Mawkmai being only a long march of twenty-five miles from M?ngnai, a detachment of twenty-five rifles was thought enough to support the Sawbwa, and in June, Hkun Hmon reported that the Karennis had quitted his country. All seemed to have settled down. The Superintendent2 did not hesitate, therefore, to call Mr. Scott to Fort Stedman for various business matters. Mr. Scott reached Fort Stedman on the 28th of June, and reported that all was well. Lieutenant Fowler was at that time in Mawkmai. On the 1st of July he moved his headquarters to M?ngnai, leaving the detachment of twenty-five rifles to garrison3 Mawkmai. The Karennis, it may be presumed, were watching his movements, for on the 3rd of July, in the evening, a body of Karennis attempted to rush the town. They were repulsed4, but[189] kept up a fire on the defenders5 until long after dark. The twenty-five Beleuchis, seconded by the Sawbwa and his armed rabble6, returned the fire and inflicted7 some loss on the enemy, who had withdrawn8 to a short distance. Considering it unsafe, after this experience, to leave Mawkmai with so small a detachment, Lieutenant Fowler moved his headquarters back to that place.
The monsoon9 was now in full force. With roads of the most primitive10 kind and swollen11 rivers, rapid travelling was difficult. Mr. Scott left Fort Stedman as soon as the news of what had happened reached him. Leaving his baggage to make what speed it could, he rode on and arrived at Mawkmai half-starved and dressed in some Shan garments which he had borrowed on the way to replace his dripping clothes, only to find that the fighting was over. Lieutenant Fowler, learning that the enemy had taken up a position within a day's march of Mawkmai, went straight for them, carried their entrenchments at the point of the bayonet, and drove them out with a loss to them of sixty men. This experience ought to have diminished the arrogance12 of Sawlapaw. He was very little moved by it. He wrote on the 13th of July in the most royal style, requesting the withdrawal13 of British troops from Mawkmai lest they should be "accidentally harmed" by his men when he attacked Hkun Hmon. This letter was returned to Sawlapaw's messengers by the Chief Commissioner14's orders. A letter written in August, in which he explained his claims against Mawkmai, and asserted that he did not know the relations of that State to the British Government, was dealt with in the same way. Both these letters were written in a style that was inconsistent with the position of the Karenni chief, and they meant defiance15.
In July, 1888, the matter was referred to the Government of India, and their sanction was received in August to demand from Sawlapaw compensation for the damage done to Mawkmai and securities for his future good behaviour, and to enforce these demands if they were not complied with.
In September, as the Karenni chief showed no signs of yielding, or willingness to meet Mr. Hildebrand, the[190] Chief Commissioner prepared and placed in the Superintendent's hands an ultimatum16 in the following terms: Sawlapaw was required firstly to come in to Fort Stedman, and there make in person his submission17 as a chief subordinate to the Queen-Empress. Secondly18, to pay an indemnity19 of two lakhs of rupees to cover the damage done to Mawkmai and the cost of the expedition sent to relieve that State; thirdly, to surrender five hundred serviceable muskets20; lastly, to covenant21 to pay annually22 a tribute of five thousand rupees to the British Government. This ultimatum was placed in the Superintendent's (Mr. Hildebrand's) hands, but he was instructed to withhold23 it until November, and meanwhile to endeavour by all possible means to persuade Sawlapaw to come to terms.
In October it seemed as if the Karenni chief was beginning to have some misgivings24. He adopted a tone of humility25 and apology, which led Mr. Hildebrand to hope for a peaceful ending. To make it easier for him, a reduction of the indemnity and of the number of the guns to be surrendered was allowed to Sawlapaw if he made his personal submission without delay. Later on, at Mr. Hildebrand's request, the Chief Commissioner allowed Mawkmai to be substituted for Fort Stedman as the place to which the chief should come, so that he should have a very short distance to travel beyond his own borders. On November 16th, as the obstinate26 chief showed no signs of yielding, the ultimatum was despatched. On the 17th a letter was received by the Superintendent bearing the date of November 5th. This letter, which had been written in a much more friendly tone, had been delayed en route. In it Sawlapaw proposed that Mr. Hildebrand should meet him at Loikaw on December 14th, accompanied "by a small escort," so that the people "should not be alarmed." "The reason," he added, "why I propose Loikaw is that at present I am like a mother with her child in her arms; she has to be with it always in order to prevent it crying; my people will feel my absence if I go to Fort Stedman." Mr. Hildebrand was permitted to accede28 to this request, provided Sawlapaw brought with him the two lakhs of rupees and the five hundred muskets required by the ultimatum. As an alternative the chief was told that if before the 14th of December he sent in the money and arms to Fort Stedman, to prove his good faith, the date for his personal submission at Loikaw would be postponed29 to the 1st of January, 1889. These concessions30, which were made in the hope of avoiding a conflict, led to nothing except, perhaps, the hardening of Sawlapaw's heart. To leave the shelter of his own territory, and present himself before a foreign potentate31 whom he is conscious of having offended, was a hard thing to ask of a half-civilized ruler. But there was no evidence that Sawlapaw had any honest intention of submitting. He was said on all sides to be preparing to resist us. It is just possible that if the Superintendent had been allowed further latitude32 he might have persuaded the Karenni to make some sort of apology. To the Chief Commissioner it appeared absolutely necessary, as an example, to insist on open and unmistakable personal submission.
Group of Red Karens.
