The seventeenth chapter told the story of the Sawlapaw expedition, which covered the time from the spring 1888 to the second month of 1889. The western frontier of the province was the scene of equally interesting and much more difficult operations during the same period. When Upper Burma was annexed2 it is doubtful whether the difficulties, that might arise from the wild tribes which would become our neighbours, received much consideration. The Burmese Government thought very little of raids and disturbances3 on their frontiers. A British Administration could not show the same indifference4.
Along the west of the Upper Burma districts of the Upper and the Lower Chindwin, of Pakokku, and of Minbu, lies a wild region of hills, inhabited by semi-savage5 tribes known to us as Chins. This mountainous region forms a wedge very long in comparison to its width. The broad end marches with the south of Manipur, the Naga Cachar, and east Sylet hills, and the point rests on Cape6 Negrais. It is formed of high, narrow ridges7 and deep valleys, all running from north to south, and the people are split up into numerous tribes and clans8 speaking many different dialects. The only system of government was that of headmen of villages, or at the most of a small group of villages, and consequently negotiations9 with the Chins as a people were impossible. The principal tribes, with which the present narrative10 is concerned are, on the north, the Siyins, including the Sagyilains, and the Sokte tribe, including the Kanhows;[288] in the centre of the country the Tashons and Hakas (nicknamed by the Burmese Baungshès); and, southward of them, a number of tribes, Chin-boks among others, who are less formidable as border neighbours.
Between the hills and the Chindwin, and forming an enclosure in the Upper Chindwin district, was the little Shan State of Kalè. Like the States on the Shan plateau, it was governed by a Sawbwa who had a measure of independence. Owing to its position, practically, on the Chindwin, Kalè was much more in subjection to the Government of Burma than the more distant Shan chiefships. It was, moreover, exposed to raids from the hill-men, and for a long time past had suffered much from the Siyin group, who were the most frequent and barbarous raiders, burning villages, slaughtering11 the peasants, and carrying off many as slaves into the mountains.
At the time of the annexation12 the Sawbwa of Kalè was an old man, by name Maung Ket, incapable13 of administering his country. On the 1st of January, 1887, the Chief Commissioner14, finding that he could neither keep order within his territory nor protect it against enemies from without, caused him to be removed with some of his officials to Mandalay, and appointed his nephew to rule in his stead. In November, 1887, Maung Ket escaped from Mandalay with his followers15 and took refuge with the Tashon Chins, who in former years were on friendly terms with the Kalè State.
In March, 1887, the Deputy Commissioner of the Upper Chindwin (Captain Raikes) met representatives of the Tashon tribes at Indin and explained to them that raiding must be stopped. His warnings seem to have influenced them; for a whole year few villages were attacked. Several circumstances, however, had tended to unsettle the minds of these wild tribes.
The ex-Sawbwa of Kalè had a disturbing influence and endeavoured no doubt to persuade them to help him to regain16 his position. In the open season of 1887-8 a project for opening up the Chin country from the Bengal boundary in the west to the frontier of Burma proper on the east was started in India, prematurely17 so far as we were concerned. It was proposed that roads should be made through the hills, communications established, and the hill people subjugated18. The phrase "from the Salween to the sea" was invented and had some effect.
On the Chin Hills—arranging a plan of attack.
Chin-Liushai Campaign.
[289]
In the winter of 1887 Captain Raikes with another officer went up the Myittha River and arranged a meeting with the Tashon chiefs. Sonpek, the principal man of the tribe, came down from the mountains and met Captain Raikes on the 3rd of January, 1888. He was courteous20, even friendly in his manner, but guarded in his speech. His fears were excited by the close questioning (concerning the routes through his country eastward) to which he was subjected, so much so that he would hardly accept the presents offered to him by Captain Raikes. The meeting, however, ended in outward friendliness21 on both sides. No action was taken by the Government towards entering or approaching the Tashon country, and nothing indicated that the Chins had been seriously alarmed.
Other events followed which added to their uneasiness. Captain Raikes had visited Indin in March, 1887, and had found two persons in the ruling Sawbwa's service whose intrigues22 were causing trouble in the Kalè State. One was Maung Tok San, the other Maung Tha Dun, styled "Chingeh," or "Minister for the Chins." These two men were removed by Captain Raikes from Kalè and confined at Al?n. After some months they were released on security. They made use of their freedom to escape to the Chin Hills, where they joined the old Sawbwa who had preceded them, and helped him to excite the tribes.
It happened at the same time that part of the Pakokku district on the Lower Chindwin was very much disturbed. The guerilla leader, known as the Shwègyobyu Prince, had been able to collect a considerable following and to raise a small revolt (see Chapter VIII., pp. 84, 85). Expelled from the low country, he also sought safety with the Tashons. The arrival of a Burman Prince, whether genuine or pretender, did not matter, a man with a certain amount of prestige, a good deal of energy, and a bitter hatred23 of the foreigners, gave the Tashons heart, and they determined24 to take action. On the 4th and 5th of May a body of Sonpek's Tashons, numbering some hundreds, descended25 on Indin, made the Sawbwa prisoner, and took[290] him to Chingaing (a village near the foot of the hills), where he had interviews with Sonpek and the Shwègyobyu Prince. He promised to join them in their resistance to the British, and on that condition was allowed to return to Indin. The Sawbwa, however, kept faith with us. Getting some men together, he sent them to attack the Shwègyobyu Prince in Chingaing, and despatched urgent messengers to the Deputy Commissioner (Mr. Ross) asking for assistance.
