Lower Burma had been reduced almost to its normal condition. The late Mr. Todd Naylor in the Tharrawaddy district had thoroughly2 extirpated3 the gangs which had troubled it and brought it to a state of quiet which it had not enjoyed for a very long time.
The disarmament of the whole province had been systematically4 taken in hand; the Village Regulation had become law, the military police had been organized and now numbered 17,880 men. The whole conditions had been changed. At the beginning of the year (1887) the troops had held one hundred and forty-two posts and the police fifty posts. At the end of the year the police held one hundred and seventy-five, and the troops eighty-four. The concentration of the troops in a few principal stations, left the work of destroying the remaining gangs to the military police, who were frequently engaged in action with dacoits. There were a few petty disasters at first. Nothing else was or could have been expected of partially5 trained men scattered6 about in small posts. There were only three serious cases in 1888. In one case, in distinct contravention of my orders, a small picket7 of ten men had been put out on the edge of a forest in a small house or shed without even a bamboo stockade8. The picket was two miles from a military police post. The Burmans set fire to a cooking shed and volleyed the police by the aid of the firelight. Seven men fell to the first two volleys and only two were unwounded. These men behaved gallantly9 and kept the dacoits at bay until aid came from the post.
In another case and in another district a patrol of one jemadar and eleven sepoys was ambushed10. The jemadar and nine of the men were killed and one man badly wounded and left for dead. The remaining man with the aid of two Burmans reached the nearest post. A party was sent out and the wounded man picked up.
The third disaster was in the Magwè district, where thirty men under an English Inspector11 met a large body of dacoits and were forced to retreat losing seven killed and two wounded. Six Snider rifles and two ponies12 were captured by the dacoits. This was an unfortunate affair for which the men were not responsible. It gave the Magwè dacoits fresh spirit.
To the responsible head of the administration the year 1888 was one of much anxiety. The troops were vacating numerous outposts held by them and they were being replaced by police fresh from India, and most of them imperfectly trained. The dacoits had learned to fear the soldiers, and the presence of a large body of men with numerous outlying detachments under military discipline and keeping touch with each other, kept districts which had all the elements of disorder13 and were perhaps in fact dominated by dacoit leaders in apparent tranquillity14. Sagaing was a notable instance of this. The district was covered with posts, but the soldiers hardly saw a dacoit, and consequently no progress was made in breaking up what was a strongly organized combination against our rule.
The troops, moreover, had learned their work; they were led by trained and zealous15 officers, who had acquired in many cases a minute knowledge of localities which was lost with them. The military police, on the other hand, were new to the country and the work, and seldom had the advantage of being led by trained British officers. The effect of the change began to be felt towards the end of 1887, and the beginning of 1888—that is to say, in the season of the year when life in the forest is dry and pleasant, the favourite time for the pastime of dacoity. Hence there was no doubt a revival16 of disorder in some places, and the petty disasters which befell the military police were magnified and made much of by some correspondents[97] who found it profitable to misrepresent everything connected with the administration of Burma.
The transition stage did not last long. The Indian police picked up their work with rapidity. No men could have learnt it quicker. They were constantly engaged with dacoits; they frequently followed up and inflicted17 punishment on them and recovered property without loss to themselves. The few mistakes were seized upon and magnified while the successes vastly greater in number were not noticed.
In the first orders regarding the military police the minimum garrison18 of a post was fixed19 at twenty-five men. This was found to be too weak and was raised to forty, and the minimum strength of a patrol was fixed at ten. I found it necessary to forbid any new post to be established without my sanction and to lay down the strength of the movable column to be maintained in each district. The local officers seemed unable to refrain from putting out posts until there was not a man left at headquarters.
In April, 1888, the Viceroy asked me if I saw any sensible signs of the reduction of our troops and the substitution of the police encouraging the dacoits or loosening our hold on the country. After explaining that the districts where the dacoits were most active and organized there had been no reduction of troops, but, on the contrary, constant military activity under keen commanders, I wrote:—
"I have carefully watched events and thought over the matter, and my conclusion is that the dacoits know that the troops have retired21 and that the police move in small numbers and have taken advantage of the occasion. If this is allowed to go on they will get bolder and will give trouble.... I am inclined to sit tight and wait until the men have learnt their work. The native officers will learn the language and the country.... The commissioners22 and district officers like to cover their districts with a perfect network of posts at short distances from each other. If they were allowed their own way there would not be a man left to move about. Last August (1887) this was foreseen, and the strength of the movable column to be kept for active operations in each district was laid down, and orders have been given and have been enforced forbidding the formation of new posts without my sanction."