[191]
During all these negotiations34, preparations for the expedition had been going on. It was expected that the main strength of Sawlapaw's resistance would be on his northern boundary. He would in all likelihood raid the districts of Lower Burma on his south; or, if he were hard pressed, he might try to escape in that direction, or he might cross into his own territory on the east of the Salween. It was settled, therefore, that there should be two columns. The main force, which was to make the real attack and to occupy Sawl?n, the capital of Eastern Karenni, was to concentrate at Saga36, thirty-six miles south of Fort Stedman, on the 27th of December. The other was to travel up by the Salween via Papun, and march on Bawlaké in Western Karenni. Its duty was to cover the districts of Lower Burma, and at the same time to distract the attention of the enemy and also prevent his retreat southward. The command of this force was given to Colonel Harvey. To meet any attempt on Sawlapaw's part to escape eastward37, a suggestion made by the British representative at Bangkok that the Siamese might be asked to co-operate had been accepted in August, and no further measure in this direction was thought necessary.
With Colonel Harvey were one hundred rifles of the Cheshire Regiment38 and one hundred and fifty rifles of[192] the 8th Madras Infantry39. Fifty rifles of the latter regiment had been advanced to Papun early in November, and the frontier posts of that district, which were held by Gurkha and Karen (Lower Burma) police, were reinforced. At the same time, in order to bring pressure to bear upon Sawlapaw and the Karennis, who depend to a large extent on imported food, a blockade was established and all exports from British territories stopped.
On the 7th of December Mr. Hildebrand reported that the Mawkmai Sawbwa had received letters from Sawlapaw announcing his intention to fight. On the 10th of December he telegraphed from Mobye that there was no hope of a peaceful solution. Lest an advance from the south should endanger a settlement, Colonel Harvey had been held back by the Chief Commissioner's orders. On the receipt of Mr. Hildebrand's telegram from Mobye, he was ordered to cover the frontier of the Salween district, arranging to reach Bawlaké on the date on which the Northern Column hoped to occupy Sawl?n. Colonel Harvey arrived at Papun on the 19th of December. Two days previously40 Kyaukhnyat, a village on the Salween River north-east of Papun, was attacked by a considerable number of Karennis. The village was burnt and the bazaar41 plundered42 under the eyes of the police, who were content to defend their own post. The delay, intended to avoid bloodshed, resulted, as often happens, in encouraging the enemy to strike the first blow. Another post was also attacked about the same time. As a precaution Colonel Harvey was strengthened by the addition of fifty British and one hundred Madras Rifles, and moved from Papun to Bawlaké on the 26th of December. Pazaung, a stockade43 held by Karennis, was taken without difficulty, and as that place offered a favourable44 position for covering the frontier of Lower Burma, Colonel Harvey remained there until he heard of the occupation of Sawl?n. The bulk of his column then returned to their quarters, leaving some Madras Rifles to strengthen the police outposts for a time.
The Northern Column was commanded by Brigadier-General H. Collett, C.B. It was composed of the following troops:—
2 guns, No. 1 Mountain Battery, Bengal.
[193]100 rifles, 1st Battalion45 Rifle Brigade.
250 rifles, 1st Beluchi Light Infantry.
4 signallers and 40 Mounted Infantry, Rifle Brigade.
70 Mounted Infantry, 1st Beluchi Light Infantry.
25 Queen's Own, sappers and miners, with medical and commissariat staff.
On the 19th of December final orders were communicated to Mr. Hildebrand by wire. They prescribed the course to be followed in each of the possible cases that might arise, while at the same time allowing him a wide discretion46 in arranging the details. The main points on which the Chief Commissioner insisted were that the East Karenni chief should make his submission in an unmistakable fashion, and give substantial guarantees for his future good conduct. Accordingly, whether Sawlapaw met Mr. Hildebrand at Loikaw or not, the Superintendent, with the column, was to proceed to Sawl?n, and there arrange the conditions on which he was to retain his position as a feudatory chief, of which open personal submission was the most essential.
The instructions then proceeded as follows: "If your march is opposed by armed force, the nature of the measures to be taken will be a military question, to be decided47 by the officer commanding; except on purely48 military grounds of urgent necessity, the Chief Commissioner does not wish villages to be burnt; in no case must villages be sacked. Your object should be to show the people that our quarrel is not with them, but with Sawlapaw. Loikaw should not be destroyed, unless the officer commanding thinks it necessary on military grounds. You should remain at Sawl?n till the future administration is settled. If you are forced to turn out Sawlapaw, it will be necessary for you to stay there till you receive the Chief Commissioner's orders on your recommendations; this may involve delay, but it cannot be avoided. It is desirable to humble49 Sawlapaw, and ensure his peaceful behaviour in future; but very undesirable50 to cause him to fly and leave the country in confusion. The object is to keep him in a friendly, subordinate alliance. You have liberty, if he submits, to mitigate51 the terms to such extent as you may think necessary to secure his future friendship, and to let[194] him see that we have no desire to harm him. If he does not submit, it will be necessary to punish him."
The terms and tenor52 of these orders will suffice to show that although the Chief Commissioner had little expectation of the peaceful settlement still hoped for by Mr. Hildebrand, he was anxious to avoid a conflict. It appeared to him that further delays and concessions could only result in encouraging Karenni arrogance, and would be misunderstood by others. There were military reasons, moreover, for finishing the business quickly and letting the troops return from the field.
General Collett, having assembled his force at Saga, left that place on the 29th for Sawl?n, Sawlapaw's capital. His route lay by Loikaw. As far as Nga Kaing, a village one march from that place, a good road had been cleared and bridged by the Sawbwa of Yawnghwè, the Myoza of Saga, and in that portion of it which passed through Sawlapaw's territory by Karennis acting53 under the instructions of the Mobye Sawbwa. On the part of the peasantry there was no enmity towards us.
