sir George White and I agreed to send the Gurkhas by the road which the Sawbwa had prepared. Any other course would have laid us open to the charge of having picked a quarrel with the Sawbwa.
There was every reason at the time for avoiding a step[94] which would have increased our direct responsibilities. The civil staff of the province was weak, not only in numbers but in experience. I was forced to trust men with districts who had no training and did not know Burmese. The annexation26 of Upper Burma was more difficult in some ways than the annexation of the Punjab. In the latter case there was in the army and in the adjacent provinces a supply of officers acquainted if not with the language of the Punjab, yet with a kindred speech. The whole cadre of Lower Burma was only threescore men, and it was impossible to take many men fit for service in Upper Burma from its ranks without leaving the Lower Province very much undermanned. For these reasons I did my best as long as I was in Burma to avoid a breach27 with the Wuntho Sawbwa, and latterly, when he sent in his wife to Mandalay to see the Commissioner, I was in hopes that we had overcome his suspicions, but I felt certain that sooner or later we should be obliged to get rid of him. I do not regret having waited as long as possible. When he broke out in 1891 the whole of the adjacent country was under control, the military police were organized and trained, and his revolt was put down with very little trouble or disturbance28. No one can say that he was treated otherwise than with the greatest forbearance. I shall not have to refer to him again.
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1
strenuous
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| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
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2
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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grievances
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| n.委屈( grievance的名词复数 )；苦衷；不满；牢骚 | |
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4
nether
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| adj.下部的，下面的；n.阴间；下层社会 | |
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5
consultation
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| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
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6
commissioner
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| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
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7
dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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8
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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9
exterminate
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| v.扑灭，消灭，根绝 | |
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10
densely
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| ad.密集地；浓厚地 | |
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11
thatch
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| vt.用茅草覆盖…的顶部；n.茅草(屋) | |
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12
populous
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| adj.人口稠密的，人口众多的 | |
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13
extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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14
insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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15
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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16
autonomous
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| adj.自治的；独立的 | |
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17
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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18
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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19
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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21
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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23
verge
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| n.边，边缘；v.接近，濒临 | |
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24
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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25
peremptory
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| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
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26
annexation
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| n.吞并，合并 | |
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27
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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28
disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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