[98]
Lord Dufferin accepted my views, saying that he would not go into the various considerations which I had placed before him, "except to say that I fully20 appreciate the calmness and good sense with which you have discussed the matter. A more excitable man might have gone off at a tangent and have been frightened into measures which would certainly have been very expensive and might not have been necessary. I have taken the Commander-in-Chief into counsel, and after going fully and very carefully into the whole matter we are content to accept your views."
There was in point of fact no reason for anxiety. Week by week the police improved. The first combined movement attempted with military police was in the difficult Popa country where four small columns under Captain Hastings, Commandant of the Myingyan battalion23, succeeded in running Ya Nyun's gang hard, but did not capture him. And in various encounters in this district alone the dacoit gangs loss amounted to: killed, 105; wounded and captured, 29; captured, 486. Eighteen ponies were taken, 316 firearms, and many dahs and spears.
The casualties of the military police in Upper Burma, during 1888, were 46 killed and 76 wounded, whilst the dacoits lost 312 killed (actually counted after action), and 721 captured. The casualties in the Army in Upper Burma between the 1st of May, 1887, and the 31st of March, 1889, were: killed or died of wounds 60, and wounded 142. (Par. 26 of the Despatch24 of Major-General Sir George White, K.C.B., V.C., late Commanding the Upper Burma Force. Dated Simla, July 6, 1889.) The police could not have been more active than the soldiers had been. They probably suffered more in proportion to their numbers owing to their inferior training. During the year 1888 the military police were in the field constantly in almost every district in the province.
It became evident that we had not a sufficient number of British officers; if a man fell sick or was wounded, there was no one to take his place. Sixteen additional officers were sanctioned for the police, but they did not arrive until after the close of the year. They added much to the strength and efficiency of the force.
[99]
On the whole, it became evident before the middle of 1888 that the police were getting a hold of the province and that no danger had been incurred25 by reducing the military garrison and bringing the troops into quarters. We had still to rely on the assistance of the soldiers in work that belonged more properly to the police.
Hence in Sagaing, Magwè, the Chindwin district, and some other places where the insurgents26 showed special activity, I was compelled in some cases to ask for aid. If it was sought unwillingly27, it was given most readily by the Major-General commanding, and was invaluable28. The civil administration was not yet able to stand alone. It was not so much the rank and file but the many British officers, keen and experienced, whose withdrawal29 was felt; for it will be remembered each police battalion had at the most two British officers, while very few districts had an area of less than three thousand square miles.
As an example of the invaluable aid rendered by the soldiers, two of the most noted30 leaders on the Ava side, Shwè Yan and Bo Tok, who had been the scourge31 of the country since the annexation32, fell to parties of British Infantry33. Bo Tok was killed by Mounted Infantry of the Rifle Brigade led by Major Sir Bartle Frere, and a few months later, Lieutenant34 Minogue, with some Mounted Infantry of the Royal Munster Fusiliers, ran down Shwè Yan. The deaths of these two men, who kept the borders of Ava, Myingyan, and Kyauksè in a ferment35, enabled the civil power to bring this country into order in a short time.
The military police, however, took their full share of work. A man who had given endless trouble to the troops since the annexation and made his lair36 on the east side of the Kyauksè district was the Setkya leader. He was attacked by the Kyauksè military police under Captain Gastrell, Commandant of the Mandalay battalion, and his band dispersed37. The Setkya escaped, but he was caught and delivered up by the Shan Sawbwa of Lawksawk. After his defeats on former occasions he had found a safe refuge in the Shan hills. The Shan leaders were now our loyal subjects, and the Setkya's career came to an end.
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1
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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extirpated
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| v.消灭，灭绝( extirpate的过去式和过去分词 )；根除 | |
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systematically
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| adv.有系统地 | |
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partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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picket
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| n.纠察队；警戒哨；v.设置纠察线；布置警卫 | |
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8
stockade
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| n.栅栏，围栏；v.用栅栏防护 | |
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gallantly
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| adv. 漂亮地，勇敢地，献殷勤地 | |
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ambushed
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| v.埋伏( ambush的过去式和过去分词 )；埋伏着 | |
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inspector
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| n.检查员，监察员，视察员 | |
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ponies
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| 矮种马，小型马( pony的名词复数 )； ￡25 25 英镑 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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zealous
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| adj.狂热的，热心的 | |
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revival
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| n.复兴，复苏，（精力、活力等的）重振 | |
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inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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commissioners
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| n.专员( commissioner的名词复数 )；长官；委员；政府部门的长官 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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incurred
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| [医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式 | |
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insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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unwillingly
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| adv.不情愿地 | |
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invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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scourge
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| n.灾难，祸害；v.蹂躏 | |
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annexation
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| n.吞并，合并 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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ferment
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| vt.使发酵；n./vt.（使）激动，（使）动乱 | |
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lair
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| n.野兽的巢穴；躲藏处 | |
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dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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