The road for some way before reaching Nga Kaing passed through scrub jungle, which gave an enemy every chance of annoying the troops. Nothing, however, occurred, and on the 1st of January, 1889, the force debouched into the wide open paddy plain of Karenni without being molested54. While the camp was being pitched, the Beleuchi Scouts55, who were exploring some wooded ground near the village, were fired upon. They were immediately joined by the Beleuchi Mounted Infantry, under Lieutenant Tighe. The enemy, driven through the wood and compelled to break cover, attempted to make for the high ground; but, our men getting between them and the hills, forced them into the plain. They numbered two or three hundred, most of them Shans under two of Sawlapaw's officials, and were not without courage. Several times they turned and stood to face their pursuers; but, ill-armed and without discipline, they had not a chance. The threescore of Mounted Infantry broke them up, rode them down, and drove them almost up to Loikaw, eight miles distant, inflicting57 heavy loss. Some of them, seeing escape to be hopeless, turned fiercely on their enemies, and the Beleuchis lost four killed and seven wounded in the pursuit.
[195]
There was little chance for a combatant soldier to gain distinction against such a foe58. Captain Crimmin, of the Indian Medical Service (Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel John Crimmin, V.C., C.I.E.), was awarded a Victoria Cross for gallantry in this action.
General Collett pressed on at once with a portion of his force, in order to complete the rout27. He reached Loikaw after dark, and found it deserted59.
Loikaw consisted of two parts, inhabited by two separate communities, the one of Shans, the other of Karens. The latter was quite deserted. But the Shans sent out a mission with green leaves, the equivalent of a flag of truce60, to welcome our people, and did what they could to make the bivouac on the ground north of the village comfortable for them. Thus the night of New Year's Day saw General Collett with Mr. Hildebrand and a part of the force occupying Loikaw, while the remainder of the troops and the baggage were in the rear at Nga Kaing. On the next day, the 2nd of January, General Collett halted, to allow the rest of the column and the baggage to come up. The difficulty of moving even five hundred men in this country, destitute61 as it was of supplies for British and Indian soldiers, and equally destitute of roads, was great. The transport bullocks numbered thirteen hundred; there were ponies62 and elephants and camp followers63 innumerable. The 3rd of January was taken up in getting the column ferried across a stream named the Balu, which runs below Loikaw, and is eighty yards wide and unfordable.
While the soldiers were thus occupied the Superintendent used the delay to distribute a proclamation issued by the Chief Commissioner, explaining why the force had entered the Karenni country, and promising65 that the peaceful inhabitants should suffer no harm. The result of this was that some of the elders came in to ask for flags or other tokens which they might use to show that their villages were not hostile. The peasants generally had left their homes, they said, and fled to the hills, and would not return unless they had some assurance of safety. Mr. Hildebrand, therefore, having found in the baggage some red cloth, made flags and gave them to the elders for distribution. Before the evening of the 3rd people were returning in numbers to[196] their homes, and applications for red flags came in from all sides. When the force continued its march flags were found placed on the paths leading up to villages from the main track.
Sawl?n was found to be four marches from Loikaw. On the 4th General Collett began to move, and encamped at Kawpiti, where trees had been felled and thrown across the road, and the advance-guard of Mounted Infantry was fired on. Our men replied, and the enemy, having suffered some loss, retreated. Some villagers came up with a red flag to warn our men that the jungle on either side of the road had been spiked66, as Sawlapaw had taken measures to oppose us. The warning was useful, and only one pony67 was injured.
On the 5th the ferry on the Pon Chaung River, at a place called Tilanga, was reached. There had been no opposition68 hitherto, but directly the scouts appeared on the river bank fire was opened on them from the other side, a distance of one hundred and fifty yards. There was a village on the far bank from which the shots came. Our men returned the fire, but, as it seemed, with no effect. The guns were brought up, and two shells were dropped into the village, and set it on fire. All resistance then ended; but the river had to be crossed. Empty rum casks had been brought with the force, and the sappers began to make rafts. The river, however, was deep and rapid, and the attempt to cross the force on rafts had to be given up. The enemy had removed and concealed69 their boats. A close search was made for them, and six or seven were discovered. A ford64 at some little distance was found practicable for elephants, and amongst the Shans who followed the force sufficient skilled boatmen were found to man the boats. On the next day, the 6th of January, General Collett began to cross his men, and by the evening the whole force was on the other side of the Pon Chaung. The elephants and boatmen were exhausted70, and could do no more that day, while all the commissariat bullocks and their loads still remained to be brought across the stream.
On the 7th, leaving a guard for the bullocks and baggage which had not crossed, the main force pushed on. The road now became very difficult. It narrowed down to a[197] steep path, on the east side of which rose abruptly71 a range of rocky hills, on the west side ran the Pon Chaung, with its tangled72 jungle, affording the best of cover to an enemy. The ascent73 was sometimes severe. Small parties of the enemy were concealed on the slopes of the hills at short distances, and occasional shots were fired from the opposite bank of the river. An enemy with more knowledge or better arms might have made the advance very difficult. As it was, the hillsides on our left had to be searched and cleared before the main body could pass. It was dusk before Sakangyi, about six miles from the last bivouac, was reached. The casualties were one man in the Rifle Brigade killed and one wounded; two Beleuchis severely74 wounded; and Surgeon Manders shot through the thigh75.
During the night the baggage came slowly in. The last bullock was not in camp until several hours after sunrise. The enemy made no attempt to annoy the baggage or the rear-guard. Leaving on the 8th, as soon as the men had breakfasted and the rear-guard was in camp, the force worked its way on in the same manner as on the day before. Firing went on incessantly76, but the flanking parties of Beleuchis did their work perfectly77. The woods within range were thoroughly78 beaten and cleared of the enemy, and the force passed through the defile79 (capturing two guns, both mounted on carriages, on the hilltop) and entered the more open country without a casualty.