This sudden raid by the Chins on the Kalè State, and their readiness to assist a pretender like the Shwègyobyu Prince, had not been foreseen, and took the authorities by surprise. The messages received at headquarters were alarming. Eleven hundred Tashon Chins were reported to have surrounded Indin and carried off the Sawbwa. Several thousands were said to be on the warpath; five hundred had occupied Indin, three hundred were marching on Taungdwin, three hundred on Kalewa—all these of the Tashon tribe. Of the Siyins, five hundred were making for Kalemyo, six hundred threatening the Kabaw Valley, and so on. The numbers were obviously much exaggerated. Nevertheless, as the men on the spot thought the situation serious, measures of precaution had to be taken. A force under Major Gleig, consisting of 100 rifles, Cheshire Regiment27, 250 Madras Infantry28 (15th) and two guns, were sent up the Chindwin River in steamers to Kalemyo. At the same time 150 Mounted Infantry (100 British, 50 Native), accompanied by Captain Eyre, the Deputy Commissioner of the district, were despatched from Pakokku, via Pauk and Gangaw, to take the raiders in the rear. A party of military police from the Kabaw Valley Battalion29, with two guns, were moved down to Kalewa.
These dispositions30 sufficed to restore order for the time. Major Gleig's force disembarked at Indin on the 24th of May; Captain Eyre with the Mounted Infantry was at Chingaing, a few miles from Indin, on the 26th, the rifles and guns from the Kabaw Valley arrived at Kalemyo about the same date. The party, accompanied by Captain Eyre, marched up through the Yaw country without meeting with any opposition31. They covered 152 miles in eight days and hoped to surprise the Shwègyobyu, who,[291] with a mixed following of Burmans and Chins, had continued to hold Chingaing; but as soon as the alarm was given by his scouts32 he fired the village and escaped into the hills. The enemy were encountered only on one occasion. On the 17th of May a police officer making a night march with 60 rifles of the military police (Indians) was attacked by a body of men under Bo Saga33, a noted34 dacoit leader. The men lately enrolled35 were unsteady and fell back, and the party retired36, losing two men wounded. The officer reported that he had found the villages on his march deserted37 and that the insurgents38 were collecting men and arms. Several Burman villages had been burnt; men, women, and children had been killed, and many carried off into the hills. The measures taken may seem in the recital39 out of proportion to the danger. But it was by no means a false alarm.
The rains had now set in, and the Kalè and Yaw country in that season does not tempt40 the hill-men to raid. They returned to their mountains. The disturbances ceased almost as suddenly as they had begun. The troops returned to their quarters, a guard of military police being left at Indin to protect the Sawbwa.
Although order had been restored for the present, it was evident to the Chief Commissioner that the Chins had yielded to the climate rather than to fear. They had escaped punishment; and as they had burnt villages and returned home with many captives the campaign in their eyes must have seemed successful.
It was necessary to protect the Yaw Valley which was our territory, and the Kalè country, the Sawbwa of which was our dependent and too weak to help himself. A proposal was made by the local officer to simplify matters by taking the Kalè State under direct administration. It was argued that as we were obliged to defend Kalè, we might as well administer the country and receive the revenues. Looking, however, to its effect on the minds of the people, this appeared to be a mistaken policy. Every Sawbwa in the Shan States might have been degraded on similar grounds. The Kalè man, so far as was known, had not been disloyal. In the early part of 1887 he had acted well, and in the present affair he had not acted[292] badly. If he had not been well informed regarding the movements of the Chins, he was no worse than the British officers in the district. He was suddenly surrounded and seized. In procuring41 his liberty by consenting to join the insurgents he took the best course, or what he thought the best course, for himself. He lost no time in sending information to the nearest officer, and he attacked the rebel gathering42 with his own men. To remove him under such circumstances would have been unfair, and might have alarmed others whose fears it was not good policy to arouse.
It was decided43, therefore, by the Chief Commissioner not to absorb Kalè, but to leave a military or police guard at or near Indin, with supports at Kalewa. An ultimatum44 was sent to the Tashons, ordering them to deliver up the Shwègyobyu Prince and other leading rebels, as well as the leaders of the Chins who captured the Sawbwa of Kalè and raided his villages. On the 21st of July, 1888, the Chief Commissioner (in a minute submitted to the Government of India) recounted the events which have been narrated45, and gave his opinion that there could be no peace until the Chin tribes had been subdued46. He asked permission to take the matter in hand as soon as the dry weather set in, and to subjugate19 the Chins once for all.
The first step in the plan of campaign was to occupy in force and permanently47 the difficult country lying below the Chin Hills, and to bring it under efficient administrative48 control.
For this purpose the Chief Commissioner in June, 1887, asked the Government of India to raise a frontier battalion in India for the Yaw Valley. It was assumed, in framing the plan of campaign, that this battalion would have been ready before the rains ended, and that it would have been possible to hold this district firmly. To have attacked the Chins and to have withdrawn49 the troops would have been to leave the villages in the plains exposed to the vengeance50 of the hill-men.