Sawl?n was now in view. The Beleuchis, under Colonel Sartorius (Colonel George Conrad, C.B.), were sent forward at once to occupy the town, which stands on a plateau some three hundred feet above the river. It was found to be quite deserted. The rest of the column encamped on the bank of the river below.
It may be well here to give some account of Sawl?n, the capital of the Red Karen country, as it was in January, 1889. It stands on some high ground about a mile to the east of the Pon Chaung. The hills at this point rise by three steps, the first and second of which open out into two small plateaux. The town is on the first step. To those looking at it as the force left the defile, it appeared to consist of a few huts. On ascending80 the hill, however, it was found to be well laid out, and to contain some really[198] fine houses. Three broad streets ran through the town parallel to each other, and were crossed at right angles by connecting roads of lesser81 width. There was an excellent water-supply. A stream from the plateau above the town had been led down the face of an almost perpendicular82 rock, and formed a very picturesque83 waterfall. On reaching the level it flowed through the town from east to west. The channel which carried the main supply was substantially bridged in each of the main streets. On both sides of every street in the town were smaller channels, fed from the parent stream. The watercourses were all carefully lined with teak to prevent erosion. Posts with glass lamps stood before the houses of the better class. Here and there in the main street a perambulator was seen standing84, where it had been left when the people fled. A box in Sawlapaw's storehouse was found full of babies' bottles, together with a very large stock of arrowroot. Evidently the younger generation of the Karennis inclined towards the luxuries of the West.
The chief, however, was said to stand on the ancient ways, rarely quitting his house, except to climb to his paddy-fields above the town, which he worked with his own hands like an ordinary peasant. His haw, or palace, however, gave some signs of his rank—a large old rambling85 house of teak, inside a teak palisade, with a smaller house for his wife in the same enclosure; a stable close by, with loose-boxes for four ponies, well built of teak, with iron-barred windows, and raised about three feet above the ground. Teak timber, which formed the wealth of the State, was lying about everywhere. The road leading up from the river to the town was littered with fine logs. It seemed that there would be little difficulty in recovering the indemnity demanded from Sawlapaw. Near the palace was an immense timber-yard with four sheds; in each shed were four saws. The yard was full of timber sawn and in the rough. The converted timber was methodically stacked in wooden frames round the yard, each frame containing the same cubic measurement of timber, so that there was no need to count the pieces. The palace was by no means the finest house in the town; that of Sawlawi, the Kya Maing, or heir-apparent, was especially good. A monastery86[199] and a rest-house, of great solidity and excellent workmanship, with very good carving87, stood a little way off.
With the occupation of Sawl?n the active military operations ended. The work of Mr. Hildebrand was only now beginning, and it was difficult and perplexing. Sawlapaw had disappeared, and if the people knew his whereabouts, none would tell. Little was known of the inner politics of the Karenni State. If the old chief chose to hide himself and let the case go against him by default, who was to be appointed in his room? It will be remembered that in the instructions given to Mr. Hildebrand, the possibility of having to supersede88 Sawlapaw was contemplated89, and Mr. Hildebrand was definitely told that he was to remain in Sawl?n until the future administration had been settled and the Chief Commissioner's orders received. In a private letter the Chief Commissioner wrote: "In the alternative of Sawlapaw running away and leaving the country without a governor, you must find some one to take his place. I do not want Karenni left on my own hands. You have had so much practice in king-making that I need say no more."
Mr. Hildebrand's difficulties were much increased by the announcement of the General in command, that the column must leave Sawl?n on the 23rd of January, to return to Fort Stedman, as the rations35 were insufficient90 for a longer stay. The task before him was no easy one in any case. That he should be able to effect a settlement of Karenni affairs in a fortnight was too much to hope. There was a risk that the object of the expedition might be frustrated91, and that the work would have to be done over again. General Collett consented to send for a supply of rations to meet the column at Mobye, to enable him to remain at Sawl?n until the 30th of January. It is not known on whom the responsibility rested for arrangements which might easily have made the expedition fruitless.
There was no possibility of laying the matter before the Chief Commissioner and obtaining his orders. Mr. Hildebrand, therefore, took the risk on himself and set to work at once to find Sawlapaw if possible; failing that, to select some one in his room. As a first step a[200] proclamation was issued calling upon Sawlapaw to appear before the 18th of January, and stating that if he did not come in a successor would be appointed to take charge of his State pending92 the Chief Commissioner's orders. At the same time the people generally were invited to come to Sawl?n to confer with Mr. Hildebrand and advise him on the choice of the man to be appointed, in case Sawlapaw did not appear.
Meanwhile it was as well to acquire some knowledge of the feelings of the people. The Superintendent's camp was moved up to the (Pongyi Kyaung) monastery, and by constant intercourse93 with monks94 and people their confidence was won, and an idea of the causes that had led to Sawlapaw's flight was formed. The disaster suffered by his men at Nga Kaing village on the 1st of January had convinced Sawlapaw that further opposition to our advance was hopeless. But there was a war party in the State of which one Naw Maing of Loikaw was the head. The measures taken to resist the force were the work of this party. On the 5th of January the smoke of the Tilanga village on the Pon Chaung was seen at Sawl?n. The chief then made up his mind. He told those who wished to remain to do as they pleased. For himself he would leave Sawl?n and would never come back. He took his wife and a few followers, and, forbidding any one else to come after him, he went to the upper plateau above the town, where he had another house, and was not seen again in Sawl?n. No one would tell whither he went.
Thereupon the Shan villagers (there was a Shan community in Sawl?n) went to the Pongyi and moved him to head a deputation to the officers with the British force. On the morning of the 6th, with two red flags and the customary green boughs95, the party set out to meet the British who were expected to arrive at Sawl?n that day. When they did not arrive, thinking the delay was on account of Sunday, the deputation returned to the town. On the evening of the 6th General Collett's force was encamped beside the Pon Chaung. A few Beleuchi Mounted Infantry Scouts were sent on to reconnoitre the road. At the entry of the defile they[201] were fired on by some Karennis, and one of the ponies was killed. They retreated without stopping to recover the saddle. The Karennis, taking the saddle from the dead pony, went back to Sawl?n in triumph, displaying their spoil and declaring that the enemy were few in number and had retreated. This put new spirit into the war party, and the peace deputation dissolved. On the 7th, when it was reported that the British were advancing in force, every one left the town, and it was found deserted, as has been already told. In two or three days, however, most of the people, Shans and Karens, had returned to their homes.
There appeared to be little chance of inducing Sawlapaw to make his appearance. The day fixed96 for Sawlapaw's surrender was the 18th of January. On the 17th a deputation representing the chief men of three of the largest communities came to Mr. Hildebrand and begged for further days of grace and a written safe-conduct for Sawlapaw. Both requests were granted. Furthermore, a promise was given that if he would come in and fulfil the conditions of the ultimatum, he would be confirmed in his position as head of the Karenni State. The date for the appearance of Sawlapaw, or, failing this, the election of his successor, was postponed until the 25th.
Mr. Hildebrand was assured that the Kya Maing, or heir-apparent, who was a nephew of Sawlapaw, would appear as a candidate for election. The 25th, the 26th, and the 27th passed, but no Kya Maing. The long-suffering patience of the Superintendent was exhausted. Fate, in the form of commissariat supplies, demanded a settlement before the 30th. Just as arrangements were being made for an election, a note was brought in from the Kya Maing to the effect that he was on his way to Sawl?n from his hiding-place in the jungle, but had broken down, footsore and weary. He promised to appear on the next day. As the people earnestly besought97 that his prayer might be granted, and as it was evident to the Superintendent that this man, as heir to Sawlapaw and acceptable to the people, was the right man to take charge of the State, and as moreover one of the wealthiest men in the State gave security to the amount of Rs. 20,000[202] that he would produce the Kya Maing, the proceedings98 were postponed until the morrow.
The remaining time had now dwindled99 to twenty-four hours, and the 28th of January was a day of anxiety for Mr. Hildebrand. It was a relief when the arrival of the Kya Maing was put beyond doubt. He made his appearance at an early hour, a man (by name Sawlawi) of about thirty-eight years of age, intelligent-looking, and evidently popular in Karenni. The election was held at noon. There were twenty-nine electors, of whom six were Heins, or chiefs of divisions, four were the chiefs or representatives of the Western Karenni States subject to Sawlapaw, the rest were headmen of villages or groups of villages, and traders in timber and other goods, many of whom were men of wealth and influence. Each man gave his vote, with the result that Sawlawi was unanimously elected.
Fourteen of the wealthy electors entered into a joint100 bond to pay the compensation of two lakhs and the five hundred muskets specified101 in the ultimatum, and a further sum of one lakh as war indemnity; the money to be paid before the end of December into the Moulmein Treasury102, and the muskets to be lodged103 in Fort Stedman before the end of the following March. The order of appointment given by Mr. Hildebrand to Sawlawi was as follows:—
"I, the Superintendent of the Shan States, hereby appoint you, Sawlawi, Kya Maing, to be Chief of the State of Eastern Karenni, on the following conditions:—
"1. That you shall govern your State in accordance with established custom, and as a tributary104 to the British Queen whom you acknowledge to be your Suzerain.
"2. That you shall enter into no negotiations, treaties, or agreements with any other State than that of England.
"3. That you shall pay as tribute the sum of Rs. 5,000 yearly.
"4. That you will in all matters obey the orders of the Superintendent of the Shan States.
"5. That in case of dispute with Siam about territory east of the Salween, you will refer the matter to the Superintendent of the Shan States for arbitration105.
[203]
"6. That no Shan, or Burman, or British subjects of any race shall be detained in any part of Eastern Karenni against their will, but that they shall have free liberty to go where they please.
"Given under my hand and seal this 29th day of January, 1889.
"A. H. Hildebrand,
"Superintendent of Shan States."
Sawlaw:—Gantarawadi Sawbwa.
(Red Karens.)
The sixth clause was inserted to provide for the abolition106 of slavery. It will be noted107 that the terms of the order did not make the State of Eastern Karenni part of British India. Experience of the difficulties arising from the position of the Shan States as part of British India, and of the absence of such difficulties in the case of the feudatory States of the Central Provinces, induced the Chief Commissioner to leave the Eastern Karenni State in the position of a feudatory chiefship.
The fifth clause needs explanation. It has been told above (p. 191) that a suggestion made by the British Representative at Bangkok for inviting108 Siamese co-operation had been acted upon. At the time no hint had been given by the Siamese, so far as was known to the Administration of Burma, that they had ulterior views, or claims to advance. It was supposed, na?vely perhaps, that as a friendly nation, anxious on many grounds to ensure the protection of Great Britain, they had agreed to act partly to help the British Government, partly to protect their own border. It was not until the 10th of November, 1888, that Mr. Gould, H.M.'s Representative at Bangkok, intimated that in return for their co-operation the Siamese would probably wish to establish their territorial109 rights over the Karenni possessions lying east of the Salween. That was the first notice of the Siamese intentions which reached the Chief Commissioner, and he had dispatched his ultimatum to Sawlapaw before its receipt. Mr. Gould was informed that the ultimatum could not be altered to include the Siamese claims. At the same time Mr. Hildebrand was instructed to reserve those claims in his settlement with Sawlapaw. Hence the insertion of the fifth clause in the order of appointment given to Sawlawi.