The next step was to march an expedition into the Chin Hills. The force was to be divided into three parts. The Siyin and Sagyilain tribe was to be invaded from the Kalè Valley by a force of the Kabaw Valley military police, brought down for the duty. The Tashon country was to be entered simultaneously51 by a column of regular troops with two guns, having its base at Sihaung on the Myittha River, to which place the men, their baggage, and supplies, could be brought by water. At the same time a force collected at Gangaw was to threaten the Yokwa Haka and Thatta Chins, to prevent them from helping52 the Tashons.
Haka Chins.
A Chin "Zu" drink.
[293]
The subjugation53 of the Tashons was judged to be the most formidable task. The object was to reach and, if necessary, to destroy their chief village in Burmese Ywama. There were no roads, only difficult hill-paths. Hill-coolies and mules54 were necessary for transport. There were no supplies in the country. The work, therefore, would have to be taken in hand leisurely55, the road cleared and made practicable for mules, supply-stations established, and nothing left to chance. A slow, determined advance, it was held, would have a greater moral effect than an attempt by forced marches to surprise the enemy. If it were possible a simultaneous attack should be made from the Arakan or Chittagong Hills on the west to take the Tashons in the rear.
In reply to the ultimatum sent to them (see above), the Tashons released the captives taken in the raids on the 18th and 19th of May, but declined to give up the Shwègyobu Prince and other Burman rebels. They put forward counter-claims on their own part, and threatened further raids if their demands were not complied with.
In August an order was sent to the chief of the Siyin and Sagyilain tribes to surrender the captives taken by them from several villages in the preceding April and July, and they were warned that if they did not comply with this demand punishment would follow.
Early in September raiding began again. While the Government of India were considering the Chief Commissioner's proposals the Chins acted. They put their threats into execution. A village near Sihaung was raided by the Tashons on the 17th of September, and an alliance was formed by a large number of subdivisions of the Haka tribe. On the 18th of September a village in the Gangaw circle of the Pakokku district was attacked, it was reported,[294] by Tashons. It was clear to the local officers that the anticipation56 of serious trouble would be realized. The Government of India were pressed, therefore, to allow the immediate57 enlistment59 of the military police levy60 for the protection of the Chin frontier, which had been asked for early in June. In October the reply of the Governor-General in Council to the Chief Commissioner's minute of July 21st was received. It was a refusal to sanction the proposed expeditions.
About this time the local officers reported that Sonpek, the Tashon leader, was inclined to give up the Burman refugees, but that he would not surrender the old Sawbwa of Kalè. It was just possible that through the latter's influence Sonpek's inclination61 might be translated into action. The old Sawbwa, therefore, was informed that he would be pardoned for his part in the disturbances if he brought about the surrender of the Burman rebels by the Tashons. At the same time, as a precaution against the attacks which were anticipated, Kalewa and Sihaung were garrisoned63, and endeavours made to prevent the Chins from getting their usual supplies of salt and other necessaries from the plains.
The country lying between the Chin mountains and the Chindwin and Irrawaddy Rivers is, speaking generally, what would be called in India "terai"; covered with large stretches of forest and intersected by numerous watercourses and streams, with a heavy rainfall and intense heat. It is very unhealthy and a difficult country for troops to work in. The main river in this track is the Myittha, which rises from the southern part of the Chin mountains; it runs almost due north for a hundred miles or more, and then turning suddenly to the east for fifteen or twenty miles joins the Chindwin at Kalewa. During its course northward64 it receives by many affluents65 the drainage of the eastern slopes of the Chindwin. Three ranges of thickly wooded hills, called the Pondaung Ranges, run parallel to the Myittha on the east, with intervening valleys which are fertile and cultivated. East of the third range of hills lies the Pagyi township of the Lower Chindwin district. In the west of this township, bordering on the hills above mentioned, is the country known as Shitywagyaung—"the valley of the[295] eight villages"—of which the most important is Thitkyidaing. West of this village lie Saga and Kyaw. The country lying between the Myittha River and the range of hills on the east is known as the Yaw country, in the southern part of which is the Yaw River, which rises in the same hills as the Myittha, but, turning in a south-easterly direction, makes its way to the Irrawaddy below Pakokku, the river-port of the district in which the Yaw country lies. Gangaw is the chief village in the Yaw country, and is more than 100 miles from Pakokku. The road to it passes through Pauk at about the twentieth mile, and the Yaw River, which has to be crossed, is unfordable when in flood.
In 1888 the country about Thitkyidaing had not been thoroughly66 reduced, chiefly on account of its unhealthiness and the scarcity67 of civil officers. Mr. Carter and Colonel Symons worked this tract68 in 1887-8, and brought it to order after the disturbances raised by the Shwègyobyu Prince, in which Major Kennedy and Captain Beville, Assistant Commissioner, met their deaths. Many of the dacoit leaders were captured or killed at that time, but the country was not thoroughly controlled.
There was so much to do in the early years of the annexation and so few to do it, that outlying tracts69 like the Yaw country were neglected for a time. This tract had, it is believed, even in the King's time, been left very much to itself. In 1887 the Deputy Commissioner of Pakokku (Captain Eyre) visited it. The people received him well. An arrangement—the best possible at the time—was made with the local officials, who undertook to pay the revenue and to be responsible for the order and protection of the territory. Hitherto the people had defended themselves against the Chins; and, to encourage them, five or six hundred muskets70 were distributed to villagers who in the opinion of the Burman officials would make good use of them. In some cases a subsidy71 was given to pay for the maintenance of a rude militia72 or irregular police. This arrangement had worked well until the time of the events now to be told, and it had the recommendation of economy in money and men when economy was more than usually imperative73.
The refusal of the Government of India to allow an expedition[296] into the Chin country in no way absolved74 the Chief Commissioner from the duty of protecting the people against these savages75, for which purpose he had sufficient means at his disposal. He therefore took counsel with the Major-General commanding in Upper Burma (Sir George White) as to the measures necessary. It was resolved to move a body of troops up from Pakokku through Gangaw along the whole line of the frontier subject to raids, and to establish a chain of posts, Tilin, Gangaw, Kan, Sihaung, Kambalè, and Indin. General Faunce, who commanded the military district in which the disturbed tracts were situated76, was given the control of the operations. Major Raikes, who was at the time in charge of the Lower Chindwin, and had had more intercourse77 with the Chins than any other of the civil officers, was associated with General Faunce and entrusted78 with the political duties. A force about 500 strong was ordered to move up along the frontier with General Faunce, while three companies of Gurkhas were to be sent by river to Kalewa. No preparations were made for attacking the Chin strongholds in the hills, as the Government in India had forbidden it. Raiding parties were to be followed up and punished whenever and so far as it might be possible.
The Chins began to act before these arrangements had been completed. Reports of raiding came tumbling in fast. On the 14th of October Homalin was attacked by followers of the Shwègyobyu, assisted by Chins from the Tashon country. On the 17th Chitpauk, in the Kabaw Valley, was raided by Siyins, who killed seven and carried off forty-five villagers. On the 20th of October Kambalè was surrounded, two villagers were murdered and six kidnapped. On the 22nd of October the Siyins attacked Kantha, north of Kan, and made off with thirty-two villagers. On the 29th of October a large body of the hill-men came down on Kalémyo, the principal village in Kalè. They burnt part of it, killed three of the villagers, wounded four, and carried forty into slavery. On the same day Khampat, in the Kabaw Valley, was raided by a party of Kanhows, seven men were killed and twenty-seven taken away.
These occurrences gave the Chief Commissioner a text for again preaching the need of punishing these unruly[297] mountaineers; and, meanwhile, such measures as were possible and within his powers were taken. On the 9th of November the Government of India intimated that they were inclined to reconsider the proposal of the Burman Administration. On the 16th their orders came, giving the Chief Commissioner a free hand to do what he could with the troops at his disposal, and with the transport to be had within the province.
General Faunce had left Pakokku on the 14th of November. Captain Eyre, the Deputy Commissioner of Pakokku, went with him. His orders were to give all the help possible to the General, especially in procuring transport. He was to retain charge of the Pakokku district, and was not to go beyond its limits. The force accompanying General Faunce consisted of 356 men of the 10th Madras Infantry, 49 Mounted Infantry of the 10th Bengal Infantry, and 50 lances of the 1st Madras Lancers. As they went forward posts were established at Chaungu, 7-1/2 miles north of Pauk, at Tilin, at Gangaw, and at Kan on the Myittha, 20 miles north of Gangaw, and at Sihaung, between Kan and Indin.
The garrisons79 at Gangaw and at Kan were strong, 170 rifles at each place, all of the 10th Regiment Madras Infantry. At Sihaung the strength was 250 rifles. Hitherto, as has been explained before, the task confided80 to General Faunce was to protect the frontier, to stop raids, and, if possible, to pursue and account for the raiding parties.
The sanction given by the Government of India on the 16th of November completely altered the character of the movement. It became primarily a punitive81 expedition against the Chins. The 1st Bengal Mountain Battery, 77 strong, with 6 guns, 58 Madras sappers, and three companies of the 44th Gurkhas, were sent up by steamer to Kalewa; and by the time the General arrived at Kambalè, which he made his headquarters and the base of his expedition, he had a force of twelve hundred men (650 being Gurkhas) under his orders, besides between 200 and 300 military police (Indians), who held Indin and Kalewa, and were placed at his disposal.
As a consequence of the change of policy, transport[298] became an urgent question—in fact the main question. The military authorities asked for two thousand coolies, men that could carry loads in the hills. The Deputy Commissioner, Captain Eyre, believed that he could get the men, and at the instance of the General commanding, the Chief Commissioner consented to allow Captain Eyre to go with this large body of coolies if he could enlist58 them, and an officer was ordered up to Pakokku to take charge of the district and to set Captain Eyre free for this purpose. This fact is mentioned, as it explains in a measure how the Deputy Commissioner's attention was somewhat distracted from his immediate duty—the administration of the district for which he was responsible.
Captain Eyre accompanied General Faunce as far as Kan, near the northern boundary of the Pakokku district. He then left him, meaning to return to Gangaw for the purpose of collecting coolies. He had information of several gatherings82 of dacoits, under known leaders, in the hills north-east of Gangaw, and at Mozo, north of Kan, and some time was spent in looking after them. He heard of a body of dacoits in position in the bed of a stream, between two thickly wooded banks in a strongly stockaded camp. The dacoits were taken by surprise, and their camp was rushed and destroyed. Pursuit was impossible, owing to the nature of the country, and there was nothing to be done except to return to Kan. The enemy harassed84 the retiring party all the way, and our men had continually to turn and drive them off.