As a matter of fact, the Siamese co-operation was purely[204] nominal110 and valueless, too late to be of any use. On the 11th of December Bangkok was informed that the columns from the Shan States and Papun would reach Sawl?n about the 7th of January. On the 28th of December the Vice-Consul at Chiengmai was told of the attack by the Karennis on the police post at Kyaukhnyat, and was asked to move the Siamese to act. On the 10th of January the result of the fight near Loikaw was telegraphed to Bangkok and Chiengmai. On the 17th they were informed of the occupation of Sawl?n. While Mr. Hildebrand was arranging matters after the occupation, a detachment of troops went to reconnoitre Ywathit, a village on the right bank of the Salween, about thirty miles south of Sawl?n. From Ywathit a party went out to see the Salween, some three miles away. This was on the 20th of January. On the evening of that day the advance-guard of the Siamese force appeared on the east bank of the Salween, at the mouth of the Mèpai Chaung, and the officer commanding this party was visited by the Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Barnard, on the 21st of January. It was known from the Vice-Consul at Chiengmai that the Siamese had taken no action until the middle of January. This, however, is a digression.
On the day following the election, a Durbar was held in a large hall in the rest-house in the grounds of the monastery, near which the Superintendent had pitched his camp. The place was well fitted for the occasion and was more ornate than one would have expected to find in the wilds of Karenni. A spacious111 chamber112 "built of the best sawn teak with venetians and folding doors of good workmanship, and a floor which might have been made for a ball-room, the whole," writes the Superintendent, "both inside and out being very highly finished with panelling and carving and gilding113." Here the notables, who had met for the election of the new chief, and all the townspeople assembled, and the Superintendent (as the Representative of the British Government), supported by the General commanding and all the officers of the force, opened the Durbar. A broad, sturdy figure of a man, with a face that bore the marks of work and climate, a determined114 man, patient and considerate, but nevertheless a man accustomed to be obeyed. There were no bright uniforms, no show of gold[205] or scarlet115. Civil and military were all in the working-dress of the field, soiled and stained with dust and sweat; for the last few marches through the wooded defile of the Pon Chaung had been very toilsome. Amongst the Shans and Karens assembled, some spots of gay colour might be seen, and smart white jackets here and there.
In a few words the causes which had led to the expedition were explained and the consequences, namely, the subordination of the Karenni chief to the British Government, and the payment by him of an indemnity. This might be unpleasant to some of them. On the other hand, to the Karenni people at large, it meant a better government, the cessation of raids and petty wars, the extension and protection of trade, and undisturbed peace. The order of appointment (provisional, as subject to the Chief Commissioner's approval), was then read and given to Sawlawi. Thus the Karenni territory, which had been hitherto independent and had been protected by us from the designs of Burma, became practically part of the Empire. It may be noted that Mr. Hildebrand acted as the Representative of the British Government on both occasions. On the first, when he secured the independence of Karenni by negotiation33 with the Burmese King; on the second, when he made Karenni subordinate to the Government of India.
What was the first use made of his new power by Sawlawi? His first thought was to rid his territory east of the Salween of the Siamese troops now occupying it. The Superintendent gave him letters to the Siamese commander, announcing the fall of Sawlapaw and the appointment of Kya Maing Sawlawi in his place; informing him that matters had been arranged with the Karennis, that the British force was withdrawing on the 30th of January, and that Siamese co-operation was no longer necessary. At the same time the Vice-Consul at Chiengmai was asked to use his influence to procure116 the immediate56 recall of the Siamese troops.
On the 30th of January the British troops left Karenni and marched back to Fort Stedman. Sawlawi was left to his own resources. Prophets of evil had foretold117 the immediate reappearance of Sawlapaw and the vengeance118 to be executed on his successor and his supporters. Excited[206] journalists published tales in Rangoon of wholesale119 executions in Sawl?n under the old chief's orders. As a matter of fact, the ex-Sawbwa never attempted to disturb the Settlement, and the new Sawbwa, Sawlawi, carried out his engagements punctually. The indemnity was paid and the fire-arms surrendered. To the day of his death, in 1907, he governed his people in an upright and capable manner.
It must be confessed there was some risk in leaving the country the day after Sawlawi's instalment. The Chief Commissioner's instructions were clear that the Superintendent should remain in Sawl?n until he received orders on his proposals. Mr. Hildebrand, however, had no choice, and the risk had to be taken, because of the defective120 arrangements for feeding the troops, which made it impossible to stay. In taking the responsibility he did his duty well. The only difficulty in Eastern Karenni arose from the action of the Siamese Government in continuing to occupy the territory east of the Salween, which had been long held by the Karens, was vital to them, and had never been in the possession of the Siamese.
This was a matter which threatened at any moment to disturb the peace and gave anxiety to those responsible for maintaining it. The first act of Sawlawi, as has been said, after his appointment was to ask the assistance of the Superintendent to procure the withdrawal of the Siamese from the territory east of the Salween. The British Vice-Consul at Chiengmai and the Siamese officer in command of their troops were notified that peace had been made and that the British troops were leaving the field; the withdrawal of the Siamese was therefore necessary. The Siamese claims had been reserved for settlement in the terms of Sawlawi's appointment. The Chief Commissioner prohibited the Karenni chief from attacking or making any forcible resistance to them. When month after month passed and they made no show of retiring, but on the contrary began to appropriate the timber and even the elephants of the Karenni traders, the local Government of Burma was placed in a very uncomfortable position. Sawlawi urged that he had accepted our terms, made his submission and acknowledged himself to be the subordinate of the Queen-Empress. He looked in return for the advantage[207] of British protection; apparently121 he was not to have it. He knew well enough that it only needed a firm order and a small display of force to cause the retirement122 of the Siamese with more alacrity123 than they had displayed in their advance. Why was nothing done? If he began to doubt our good faith, it was no wonder.