Next day reports came in that the villagers were joining the dacoits, and that a body of some hundreds were collected at Chaungzon. After arranging with the officer commanding at Kan that a party should be sent to attack this gathering, Captain Eyre returned to Gangaw to collect the coolies wanted by General Faunce. He reached Gangaw on the 11th, and busied himself with this duty. On the 16th of December, hearing that three of the dacoit leaders were in considerable strength at Kunze, north-east of Gangaw, a force of 105 rifles, 10th Madras Infantry, attacked and dispersed86 them, but without inflicting87 serious loss. From that date the garrison62 of Gangaw may be said to have done nothing. They sat still and allowed the rising to gather strength.
[299]
Seeing the dacoit bands active and gathering strength, while the British officers and the garrison were apparently88 helpless, the villagers, to whom guns had been given, the quasi-militia men amongst the foremost, joined the insurgents. It was another object-lesson in the folly89 of arming the Burmese peasantry, and the still greater folly of allowing an Asiatic foe90 to think you are afraid to attack him. The town of Gangaw was defended by a stockade83 of teak. The military post had been so placed as to rest on this stockade, and would have become untenable if the enemy had succeeded in occupying the town. The garrison of 170 men had therefore to defend the town stockade, nearly a mile in extent. It was not considered strong enough to hold the town and at the same time to move against the hostile bands, who had now gathered in considerable numbers, and were occupying a village called Shonshé on the south, and three villages on the north-west. On the 24th of December a convoy91 with supplies left Gangaw for Kan, which was the next post to the north. It was fired upon soon after leaving Gangaw, and lost two men killed and two wounded. From Kan this party went on to Sihaung, from which place it returned. It was again attacked on the march back, between Sihaung and Kan, and lost heavily. Meanwhile the enemy, who had been strengthened from the peasantry around, attacked Gangaw on the 30th of December, and again on the 31st. They were reckoned to number 500 men, but their attacks inflicted92 no loss on the garrison.
Some sort of council of war, in which both civil and military officers joined, now took place, and it was held that if a determined attack were made on Gangaw or Kan it must succeed. The garrison of Kan, therefore, was ordered into Gangaw, and they obeyed the order, to say the least, without reluctance93. They met with no opposition on the way, but they brought with them reports of the loss suffered by the detachment which went to Sihaung, which helped further to depress the dispirited garrison.
In Gangaw itself, although it was assaulted daily until the 6th of January, when a relieving force arrived, there were no casualties. The enemy was contemptible94, and even his numbers were, it is believed, exaggerated. The[300] danger was created by the inaction of the defence rather than by the number or the enterprise of the assailants.
The Chief Commissioner was in Rangoon during the early days of December. The first news of the trouble came to him in a telegram from Major Raikes, who was on special duty on the Chin frontier; it was dated the 14th of December, from Gaungu on the Myittha, and was received in Rangoon on the 17th. It reported the attack made on the dacoit camp by Captain Eyre on the 9th of December, and recommended that troops should be sent against this gang. In reply, Major Raikes was reminded that all the troops and military police on the frontier were under the General's orders and were close to the scene of action, while it would take a fortnight or more to send troops up from Pakokku. On the 20th of December a second telegram came from Major Raikes, reporting the affair at Chaungzon on the 13th of December. He explained that General Faunce had ordered the officer commanding at Gangaw to deal effectively with these gatherings; that two attempts, both unsuccessful, had been made to disperse85 the band near Chaungzon; that a third attack was about to be made, but the force ordered to make it could only be spared for a few days, as the General wanted all his men for frontier patrols and for the expedition into the hills. He therefore pressed for reinforcements as necessary for the destruction of these gangs.
Orders were then given for a small column of military police and troops to march up at once from Pakokku. The Deputy Commissioner of the Lower Chindwin was told to send all the police he could spare across from Al?n to the disturbed area. The state of things was communicated by telegram to Sir George White, who was on the Chindwin on his way to Kalewa, and the despatch26 of reinforcements from Pakokku was suggested.
On Christmas Day the first reports from Captain Eyre himself came in. He described the insurgents as increasing in numbers rapidly, and begged for more troops. This was the first intimation received by the Chief Commissioner that the local officers were unable to cope with the rising and that it was of a serious character. The Commissioner[301] was thereupon ordered to Pakokku to hasten the dispatch of the small column previously95 mentioned; and lest there should be difficulty in finding Sir George White, the officer commanding at Myingan was asked to get a force ready for immediate despatch. On the 26th a message came from Sir George White, dated from Mingin on the Chindwin, that he had ordered the despatch of a force 200 strong from Pakokku via Pauk, and Major Kingston with 250 rifles, troops and military police, from Al?n, to hasten to Gangaw. At the same time Colonel Macgregor, with 150 rifles of the 44th Gurkhas, who were with General Faunce, was ordered down from Sihaung to Gangaw. Meanwhile the Chief Commissioner had sent up 125 rifles of the Pakokku military police, under Lieutenant96 Phillips, by forced marches by the Kyaw Valley route. Major Kingston and Lieutenant Phillips joined hands at Kyaw on the 2nd of January. On the 6th they attacked the insurgents in Shonshé, south of Gangaw, and drove them out with considerable loss. At the same moment Colonel Macgregor with his Gurkhas fell upon the bands who were occupying a village north of Gangaw, and handled them roughly. No stand was made by these people, who had kept nearly 350 Madras Infantry shut up in Gangaw.