As a matter of fact—a fact to him unknown, and unintelligible124 if it had been known—the Chief Commissioner could do nothing but put the case to the Government of India. This was done in as strong words as possible. The Government of India could do nothing except through the Secretary of State; the Secretary of State could not act except through the British Foreign Office; the Foreign Office was obliged to work through the Siamese Embassy in London and the British Resident in Bangkok; the King of Siam had to consult his local lieutenants125 at Chiengmai. The situation demanded patience, and much of it.
It has been said above that the territory occupied by the Siamese was vital to the Karennis. Their best and most extensive forests, the main source of their wealth, lay there. The only way of getting timber to the market from the forests was (and is) by floating it down the Salween, the mouth of which is in British territory opposite to Moulmein. The logs are stopped and collected at Kado, a short distance from the mouth of the river, and a duty levied126 by the Government of Burma. Every owner of timber has his stamp with which he marks his logs, and a register of these stamps is kept by the forest officer. The logs which had been seized by the Siamese were easily distinguished127, and orders were given to the forest officer to detain them. By this means a check was put upon the rapacity128 of the Siamese, and the loss of the Karenni timber dealers129 restricted. In the course of time, the matter was arranged between the Siamese and the Foreign Office, and the Karennis were restored to possession (vide Chapter XVIII, p. 221).
The history of this matter shows the difficulties which the Government of India and their subordinates on the spot meet with in dealing130 with a boundary dispute, even of a simple kind, with a foreign country. The facts have to be gathered locally and placed before the Government of India, who then have to negotiate through the Foreign Office, with[208] the risk of misunderstanding and the certainty of long delays. It is unavoidable. Fortunately, on the north-western frontier, where the delays and hesitation131 which caused inconvenience in the disputes with Siam might breed serious trouble, the action of the Government of India is less trammelled.
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lieutenant
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n.陆军中尉,海军上尉;代理官员,副职官员 | |
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superintendent
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n.监督人,主管,总监;(英国)警务长 | |
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garrison
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n.卫戍部队;驻地,卫戍区;vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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repulsed
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v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 );驳斥;拒绝 | |
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defenders
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n.防御者( defender的名词复数 );守卫者;保护者;辩护者 | |
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rabble
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n.乌合之众,暴民;下等人 | |
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inflicted
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把…强加给,使承受,遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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withdrawn
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vt.收回;使退出;vi.撤退,退出 | |
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monsoon
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n.季雨,季风,大雨 | |
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primitive
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adj.原始的;简单的;n.原(始)人,原始事物 | |
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swollen
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adj.肿大的,水涨的;v.使变大,肿胀 | |
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arrogance
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n.傲慢,自大 | |
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withdrawal
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n.取回,提款;撤退,撤军;收回,撤销 | |
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commissioner
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n.(政府厅、局、处等部门)专员,长官,委员 | |
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defiance
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n.挑战,挑衅,蔑视,违抗 | |
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ultimatum
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n.最后通牒 | |
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submission
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n.服从,投降;温顺,谦虚;提出 | |
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secondly
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adv.第二,其次 | |
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indemnity
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n.赔偿,赔款,补偿金 | |
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20
muskets
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n.火枪,(尤指)滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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covenant
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n.盟约,契约;v.订盟约 | |
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annually
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adv.一年一次,每年 | |
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23
withhold
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v.拒绝,不给;使停止,阻挡 | |
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misgivings
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n.疑虑,担忧,害怕;疑虑,担心,恐惧( misgiving的名词复数 );疑惧 | |
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humility
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n.谦逊,谦恭 | |
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obstinate
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adj.顽固的,倔强的,不易屈服的,较难治愈的 | |
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rout
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n.溃退,溃败;v.击溃,打垮 | |
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accede
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v.应允,同意 | |
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postponed
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vt.& vi.延期,缓办,(使)延迟vt.把…放在次要地位;[语]把…放在后面(或句尾)vi.(疟疾等)延缓发作(或复发) | |
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30
concessions
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n.(尤指由政府或雇主给予的)特许权( concession的名词复数 );承认;减价;(在某地的)特许经营权 | |
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potentate
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n.统治者;君主 | |
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latitude
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n.纬度,行动或言论的自由(范围),(pl.)地区 | |
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negotiation
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n.谈判,协商 | |
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negotiations
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协商( negotiation的名词复数 ); 谈判; 完成(难事); 通过 | |
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rations
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定量( ration的名词复数 ); 配给量; 正常量; 合理的量 | |
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saga
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n.(尤指中世纪北欧海盗的)故事,英雄传奇 | |
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eastward
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adv.向东;adj.向东的;n.东方,东部 | |
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regiment
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n.团,多数,管理;v.组织,编成团,统制 | |
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infantry
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n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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previously
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adv.以前,先前(地) | |
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bazaar
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n.集市,商店集中区 | |
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plundered
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掠夺,抢劫( plunder的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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stockade
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n.栅栏,围栏;v.用栅栏防护 | |
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favourable
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adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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battalion
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n.营;部队;大队(的人) | |
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discretion
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n.谨慎;随意处理 | |
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decided
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adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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purely
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adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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humble
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adj.谦卑的,恭顺的;地位低下的;v.降低,贬低 | |
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undesirable
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adj.不受欢迎的,不良的,不合意的,讨厌的;n.不受欢迎的人,不良分子 | |
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mitigate
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vt.(使)减轻,(使)缓和 | |
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tenor
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n.男高音(歌手),次中音(乐器),要旨,大意 | |
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acting
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n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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molested
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v.骚扰( molest的过去式和过去分词 );干扰;调戏;猥亵 | |
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scouts
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侦察员[机,舰]( scout的名词复数 ); 童子军; 搜索; 童子军成员 | |
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immediate
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adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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inflicting
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把…强加给,使承受,遭受( inflict的现在分词 ) | |
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foe
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n.敌人,仇敌 | |
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deserted
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adj.荒芜的,荒废的,无人的,被遗弃的 | |
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60
truce
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n.休战,(争执,烦恼等的)缓和;v.以停战结束 | |
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destitute
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adj.缺乏的;穷困的 | |
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ponies
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矮种马,小型马( pony的名词复数 ); £25 25 英镑 | |
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followers
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追随者( follower的名词复数 ); 用户; 契据的附面; 从动件 | |
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Ford
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n.浅滩,水浅可涉处;v.涉水,涉过 | |
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promising
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adj.有希望的,有前途的 | |
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spiked
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adj.有穗的;成锥形的;有尖顶的 | |
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pony
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adj.小型的;n.小马 | |
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opposition
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n.反对,敌对 | |
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concealed
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a.隐藏的,隐蔽的 | |
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exhausted
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adj.极其疲惫的,精疲力尽的 | |
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abruptly
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adv.突然地,出其不意地 | |
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tangled
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adj. 纠缠的,紊乱的 动词tangle的过去式和过去分词 | |
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ascent
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n.(声望或地位)提高;上升,升高;登高 | |
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severely
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adv.严格地;严厉地;非常恶劣地 | |
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thigh
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n.大腿;股骨 | |
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incessantly
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ad.不停地 | |
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perfectly
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adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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thoroughly
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adv.完全地,彻底地,十足地 | |
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defile
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v.弄污,弄脏;n.(山间)小道 | |
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ascending
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adj.上升的,向上的 | |
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lesser
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adj.次要的,较小的;adv.较小地,较少地 | |
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perpendicular
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adj.垂直的,直立的;n.垂直线,垂直的位置 | |
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picturesque
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adj.美丽如画的,(语言)生动的,绘声绘色的 | |
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standing
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n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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rambling
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adj.[建]凌乱的,杂乱的 | |
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monastery
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n.修道院,僧院,寺院 | |
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carving
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n.雕刻品,雕花 | |
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supersede
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v.替代;充任 | |
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contemplated
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adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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insufficient
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adj.(for,of)不足的,不够的 | |
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frustrated
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adj.挫败的,失意的,泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 );挫败;使受挫折;令人沮丧 | |
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pending
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prep.直到,等待…期间;adj.待定的;迫近的 | |
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intercourse
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n.性交;交流,交往,交际 | |
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monks
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n.修道士,僧侣( monk的名词复数 ) | |
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boughs
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大树枝( bough的名词复数 ) | |
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fixed
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adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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besought
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v.恳求,乞求(某事物)( beseech的过去式和过去分词 );(beseech的过去式与过去分词) | |
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98
proceedings
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n.进程,过程,议程;诉讼(程序);公报 | |
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99
dwindled
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v.逐渐变少或变小( dwindle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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100
joint
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adj.联合的,共同的;n.关节,接合处;v.连接,贴合 | |
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101
specified
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adj.特定的 | |
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102
treasury
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n.宝库;国库,金库;文库 | |
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103
lodged
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v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 );暂住;埋入;(权利、权威等)归属 | |
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104
tributary
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n.支流;纳贡国;adj.附庸的;辅助的;支流的 | |
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105
arbitration
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n.调停,仲裁 | |
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106
abolition
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n.废除,取消 | |
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107
noted
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adj.著名的,知名的 | |
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108
inviting
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adj.诱人的,引人注目的 | |
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territorial
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adj.领土的,领地的 | |
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nominal
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adj.名义上的;(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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111
spacious
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adj.广阔的,宽敞的 | |
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112
chamber
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n.房间,寝室;会议厅;议院;会所 | |
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113
gilding
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n.贴金箔,镀金 | |
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114
determined
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adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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115
scarlet
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n.深红色,绯红色,红衣;adj.绯红色的 | |
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116
procure
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vt.获得,取得,促成;vi.拉皮条 | |
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117
foretold
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v.预言,预示( foretell的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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118
vengeance
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n.报复,报仇,复仇 | |
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119
wholesale
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n.批发;adv.以批发方式;vt.批发,成批出售 | |
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120
defective
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adj.有毛病的,有问题的,有瑕疵的 | |
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121
apparently
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adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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122
retirement
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n.退休,退职 | |
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123
alacrity
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n.敏捷,轻快,乐意 | |
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124
unintelligible
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adj.无法了解的,难解的,莫明其妙的 | |
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125
lieutenants
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n.陆军中尉( lieutenant的名词复数 );副职官员;空军;仅低于…官阶的官员 | |
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126
levied
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征(兵)( levy的过去式和过去分词 ); 索取; 发动(战争); 征税 | |
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127
distinguished
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adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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128
rapacity
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n.贪婪,贪心,劫掠的欲望 | |
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129
dealers
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n.商人( dealer的名词复数 );贩毒者;毒品贩子;发牌者 | |
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130
dealing
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n.经商方法,待人态度 | |
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131
hesitation
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n.犹豫,踌躇 | |
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