The duty of restoring order in the Yaw country was entrusted to Colonel W. P. Symons, who had displayed great ability in dealing97 with dacoit gangs in Sagaing. He was assisted by Mr. D. Ross, as civil officer in charge of the district. The country was cleared of dacoits, partially98 disarmed99, and reduced to order. The rank and file of the insurgents were allowed to return to their homes, the guilty villages being punished collectively by fines. The Yaw country has been peaceful ever since.
The Gangaw episode was, in the language of the Boer War, "a regrettable incident." The garrison at the outset may have been unable to face the insurgents in the field, but, after the Kan detachment had been called in, it numbered 340 rifles—a sufficient number of disciplined troops to deal with a much larger number of dacoits, a mere100 rabble101, armed, when they were armed at all, with old muzzle-loading rifles, or still more ancient muskets. The[302] incident was not, however, barren of good results. It sufficed to convince even the most devoted102 admirer of "the old coast army" that a portion of the Madras troops was unfit for active service—a fact which had more than once been brought to notice by the Chief Commissioner. The disbanding of the regiment responsible for the failure was the beginning of a large measure of army reform that had been too long delayed. Hence these events, trivial in themselves, may be worth recording103.
The narrative may now return to the central business, namely, the expedition against the Chins.
General Faunce arrived at Kambalè and assumed command of the operations on the 3rd of December. On the 7th the fighting began. A working-party sent to establish a post between Kambalè and the foot of the hills was fired on, and Lieutenant Palmer, R.E., who commanded the Madras Sappers, was killed. On the 10th of December a strong body of Chins of the Tashon tribe suddenly issued from the hills, and attacked the camp of the 42nd Gurkhas at Sihaung, and a simultaneous attack was made on the village. They paid dearly for their audacity104. The Gurkhas drove them off, followed them up, and inflicted heavy loss on them. On the same date Indin, the capital of the Kalè Sawbwa, was fired into, and the military police post of Kangyi, twenty miles north of Kalemyo, was attacked.
It had been intended to limit the operations of the season 1888-9 to the Siyin and Sagyilaing tribes. In dealing with savage people it is not possible to lay down a line beyond which you will not step. In view, therefore, of the probable necessity of taking action against the Tashons, 200 rifles of the Norfolk Regiment, 50 Madras sappers, and the remaining companies of the 42nd Gurkhas from their quarters at Bernardmyo, were ordered to the front. Sir George White himself arrived at Kalewa on the 29th of December, but left to General Faunce the immediate command of the force in the field. Matters were further complicated by the appearance of another section of the Chins. In October, a village in the Kubo Valley had suffered from a raid by Kanhows. A large body of this tribe came down in December and attacked Kangyi, north of Kalemyo. It was held by military police, who repulsed105 them. Further investigations106 made it clear that these Kanhows were so closely related by position and ties of kindred to the Siyins and Sagyilains as to make them indistinguishable. A proposal, therefore, to include them in the operations against the latter was sanctioned. It was proposed also to send at the same time a column to Minlèdaung, on the borders of the Tashon country, but this was not found convenient and was dropped.
[303]
An ultimatum was now sent to the Siyins and Sagyilains, demanding the restoration of all their captives, the surrender of a certain number of fire-arms, and the payment of a fine. In default of the acceptance of these terms, General Faunce was told to destroy the villages of the tribes and by a rigorous blockade to prevent food supplies from reaching the hills. During December and January preparations for the advance occupied the attention of the General and his staff. Transport coolies were obtained from Manipur. A road was begun, and step by step the base of operations advanced towards the goal of the expedition, the main village of the Siyins, called Koset by them.
On the 23rd of January, 1889, Sir George White and General Faunce made a reconnaissance to the summit of the Letha Range, to an altitude of 8,200 feet above sea-level. The force then advanced steadily107 up the hills in the face of a continued but unsuccessful opposition; the sappers, assisted by coolies, making a road as the men climbed up, and constructing rough stockades108 in which the men slept and rations1 were stored. The advance was obstructed109 by formidable stockades, generally held by the enemy, but not firmly defended. Day and night the Chins ambushed110 our men, taking advantage of every suitable position. The following telegram from Sir George White to the Chief Commissioner, dated the 28th of January, 1889, describes one of the skirmishes: "Enemy yesterday attacked our working-party on road above this, and held our covering-party, 40 British and 100 Gurkhas, from 9 till 2, when I arrived and ordered their positions to be charged. We carried all, driving them entirely111 away, getting off ourselves wonderfully cheaply—only one Norfolk dangerously wounded. Enemy in considerable numbers, using many rifles and plenty of ammunition112. They fired at least[304] 1,000 rounds, standing113 resolutely114 until actually charged, even trying to outflank us. Their loss probably about eight or ten, but they were carried down the Khuds at once. Most difficult enemy to see or hit I ever fought."
On the 4th of February the village of Koset was reached, and after a slight resistance, occupied. It was fired by the Siyins before they retreated, and was reduced to ashes before our men reached it. The enemy harassed the camp every night, firing into it from the higher ground, and at several villages they ineffectually opposed us. They opened communications at one time with the political officer, but as they continued ambushing115 and firing on the troops and refused to surrender the Burman captives, it was evident that they were fooling us. Step by step, therefore, the advance was made good, until the Siyin territory had been overrun, and by the 5th of March all their villages were in our hands. The site of the village of T?klaing was chosen as the headquarters of the Chin expeditionary force, and its name was changed to "Fort White," and a post was built there with materials taken from the village.
The chastisement116 inflicted on the Siyins had some little effect on the Kanhows, who had made similarly insincere overtures117. On the 24th of February a deputation of them came to Fort White, bringing presents and asking that their villages might be spared. With the Chief Commissioner's approval, terms were offered to them, namely: to surrender all the captives in their hands, and a portion of their fire-arms; to pay a fine of 1,000 rupees, and to engage to pay a light annual tribute as a token of submission118. Ten days were given them to consider and accept these terms. On the 6th of March they returned, bringing six of the captives and presents, but failed to comply with the other conditions. Their presents, therefore, were refused, and on the 8th of March General Faunce moved against them. The force was actively119 engaged against them until the 20th of March, when it returned to Fort White. The operations were well planned and executed, and imposed great labour on the troops, as the mountain tracks were most precipitous and difficult. Most of the villages were destroyed, in many cases by the Chins themselves, and large stores of grain and other food-supplies were taken. April was occupied in negotiations with the Tashons, and the troops rested.
In the Second Defile120 of the Irrawaddy below Bhamo.
[305]
As it was ascertained121 that the Siyins had built a new Gurkha village at Tartan, which had been taken in the earlier operations, a force consisting of 65 rifles of the 2nd Battalion Norfolk Regiment and 60 rifles of the 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry was sent to drive the Chins out. The village was strongly stockaded and obstinately122 defended. One of the two stockades was taken. The loss on our side was one officer (Second-Lieutenant Michel) and two men of the Norfolk Regiment killed, one Gurkha killed, and two officers and six men wounded. In this action Captain Le Quesne, of the Army Medical Corps123, showed conspicuous124 courage in attending to Lieutenant Michel, and was awarded the Victoria Cross. The troops retired to Fort White without completing their work. A few days later they returned and destroyed the village and stockades unopposed.
The rains, which begin early in this region, had now set in, and active operations ceased. In this business, from first to last, including the engagements of Gangaw and Kan, our loss amounted to 26 killed and 54 wounded; the enemy's loss can only be conjectured—it was probably light. The main object now was to secure the peaceful submission of the Tashons. Towards the end of March they showed an inclination to parley125, and sent letters purporting126 to come from six of their chiefs. It was decided to give them as much time as possible to consider the terms offered to them, and in the meanwhile no movement was to be made against their villages or certain settlements of the Kanhows which were within, or close to, the borders of the Tashon tribe. One of the Kalè officials, Maung Nwa, was selected to take a letter to the chiefs, giving them twenty-one days to decide on their course of action.
Maung Nwa succeeded in reaching Falam, the Ywama, or mother-village, of the Tashons. On the 18th of April he returned to Fort White, bringing letters from the chiefs and from the ex-Sawbwa of Kalè. A minor127 chief accompanied him, and on a subsequent day another Tashon chief came in with messages to Major Raikes. This beginning[306] of personal intercourse was encouraging, and on our part concessions128 were made in respect of the surrender of the Burmese refugees, while the release of the captives was insisted on. Later on some overtures were made on the part of the Siyins and a few captives delivered to our officers. On the 2nd of May men from the Kanhow tribe came in; they brought the fine of Rs. 1,000, which had been imposed on them, and the tribute, and tendered the submission of their tribe, but no captives. They clung to their captives as to life. Later on, however, they released some and brought them to Fort White. It was believed at the time that they had given up all; it was discovered later that they had held back a considerable number. The Siyins surrendered seven captives; but they made no further steps towards submission. At the end of the open season of 1888-9 the situation was this: Severe punishment had been inflicted on the offending tribes, and 114 of the Burmans carried off by raiding parties had been recovered. The Siyins and Sagyilains, notwithstanding the destruction of their villages, had not given in; the Kanhows had made a show of submission, and had partly complied with our terms; the Tashons had exchanged messages, but had given no proof of penitence129.
It was necessary to show the Chins that the arm of the British Government was long enough to reach them even in their mountain fortresses130, and that our soldiers could remain in their country. It was decided, therefore, to keep the troops at Fort White during the rains and to prevent the Chins, who had not submitted, from rebuilding their villages or cultivating their fields. A rigorous blockade of the routes from their hills to the plains was ordered, in the hope that it would help to overcome their obstinacy131. Nothing more could be done until the season for taking the field again came round.
General Faunce's column had done all that men could do in a very difficult and unknown country against a very difficult enemy, pronounced by a man who had seen some fighting to be "the most difficult enemy to see or hit I ever fought." The expedition was late in starting. The reason has been explained. That the next season's operations were more successful with less severity is no reproach to[307] the General commanding the first expedition or to the political officer. Their work had made our power felt, and had given us some knowledge of the people. If a garrison had not been established at Fort White in 1888-9, it would have been scarcely possible to have acted against the Tashons on the plan which ensured success in 1889-90.
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1
rations
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| 定量( ration的名词复数 )； 配给量； 正常量； 合理的量 | |
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annexed
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| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
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3
disturbances
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| n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 )；打扰；困扰；障碍 | |
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indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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cape
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| n.海角，岬；披肩，短披风 | |
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ridges
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| n.脊( ridge的名词复数 )；山脊；脊状突起；大气层的)高压脊 | |
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clans
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| 宗族( clan的名词复数 )； 氏族； 庞大的家族； 宗派 | |
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9
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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narrative
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| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
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11
slaughtering
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| v.屠杀，杀戮，屠宰( slaughter的现在分词 ) | |
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annexation
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| n.吞并，合并 | |
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13
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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14
commissioner
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| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
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15
followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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16
regain
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| vt.重新获得，收复，恢复 | |
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prematurely
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| adv.过早地，贸然地 | |
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18
subjugated
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| v.征服，降伏( subjugate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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19
subjugate
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| v.征服；抑制 | |
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20
courteous
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| adj.彬彬有礼的，客气的 | |
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21
friendliness
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| n.友谊，亲切，亲密 | |
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22
intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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27
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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30
dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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scouts
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| 侦察员[机，舰]( scout的名词复数 )； 童子军； 搜索； 童子军成员 | |
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saga
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| n.(尤指中世纪北欧海盗的)故事，英雄传奇 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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enrolled
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| adj.入学登记了的v.[亦作enrol]( enroll的过去式和过去分词 )；登记，招收，使入伍（或入会、入学等），参加，成为成员；记入名册；卷起，包起 | |
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retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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38
insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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39
recital
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| n.朗诵，独奏会，独唱会 | |
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40
tempt
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| vt.引诱，勾引，吸引，引起…的兴趣 | |
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41
procuring
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的现在分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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42
gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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43
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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44
ultimatum
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| n.最后通牒 | |
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45
narrated
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| v.故事( narrate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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46
subdued
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| adj. 屈服的，柔和的，减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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47
permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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48
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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49
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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50
vengeance
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| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
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51
simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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52
helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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53
subjugation
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| n.镇压，平息，征服 | |
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54
mules
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| 骡( mule的名词复数 )； 拖鞋； 顽固的人； 越境运毒者 | |
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55
leisurely
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| adj.悠闲的；从容的，慢慢的 | |
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56
anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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57
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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58
enlist
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| vt.谋取(支持等)，赢得；征募；vi.入伍 | |
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59
enlistment
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| n.应征入伍，获得，取得 | |
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60
levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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61
inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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62
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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63
garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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64
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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affluents
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| n.富裕的，富足的( affluent的名词复数 ) | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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67
scarcity
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| n.缺乏，不足，萧条 | |
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68
tract
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| n.传单，小册子，大片(土地或森林) | |
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tracts
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| 大片土地( tract的名词复数 )； 地带； （体内的）道； （尤指宣扬宗教、伦理或政治的）短文 | |
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70
muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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71
subsidy
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| n.补助金，津贴 | |
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72
militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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73
imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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74
absolved
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| 宣告…无罪，赦免…的罪行，宽恕…的罪行( absolve的过去式和过去分词 )； 不受责难，免除责任 [义务] ,开脱（罪责） | |
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75
savages
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| 未开化的人，野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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76
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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77
intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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78
entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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79
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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80
confided
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| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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81
punitive
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| adj.惩罚的，刑罚的 | |
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82
gatherings
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| 聚集( gathering的名词复数 )； 收集； 采集； 搜集 | |
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83
stockade
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| n.栅栏，围栏；v.用栅栏防护 | |
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84
harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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85
disperse
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| vi.使分散；使消失；vt.分散；驱散 | |
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86
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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87
inflicting
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的现在分词 ) | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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89
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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reluctance
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| n.厌恶，讨厌，勉强，不情愿 | |
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contemptible
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| adj.可鄙的，可轻视的，卑劣的 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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98
partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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disarmed
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| v.裁军( disarm的过去式和过去分词 )；使息怒 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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101
rabble
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| n.乌合之众，暴民；下等人 | |
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102
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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recording
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| n.录音，记录 | |
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audacity
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| n.大胆，卤莽，无礼 | |
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repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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106
investigations
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| （正式的）调查( investigation的名词复数 )； 侦查； 科学研究； 学术研究 | |
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steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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stockades
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| n.（防御用的）栅栏，围桩( stockade的名词复数 ) | |
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obstructed
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| 阻塞( obstruct的过去式和过去分词 )； 堵塞； 阻碍； 阻止 | |
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ambushed
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| v.埋伏( ambush的过去式和过去分词 )；埋伏着 | |
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111
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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112
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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resolutely
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| adj.坚决地，果断地 | |
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115
ambushing
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| v.埋伏( ambush的现在分词 )；埋伏着 | |
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116
chastisement
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| n.惩罚 | |
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117
overtures
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| n.主动的表示，提议；（向某人做出的）友好表示、姿态或提议( overture的名词复数 )；（歌剧、芭蕾舞、音乐剧等的）序曲，前奏曲 | |
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118
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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119
actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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120
defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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121
ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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122
obstinately
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| ad.固执地，顽固地 | |
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123
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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parley
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| n.谈判 | |
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126
purporting
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| v.声称是…，（装得）像是…的样子( purport的现在分词 ) | |
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minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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128
concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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129
penitence
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| n.忏悔，赎罪；悔过 | |
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130
fortresses
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| 堡垒，要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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131
obstinacy
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| n.顽固；（病痛等）难治 | |
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